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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE BATTLE JOINED 
i) Tension Spreads 
Grave concern existed within the Foreign Office about 
the tension in the Lebanon spreading elsewhere in the Middle 
East. Neighbouring Arab states seemed all too willing to 
muscle in on behalf of the Lebanese to force the French to 
restore the situation. From Ibn Saud came a flood of 
protestsl, and from Iraq too, where Nuri Said sought to make 
political ~3pital out of Lebanese misfortunes. The latter 
had calmly announced to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis2 that "after 
what had happened, it would be impossible for the French and 
Lebanese to live in harmony ... [and] that this was [a] 
grand opportunity for His Majesty's Government to oust them 
[i.e. the French] from the Levant".3 Formal Iraqui protests ~ 
were made against the French action and British and American 
diplomatic intervention was requested; two deputies in the 
IraqJi Chamber even called for armed Iraqpi intervention to ' 
expel the French. 4 
In Egypt, King Farouk warned that the Germans would lose 
no time in exploiting the situation for propaganda purposes 
and that even the Russians would not hesitate to fish in 
1 Jordan (Jedda) to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, 
E6934/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
2 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis: British Ambassador to Iraq, 
from February, 1941. 
3 Cornwallis to Foreign Office, 11 November 1943, 
E6860/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
4 Cornwallis to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, Nos 
1077 and 1078, E6932/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
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such troubled waters. 5 Nahas Pasha had also been watching 
the unfolding of events in the Lebanon with some concern. 
Shone6 reported that before the arrests, Nahas had expressed 
the hope to de Benoist, both in conversation and by letter, 
that "an honest and courageous solution" to the 
consti tutional crisis would be found as quickly as possible. 7 
When news of Helleu' s heavy-handed tactics broke, Nahas 
immediately launched into action; the Egyptian afternoon 
press on 11 November printed his letter to de Benoist and 
the nascent Arab unity movement accused the French Committee 
of conducting an imperialist policy. Nahas also protested to 
the Committee itself and to Britain and America, expressing 
the conviction that Britain should intervene to restore 
order. 8 On 12 November, he penned a stronger protest to the 
French, threatening to reconsider the attitude of Egypt 
towards the Committee and to take measures against the local 
French. 9 There was little doubt, Shone reported, that Nahas, 
propelled by his desire to lead the Arab world, was seeking 
to make the very most of the crisis; he had unleashed the 
full force of the Egyptian press against the French and was 
5 Shone to Foreign Office, 12 November 1943, 
E6874/27/89, FO 371/35184. See also record of interview with 
Farouk, Kirk to Hull, 11 November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, 
pp 1020-21. 
6 Terence Shone: British Minister, Cairo, 1940-44; in 
December 1944, on the departure of Spears from the Levant, 
he was appointed British Minister to Syria and Lebanon. 
7 Shone to Foreign 
E6863/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
Office, 11 November 1943, 
8 Shone to Foreign Office, 11 November 1943, 
E6864/27/89, FO 371/35184; Kirk to Hull, 11 November 1943, 
FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, pp 1012-13 and pp 1020-21; Guerre 1939-
45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1312 contains copies of many of Nahas' 
various letters of protest. 
9 Shone to Foreign Office, 12 November 1943, 
E6883/27/89, FO 371/35184; Conversation Filliol-Dumani Bey, 
12 Novembre 1943, No 107, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 
1312. 
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"stimulating editors to support the Lebanese and attack the 
French strongly" .10 
The strength of the Egyptian reaction as perceived by 
the British was not exaggerated and certainly gave the 
French cause for concern. Baron de Benoist confirmed to 
Algiers that Syrian and Lebanese circles in Egypt were 
extremely agitated; he also reported that Nahas was furious 
and had launched the Egyptian press on a violent anti-French 
campaign, such that even normally moderate and pro-French 
journalists "sont obliges de suivre Ie courant".l1 In fact it 
was in Egypt that some of the most serious reactions to 
events in the Lebanon occurred: on 14 November there were 
hostile demonstrations outside the premises of the French 
Delegation both in Cairo and at Alexandria; several windows 
were broken and when Egyptian police failed to intervene, 
the demonstration was eventually broken up by American 
police. 12 Shone was obliged to appeal urgently to Nahas to 
call a halt to such potentially violent incidents; though 
Nahas did attempt to enforce some restraining measures, 
Cairo was the scene of further anti-French demonstrations on 
10 Shone to Foreign Office, 12 November 1943, 
E6873/27/89, FO 371/35184. For examples of articles 
appearing in the Egyptian press both before and after the 
arrests, see Shone to Foreign Office, 10 November 1943, 
E6862/27/89, FO 371/35184 and Shone to Foreign Office, 16 
November 1943, E7061/27/89, FO 371/35187. See also Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1312, for de Benoist's reports on 
the Egyptian press. 
11 De Benoist a Alger, 12 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-
45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999; de Benoist a Alger, 13 Novembre 
1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1312. The Baron 
pointed out that as usual, "Le Misri" had set the tone with 
headlines such as: "La France Libre et Ie Liban Enchainee" 
and "Les Franc;:ais Libres imitent les Allemands: Le 
Gouvernement des Senegalais au Liban". 
12 De Benoist a Alger, 14 et 15 Novembre, Nos 112 and 
113, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1312. 
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15 November, in which one person died and fifteen were 
injured. 13 
Britain was concerned to prevent the spread of tension 
throughout the Middle East, not only from the security 
aspect but to protect her own image and position. Casey 
pointed out to the Foreign Office the increasingly widely 
held opinion that Britain was ultimately responsible for 
order in the Lebanon and by extension, for the lives and 
liberties of the Lebanese people. 14 The prevalence of such 
thinking was illustrated only days later by a debate in the 
Iraqui Parliament, during which an Iraqui deputy described x 
the French as "British mercenaries", for without British 
money and armed support, the Fighting French would never 
have established themselves in the Levant. 15 The naturally 
drawn conclusion was that it was Britain's responsibility to 
keep the French under control and her failure to do so might 
gravely jeopardise her own position in the Middle East. 16 The 
Cornrnander-in-Chief articulated similar concern about a 
possible waning in the initial wave of pro-British 
enthusiasm: it had generally been anticipated in the Middle 
East that Britain would intervene quickly in the Lebanon to 
put the situation to rights. He was worried that her failure 
to do so might cause a swing in public opinion away from 
Britain with possible serious consequences. 17 
13 Shone to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, 
E6975/27/89; Shone to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, 
E7015/27/89 and E7016/27/89; all in FO 371/35186; Shone to 
Foreign Office, 16 November 1943, E7133/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
14 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E6861/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
11 November 1943, 
15 Cornwallis to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, 
E6932/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
16 Shone to Foreign Office, 
E6974/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
14 November 1943, 
17 Cornrnander-in-Chief, Middle East to War Office, 13 
November 1943, E7004/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
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Reports received in London from Spears early on 12 
November indicated that after the imposition of a curfew and 
a relatively calm night, the situation was deteriorating. 
To the Foreign Office it seemed that French behaviour was 
becoming "more and more outrageous": radio broadcasts were 
being jammed and low-flying aircraft were being used to 
intimidate the population. From his house, Spears had heard 
heavy machine-gun fire, rifle shots and grenade explosions, 
all emanating from a nearby Moslem quarter. Furthermore, he 
had received reports that Senegalese soldiers had lobbed 
grenades into unarmed crowds and fired on children who had 
tried to rip down the newly-affixed posters of de Gaulle. 1B 
Under such circumstances, it was almost inevitable that 
Spears was chafing at the bit and calling for immediate 
British action. He had become more and more convinced that 
the moment for British military intervention was "fast 
approaching, since the employment of black troops and of 
tanks and armoured cars, far from calming public opinion, is 
exciting it" .19 He been absolutely horrified to learn that if 
Britain did intervene, the Foreign Office inclined towards 
the declaration of an etat de siege. He argued that this 
would cause "quite unnecessary complications", as an etat de 
siege had been designed to meet an external threat in 
conjunction with the French, not internal disturbances in 
opposition to them. Spears continued to insist that Britain 
should intervene with a declaration of martial law and the 
sooner the better. Martial law could be declared when he, 
Spears, and the Army Commander agreed that the French were 
using excessive force: the Army Commander would simply 
inform his French counterpart that Britain was assuming 
1B Spears to Foreign Office, 
E6905/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
19 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E6903/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
12 November 1943, 
12 November 1943, 
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control for security and order him to confine his troops to 
barracks. Spears remained convinced that as soon as French 
troops disappeared from the streets and the British replaced 
them, order would be restored. 20 
The Foreign Office however, refused to sanction Spears's 
plea. According to War Office information, there had been 
"considerable exaggeration" in early reports. 21 Despite 
Friday prayers, the 12 November had passed without serious 
disorder anywhere either in Lebanon or Syria. Though of 
necessity, the situation was still regarded as grave, the 
Commander-in-Chief emphasised that the BBC, Reuters and the 
local press all seemed to have exaggerated matters grossly. 22 
The fact that War Office information was "slightly calmer 
than Sir E. Spears's" was not lost on Foreign Office 
officials. 23 
At a joint meeting between Foreign and War Office 
representatives, the relative merits of declaring an etat 
de siege or British martial law were discussed. It was 
decided that a declaration of martial law was contrary to 
the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements and would be tantamount 
to tearing up those agreements; it could only be justified 
therefore, "in the greatest emergency". Spears's proposal of 
simply assuming control over the French would not work, a 
Foreign Office official minuted, as the French would refuse 
point blank to obey British orders, with the result that "we 
should just have to take the whole [of the] Levant States 
over, (which is precisely what Sir E. Spears has wanted us 
20 "b"d 22. 
21 Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to War Office, 12 
November 1943, E6903/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
22 Commander-in-Chief, Middle East to War Office, 13 
November 1943, E7004/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
23 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 13 November 1943, 
E6913/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
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to do all along)".24 Telegrams were accordingly sent both to 
Spears and to the Commander-in-Chief, informing them that a 
declaration of martial law was out of the question at the 
present stage. 25 Additionally, Makins was instructed to 
reinforce his representations to the French and to leave 
them in absolutely no doubt that their attitude and action 
were regarded as "wholly indefensible". The situation in the 
Levant was deteriorating rapidly and the entire Middle East 
was now "in a state of growing excitement". The Committee 
was expected to comply immediately with the British request 
for Helleu' s recall and for the release of the Lebanese 
ministers; otherwise, Britain would completely dissociate 
herself from the French, 
consequences for them. 26 
with 
ii) The Prime Minister Intervenes 
possible unpleasing 
From the point of view of the Prime Minister's general 
relations with the French, events in the Lebanon could not 
have come at a worse time. Since the formation of the French 
Committee, Churchill had advocated the playing down of de 
Gaulle's role and the nurturing of the Committee as a 
collective body with which the Allies could do business. To 
his extreme annoyance, de Gaulle continued to consolidate 
his own position at Giraud's expense. Giraud had dug his own 
grave: his handling of the liberation of Corsica, and 
especially his failure to keep the Committee informed, had 
24 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 13 November 1943, 
E6903/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
25 Foreign Office to Spears, 13 November 1943; War 
Office to Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, 13 November 1943; 
both in E6903/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
26 Foreign Office to Algiers, 12 November 1943, 
E6848/27/89, FO 371/35184. 
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aroused considerable misgivings and suspicion. 27 An internal 
dispute which subsequently developed was initially written 
off by Macmillan "as nothing but a storm in a Corsican tea-
CUp".28 However, by 25 September, "ugly rumours" were 
reaching him "of fresh and perhaps this time irreconcilable 
dissensions among the French". 29 At a Committee meeting that 
day, de Gaulle had proposed three decrees to allow the 
Committee to appoint a civilian Commissioner of War, to whom 
Giraud would be responsible, thereby distinguishing the 
military command from the governmental authority and 
subordinating the former to the latter. De Gaulle's own 
powers were to remain unaffected. Giraud refused to accept 
the proposals and stated that he preferred to resign. 
Churchill had also got wind of rumours of these ominous 
developments and immediately telegraphed Algiers, 
instructing Macmillan to inform de Gaulle that "any 
alteration in the system of co-Presidents would overthrow 
the basis on which the French Committee had been recognised 
and would have the most serious results". Macmillan realised 
that if he obeyed his instructions, he would immediately 
jeopardise any chances of a settlement, as de Gaulle would 
fly into a rage about supposed "Allied intervention in 
French affairs" and use this as an excuse for a patriotic 
rallying. Throughout 26 September, Macmillan met a 
procession of French, all of whom confirmed that any form of 
intervention would be disastrous. He saw Giraud who remained 
27 Giraud, with British assistance, had for several 
months been arming the Corsican patriots who rose up against 
the Germans early in September 1943. He had failed to inform 
either de Gaulle or the Committee of his actions and was 
subsequently accused of trespassing beyond his military 
sphere into the political. See Kersaudy, op cit, pp 298-99; 
Crawley, op cit, pp 209-10; Ledwidge, op cit, pp 161-62. 
28 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 21 September 1943, 
p 226. 
29 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 25 September 1943, 
p 228. 
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adamant that he would resign and de Gaulle who insisted that 
the cO-Presidency would in fact still exist juridically, 
though not in practice. 30 
Macmillan wrote to Churchill and attempted to assuage 
his fears. Whilst he acknowledged that de Gaulle's 
manoeuvrings would to some extent destroy the equilibrium 
between the two generals, there was no intent to abolish the 
co-Presidency. He reassured Churchill that he had seen 
Generals Giraud, Georges, de Gaulle and Massigli, and made 
absolutely clear to them the grave view the British 
government would take if Giraud were forced into a position 
of inferiority or resignation. 31 
Churchill's doubts remained however; in a meeting with 
Vienot and Roche32 on 27 September, he mentioned reports that 
de Gaulle had been trying to obtain personal control of the 
Committee. When Vienot tried to assure Churchill that there 
was no truth in these rumours, the Prime Minister responded 
tersely that if that was the case, the Committee should act 
forcefully to prevent such rumours from being spread. 
Churchill also warned the two Frenchmen that "if the General 
should achieve supreme power in France, he would very soon 
quarrel with England and the USA". 33 
Churchill despatched another telegram to Macmillan, 
emphasising that if de Gaulle were to achieve anything like 
sole mastery of the Committee, he would be on a collision 
course with the United States, and ultimately, Churchill 
30 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 26 September 1943, 
pp 229-32. 
31 Macmillan to Churchill, 26 September 1943, FO 954/8. 
32 Louis Roche: Counsellor at London Delegation of CFLN. 
33 Record of conversation between the Prime Minister, 
M. Vienot, Major Morton and M. Roche, 27 September 1943, 
Zl0285/2043/G17, FO 371/36075. 
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would range both himself and Britain with Roosevelt. 34 By 29 
September however, Macmillan had learned that the crisis had 
run its usual course: "Everyone had quarrelled, everyone had 
reSigned and everyone had become reconciled ... " At a 
Committee meeting on 27 September, a Commissioner for 
National Defence had been appointed and French forces had 
been divided into two categories, one to remain at the 
disposal of Giraud as Commander-in-Chief for operational 
purposes, and the other under the direct authority of the 
new Commissioner, Legentilhomme. 35 Macmillan wrote to 
Churchill to inform him that for the moment the danger had 
been averted. 36 In his diary however, he observed wryly: 
"Giraud claims victory; de Gaulle has won it". 37 
Just over a month later, further changes were afoot. It 
had been decreed on 17 September that there should be formed 
at Algiers a provisional Consultative Assembly to assist the 
Commi ttee in its work and, given the circumstances, to 
provide as representative an expression as was possible of 
French national opinion. The Assembly was to consist of over 
one hundred members, almost half of whom were to be 
representatives of the various groups of the French 
Resistance. Its inaugural session took place on 3 November 
and was attended by representatives from Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 38 Within days of the Assembly 
beginning to function however, a bitter attack was launched 
34 Churchill to Macmillan, 29 September 1943, Fa 954/8. 
35 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 29 September 1943, 
p 244. 
36 Macmillan to Churchill, 1 October 1943, Fa 954/8. 
37 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 29 September 1943, 
p 244. 
38 On the formation of the Assemblee Consultative 
provisoire, see J. Lacouture, De Gaulle, Le Rebelle, 1890-
1944, Vol I, (Paris, 1984), p 734; Macmillan, Blast of War, 
p 417-418. 
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for a restructuring of against Giraud and there were calls 
the Committee to include fewer generals and more 
poli ticians. It was decided that all Committee members 
should resign and a small sub-Committee of four (de Gaulle, 
Pleven, Tixier and Mayer) was appointed with the task of 
reorganisation. It was also further stipulated that there 
should be a definite separation of the "pouvoir militaire" 
from the " pouvoir civil". As Giraud was shortly due to 
resume his military command, when the reorganised Committee 
was announced on 10 November he retained his post as 
Commander-in-Chief but was no longer co-President; General 
Georges and Couve de Murville (both Giraudists), were also 
eliminated. 
A strong reaction from Churchill was inevitable. He 
telegraphed to Roosevelt on 10 November that he was 
not at all content with the changes in the French 
National Committee which leave de Gaulle sole 
President. The body we recognised was of a totally 
different character, the essence being the co-
Presidency of Giraud and de Gaulle. I suggest we 
maintain an attitude of reserve until we can discuss 
the si tua tion together. 39 
When, only a day later, events in the Lebanon took the 
course they did, the Prime Minister's fury can only have 
increased. 
General Foreign Office handling of the Lebanese affair 
and, in particular, the determination to avoid an escalation 
of the crisis by a declaration of British martial law, was 
certainly rendered a good deal easier by the Prime 
Minister's departure at noon on 12 November for Plymouth, 
where he boarded the battleship Renown, for a lengthy voyage 
to Cairo. As soon as the crisis had erupted, Churchill had 
recei ved a personal telegram from Casey, urging him to 
39 Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 November 1943, FO 954/8. 
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discount the allegations that the French would inevitably 
make about Spears's role in the affair. Casey had 
additionally urged Churchill to realise that all possible 
pressure would be required "to make [the French] untangle 
the knot that they have tied". 40 Acting upon this advice, 
Churchill telegraphed the War Cabinet that he hoped "a very 
strong telegram" would be sent to Macmillan, demanding that 
the French immediately release the Lebanese President and 
ministers and dismiss "the drug-trafficker Edde". 41 
Casey had furthermore suggested to Churchill that he 
might find it necessary to join American pressure to that of 
Britain in order to achieve a satisfactory solution to the 
si tuation. 42 Churchill was immediately receptive to the 
suggestion. He drafted a telegram to Roosevelt, the tenor of 
which well illustrates the extent of his irritation with the 
French and especially de Gaulle. In it, he spoke of "the 
lamentable outrages" which the French had committed, 
completely stultifying all their undertakings both to the 
Levant States and to Britain. He continued: 
There is no doubt in my mind that this is a 
foretaste of what de Gaulle's leadership of France 
means ... People will say: "What kind of France is 
this which, while itself subjugated by the enemy, 
seeks to subjugate others?". 43 
Churchill stressed that Britain and America should take 
the matter up together in the strongest manner: 
40 Casey to Churchill, 11 November 1943, TI947/3, 
MOS/I02, PREM 3/421. 
41 Churchill to War Cabinet, 12 November 1943, PREM 
3/421. 
42 Casey to Churchill, 11 November 1943, TI947/3, 
MOS/I02, PREM 3/421. 
43 Churchill to Roosevelt, 13 November 1943, TI952/3, 
E7116/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
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Already we have seen the character of the body we 
recognised at Quadrant totally altered by de 
Gaulle's complete assumption of power. The outrages 
in the Levant are of a different character and 
afford full justification, with the support of world 
public opinion, of bringing the issue with de Gaulle 
to a head. 44 
As far as Churchill was concerned, the Lebanese ministers 
should be released and "permitted to resume their full 
function"; the Assembly should also be allowed to meet again 
as soon as conditions allowed. If this did not happen, 
recognition should be withdrawn from the Committee and the 
process of arming French troops in North Africa should be 
halted. Churchill declared that he was presently enquiring 
into the state of British forces in the Levant, but warned 
Roosevelt that should action be taken there, precautionary 
measures would also be required in North Africa, "for ... 
there is nothing this man will not do if he has armed forces 
at his disposal". 45 
The Foreign Of ice must have been extremely disturbed by 
the contents of this telegram and even more worried by a 
telegram Churchill had despatched to Wilson and Casey. This 
informed them that he expected the Cabinet would take "a 
very strong line against General de Gaulle and the outrages 
in Syria", and requested urgent information as to what 
forces there were available, 
to overawe and, if necessary, to overpower the 
French, on the basis that the inhabitants are 
sympathetic to us. 46 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
46 Churchill to Casey and Wilson, 12 November 1943, 
T1950/3, PREM 3/421. See also Wilson to Holmes, 13 November 
1943, ADC/434, WO 201/982. 
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Thus, whilst the Foreign Office was insisting to British 
officials in the Middle East that British troops were not to 
be used in the Levant, the Prime Minister was creating the 
opposite impression, with a telegram which must have 
breathed renewed hope into Casey and Spears if no-one else. 
Fortunately for the Foreign Office however, when the 
Cabinet reviewed the Lebanese situation on the afternoon of 
12 November, a much less belligerent attitude prevailed. 
There was some pressure for Britain to increase her demands 
on the French Committee and to insist not only on the 
release of the ministers, but also on their reinstallation 
as a government in order to restore the position which had 
obtained prior to the French arrests. 47 The point was made 
however, and met with general support, that to make another 
demand on the French when her original demands had not yet 
been met, would weaken Britain's own position. It was 
thought that if the original demands were refused by the 
French, then they could be restated and raised to include 
reinstatement. It was agreed that it should be made 
perfectly clear to the French that if her demands were not 
complied with, Britain would withdraw recognition of the 
Committee. It was felt that every endeavour should be made 
to avoid a situation where British troops might have to 
intervene, though it was recognised that "in the last 
47 See Wiley (American Consul, Algiers) to Hull, 13 
November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, p 1025. Wiley mentions in 
this report that Makins had received strong instructions 
from his government which he had proceeded to deliver. He 
(Wiley) describes those demands as the immediate release of 
the President and members of the Lebanese government, and 
that they should be "restored to their positions". Evidently 
the American had gained the impression from Makins that the 
Bri tish request for the release of the Lebanese implied 
their release and their reinstatement, rather than just 
their release. This impression would have been fortified by 
Churchill's letter to Roosevelt, in which Churchill had 
expressed his view that the Lebanese ministers should be 
released and "permitted to resume their full function". 
Churchill to Roosevelt, 13 November 1943, T1952/3, 
E7116/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
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resort, if all else failed", intervention might be the only 
t · 48 Op 1on. As a result of these resolutions, Casey and Spears 
were informed that the War Cabinet sincerely hoped that it 
would not be necessary to employ British troops in the 
Levant at the present stage. 49 In the Middle East, General 
Wilson informed Holmes that Casey had received a telegram 
from Eden, informing him that the Cabinet had taken a more 
moderate line than had been expected by the Prime Minister. 5o 
During its deliberations on 12 November, the War Cabinet 
had also recommended that two further telegrams be 
despatched to Algiers; one endorsed the Foreign Office 
demands about the release of the ministers and the removal 
of Helleu and went on to stress that the Committee should be 
made to understand that its future relationship with Britain 
depended on whether or not they acquiesced in these 
demands. 51 The second advocated an attempt to discover the 
extent to which individual members of the CFLN had been 
party to Helleu's action. It was felt that perhaps those who 
had not been aware of it might be encouraged to pressure 
their colleagues into meeting the British demands and 
perhaps "to exercise restraint on de Gaulle or whoever is 
responsible for the present deplorable situation". 52 
48 Conclusions of Meeting of War Cabinet, 3. 30pm, 
Friday, 12 November 1943, CAB 65/36. 
49 Foreign Office to Casey, 12 November 1943, FO 
226/245. 
50 Wilson to Holmes, 13 November 1943, ADC/434, WO 
201/982. 
51 Foreign Office to Algiers, 12 November 1943, 
E6848/27 /89, FO 371/35184. Churchill had actually sent a 
telegram to the Cabinet expressing the hope that "a very 
strong telegram" would be sent to Algiers. Churchill to War 
Cabinet, 12 November 1943, PREM 3/421. 
52 Foreign Office to Algiers, 12 November 1943, FO 
226/245. 
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iii) Casey Visits Beirut And Calls For British Intervention 
By 13 November, the situation in the Lebanon had further 
deteriorated: many towns were closed and reports Spears had 
received entirely confirmed "the extraordinary brutality of 
the French". 53 In Beirut itself, Moslem quarters were being 
surrounded by French troops. In a separate incident, when a 
deputation of some fifty students from the American 
University had tried to approach the Spears Mission, French 
marines had opened fire on them, causing ten casualties. 54 
There had been incidents at Rayak, Tripoli, and Sidon, in 
which the French had opened fire on unarmed crowds, 
resul ting in almost one hundred casual ties and several 
deaths. 55 The French, Spears subsequently claimed, were dOing 
their best to play down the events. They flatly denied the 
Sidon incident and referred to the "foolish imprudence" of 
youths for "getting in the way of Bren carriers"; Spears 
also roundly denounced the BBC for quoting so extensively 
from communiques issued by the French, thereby creating the 
impression that the British government was at one with the 
French. 56 Reports received in the War Office however, from 
53 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E6931/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
13 November 1943, 
54 Spears to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, 
E6947/27/89, FO 371/35185. See also Spears, op cit, p 240; 
Eyewitness account of incident in front of Spears Mission, 
9.30am, 13 November 1943, by Lt. Col. K. C. Gresham, WO 
201/984. 
55 Spears to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, 
E6930/27/89 and E6931/27 /89; both in FO 371/35185. First 
reports estimated that there were eleven casual ties at 
Tripoli, seven of which were children under eight. A later 
report from the Political Officer there claimed that there 
had been eight deaths and twenty-four casualties. (See 
Spears to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, E7049/27/89, FO 
371/35186). At Sidon sixty to seventy casualties were 
reported, though the number of fatalities was unknown. 
56 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E6964/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
14 November 1943, 
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representatives of the Ninth Army, continued to be less 
sensational. Whilst the deterioration in the situation was 
confirmed, it was also stressed that there were "many 
dangerous and unfounded rumours current", and that in 
particular, most Reuters reports were "grossly exaggerated 
and irresponsible". 57 
The Foreign Office agreed that it was clear that the 
stories of rioting had been "very exaggerated", but 
nonetheless admitted that there had certainly also been 
"some very nasty incidents". 58 Much exasperation was directed 
towards the French as it was considered that their behaviour 
had been "the height of unwisdom". They were "obviously most 
unpopular" in the Levant, and were felt to be "a millstone 
round our necks in dealing with the Arabs". 59 A telegram was 
despatched to Macmillan, instructing him to register an 
immediate protest with the French in the strongest possible 
terms against the incident outside the Spears Mission. 60 
As far as Beirut was concerned, the Foreign Office could 
only issue stop-gap instructions pending Catroux's arrival. 
Spears was requested to do his utmost to prevent the local 
French authorities from "behaving provocatively" and 
likewise to induce the Lebanese "to behave as calmly as 
possible", as it was not in their interests that disorders 
should occur. Casey was warned to expect Catroux's arrival 
in Cairo, and to make it plain to the Frenchman that Britain 
considered that the Committee had so far been "evasive" over 
the Lebanese affair. Only by stretching forbearance to the 
57 Wilson to War Office, 14 November 1943, E6976/27/89, 
FO 371/35186. 
58 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 15 November 1943, 
E6976/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
59 ibid. 
60 Foreign Office to Algiers, 14 November 1943, 
E6967/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
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absolute limit had Britain been prepared to wait until 
Monday, 15 November for Catroux's arrival in Beirut, and 
wi th luck, a quick solution to the crisis. Casey should 
remind Catroux that Britain confidently expected that his 
"appropriate instructions" included authorisation to release 
the Lebanese ministers immediately and moreover, that his 
arrival would signal Helleu' s effective subordination to 
him. 61 
The discrepancy in reports about the general situation 
in the Lebanon emanating from Spears on the one hand, and 
from the military on the other, continued to be noted in 
London. Casey too had become confused by the conflicting 
reports and decided to visit Beirut to assess the situation 
for himself. 62 He was equally confused by his instructions 
from the Foreign Office about possible British intervention. 
His directions thus far had been that British troops would 
have to be employed if military security required, but that 
at the present juncture it was preferable that they should 
not be not used. 63 These instructions had received Cabinet 
endorsement, but Casey had also received Churchill's enquiry 
about the state of British forces in the Levant and this 
must have added to his confusion. Additionally, conditions 
now seemed to have deteriorated to such an extent that Casey 
wondered whether Britain might anyway intervene to pacify 
the situation, even though her military interests were not 
considered jeopardised. He summarised his thoughts thus: 
What it boils down to is, 
undertakings regarding the 
can we fulfil 
independence of 
our 
the 
61 Foreign Office to Casey, 
E6915/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
13 November 1943, 
62 Casey to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, 
E6926/27/89, FO 371/35185; Kirk (Cairo) to Hull, 13 November 
1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, p 1023. 
63 Foreign Office to Casey, 11 November 1943, 
E6848/27 /89, FO 371/35184; Foreign Office to Beirut, 12 
November 1943, FO 226/245. 
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Levant States by purely political action or should 
we use force?64 
As far as Casey was concerned, his mind was already made up 
and the issue was quite clear. Even before his visit to 
Beirut, he had declared that if the French continued to use 
force, then he was inclined to use British troops to restore 
order. 65 To the Foreign Office he explained himself thus: 
Common humanity and our reputation with the Arab 
world prompts us to take charge of the situation and 
restore order and the liberties of the Lebanese. 
This would certainly bring us into conflict with the 
French. This decision must rest with tOU, as issues 
beyond the Middle East are involved. 6 
Casey reached Beirut at 4. OOpm on 13 November. After 
discussions with Spears and General Holmes, he embarked on 
a tour of Beirut and on a series of interviews with a 
variety of individuals, including Dr. Dodge,67 the Maronite 
Archbishop and the Grand Mufti. Dodge had spoken of the 
"incredible folly" of the French in throwing away their 
prestige in the Levant; he observed that even the 
Christians, their closest allies, had turned against them, 
and forecast that unless Catroux released the Government and 
dismissed Helleu, the Lebanese would rise against the French 
and destroy them "with great bloodshed". The two religious 
leaders had only confirmed what Dodge had said: there was 
complete accord between Christians and Moslems alike and 
64 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E6924/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
13 November 1943, 
65 Kirk to Hull, 13 November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, 
p 1023. 
66 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E6924/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
13 November 1943, 
67 Dr. Dodge was President of the American University 
in Beirut. 
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unless Britain protected the Lebanese from French savagery, 
they would take the matter into their own hands. 68 
Although in conversation with Holmes on the evening of 
13 November, Casey had stated that the likelihood of a 
declaration of martial law was now receding, his visit to 
Beirut did not alter his conviction that if the French used 
excessive force, British troops ought to intervene. He had 
made out such a strong case for British intervention 
however, that Holmes began to doubt his own instructions and 
telegraphed Wilson for guidance. The Commander-in-Chief 
confirmed that for the present, British troops were not to 
be used and that interference with the French territorial 
command could be justified only in the greatest emergency.69 
Similarly, after a conversation on the morning of 14 
November, Wadsworth reported that the Minister of State 
answered a question "in a manner which suggested that he had 
already made up his mind on [the] need for British military 
intervention" . 70 
Indeed, Casey had arrived in Beirut convinced of the 
need for British military intervention and the impressions 
he had received during his visit had evidently done nothing 
to lessen those convictions. He distilled the conclusions he 
had drawn into a telegram which was sent to London from 
Beirut before his return to Cairo. He estimated that the 
tension was increasing and that the situation would soon be 
"potentially very dangerous". Thus far the Lebanese had 
refrained from insurrection, hoping for British 
intervention. He believed that the Lebanese would maintain 
68 Casey to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, 
E6967/27/89, FO 371/35185. For printed version, see Spears, 
op cit, p 248-251. 
69 Holmes to Wilson, 13 November 1943, ADC 433; Wilson 
to Holmes, 14 November 1943, CIC/173; both in WO 201/984. 
70 Wadsworth to Hull, 14 November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol 
IV, pp 1030-1031. 
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their restraint only if the British assumed control in the 
principal towns. He recommended that Britain should take 
over patrolling duties only, which would be " less 
unpalatable" to the French than a total transfer of control. 
Like Spears, he was certain that the French would accept 
this if the Commander-in-Chief made the demand with the 
maximum firmness "as an essential military measure in aid of 
internal security".71 
Casey realised only too well the objections that his 
proposal would encounter: the British government would be 
unwilling to complicate matters further with the French 
before they had had the opportunity to respond to the two 
major demands already made upon them. But Casey regarded it 
as extremely unlikely that the French would comply with 
Bri tish demands. This had been brought horne to him by a 
press conference the previous evening, at which Helleu had 
stated that total independence for the Levant States was out 
of the question, that de Gaulle had been in full agreement 
with the measures he had taken and that Catroux was coming 
to Beirut purely to discuss military matters with Wilson and 
Holmes. Spears had observed, and Casey was inclined to 
agree, that stupid as Helleu was, he would never have made 
such a statement unless authorised to do so by Algiers, for 
it rendered a French climb-down virtually impossible. 72 
Moreover, given the bitterness of the pill which Britain 
was asking the French to swallow, Casey fully expected that 
the French would attempt to play for time, in the hope that 
something would happen to save their skin. He predicted that 
Catroux's mission was just such a device invented by de 
Gaulle "to spin things out ... till British indignation has 
71 Casey to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, 
E6963/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
72 Spears to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, 
E6966/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
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cooled and some new factor emerges to help him out of his 
dilemma". In these circumstances, timing was therefore 
crucial. Judging from what he had seen, he believed there 
was a "grave risk of the situation getting irrevocably out 
of hand, unless the suggested remedy [i.e. British 
assumption of patrolling duties in the major towns] is 
applied by 09.00 hours, Wednesday, November 17th at latest". 
This he considered "a not unreasonable time-limit in the 
urgent circumstances that exist". 73 
Unfortunately for Casey, his suggestion found little 
favour with the military. At a Middle East Defence Committee 
meeting on 15 November, Wilson had "a considerable argument" 
with Casey about it, and pressed his view that it must be 
all or nothing. 74 Nor did Casey's recommendations fare any 
better in London where it was felt that the French deserved 
at least a little time to carry out the British demands, 
especially as, contrary to Casey's belief, it was expected 
that they would comply with the demands. A War Cabinet 
meeting on 15 November discussed Casey's telegram and the 
proposed Foreign Office reply. Sir A. Cadogan said that 
present policy was tentatively to allow the French another 
twenty-four hours and if no answer was received, to request 
compliance within another twenty-four or forty-eight hours. 
The reply to Casey, endorsed by the Cabinet, pointed out 
that if the French failed to comply with Britain's demands, 
Bri tish intervention would hardly be very effective if 
confined to mere patrolling duties in the larger towns. A 
more sensible course would be for Britain to dissociate 
herself from French actions and, subject to prior Cabinet 
approval, impose Bri tish martial law. Under those 
circumstances, it was thought that public feeling would be 
73 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E6963/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
14 November 1943, 
74 Wilson to Holmes, 15 November 1943, ADC/437, WO 
201/982. 
383 
"much more profoundly stirred than it is at present, if it 
is known that the French have rejected our first efforts to 
secure a settlement". 75 The telegram was copied to Beirut 
and to Algiers, and on the Cabinet's recommendation, a 
supplementary telegram was sent to Beirut, to make it 
absolutely clear that at the present stage, no threat of the 
imposition of British martial law should be used or even 
referred to, in any dealings with the French. 76 
iv) A Posteriori Reasoning 
" Les circonstances exigaient des mesures rapides et 
radicales". This was how Helleu, at 10.00am on 11 November, 
routinely announced his actions to the Committee in Algiers. 
His telegram went on to explain that he had dissolved the 
Chamber and suspended the constitution, and had ordered the 
arrests "pour evi ter la subsistance d' un organisme 
constitutionnel qui aurait pu, avec des appuis exterieurs, 
s'opposer a mes decisions". He reassured the Committee that 
he had done everything necessary to ensure that order was 
maintained. He expected other Arab states to register their 
displeasure and also anticipated a strong protest from 
Spears, who was "d' ailleurs, Ie veri table responsable des 
menees anti-franc;:aises contre lesquelles j' ai du reagir". 
Despite the fact that two requests for reinforcements had 
now been turned down, Helleu evidently felt that in the 
circumstances which now prevailed, he might effect a change 
of mind, and reminded the Committee of the request he had 
previously made for reinforcements: "Je vous rappelle 
75 Foreign Office to Casey, 
E6963/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
15 November 1943, 
76 Conclusions of meeting of War Cabinet, 5. 30pm, 
Monday, 15 November 1943, CAB 65/36. 
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instamment rna demande concernant l'envoi du "Richelieu" ".77 
In conclusion, he promised to keep the Committee informed 
about the way events were developing. 
How had the French come to take such drastic action? In 
attempting to determine exactly what drove Helleu to act as 
he did, it is interesting to ponder a point made by George 
Kirk in The Middle East in the War, that in Algeria on 23 
September 1943, Catroux had himself dismissed all the Moslem 
members of the Delegations Financieres, and had interned two 
of their leaders, when in an act of defiance towards France, 
they had absented themselves from the formal opening of the 
Delegations Financieres. Whilst there is no evidence 
directly linking Helleu's high-handed behaviour with that of 
Catroux's a month and a half previously, it is quite 
possible that Helleu thought he could draw a lesson from 
Algerian events. After all, Catroux had emerged untarnished 
from the episode and indeed, his action had resulted in an 
apology from the Moslem members so that Catroux had 
subsequently withdrawn their dismissal. 78 
It is also incontestable that since the outcome of the 
elections, Helleu had been subjected to considerable 
pressure from his closest and most influential advisers, to 
act firmly to stem the nationalist tide before it swamped 
what ground France was still managing to cling to. In mid-
October, for example, Jean Chabret, the Delegation's 
Conseiller Legislatif, provided Helleu with a ten page 
article entitled "Pouvoir du Delegue General". The concern 
from Helleu or from members of his staff for a definition of 
the Delegue General's role and powers is telling. The 
article went to great lengths to justify the French position 
in the Levant, asserting that despite the declarations of 
77 Helleu a Alger, 11 Novembre 1943, No 327-330, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
78 George Kirk, op cit, pp 279, 420-421. 
385 
independence, France still retained responsibilities for the 
Levant, of which she could not be divested without the 
approval of the League of Nations. More especially, it 
stated that nothing could be done to alter the status quo 
without the Delegue General's assent: 
En ce qui concerne plus particulierement les 
Constitutions libanais et syrien, leur revision 
doit, pour Atre valable, non seulement avoir ete 
faite suivant la procedure constitutionelle, mais 
avoir, en outre, recueilli l'accord du Delegue 
General ... ils ne peuvent Atre modifies qu' avec 
l'assentiment de la Puissance Mandataire. 79 
The paper went on to maintain that Catroux's declarations of 
independence had been inspired by Robert de Caix's theory 
that "Le mandat cessat d' exister en fait avant de cesser 
d'exister en droit". However, should this ideal prove 
unattainable or unrealistic 
par suite de la negligence, de la faute ou de 
l'incapacite de representations des Etats, la France 
aurait incontestablement Ie droit et Ie devoir, en 
vertu des obligations et des responsabilites qui lui 
incombent, de prendre toutes mesures poli tiques, 
legislatives, financieres ou administratives, 
qu'elle jugerait necessaires pour l'accomplissement 
de sa mission. 80 
Additionally, the considerable influence which Baelen 
and Boegner wielded over Helleu should not be forgotten. The 
entire blame for the Lebanese crisis cannot simply be 
assigned to these man, but their role is discernible 
throughout, and especially Boegner's as at the time of the 
crisis, Baelen was indisposed. It was Boegner who had 
originally persuaded Helleu 
reinforcements to strengthen 
to 
French 
press Algiers for 
negotiating power. 
79 Note:" pouvoir du Delegue General", par Jean Chabret, 
Beyrouth, 13 Octobre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 
999. 
80 "b"d 1. 1. • 
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Furthermore, he had submitted a paper to Helleu prior to his 
departure for Algiers, strongly advocating that the alliance 
between France and the Levant States be cemented before it 
was too late. 81 He suggested that the Levant governments 
somehow be brought to agree to a formal exchange of letters 
stating that the 1936 treaties would come into force as soon 
as a properly constituted French Parliament existed to 
ratify them. In fact, the allegedly liberal proposals with 
which Helleu returned from Algiers were based on the 1936 
treaties, as Boegner had proposed, despite the fact that it 
must have been realised that these were no longer acceptable 
to the Levant States. 
Given such pointers, it is relatively easy to see why 
events in the Lebanon took the course they did. The hard 
core element on Helleu's staff knew that Khoury and Solh 
would never accept that France should hold a position in the 
Levant which the 1936 treaties had outlined. What was needed 
therefore, was a government which would accept those 
treaties. When the Lebanese government acted as it did by 
unilaterally reforming the constitution and abolishing all 
reference to the mandate, it played directly into French 
hands. As Chabret had outlined a month previously, and as 
had been made abundantly clear to the Lebanese in the 
communique issued on 5 November, the French considered that 
no alteration to the constitution was permissible unless 
approved by the Delegue General. In responding to the 
Lebanese challenge therefore, the French considered 
themselves free to employ whatever measures they saw fit. 
They felt fully justified in removing the government in 
order to install another which would be more amenable to the 
idea of a treaty with France. 
81 Boegner a Helleu, 20 Octobre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
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that, since the elections, 
had wanted to crack down on 
most 
the 
Lebanese and were exploring all means of doing so. It is 
probable however, that the extreme action of arresting the 
government was something which was decided upon purely as a 
response to the Lebanese defiance on 8 November, firstly in 
refusing to await Helleu's return, and secondly, in 
proceeding to amend the constitution. It is difficult to 
assess exactly what role Helleu played in formulating the 
scheme. He was sufficiently perturbed by the turn of events 
to return from Cairo a day earlier than he had originally 
intended. It is most probable however, that he returned to 
find the plot already being hatched by certain ring-leaders 
amongst his staff and all that remained for him to do was to 
give the go ahead. 82 
The French arrests have been described as a "brutally 
efficient round-up of the Lebanese ringleaders". 83 Brutal 
they may have been, but efficient they most certainly were 
not. Three ministers escaped arrest initially and although 
one was apprehended later in the day, the other two remained 
at large, able to form preCisely the constitutional rump 
which Helleu claimed he had been trying to avoid. 84 By 12 
82 Though too much emphasis cannot be placed on this, 
Wadsworth's account of his interview with Helleu on 11 
November is interesting. When speaking of his failure to 
inform Spears of what had been planned, Helleu asked: "Could 
I tell him what had been prepared [my italics] in greatest 
secrecy for me to do that night [?]". Wadsworth to Hull, 11 
November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, p 1019. 
83 Gaunson, op cit, p 126. 
84 Casey, prompted by Spears, had suggested that the two 
Lebanese ministers still at large, should be sent to Egypt 
or Palestine for asylum from the French, possibly 
accompanied by three or four members of the Chamber of 
Deputies. After discussion with Colonel Cal thorpe of the War 
Office, the Foreign Office vetoed the idea, having decided 
that such a move might well create a dangerous Anglo-French 
incident. Casey to Foreign Office, 12 November 1943, 
E6901/27/89, FO 371/35184; Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 13 
November 1943, and Foreign Office to Casey, 13 November 
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November, the two ministers still at liberty had galvanised 
themselves into action, paying Spears a surreptitious visit 
with the text of a resolution unanimously passed by thirty 
three deputies from the Chamber. The resolution condemned 
the French action as unconstitutional, accused Edde of high 
treason and affirmed continued loyalty to Riad Solh's 
government. They proposed to act in the name of the 
President and his Cabinet, and called upon the population to 
withhold their taxes, on government officials to refuse to 
obey orders, and on other Arab nations to come to their 
assistance. 85 
However bungled Helleu's actions may have been, he made 
no apologies to Algiers. Instead, he helpfully provided 
Massigli with a list of arguments which might be used to 
fend off the inevitable British and American protests and 
criticisms. Firstly he argued, the Lebanese had undoubtedly 
been engaged in "un veritable complot politique destine a 
nous chasser du Liban", and consequently radical measures 
had been required in the interests of military security. He 
suggested that even before their protests began to pour in, 
the British might be reminded that the French measures were 
not so different from the forceful tactics that Britain had 
herself employed in Iraq against Rashid Ali and in Egypt to 
install Nahas Pasha in power. Lastly, as the mendacious and 
tendentious reports which were already being circulated 
about events in the Lebanon were of British origin, Britain 
had no room to condemn the French action as likely to 
disturb public order and security.86 
1943, E6913/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
85 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E6907/27/89; Spears to Foreign Office, 
E6908/27/89; both in FO 371/35184. 
12 November 
12 November, 
1943, 
1943, 
86 Beyrouth a Alger, 12 Novembre 1943, No 1534, Guerre 
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In complete contrast to Spears, who had been tempted to 
exaggerate the disturbances in the Levant to add weight to 
his own advice to impose British martial law, Helleu was 
above all concerned to play down the effects of his action 
to Algiers and to emphasise that complete calm reigned in 
the Lebanon. 87 In numerous telegrams to the Committee, he 
denied that internal order had been disturbed and complained 
bitterly about the inaccurate reports Reuters was emitting. 
It was not true, he argued, that the forty eight deputies 
who had voted to amend the constitution had all been 
arrested, nor that wholesale arrests were being carried out 
among the population. 88 Reports that serious trouble was 
expected in major towns and from the Druzes were false, as 
were stories of confrontations between French tanks and the 
Lebanese populace. Helleu categorically denied that 
Senegalese troops had attempted to occupy Bechara el 
Khoury's house. He claimed that it was untrue "que les tu~s 
se chiffrent par dizaines; il y a eu, en tout et pour tout, 
trois tu~S".89 Stories that he no longer had the situation in 
hand "sont entierement fausses". 90 Helleu claimed that the 
incident outside the Spears Mission had arisen when a sous-
officier was set upon by the crowd91 ; the Sidon affair was 
simply written off, as owing its origins "aux excitations de 
la radio etrangere et peut-etre a une visi te a Saida du 
87 Beyrouth a Alger, 12 Novembre 1943, No 340, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
88 Beyrouth a Alger, 12 Novembre 1943, No 338-9, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
89 Beyrouth a Alger, 13 Novembre 1943, No 351, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
90 Beyrouth a Alger, 13 Novembre 1943, No 358-9, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
91 ibid. 
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Capitaine Thomas de la B.S.M.".[British Security Mission]92 
He told eagerly of visits from various Lebanese notables, 
all of whom had expressed satisfaction with his action which 
"avai t arrete sur une pente fatale Ie Liban et par suite 
toute la chretiennete d' Orient" . 93 When Generals Humblot and 
Monclar walked about in Beirut on 14 November, even in the 
Moslem quarters, "ils ont ete l'objet de nombreuses 
manifestations de sympathie". 94 
Worst of all, Helleu alleged, British propaganda was 
using such reports to hinder Edde' s attempts to form a 
Cabinet. 95 He believed that the British were trying, without 
success, to form a Moslem bloc hostile to France and to 
insinuate that events in the Lebanon had aroused the anger 
of the whole of the Moslem world. This was manifestly 
untrue, he claimed, and Syria was the perfect example with 
which to refute this. Syria was completely calm and the 
government had done nothing to demonstrate solidarity with 
Riad Solh, despite attempts by certain Lebanese deputies to 
get it to do so. 96 In fact, Helleu claimed that he had 
received a letter from the Syrians "con<;:ue en termes tres 
courtois et tres moderes"; Shukri Quwatli, when he delivered 
it, had apparently commented to the Delegue at Damascus: "Le 
document que nous avons remis n'est pas une protestation, 
ce n'est pas une note, c'est une lettre, une simple lettre. 
92 Note par Ie Conseiller Administratif de la France 
Combattante au Liban Sud, Saida, 14 Novembre 1943, 
Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre, 4H 308. 
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Nous ne pouvions faire moins". He11eu observed: "Nous devons 
certainement en savoir gre au Gouvernement Syrien; je pense 
. .. qu' il a fait Ie minimum". 97 
There is evidence to suggest that if the French were 
delighted by the attitude of reserve maintained by the 
Syrians, the British were not so pleased and were actively 
encouraging the Syrians to adopt a firmer line and to 
demonstrate their solidarity with the Lebanese. On 16 
November, Brenan, the Political Officer at Damascus informed 
Lascelles: "Our various demarches to the Syrian President 
have borne fruit and to the point where, I submit, it might 
be unwise to go further, unless you wish clashes with the 
French to break out". 98 Only a day earlier, Lascelles himself 
had seen fit to reprimand Colonel Summerhayes, the Political 
Officer at Aleppo, for attending the French Armistice Day 
Ball, and in so doing made a scathing comment about the fact 
that the Syrians were being "so wobbly about supporting 
their neighbours". Lascelles went on to allege that 
Summerhayes must have realised that French actions "would 
inevi tably strain our relations to breaking point" and 
informed him that it was the Minister's wish, until further 
notice, that he maintain an attitude of "extreme coldness" 
towards the French. 99 
v) Makins And Macmillan Tackle The French 
Swamped by such reports from Helleu, the French in 
Algiers were steadfastly refusing to accept that they had 
97 Beyrouth a Alger, 16 Novembre 1943, s.n., Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. A version of this telegram is 
also to be found in Vol 1575. 
98 T. V. Brenan to D. W. Lascelles, DO 383, 16 November 
1943, FO 226/241. 
99 D. W. Lascelles to C. H. Summerhayes, 15 November 
1943, FO 226/241. 
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done anything wrong and denying that anything was amiss in 
the Levant. To add to Makins' difficulties, the telegrams 
containing his instructions arrived late, corrupt, in 
inverse order and without reference to each other. It was, 
he observed, "lucky that there was no slip-up" .100 Though he 
had already seen Massigli earlier in the day, on the evening 
of 12 November he saw Massigli and de Gaulle together. 101 He 
noted that both seemed "rather subdued". De Gaulle had 
insisted that the Committee's position in the Lebanon was 
unassailable because French actions were based on mandatory 
rights; the Committee had honoured its promise of 
independence to the States, elections had been held and a 
government had been formed, which had proceeded to provoke 
the French Committee just when it had decided to negotiate 
a treaty. In the face of such provocation the Committee had 
merely exercised France's mandatory rights. If Britain 
forced the issue, de Gaulle defiantly threatened to 
retaliate by withdrawing all French officials and troops 
alike from the Levant. On a more conciliatory note however, 
he had informed Makins that Catroux, equipped with 
"appropriate instructions", would be departing for the 
Lebanon on either 13 or 14 November and would calIon Casey 
in Cairo en route. Makins ended his report with the 
information that from what he had been given to understand, 
Helleu had acted "wi thin his instructions from Algiers". 102 
100 Makins to Strang, 18 November 1943, FO 800/432. 
101 See also Wiley to Hull, 13 November 1943, FRUS, 
1943, Vol IV, pp 1024-25, as Makins gave an account of his 
meeting to Wiley who relayed the main details to the State 
Department. In his letter to William Strang, Makins informed 
him that he had had "a strained interview with de Gaulle and 
Massigli, but fortunately, just as it looked like becoming 
stormy, the lights fused. Oddly enough this rather threw de 
Gaulle out of his stride". Makins to Strang, 18 November 
1943, FO 800/432. 
102 Makins to Foreign Office, 
E6195/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
12 November 1943, 
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In view of further telegrams received from the Foreign 
Office, Makins was obliged to see Massigli again early on 13 
November. He deli vered a note which expressed Britain's 
inability to acquiesce in any further deterioration of the 
Lebanese situation, and stated that unless Britain received 
authoritative assurances that everything possible was being 
done to reach a modus vivendi, she proposed to settle 
matters herself by inviting French, Syrian, Lebanese and 
American representatives to a conference. The note further 
requested the immediate withdrawal of Helleu and the release 
of the imprisoned Lebanese; for the moment Britain complied 
with the suspension of the Chamber, though its reassembly 
was expected at the earliest possible date. 103 
Massigli survived the meeting by launching a counter-
attack. He drew attention to the various false and 
exaggerated Reuters reports104 emanating from the Levant, the 
dissemination of which, he protested, "only added fuel to 
the flames", and served nobody's interests; he requested 
that every effort be made not to exaggerate events in the 
Lebanon. 105 Later that same day, the Committee met and 
subsequently announced that it had entrusted Catroux, who 
would be leaving forthwith for Beirut, with the task of 
restoring normal constitutional life to the Lebanon, within 
103 See Foreign Office to Casey, 11 November 1943, Nos 
3521 and 3522, E6848/27/89, FO 371/35184; Makins to Foreign 
Office, 13 November 1943, E6925/27/89, FO 371/35185. For a 
printed copy of the British note, see De Gaulle, L'Unite, 
1942-44, pp 597-598. 
104 One of these reports claimed that forty-eight 
Lebanese deputies had been arrested and another that there 
were serious disorders through the Levant. 
105 Makins to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, No 2338, 
E6925/27/89; Makins to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, No 
2332, E6950/27/89; both in FO 371/35185. 
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the framework of the mandate, such as had been defined in 
previous declarations by the Committee. 106 
The extent to which the French were denying any 
reponsibility for the Lebanese situation is further evident 
from instructions which Massigli eventually sent to the 
French representatives in London, Washington and Moscow. 
These reaffirmed categorically that accountability rested 
squarely with Riad Solh and his colleagues in the first 
instance; however, it was alleged that an equally large part 
of the blame 
incombe aux agents bri tanniques, du fait de leur 
ingerence dans les affaires libanaises et syriennes, 
dans la politique interieure et administrative des 
Etats et meme dans les rapports des gouvernements 
de ces Etats et les representants de la France. 
It was claimed that the endless encouragement British 
agents had offered to Syrian and Lebanese ministers had 
enticed them away from France and had started them off 
vers une poli tique qui, appuyee sur Ie soutien 
britannique, entend faire table rase de nos interets 
historiques au Liban et en Syrie. 
Countless protests to the British had produced absolutely no 
effect and since the reintroduction of constitutional life, 
Spears and his associates had only redoubled their efforts. 
This behaviour on the part of the British agents constituted 
a contradiction of formal undertakings by the British 
government and was hardly compatible either with respect for 
France's privileged position or with the continued and legal 
106 Algiers to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, 
E6995/27/89, FO 371/35186. Spears found this assertion on 
the part of the Committee "particularly disquieting", as it 
suggested to him the intention "to bargain or to attempt to 
bargain for the release of the Government against promises 
to revert to the former "Mandatory Constitution"." Spears to 
Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, E7009/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
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existence of the mandate. Massigli assured the 
representatives at great length that France intended to keep 
her promises to the Levant States; he warned them especially 
against the tendentious reports in the British press and 
insisted that Helleu was painting a very different 
picture. 107 
Prior to its despatch, de Gaulle saw a draft of this 
telegram and instructed Massigli that it would be as well to 
add "que dans l'extremite, nous nous retirerions du Levant". 
He professed his belief that the threat of a French 
withdrawal might be 
la seule consideration dont les consequences peuvent 
faire changer l' atti tude des Anglais comme c;:ela 
s'est produit dans d'autre occasions. En outre, il 
est preferable de ne pas Ie leur cacher maintenant 
tandis qu'il est temps pour eux de fixer leur 
posi tion. 108 
De Gaulle evidently hoped that by the adoption of this 
defiant attitude, he might succeed in forcing the British 
to back off. 
When Macmillan returned to Algiers from Italy on the 
afternoon of 13 November, he found the crisis "in full 
swing" . He and Murphy 109 went into conference almost 
immediately, and shortly thereafter descended successively 
upon Massigli. 110 Murphy in fact presented Massigli with a 
107 Massigli a Londres, Washington et Moscou, 13 
Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
108 De Gaulle a Massigli, 13 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-
45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. Also in Papiers Massigli, Vol 
1479. 
109 Robert Murphy: Roosevelt's personal representative 
in Algiers and Chief Civil Affairs Officer on General 
Eisenhower's staff. 
110 H. Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 13 November 
1943, p 291. 
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note of such stiffness that Massigli later requested that it 
be modified on the grounds that it was unjust to the 
French. 111 As Britain's note of protest had already been 
delivered, Macmillan, accompanied by Makins, had nothing new 
to say to Massigli. The latter however, did open up a little 
and divulged that in his opinion, Helleu "had made a 
blunder", though he insisted "that the mistakes had not been 
all on one side". He continued to assert that complete calm 
reigned in the Lebanon and that British accounts of events 
were exaggerated and untrue. When pressed by Makins to 
supply an answer to Britain's demands, he explained that 
Helleu was effectively suspended by Catroux's mandate and 
that the liberation of the Lebanese was now Catroux's 
responsibility, with which he would deal as he saw fit.112 
Macmillan confessed that the talk had not been "altogether 
satisfactory" though he retained his "usual confidence in 
Massigli's wisdom and fairness".113 
Macmillan also managed to see Catroux on the evening of 
13 November before his departure to the Levant. It had been 
111 See Murphy to Hull, 14 November 1943, FRUS, 1943, 
Vol IV, p 1030. The particular sentence to which the French 
objected read: "It is difficult to understand how [the] 
French whose country is now groaning under [the] heel of the 
invader, can be unmindful of the aspirations toward 
independence of another people". Macmillan to Foreign 
Office, 16 November 1943, E7095/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
112 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 13 November 1943, 
E6957/27/89, FO 371/35185. Massigli had intimated to Murphy 
that the unilateral action of the Lebanese in violating the 
mandate, had very possibly been inspired by Spears. Massigli 
also stated that Helleu "whose judgment apparently he does 
not rate highly", ordered the arrests "on his own initiative 
without prior consultation with the Committee", and would be 
"quietly shelved" once the ministers were released. Murphy 
to Hull, 13 November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, pp 1026-27. 
113 H. Macmillan, Blast of War, p 422. Murphy recorded 
that "Macmillan feels, as I do, that Massigli is doing his 
utmost to arrive at a prompt solution" Murphy to Hull, 13 
November 1943, FRUS, 1943., Vol IV, pp 1026-27. 
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noted by Makins that Catroux, that very evening, had 
authorised the Commissariat for Information to say that 
Helleu had acted without reference to Algiers, which 
completely belied the impression Makins had gathered the 
previous day. Catroux confirmed this to Macmillan, by 
stating that Helleu "had made a fool of himself ... [and] 
had taken these drastic steps without even telegraphing for 
instructions". Catroux sought to deflect attention from 
Helleu's actions by attacking British policy which, he 
alleged, had been none too helpful. He nonetheless professed 
a desire to see the matter settled urgently in view of the 
harm being done to Anglo-French interests. From the 
impression he created during the meeting, Macmillan believed 
that Catroux would arrive in the Levant "in a mood anxious 
for conciliation". Dealing with such fraught situations, he 
reasoned, was "after all his metier and no-one is more 
practised at it than he". Catroux had even frankly admitted 
to Macmillan that his main difficulty lay in preserving 
French face, though he had not seemed unduly perturbed at 
the prospect, declaring with a smile, "that there were other 
ways of dealing with the Government than putting them into 
prison" . 114 Macmillan obviously felt it wise not to press 
Catroux too closely on this remark. 
There was therefore considerable optimism amongst the 
British contingent in Algiers that Catroux could be relied 
upon to conduct affairs in a conciliatory manner and that 
the matter would soon be settled. This optimism would have 
evaporated had various letters which de Gaulle wrote on 13 
November to Helleu, to Catroux and to Massigli respectively, 
been public knowledge. De Gaulle's letter to Helleu 
constituted an unequivocal declaration of support: he 
affirmed that the forceful tactics Helleu had employed must 
have been considered necessary, as he had seen fit to employ 
114 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, 
E6976/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
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them. Additionally, he assured Helleu that he would not be 
disavowed. De Gaulle warned that he anticipated considerable 
difficulties from the British. He remained convinced 
however, that their tough approach was bluff, as they least 
of all could afford trouble in the Levant and hence would 
not carry things too far. The letter went on to advise 
Helleu of Catroux's impending arrival but stressed that he 
was returning not to disavow him but to support him in the 
name of the Committee of Liberation. 115 
Prior to his dawn departure on 14 November for the 
Levant, Catroux also received a letter from de Gaulle, who 
was evidently anxious to make his thinking absolutely 
clear. 116 With the letter, de Gaulle enclosed a report from 
Helleu and a letter from Baelen, which, he claimed, would 
serve to illustrate the state of French feeling before the 
arrests. 117 De Gaulle's own letter warned Catroux of the 
alarmism which he was bound to encounter from Casey and 
others, and advised him to say nothing publicly that might 
incriminate Helleu; even if the latter's actions had been a 
Ii ttle too forceful, France was solidly behind him. De 
Gaulle further instructed Catroux to reject out of hand any 
proposal which might be broached for a conference or a 
commi ttee of enquiry. He reminded Catroux that what he 
should seek to obtain was the re-establishment of the 
existing constitution and a government acceptable to the 
Committee. Provided France remained firm, he did not believe 
115 De Gaulle .. Helleu, 13 Novembre 1943, cited in de a 
Gaulle, L'Unite, 1942-44, pp 598-99. 
116 De Gaulle .. Catroux, a 13 Novembre 1943, cited in de 
Gaulle, L'Unite, 1942-44, p 597. 
117 Neither the report from Helleu nor the letter from 
Baelen are published. 
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that the English would make serious difficulties; if they 
did, France would be obliged to vacate the Levant.118 
By way of adding force to all of this, de Gaulle also 
wrote to Massigli, who was the last person due to see 
Catroux before his departure. The letter instructed Massigli 
to make it quite plain to Catroux that the arrangements he 
was permitted to make in Beirut 
ne comportent evidernrnent pas celles qui seraient 
susceptibles d'alterer notre position mandataire de 
droit et de fait. 
Above all, de Gaulle reiterated his own impression 
que la situation locale n'est pas mauvaise, que les 
gens du Liban et de Syrie attendent de voir si nous 
restons fermes pour s'accomoder de notre energie ou 
tirer parti de notre faiblesse. Dans ce dernier cas, 
l'affaire est perdue et elle ne doit pas l'etre. 119 
118 De Gaulle a Catroux, 13 Novembre 1943, cited in de 
Gaulle, L'Unite, 1942-44, P 597. 
119 De Gaulle a Massigli, 13 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-
45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. Also contained in Papiers 
Massigl i , Vol 1479. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
LE NUAGE QUI PASSE ... 
i) The View From Carlton Gardens 
There can be no doubt that news of Lebanese events came 
as a completely unwelcome surprise to French representatives 
in London, where it was felt that the whole affair could 
only tarnish the Committee's reputation and undo the work 
thus far achieved in restoring France to her rightful 
position as a major European power. Carlton Gardens found 
itself in the embarrassing and difficult situation of having 
to deal with a serious crisis for which the French were 
deemed largely responsible, without much information from 
French sources, or guidance as to the best line of defence. 
As soon as the crisis broke, Vienot hurriedly requested 
information from Algiers or directly from Beirut to help 
answer the questions and representations with which he was 
being deluged. 1 He was sure that Massigli would realise the 
serious feeling the affair had aroused in Britain. Whilst 
himself admitting that Helleu's measures made a mockery of 
general democratic principles, he observed, with a certain 
degree of bitterness, that British parliamentary and 
journalistic circles inevi tably interpreted them in the 
worst possible light, whereas the machinations of Spears and 
the Committee's grievances in that respect were given no 
credence whatsoever. Since the news had broken, Vienot 
claimed he had received a procession of visitors, all of 
whom were "les mieux disposes a notre egard". Nonetheless, 
they had all warned of the dire effect Lebanese events were 
having on British public opinion. He assured Massigli that 
1 Vienot a Alger, 11 Novembre 1943, No 145-6, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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with the scant information at his disposal, he had done his 
best to reply to their allegations and urgently requested 
further information on the origin and the nature of the 
crisis. In particular, he asked "si les mesures prises a 
Beyrouth avaient fait l'objet d'instructions expresses du 
Comite?", as the rumour was rife in London that Helleu had 
been in Algiers only a few days before carrying out the 
arrests. 2 
In a personal letter written "dans Ie brouhaha des 
remous de 1 ' affaire libanaise" , 3 Vienot pleaded for 
Massigli's unofficial impressions. With only Reuters 
despatches for information, his own first impressions were 
que nous nous sommes lances dans une terrible 
bagarre d'ou nous sortirons tres meurtres. 
The whole incident, he observed, was like "pain benit" for 
France's detractors. Indeed, Vienot was concerned that the 
Lebanese affair would do untold damage to French repute and 
ruin her chances of success in various aspects of diplomacy. 
In particular, he worried that the Lebanese affair would 
divert public attention from the vital question of French 
participation on the European Advisory Commission4 , just at 
2 Vienot a Massigli, 12 Novembre 1943, No 1165-6, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
3 Vienot mentioned that during the course of writing 
the letter, he had been interrupted over ten times. 
4 In August 1943, the Russians had suggested the 
establishment of a Three Power Mediterranean Commission to 
deal with pressing European problems. Churchill had 
suggested that the French Committee be invited to join, as 
he thought it would be "important" to the French and "a step 
forward in the right direction". (Churchill to Macmillan, 11 
September 1943, FO 660/139). The matter was broached with 
the French and de Gaulle expressed his gratitude, for the 
proposal meant that the Committee would meet on an equal 
footing with the three major Allied Powers. (Makins to 
Strang, 13 September 1943, FO 660/139). The French appetite 
was thoroughly whetted and London began to be bombarded with 
enquiries as to when some progress might be expected. 
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the wrong time. 5 Massigli and Vienot had both been bitterly 
disappointed by the decision at the Moscow Council of 
Foreign Ministers to exclude France. They had been doing 
their best to effect a reversal of the decision, by 
stressing the deplorable effect it would have in Algiers; 
Massigli had even spoken of resignation over the issue. 6 
During early November, it had been observed that the French 
were trying to play one European power off against another, 
and had stepped up their campaign even to the extent of 
threatening to refuse to participate in the subsidiary body, 
in order to achieve representation on the more prestigious 
European Advisory Commission. Vienot must have realised that 
any chance of progress on this front had effectively been 
scuppered by the events in the Lebanon. 7 
Furthermore, Helleu's action had been most untimely as 
it had occurred just as the British government proposed 
naming Duff Cooper as its representative to the CFLN. The 
appointment had always been open to serious doubt, as Vienot 
must have known. The Foreign Office had initiated and 
strongly backed the idea, as it was believed that the high 
regard which Duff Cooper enjoyed 
(Makins to Strang, 20 September 1943, FO 660/139) However, 
it had been decided at the Moscow Conference of Foreign 
Ministers (19-30 October 1943), that France would be 
admitted only to the Italian Advisory Commission and not to 
the wider ranging European Advisory Council which would sit 
in London. 
5 Vienot a Massigli, 12 Novembre 1943, Papiers Massigli, 
Vol 1480. 
6 Dixon to Foreign Office, 27 October 1943, FO 660/139; 
Macmillan to Foreign Office, 29 October 1943, FO 660/140. 
7 The French did not gain entrance to the European 
Advisory Commission until November 1944. See Macmillan, 
Blast of War, p 410; Macmillan, War Diaries, Entries for 2 
and 7 November 1943, pp 274, 283-84. 
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would enable him to stand up to the PM over our 
French policy ..• [He] knew France and the French 
extremely well. He was stout and Gaullist. His lack 
of activity was also rather an advantage. He would 
leave the French alone. 8 
Churchill, who had been casting about for a suitable 
appointment for Duff Cooper had initially preferred the idea 
of appointing him as Ambassador to Italy. He had been won 
round by Eden, who, on 6 October, offered Duff Cooper the 
choice of the Italians or the Free French. 9 Duff favoured the 
French option, stating that he believed he could do "good 
work" wi th the French and the matter had been deemed 
settled. 10 
Due to an unfortunate combination of circumstances, 
however11 , Churchill had begun to have second thoughts as to 
his suitability for the post. Duff Cooper wrote to Churchill 
to assuage his doubts, promising loyally to carry out the 
policy of His Maj esty' s Government, but Churchill still 
foresaw difficulties when Cooper, in view of his Gaullist 
sympathies, might actually be pursuing a policy in complete 
opposition to the one which he, the Prime Minister, felt 
necessary. Churchill's fears centred exclusively on de 
Gaulle and he placed at Cooper's disposal all the relevant 
8 Harvey, (Ed), op cit, Entry for 30 September 1943, pp 
302-3. 
9 John Charmley, Duff Cooper. The Authorised Biography, 
(London, 1986), p 167. 
10 J. Harvey, (Ed), op cit, Entry for 8 October 1943, p 
305. Churchill later informed Duff Cooper that he had not 
authorised Eden to offer him the post, but merely to sound 
him out. Charmley, op cit, p 168. 
11 According to Duff Cooper's own account, as reproduced 
by Charmley, op cit, pp 167-70, he had attended a dinner on 
7 October, during which he had defended de Gaulle against a 
vehement attack from amongst others, Alastair Forbes, and as 
a result of which the latter had informed Churchill that he 
was violentlly pro-de Gaulle. See also: A. Duff Cooper, Old 
Men Forget, (London, 1953), pp 315-16. 
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Foreign Office files to enable him to better understand the 
nature of the problem. In a letter, he explained his belief 
that de Gaulle had contracted a deep antipathy towards both 
Britain and America, and was attempting to split one from 
the other or both from Russia. 
He is a man Fascist-minded, opportunist, unscrupulous, 
ambitious to the last degree, and his coming to power in 
the new France would lead to great schisms there and 
also to a considerable estrangement between France and 
the western democracies. 12 
For Duff Cooper, who claimed to have had no idea of the 
extent of de Gaulle's misdemeanours, the material Churchill 
had provided had been "quite sufficient" to convince him 
that the General was "a potential source of mischief and a 
standing menace to Anglo-French, and what is even more 
important, Anglo-American relations". Nonetheless, pleading 
his own case, he suggested that "an individual who had the 
reputation of being pro-de Gaulle and no longer deserved 
it", would make "a very sui table envoy". 13 To this argument, 
Churchill had finally succumbed. Cadogan had just informed 
Vienot of the decision to go ahead with Cooper's 
appointment. The Frenchman had been informed on very good 
authori ty that by the choice of such a personality, the 
Bri tish government was demonstrating "I' importance qu' il 
h C · ~ tIt· fl· " 14 Wh t attac e au om1te e aux re a 10ns ranco-ang a1ses . a 
worried Vienot was that events in the Lebanon might make 
Britain, and especially Churchill think a third time about 
such an appointment. 
12 Churchill to Duff Cooper, cited in Charmley, op cit, 
pp 168-169. 
13 Duff Cooper to Churchill, cited in Charmley, op cit, 
pp 169-170. 
14 Vienot a Alger, 10 Novembre 1943, No 1128-30, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1551. 
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By 13 November, Vienot's knowledge of what was happening 
in the Lebanon was still limited to Reuters despatches; he 
again telegraphed Algiers that it was absolutely essential 
for him to obtain information from a French source, 
especially to refute certain press allegations. 15 More 
information would have been especially useful for Vienot in 
a meeting on 13 November with Cadogan. Vienot had resorted 
to the old ploy of defence by attack and had complained 
about the sensationalist tones of the British press. Cadogan 
who was "trAs raisonnable et trAs mesure", had defended the 
press: given the seriousness of events, he believed it had 
"on the whole ... treated the matter very objectively"; 
nonetheless, Vienot recorded that he had also promised that 
it would be warned to sober down and in future, to bear in 
mind the tendentiousness of reports emanating from the 
Middle East. 
Cadogan had questioned Vienot closely about the origins 
of the crisis. The Frenchman had answered that as far as he 
was aware, Helleu had received very conciliatory 
instructions in Algiers, and must therefore have encountered 
severe difficulties on his return to have subsequently 
adopted such an unexpected attitude. Cadogan had also driven 
horne Britain's displeasure with Helleu's behaviour towards 
Spears; he had failed to give Spears even the slightest hint 
of his proposed measures, despite dining with him only a few 
hours before, and had deceived the British Minister by 
assuring him that nothing would be done which might create 
a difficult situation. The British government, Cadogan 
asserted, had deeply regretted such a lack of collaboration. 
The mere mention of Spears, however, transferred the 
advantage to Vienot, who swiftly retorted that such a state 
of affairs existed only because the French, from their past 
experiences, had too many reasons to distrust Spears. 
15 Vienot a Alger, 13 Novembre 1943, No 1178-79, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
406 
Cadogan's account simply states that when Vienot began to 
hint at bad personal relations, he had told him that that 
"was really irrelevant .•. [and] could not possibly excuse 
such lack of co-operation between two Allies". 16 Vienot' s 
report states that Cadogan had admitted "que les torts 
etaient sans doute a partager". What is clear is that Vienot 
certainly believed he had escaped very lightly. He reported 
optimistically that Cadogan had said nothing to imply that 
British intervention was even being contemplated, but 
rather, had given the impression that all Britain's trust 
had been placed in Catroux and his ability to pacify the 
si tuation. 17 
If anyone realised and appreciated the efforts which 
were being made by the Foreign Office to prevent matters in 
the Levant from developing into a full scale show-down 
between the British and the French, it was Vienot. On 14 
November he telegraphed Massigli in Algiers, paying tribute 
to the Foreign Office policy and all that it had thus far 
achieved during the crisis: 
La tradition constante de la politique frangaise et 
anglaise depuis Ie debut de l'Entente Cordiale, a 
ete d'eviter dans toute la mesure du possible, que 
la rivalite qui a toujours oppose la France et la 
Grande Bretagne dans Ie Proche Orient, ne vienne pas 
troubler les relations franco-britanniques. Le 
Foreign Office est reste, dans une large mesure, 
fidele a cette pratique. 18 
16 Vienot a Alger, 13 Novembre 1943, No 1185-89, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999; Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 13 
November 1943, E6954/27/89, FO 371/35185. The two separate 
accounts of the meeting do not correspond particularly well. 
Cadogan strives to emphasise how stiff an attitude he had 
adopted with Vienot, whereas to Algiers, Vienot stressed how 
conciliatory Cadogan had been. 
17 Vienot a Alger, 13 Novembre 1943, No 1185-89, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
18 Vienot a Massigli, 15 Novembre 1943, No 1203-06, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. 
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ii) The Trouble-Shooter Arrives 
As Vienot had correctly reported, Foreign Office 
officials were indeed impatiently awaiting the arrival of 
Catroux in the Levant. Casey had ascribed to Catroux a 
devious role as a Fabian tactician; Macmillan however, had 
confidently predicted that his mission was one of 
conciliation, and Foreign Office officials inclined more 
towards the latter view. One man far from eager to see 
Catroux however, was Helleu. He had not yet received de 
Gaulle's letter warning him of Catroux's impending arrival, 
but on 13 November, he received a telegram from Catroux 
himself, announcing his imminent arrival "avec pleins 
pouvoirs pour denouer la crise libanaise". 19 The Delegue 
telegraphed Algiers on 14 November in utter disbelief about 
a British broadcast he had heard, which had stated that the 
Committee was disavowing him and that Catroux was coming in 
order to "prendre Ie contrepied de rna poli tique" . He 
recommended the issuance of a dementi "pour dissiper cette 
equivoque, qui peut gener aussi bien Ie General Catroux que 
moi-meme" . 20 Clearly, the thought that the Committee might 
react adversely to his actions and send Catroux out to the 
Levant to overrule him and to put matters to rights, had 
never really entered Helleu's mind. 
In a personal telegram to de Gaulle on the previous day, 
13 November, Helleu pleaded incredulously that he had taken 
energetic measures "conformement it I ' espri t de nos 
conferences". Furthermore, he stressed that he had even 
warned the Lebanese that if he was presented with a fait 
19 Helleu it de Gaulle, 13 Novembre 1943, Service 
Historique de l'Armee de Terre, 4H 308(3). 
20 Helleu it Alger, 14 Novembre 1943, No 764, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
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accompli, he would reserve his entire liberty of action. In 
a slightly accusatory tone he continued: 
Nous avions decide qu'il fallait aller jusqu'a 
passer outre au risque de troubles. Vous m' aviez 
confirme l'instruction d'agir sans reference 
prealable a Spears. 21 
The latter remark is significant. It would seem to imply 
that Helleu had sought de Gaulle's approval for keeping 
Spears in the dark as to his actions. Though Helleu 
evidently believed that he had received his chief's approval 
to disregard Spears, it is not clear whether or not he had 
informed de Gaulle of exactly how he proposed to act. 
Helleu confessed to de Gaulle that he had hesitated 
before proceeding with the arrest of the Chief of State, 
mais celui-ci s'etait mis volontairement en fleche 
dans l'action contre la France. II nous avait 
hypocritement dupe. 
He continued reassuringly that there had been no serious or 
generalised trouble, "malgre l'appui donne par les 
britanniques aux agitateurs". His measures, he claimed, had 
been taken, 
contre des hommes qui avaient fait huer la France et 
qui avaient forme une association etroite avec la 
Puissance qui poursuit depuis des annees ici 
l'eviction de notre pays. 
As news of Catroux' s arrival had been publicised, Helleu 
claimed, it had created confusion surrounding his own 
position: he predicted that he would be obliged "de faire 
des reserves sur la securite au cours des jours qui 
viennent". He ended his telegram to de Gaulle thus: 
21 Helleu a de Gaulle, 13 Novembre 1943, Service 
Historique de l'Armee de Terre, 4H 308(3). 
C'est votre presence 
redressement accompli. 22 
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qui sanctionnerait Ie 
His plea was echoed that same day by one Commandant de 
Sieyes23 : 
Permets a notre vielle ami tie que j' appelle tres 
vivement aupres de toi la suggestion de M. Helleu de 
ta venue immediate au Levant. 24 
It is evident from the tone of this correspondence that 
those responsible for the events in the Lebanon had no 
hesitation in addressing such correspondence to de Gaulle 
and they clearly expected their letters to receive a 
sympathetic hearing. 
There were others on the staff in the Delegation 
Generale who were evidently less certain about how the 
Committee would react to events carried out in its name in 
the Lebanon. Once the news broke that Catroux was en route, 
some thought it more politic to try and curry favour with 
him. One such a man was Baelen, who described himself to 
Catroux as "un ancient collaborateur qui a participe sous 
vos ordres a la lutte journaliere pour la defense de la 
France". He despatched a rapturous welcome to greet Catroux 
in Cairo: 
22 "b"d 1.. 1.. • 
23 Commandant de Sieyes: mentioned as a private 
intelligence officer for de Gaulle in the Levant in 1945. 
24 Commandant de Sieyes a de Gaulle, 13 Novembre 1943, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. On 18 November Helleu 
sent de Gaulle a message, informing him that he was sending 
the Commandant to Algiers, as "porteur d'un pli important". 
He begged de Gaulle to receive him as soon as he arrived. 
Helleu a de Gaulle, 18 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger 
CFLN, Vol 1575. 
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Vo!r7 presence dissipera les derniers nuages. Elle pr7v1endra les interventions mili taires anglaises et d01 t permettre une clarification avantageuse des 
rapports franco-anglais au Levant. 
Baelen sought to enlighten Catroux prior to his arrival in 
Beirut, about the state of affairs in the Levant; he stated 
his personal conviction that the French position would have 
been lost without the "coup d'eclat" which had occurred, as 
Bechara el Khoury had broken all his promises and had risen 
up against France. Baelen remained supremely confident 
however, that the damage to France's position had now been 
contained. Spears had been unmasked, "et a peut-etre perdu, 
en une nuit, deux ans de travail anti-fran9ais". Moreover, 
he was dismissive of the threats from Cairo and Bagdad about 
possible Egyptian and Iraqui intervention. He insisted that 
British-controlled radio stations were conducting "un 
campagne de mensonge digne de Goebbels", which only served 
to highlight the game the British were up to. In Baelen's 
opinion, there was nothing to worry about: Syria "demeure en 
expectative, nullement malveillant", and there was "rien de 
tragique en matiere de securi te" . 25 
Catroux did not actually reach Cairo until the afternoon 
of 14 November. He immediately fulfilled Casey's worst 
expectations by postponing the proposed 6. OOpm meeting, 
despite the urgency of the situation, as he claimed to be 
exhausted and to have a fever. He promised to calIon Casey 
before 9.30 the following morning, before flying to Beirut. 26 
The pair finally met on Monday 15 November27 , when Casey 
informed Catroux that unless the Lebanese ministers were 
25 Baelen a Catroux, 13 Novembre 1943, 
Historique de l'Armee de Terre, 4H 308(3). 
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26 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E6955/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
14 November 1943, 
27 The meeting was also attended on the British side by 
Major Pavitt, Sir William Croft~ and Mr. Ham~lto~, ~nd on 
the French side by Baron de Ben01st and Capta1n F111101. 
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released in the shortest possible time after his arrival in 
Beirut, the situation was likely to get out of hand. He 
warned that Britain would not tolerate any further 
deterioration in Levant affairs and therefore the very 
future of Anglo-French relations hung in the balance. 28 
Catroux replied that Helleu had acted on his own 
responsibili ty. Though Casey recorded that Catroux "would 
give no undertaking as to [Helleu's] early recall", he had 
stated that his supercession of Helleu "constituted in 
effect a sanction and disavowal". Catroux had tried to 
emphasise the importance of leaving all political initiative 
in the Levant to the French. Whilst he accepted the 
sincerity of Britain's declarations regarding France's 
special position, he remained convinced that 
a grave factor in the present situation was a 
general belief that Great Britain intended to 
undermine and ruin the authority of the French in 
the Levant. 
If Britain did interfere in Levant affairs, the French would 
prefer to withdraw, and put their case before international 
opinion to judge. He intended to effect a settlement which 
encompassed the French declaration of independence, her 
duties and obligations as the Mandatory power and her 
reponsibility as an Ally, but he would do this "in his own 
way and time". He refused to regard the British demands as 
an ultimatum but rather as "a proposal", in dealing with 
which, he would have to take French prestige into account, 
as well as the relationship which ideally ought to exist 
between Allies. As Casey again stressed the need for urgent 
action, Catroux astonished him by announcing that he did not 
28 Casey to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, 
E7010/27 /89, FO 371/35186; Record of meeting between the 
Minister of State and General Catroux, Cairo, 15 November 
1943 E7387/27/89, FO 371/35192; Casey to Foreign Office, 15 
Nove~ber 1943, PREM 3/421; Casey, op cit, pp 144-45. 
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intend to leave for Beirut until the following day, alleging 
that he needed to consult with the Commander-in-Chief. 
Nothing Casey said would persuade Catroux otherwise. 29 
Catroux filed his own account of the encounter with 
Casey a day later from Beirut. 30 He emphasised to Algiers how 
alarmed Casey had been at his delay in reaching Beirut and 
how much pressure he had applied to try and persuade him to 
leave as soon as possible, to dismiss Helleu, to release and 
to reinstate the ministers. His account stresses the 
complaints he had himself lodged about Spears, about "la 
longue serie des agissements de Spears et ses interventions 
dans Ie choix du President". Catroux reported that he had 
told Casey that 
l'affaire en question apparait a 1 'opinion comme une 
grave episode de la ri vali te Franco-Anglaise et 
marque que Ie Ministre d' Angleterre se trouve a 
I 'origine de la presente crise. Casey l' a defendu" . 31 
In his memoirs, Catroux recalls that he had maintained that 
the remedy for all Franco-British difficulties in the Levant 
lay in "Ie depart simul tane d' Helleu et de Spears". 32 Casey 
however, loyally made no mention of this part of the 
conversation to London. 
General Wilson also saw Catroux briefly on 15 November. 
Wilson thought he seemed "very tired indeed ... after a two 
hour slogging match with Casey", and "anxious about his task 
in Beirut". Like Casey, Wilson stressed the importance of 
immediate action, and "rubbed in the security aspect from 
29 ibid. 
30 Catroux a Alger, 16 Novembre 1943, No 1581, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
31 ibid. 
32 Catroux, op cit, p 413. 
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the Allied point of view". 33 He instructed Holmes to deal 
similarly with Catroux when he arrived in Beirut, "and avoid 
where possible the political discussions, except to get 
things done quickly ... ,,34 In a telegram to the CIGS, he 
expressed his concern that unless Catroux made a "generous 
gesture" and quickly, trouble might restart in the Lebanon 
and might well spread to Syria. 35 
A second meeting took place between Casey and Catroux on 
15 November. Casey creates the impression both in his 
telegrams and in Personal Experience, that the meeting was 
spontaneous, that Catroux was "very worried" and wanted a 
private meeting, as he thought it most important to clear 
his mind with Casey before departing for Beirut. 36 Catroux 
however, asserts that the meeting took place at Casey's 
request and reproduces his report of the conversation in his 
memoirs. 37 The two separate accounts of the meeting bear 
little resemblance, as both men evidently sought to 
highlight different aspects of the conversation. Catroux 
recorded how Casey had stressed the effect French behaviour 
in the Lebanon would have on her future relations with 
Britain and America. Whilst acknowledging the importance of 
these relations, Catroux argued that the dignity and rights 
of France were more important still. He contended that any 
clarification of Franco-British relations was impossible 
while Spears remained in the Levant; only after the recall 
33 Wilson to Holmes, 15 November 1943, ADC/437, WO 
201/982. 
34 Wilson to Holmes, 15 November 1943, WO 201/984. 
35 Wilson to CIGS, 15 November 1943, CIC/184, PREM 
3/421. 
36 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E7012/27/89, FO 371/35185. 
15 November 1943, 
37 Catroux, op cit, pp 413-14; Catroux a Alger, 17 
Novembre 1943, No 389-91, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 
1575. 
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of both Spears and Helleu might a return to constitutional 
life, with Bechara el Khoury at the helm, be envisaged. 38 
Casey however, reported that Catroux was extremely 
perturbed that extensive publicity had transformed a Franco-
Lebanese dispute into a Franco-British dispute. He had even 
admitted that by rights, Helleu should be recalled and the 
government restored, though actually to do so "would be 
regarded as a straight French capitulation to the British 
wi th a complete loss of face to the French". There were 
things that could be done and others that could not, Catroux 
declared, and he had actually threatened that "he had to 
envisage seriously recommending that the French should 
retire from the Levant". Perhaps realising the strong 
element of bluff in these threats, Casey was unsympathetic: 
he pointed out that if Helleu had acted on his own 
initiative as Catroux had claimed, then it would be 
perfectly possible to come up with a cleverly worded 
statement which laid all blame at his feet, and let the 
Committee off the hook. (Casey really did not believe that 
Helleu had acted on his own initiative. On 17 November, he 
wrote to Churchill: "Catroux blames Helleu for everything 
and says he acted without instructions from Algiers. I do 
not believe this is true but if they choose to make Helleu 
the scapegoat, it does not appear to matter to us". 39) In the 
meantime, he reminded Catroux, two very important issues 
remained at stake Anglo-French and probably Franco-
American relations, and the Allied war effort in the Lebanon 
and there remained only a limited time in which to 
salvage them. 40 
38 "b" d 22. 
39 Casey to Churchill, 17 November 1943, Box III, File 
III, Spears Papers, MEC. 
40 Casey to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, 
E7012/27/89, FO 371/35186; Casey, op cit, p 145. 
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iii) A Time-Limit Determined 
In support of Casey's plea for the imposition of a time-
limit on the French, Spears had been keeping the Foreign 
Office well supplied wi th telegrams describing the 
deteriorating situation in the Levant. Edde had failed 
miserably to form a government of any description, and in 
Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli, the strikes and general 
disturbances continued. 41 Spears took particular pains to 
highlight how crucial his own role was as guardian of the 
peace, by emphasising the increasing desire of many Lebanese 
to resort to violence. A local chieftain in South Lebanon 
with over two hundred men at his disposal had enquired of 
the Legation whether he might commence sabotage activities 
against the French, and the mayor of Sidon had reported a 
plan to blow up French installations in the town. It had 
been stressed to both that Britain wished to avoid any 
disturbances causing unnecessary loss of life and 
fortunately the counsels of moderation had been heeded. In 
addition, the legal government, now in hiding, had planned 
an attack on Beirut, but Spears had sent a similar message 
to them to remain calm and to do nothing foolish in view of 
Catroux's imminent arrival. 42 A representative of the Ninth 
Army had also contacted the government with a similar plea 
and it had promised to remain quiet unless attacked. 43 Nor, 
Spears was keen to stress, were the Lebanese without offers 
of outside assistance: he had reliable information that 
representatives of certain Palestinian Arab terrorist 
41 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7053/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
16 November 1943, 
42 Spears to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, Nos 674 
and 675, E6972/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
43 Wilson to CIGS, 15 November 1943, CIC/184, PREM 
3/421. 
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organisations had offered assistance to the Lebanese 
government, though the government had rejected the offer.44 
Adding to the drama of Spears' reports, he himself was 
at the centre of an incident with the French. Just after 
9.00pm on 15 November, three hours after the curfew, he left 
the Mission by car for home. As the car slowed down on a 
hill, a French soldier appeared, brandishing a revolver in 
the general direction of the car and forcing the driver to 
stop. The soldier, according to French reports, was quite 
drunk, easily disarmed, apprehended and marched off by the 
military police. Spears however, reported that the incident 
was a good illustration of the mentality of the French in 
the Levant "who feel they can threaten people with loaded 
revolvers with impunity" and especially of 
the complete lack of discipline of French troops and 
the utter inability of the French military 
authorities to control them. 45 
Helleu felt that the incident was being blown up out of all 
proportion and informed Algiers of his suspicions that 
Spears was trying 
de monter cette affaire en epingle pour obtenir sans 
doute que Ie contrale de la securite passe 
presentement aux mains des britanniques. 46 
44 Spears to Foreign Office, 16 November 1943, 
E7060/27/89, FO 371/35187. Henri Pharaon informed a member 
of the Spears Mission staff that he had received visits from 
representatives of certain Palestinian terrorist 
organisations with offers of assistance. See Note, dated 15 
November 1943 in FO 226/241. 
45 Spears to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, 
E7017/27/89, FO 371/35186; Spears, op cit, pp 255-56. 
46 Helleu a Alger, 15 Novembre 1943, No 368-69, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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Spears certainly wanted more decisive action from his 
own government. He had not been been particularly pleased 
with the way Casey had handled Catroux, feeling that the 
Minister of State had let him off too lightly. He reminded 
the Foreign Office that Catroux had failed to reach Beirut 
by the 15 November, the date Britain had stipulated. Worse 
still, Catroux had made it quite plain in conversation with 
Casey that he intended, on arrival, "to cast about for face-
saving devices". It seemed from the statement issued by the 
Committee on 13 November that the French intended to attempt 
to bargain the release of the ministers against a reversion 
to a mandatory constitution, which was certainly far from 
satisfactory, and given the present temper of the Lebanese 
people, "doomed to failure". 47 He professed to understand 
that the French might find compliance with the British 
demands unpalatable, but, he admonished, "we simply cannot 
afford to plunge these countries in bloodshed and chaos out 
of regard for French" face" . ,,48 Above all, Spears was adamant 
that Britain should not be intimidated by the French threats 
to withdraw from the Levant as these were 
blackmail" . 49 
"sheer 
To highlight the potential danger of the situation, 
Spears reported that the French had sent an armed detachment 
into the area in which they believed the remainder of the 
government was in hiding. He warned that this would 
undoubtedly provoke an angry reaction throughout Lebanon and 
47 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7009/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
48 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7050/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
15 November 1943, 
16 November 1943, 
49 ibid. Spears pointed out that there were actually far 
fewer Frenchmen in the Levant than was generally realised, 
and the absence of the unco-operative and anti-British ones 
would be no hindrance. 
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possibly also in Syria, where tempers were steadily rising. 50 
The only way in which Spears believed Catroux could avoid 
the risk of serious trouble was by unconditionally releasing 
the President and his ministers within a few hours of his 
arrival and by announcing the early reassembly of 
Parliament. Otherwise, he urged that the French be 
instructed to withdraw all their troops and personnel to a 
safe distance, especially in Beirut. He expressed his 
disgust that the situation had been allowed to drag on so 
long and called for more decisive action: 
Algiers, with their futile complaints about alleged 
exaggerations in the press, seem incapable of 
realising the gravity of a situation regarding which 
they have undoubtedly been misinformed by Helleu. 
The last turn of the screw must be applied 
forthwith. 51 
Fortunately for Spears, the attitude which the British 
government was now adopting was hardening. As the days 
passed, Eden certainly seemed to be taking a stronger line 
than had hitherto been the case. In discussion with Hankey 
on 16 November, he revealed that if the French did not meet 
Britain's demands, as seemed more and more likely, he had 
decided that the time had come for Britain to make up her 
mind not only what she was going to do, but also when she 
would do it. He mentioned that the time seemed to be 
approaching when, as Casey had proposed, Catroux would have 
to be informed that, unless Britain received satisfaction 
within a given time, British martial law would have to be 
50 The French subsequently commenced military operations 
against a village thought to be sheltering the government 
and Spears protested to Catroux, insisting that the troops 
be recalled. The French however, replied that their troops 
were merely protecting some ammunition dumps. See Spears to 
Foreign Office, 16 November 1943, No 693, E7052/27/89 and No 
696, E7060/27/89; both in FO 371/35187; Spears to Catroux, 
16 November 1943, FO 226/245. 
51 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7009/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
15 November 1943, 
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declared. 52 He warned a Cabinet meeting that day that the 
indications were now that Catroux intended to play for time, 
and that unless the Lebanese ministers were released within 
a given time, Britain might be forced to state her proposed 
actions. The Cabinet however, was reluctant to take such a 
step; for the moment, i t resolved merely to review the 
situation when more information was available. 53 
There was a growing concern within the Foreign Office 
about the steady deterioration of the conditions in the 
Levant: the food situation was worsening, the French and the 
Lebanese had only narrowly been restrained from violence, 
and it was only a matter of time before outside offers of 
assistance were accepted, thereby inflaming the situation 
and compromising the military security of a vitally 
important area. Yet despite all this, there was a real 
reluctance within the Foreign Office to side with Casey and 
Spears. A Foreign Office note to Eden, to prepare him for 
the Cabinet meeting on 17 November, pointed out that serious 
disorders in the Lebanon might well have grave repercussions 
in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East; it seemed that 
unless the Lebanese ministers were released forthwith, 
Britain's position throughout the region would be critically 
affected. Whilst all these factors seemed to dictate a need 
for some positive action from the British to restore the 
si tuation, the note stressed that conversely, to declare 
British martial law would be a very serious step and would 
have profound consequences for Britain's relations with the 
French in North Africa. The note advised therefore that it 
52 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 16 November 1943, 
E7102/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
53 Conclusions of a War Cabinet meeting, 5.30pm, 
Tuesday, 16 November 1943, CAB 65/36. 
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would be better to secure the desired result by increasing 
diplomatic pressure if at all possible. 54 
An additional reminder of the need for circumspection 
had come in a telegram from Halifax55 , who had warned that 
if Britain was obliged to use force, she could expect 
"considerable [American] criticism and suspicion of supposed 
British imperial designs in the Levant". He explained that 
in American minds, the Lebanese situation was analogous to 
the British imprisonment of Gandhi and Nehru in India56 , and 
it was well nigh impossible to get American opinion to see 
the difference. If Britain waded in too forcefully, the 
American public, as yet undecided between the French and the 
Lebanese, "would probably be a good deal more united in 
suspecting British motives". 57 Halifax had warned therefore 
that as far as American sensitivities were concerned, it 
would be desirable to play down British intervention in the 
Lebanon as much as possible "and to avoid any excuse for the 
suspicion that we are trying to exploit the incident for 
ends of our own, or that we use one set of arguments where 
India is concerned (that public security requires the arrest 
of political leaders) , and the opposite arguments where 
54 Note for Secretary of State for Cabinet meeting, 17 
November 1943, E7102/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
55 Lord Halifax: British Ambassador to the United States 
between 1941 and 1946. 
56 When Casey communicated the gist of Halifax's 
telegram to Kirk, the American, though admitting that he 
probably did not have balanced appreciation of American 
opinion, reacted strongly and claimed that the suggested 
analogy was "cockeyed" and that the two situations did not 
compare. Casey to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, 
E7134/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
57 Halifax had enclosed a summary of American press 
coverage of the Lebanese affair to illustrate his case: for 
example, the Washington Post supported the arrests as a 
necessary measure until the end of the war, whereas the 
Washington News cri ticised de Gaulle's "high-handed 
dictatorship". 
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Syria is concerned". 58 The Foreign Office had already been 
warned by Colonel Hoskins, (a special emissary of 
Roosevelt's), that most American officials were convinced 
that the British Middle East authorities, especially Spears, 
"intended, by hook or by crook, to wrest the Levant States 
from the French". 59 To officials in London, who were loath 
to contemplate the idea of intervening against the French in 
the Levant unless absolutely essential, this telegram from 
Halifax served to highlight the need to proceed with 
considerable caution. 
Nonetheless, when the Cabinet met at noon on 17 
November, with hardly any more information at its disposal 
than had been available at its previous meeting, Eden 
announced that to avoid further delay, the French must be 
brought to comply with Britain's demands by a definite time. 
If they proved willing to dismiss Helleu and to release the 
Lebanese, he proposed summoning a conference to negotiate a 
modus vivendi. If on the other hand they proved unwilling, 
he specifically rejected the idea previously mooted, of 
threatening the Committee with the withdrawal of British 
recogni tion. He read aloud to his colleagues a telegram 
which he proposed to send to Casey. This instructed the 
Minister of State, if there had been no promising signs from 
the French by the evening of 18 November, to fly to Beirut 
first thing on 19 November and to inform Catroux that unless 
the British demands were satisfied by 10.00am on Sunday, 21 
November British martial law would be declared, on grounds , 
of military necessity and without any political 
implications. The Cabinet approved the despatch of the 
58 Halifax to Foreign Office, 
E7032/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
15 November 1943, 
59 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 16 November 1943, 
E7032/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
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telegram. 60 A second telegram examined other possible 
scenarios: if Catroux recommended, as he had threatened, a 
total French withdrawal, then Casey should inform him that 
Britain would regret the decision, but would be forced to 
take over; if Catroux released the Ministers, though without 
reinstating them for, as the telegram pointed out, 
Britain was "not insisting on the immediate re-establishment 
of the old Government" the next stage would be to 
persuade Catroux to negotiate a modus vivendi with the 
Lebanese under Britain's good offices. 61 
iv) Much Ado About Nothing 
As Spears had described, in Algiers the French were 
defiantly maintaining that nothing was amiss in the Lebanon. 
There was no hint of self-criticism in the local press, the 
whole tone of which was one "of injured innocence".62 With 
headlines such as "The Lebanese incidents have been grossly 
twisted and exaggerated. Calm reigns throughout the 
country", the French press pursued its "ostrich-like policy" 
and continued to "soft-pedal" events in the Lebanon. 63 
Particularly great prominence was given in Algiers to a 
report in The Times which criticised the sensational 
despatches which other papers had featured, and reported 
60 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, noon, Wednesday, 
17 November 1943, CAB 65/36; Foreign Office to Casey, 17 
November 1943, E7102/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
61 Foreign Office to Casey, 17 November 1943, 
E7102/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
62 Algiers to Foreign Office, 14 November 1943, 
E7058/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
63 Makins to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, FO 
226/245; Makins to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, 
E7091/27/89 and Makins to Foreign Office, 16 November 1943, 
E7079/27/89; both in FO 371/35187. 
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that "profound calm" now reigned in the Lebanon. The 
Committee too made similar assertions: it published a 
communique on 15 November to the effect that foreign news 
sources had given a fundamentally inaccurate picture of the 
Lebanese situation. Blame continued to be laid at Riad 
Solh's door for provoking the whole affair by presenting 
Helleu with a fait accompli. Subsequent events had been 
"grossly distorted and exaggerated"; Lebanon was completely 
calm and, on arrival, Catroux would put an end to any 
misunderstandings which persisted. 64 
Considerable efforts being were made by Macmillan's 
staff to pull the wool from French eyes. Makins made a 
strong protest to Massigli about the incident outside the 
Spears Mission. The latter appeared "much disturbed and said 
that if the facts were as stated, the action of French 
troops was obj ectionable" . 65 A written report on the Tripoli 
incident was also handed to Massigli on 17 November, and met 
with a similar response: Massigli replied that the facts, 
"if true, were terrible". Macmillan tried to emphasise to 
Massigli that if calm was preserved in the Levant, it was 
due to the continual efforts of British officials to 
restrain the emotions of the people. He pointed out that had 
Bri tain wanted to, she "could have set the whole Levant 
States ablaze", but instead, she had thrown her whole weight 
"towards peace and quiet". 66 These efforts to alert the 
French in Algiers to the real nature of the problem in the 
Levant States may have had some impact on Massigli 
personally; no change however, was discernible in the 
official French attitude. 
64 Algiers to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, 
E7062/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
65 Algiers to Foreign Office, 15 November 1943, 
E7057/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
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In a telegram despatched on 16 November to its missions 
abroad to enable them "de contrebattre les informations 
fausses ou tendancieuses ... ", the Committee rigidly adhered 
to its original line: the Lebanese had provoked Helleu to 
suspend the constitution and to arrest the government. It 
was stated however, that "en raison de l' urgence, l' avis 
prealable du Comite sur les mesures envisagees ne fut pas 
sollici te". The telegram alleged that the population had 
understood the necessity of such measures and had remained 
perfectly calm throughout the Levant; the only 
demonstrations of any importance had taken place in Beirut. 
Foreign correspondents had presented an entirely false 
impression of the situation and "ont inconsciemment servi 
les buts de la propagande allemande". 67 
Similarly, on 16 November, de Gaulle made a speech to a 
specially summoned meeting of the Constituent Assembly, in 
which he contended that Lebanese behaviour had been 
considered unacceptable by Helleu and by the Committee on 
three separate counts: the government had unilaterally 
modified an international statute which it was not entitled 
to modify; this had been carried out in a manner which 
amounted to a provocation of France; finally, the 
government's action was of a nature to disturb the political 
and strategic conditions of the area. De Gaulle stressed 
that France herself was unable to unilaterally renounce a 
mandate which had been conferred on her by the League of 
Nations. Catroux had promised in 1941 to proceed with the 
establishment of Levant independence and the present crisis 
had made no difference to that policy: the Committee still 
wished to see a normal constitutional situation prevail in 
the Lebanon. However, France was obliged to protect her own 
traditional position in the area and to preserve the peace 
67 Alger a Londres, Moscou, Washington etc., 16 Novembre 
1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
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and tranquillity of an area so vital to the Allied cause. 
Catroux was currently on the spot, with Lebanese agreement, 
studying the best means of solving the problem. De Gaulle 
did his best to play down the affair, making use in his 
speech of a phrase which he claimed to have borrowed from 
Poincare: "Le nuage qui passe n'obscurcira pas l'horizon". 
This was to become the keynote of all press reports in 
Algiers the following day. 68 The Foreign Office was not 
impressed; when Hankey received a copy of the full text of 
the speech, he commented that it was "mostly "bla" ", and 
continued: 
I see very little likelihood that anyone in Algiers 
except M. Massigli knows what is really the issue. 
The general atmosphere is make-believe. 69 
However, until Catroux's arrival in Beirut on 16 
November, the French Committee had very little information 
on which to base its judgment. It had had to rely almost 
exclusively on Helleu's reports, and these, as in the early 
stages of the crisis, had continued to minimise events in 
the Lebanon and to protest against any sources which said 
differently: "Tout est calme ici, mais l' activi te 
britannique est constante et menacante", claimed Helleu on 
15 November. He added that he had received information that 
the Political Officer at Deir ez Zor had been instructed to 
keep relations with the French to a strict minimum "en 
raison des atroci tes franc;aises" . 70 Similar unconfirmed 
reports had also reached the British military establishment 
that all Political Officers in Syria had received such 
68 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, 
E7097/27/89, FO 371/35187; Macmillan to Foreign Office, 17 
November 1943, E7162/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
69 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 18 November 1943, 
E7104/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
70 Beyrouth a Alger, 15 Novembre 1943, No 1568, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
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instructions, and that the French regarded this as almost a 
breach of diplomatic relations. 71 
On 16 November, Helleu wrote to Massigli at great 
length, complaining about Reuters reports, which continued 
to be "generalement grossierement mensongeres". He accused 
certain British agents, motivated purely by spite, of 
orchestrating "une campagne d' information mensongere", which 
on 13 and 14 November, "atteignit son paroxysme. Le Liban 
fut depeint comme etant entierement a feu et a sang ... on 
s'effor9a, en outre, de donner 1 'impression que les troubles 
avaient pris Ie caractere d ' un veri table mouvement 
revolutionnaire" . British controlled radio stations and 
Reuters together, he alleged, had outdone Radio Berlin, and 
he underlined that the campaign was as damaging to the 
Allied war effort as it was to French interests, for in 
effect, it constituted "un manoeuvre d' exci tation et un 
appel a la revolte".72 
Even after Catroux's arrival, Helleu kept up a barrage 
of telegrams to Algiers, asserting that he continued to 
receive "de tres nombreux temoignages de satisfaction et de 
reconnaissances suscitees par les mesures que j'ai prises 
pour redresser la situation".73 Furthermore, troops from the 
seventh battalion which he had sent into the mountains had 
been welcomed warmly, Damascus remained "absolument calme", 
and in Beirut, the strike was a sham, as shops were in fact 
selling their goods but with their shutters partially 
71 PICME to War Office, 17 November 1943, E7118/27/89, 
FO 371/35188. 
72 Helleu a Alger, 16 Novembre 1943, No 1803/DC, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
73 Helleu a Alger, 17 Novembre 1943, No 409; Helleu a 
Alger, 18 Novembre, No 427; Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 
1575. 
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closed. 74 Rumours of food shortages were being circulated by 
the British, who "veulent prouver A la population qu'eux 
seuls peuvent assurer Ie ravi taillement" . Moreover, he 
insisted that there was no question of a united Arab front 
against the French: "J'en ai eu une premiAre preuve dans 
l'attitude plus correcte du gouvernement syrien".75 
v) Breaking the Rules of Fair Play 
On the French side, it fell to Vienot however, to try 
and wake Algiers up to the damage French action in the 
Lebanon had done and was continuing to do, to French 
standing in Britain. No matter how temperate and measured 
the Foreign Office reponse had been, the same could not be 
said for the reactions of large sections of the British 
press and public opinion, the scale and acuteness of which 
had surprised Vienot. By citing examples of the 
sensationalist headlines carried by British newspapers, he 
hoped to bring horne to Algiers the gravity of the situation. 
France faced "une violente prise de position de l' opinion 
bri tannique contre Ie Comi te et la poli tique franc;aise". 
Indeed, the popular press was proving so critical that 
Vienot thought it improbable that the British government 
would be able to ignore it for much 10nger. 76 
In fact the staff at Carlton Gardens had been obliged 
to make frequent complaints about the excesses of the 
Bri tish press. At a meeting on 16 November with British 
representatives, the French alleged that British newspapers 
74 Helleu A Alger, 17 Novembre 1943, No 408 et No 410; 
Helleu A Alger, 18 Novembre 1943, No 427; Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
75 Helleu A Alger, 18 Novembre 1943, No 423-26 et No 
428-9, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
76 ibid. 
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"n' avaient pas joue Ie jeu". 77 Vienot informed Algiers on 17 
November that he possessed proof that Reuters had colluded 
avec certains j ournaux bri tanniques pour leur passer 
a propos des incidents du Liban informations anti-
franc;aises et pour stopper celles qui nous sont 
favorables • 78 
A "very embarrassed" Roche subsequently brought up the 
"painful and delicate matter" with Mack79 • Though the latter 
refused "to admit any French complaint in connection with 
the Lebanon", and asked Roche to supply "chapter and verse", 
he admitted subsequently in a minute, that there was 
"substance in M. Roche's complaint". Roche had added that 
the general attitude of the British press over the Lebanese 
"gave the impression that they were waiting for an 
opportuni ty to attack the French". 80 
This was certainly a common feeling amongst French 
representatives in London. Vienot had earlier recorded his 
surprise at the virulence of the British press, and though 
by 17 November, the tone of the newspapers was much calmer, 
he thought it more and more obvious "qu'une campagne a ete 
montee contre nous". 81 The Foreign Office itself however, had 
been sympathetic and had promised to do what it could, for 
example in suppressing the fact that Britain was demanding 
77 Vienot a Alger, 16 Novembre 1943, No 1215-17, ,Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
78 Vienot a Alger, 17 Novembre 1943, No 1256, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
79 w. H. B. Mack: Counsellor in the Foreign Office; 
subsequently employed as Political Liaison Officer with US 
forces in Great Britain, with rank of Acting Assistant Under 
Secretary of State. 
80 Minute by W. H. B. Mack, 18 November 1943, 
E7316/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
81 Vienot a Alger, 17 Novembre 1943, No 1272-79, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
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Helleu's recall , to thereby avoid adding any further to 
Catroux's difficulties. 82 There was a general recognition 
that Cadogan had been as good as his word, and had succeeded 
in moderating the tone of the press a little. All this had 
served to convince Vienot 
que Ie Foreign Office ... est etranger aces 
manoeuvres. Ce sont d'autres milieux qui ont saisi 
l' occasion de lancer une attaque. 83 
Vienot certainly suspected a conspiracy of sorts against 
France. He had already reported the hostile attitude of 
Reuters but felt that it was not purely by chance that the 
Daily Express and the Evening Standard had adopted "une 
atti tude insul tante" towards France, or that the Daily 
Sketch "colporte d'invraisemblables recits": 
Derriere ces journaux dont Ie grand public est 
friand, il ne me parait douteux que certains gens de 
la cite aient agi sans se montrer. Ce serait 
neanmoins limiter la portee de la manoeuvre que d'en 
attribuer les mobiles aux seuls interets de tel au 
tel groupe financier. Le probleme est plus vaste et 
de caractere politique. Sans vouloir Ie simplifier, 
on peut admettre que certains milieux canservateurs 
ne cherchent pas tant a evincer la France du Levant 
qu'a porter un coup au Gaullisme dont les tendances 
"de gauche" les inquietent des aujourd'hui, ret] les 
preoccupent mains que l'avenir. 84 
Vienot believed that these circles saw in the Committee 
les signes avant-coureurs d'un regime qu'ils 
denoncent deja comme socialisant et communisant. Les 
entreprises de la presse populaire conservatrice se 
sont trouvees facilitees du fait qu'au meme moment, 
mais pour des raisons diametralement opposees, les 
82 Vienot a Alger, 16 Novembre 1943, No 1215-17, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
83 Vienot a Alger, 17 Novembre 1943, No 1272-79, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
84 ibid. 
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doctrinaires et travaillistes, par la voix du News 
Chronicle et du Daily Herald, ont critique notre 
poli tique dans les termes les plus severes. Des 
souP90ns de fascisme ont encore aggrave dans 
l'opinion les degats produits par des souP90ns du 
socialisme. 85 
Vienot claimed that the British press had brutally broken 
"les regles du Fair Play", and had lacked dignity throughout 
the episode: 
De l'aveu general, jamais depuis bien des annees on 
n'avait assiste a un tel dechainement. Les procedes 
employes, indignent d'ailleurs de nos amis les plus 
fideles et les plus surs, mais cette campagne a 
laisse des traces. 86 
The Foreign Office sympathised to a large extent with 
the French case, though it was pointed out that French 
censorship in the Levant had contributed to some of the 
inaccuracies and sensationalism. Moreover, there was reason 
to be "seriously perturbed" by the completely misleading 
information the French press in North Africa was 
disseminating. 87 As Macmillan observed, the officially 
inspired and controlled local press continued to create the 
impression that there had been "much ado about nothing", 
with the consequence that opinion would be taken aback if 
events took a more drastic turn. 88 
Indeed, a certain suspicion existed within the Foreign 
Office itself that not all departments within the government 
were as sympathetic as the Office itself towards the French. 
That suspicion was fuelled when the French handed them a 
85 ibid. 
86 ibid. 
87 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 18 November 1943, 
E7316/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
88 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, 
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copy of a directive issued to all sections of the BBC at 
3.00pm on 16 November. The directive made extensive use of 
a particularly damning Evening Standard article, and warned 
that in view of the gravity of the Lebanese situation, 
Britain might have to take drastic action. "Therefore", it 
continued, "cut out the anodyne and the whitewash and let 
London speak firmly in a British voice". Fortunately, due to 
French protest, the directive was withdrawn before any harm 
was done, but the Foreign Office was concerned to know where 
"the wheeze" had originated and suspected Number 10, the 
Political Warfare Executive or Special Operations 
Executive. 89 A later PWE directive, Vienot was pleased to be 
able to report, instructed the BBC to comment on the 
Lebanese situation "avec reserve". 90 
Certainly an improvement in the tone of the British 
press did manifest itself and by 19 November, Vienot 
observed that the sensationalism had all but disappeared. 91 
If by 20 November however, the press had ceased to publish 
the more alarmist reports of hitherto, it nonetheless still 
contained "des articles qui prouvent que la crise libanaise 
continue de preoccuper gravement les milieux poli tiques". It 
still seemed to be felt in Carl ton Gardens that Algiers 
appreciated neither the gravity nor the urgency of the 
Lebanese situation. Even among those who were better 
disposed towards the French, and who were prepared to allow 
them "Ie temps de souffler", there was a feeling "de 
desapprobation latente". Reproaches were levelled at the 
French on the one hand for minimising the full significance 
of the affair, as evinced by the Algerian press, and on the 
89 Minutes by W. H. B. Mack, 18 November 1943 and R. M. 
A. Hankey, 28 November 1943, E7293/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
90 Vienot a Alger, 20 Novembre 1943, No 1339-40, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
91 Vienot a Alger, 19 Novembre 1943, No 1296-7, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. 
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other for not having demonstrated more of a spirit of 
collaboration towards the British: that Helleu had failed to 
inform Spears of his intentions still weighed heavily even 
upon Spears's detractors. 92 
vi) "Pour Partir en Guerre Contre L'Angleterre ... " 
Vienot had already tried to impress upon Algiers that 
the repercussions of French action would be wide and far-
reaching. The situation was extremely serious and he 
considered that it was now being aggravated by two hitherto 
unforeseen factors. Firstly, little or no credence was given 
in Britain to the possibility that Helleu had acted on his 
own ini tiati ve. British opinion was convinced that the 
serious measures to which Helleu had resorted, must have 
been decided upon in advance by the Committee. 93 In two 
separate telegrams Vienot pointed out that an announcement 
made in Algiers that Helleu had himself been responsible for 
his actions, had created a slight detente, only to be 
dissipated by a broadcast from Brazzaville of a communique 
from the Delegation Generale in the Levant, formally 
declaring that the Committee approved Helleu's measures. The 
broadcast had caused an uproar in the London media circles 
where it had been interpreted as an official expression of 
the Committee's attitude. Vienot urgently requested the 
issuance of "un dementi officiel, immediat et categorique" 
to ensure that the press were unable to continue to exploit 
the communique. 94 
92 Vienot a Alger, 19 et 20 Novembre 1943, No 1317-18, 
No 1323-24, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. 
93 Vienot a Alger, 14 Novembre 1943, No 1197-1201, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
94 Vienot a Alger, 16 Novembre 1943, No 1240-41 et No 
1242-43, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
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A further complicating factor in 
reckoned, was the natural tendency 
the affair, Vienot 
of the British to 
establish a cause and effect relationship between the events 
in Beirut and the recent alterations in the Committee: 
Des suspicions ou meme des accusations qui depassent 
de beaucoup la crise libanaise, s' expriment 
ouvertement, soi t qu ' on mette en cause les 
pretendues tendances dictatoriales du General de 
Gaulle, soit Ie pretendu nationalisme dont 
s'accompagnerait la resurrection franQaise, soit une 
pretendue politique anti-britannique du Comite. 95 
He pointed out that emotions the Lebanese incident had 
provoked served only to demonstrate Britain's permanent 
preoccupation with Near Eastern questions. The sentimental 
attachment of the British people to the Middle East meant 
that the authorities were on constant alert as to 
developments there. Britain's policy of support for pan-
Arabism was largely undertaken, he maintained, to assure the 
tranquillity of the area, which the War Office considered 
vital. Britain could hardly turn a blind eye therefore to 
what appeared to be a policy of force, threatening the 
security of the entire region. Britain's concern with the 
peace and quiet of the area was only heightened by the fact 
that it might shortly become a base for forthcoming military 
operations. 96 
Vienot had been bitterly upset by Lebanese events as he 
continued to believe that the French cause had made real 
progress in Britain in the previous three months. There was 
a growing interest in the Resistance and all things French; 
95 Vienot a Massigli, 14 Novembre 1943, No 1197-1201, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
96 Vienot a Alger, 15 Novembre 1943, No 1203-1206, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. Operations were due to 
commence early in the following year in the Aegean and 
unless Turkey could be persuaded to allow the Allies use of 
her airfields, bases in the Levant would be used. 
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the idea that France should play an active role in European 
affairs was becoming increasingly widespread, as was the 
tacit acceptance of the Committee as the organ of government 
of France in the future. Even the phlegmatic acceptance 
which Britain had accorded the recent purge of the Committee 
had foreshadowed "une evolution heureuse de la poli tique 
anglaise a notre egard, evolution que freignait seulement Ie 
souci de menager I' Amerique". The present crisis, he feared, 
had set back and compromised progress in each of these 
domains and he concluded: 
En tout cas, elle fournit une precieuse diversion 
aux elements qui nous sont defavorables et qui 
desirent eviter que ne se pose serieusement devant 
I 'opinion, la question de notre participation a la 
Commission europeennne. 97 
Vienot had been still more depressed to receive 
Massigli's despatch containing de Gaulle's instructions to 
threaten Britain with the possibility of a French withdrawal 
from the Levant. As the telegram had conveniently arrived 
incomplete, Vienot had deliberately chosen not to make the 
demarche as instructed. Instead, he remonstrated with 
Massigli that the whole notion was ridiculous: a French 
withdrawal would completely destroy any modicum of prestige 
and authority that France still possessed. Moreover, her 
place would immediately be seized by others, whereupon 
Spears and his entourage would have scored "un succes 
definitif". If the threat was made, it would be interpreted 
by the Foreign Office "comme l'annonce d'un appel du Comite 
a l'opinion fran9aise contre 
compromise everything which he, 
protect. He continued: 
l'Angleterre", 
Vienot, was 
and would 
fighting to 
L'appel du peuple fran9ais contre les Alliees, car 
il faut voir clairement que c'est de gela dont il 
s'agit, signifierait un triomphe sans precedent de 
97 Vienot a Alger, 14 Novembre 1943, No 1197-1201, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
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la propagande allemande et vichyiste. II creerait Ie 
trouble et Ie decouragement les plus graves dans la 
France occupee. 98 
Vienot demanded to know whether the Committee was prepared 
to accept the dire consequences which would inevitably 
result if he carried out the threat. He himself was not 
prepared to do so. 
In a separate personal and private letter to Massigli, 
Vienot fully acknowledged that his telegram would provoke 
"des remous serieux". He explained however, that he had 
thought long and hard about it. He had no intention of 
telling the British that France was ready to abandon the 
Lebanon, nor of denouncing to the people of France the 
Allies on whom the Free French depended. He stressed to 
Massigli that if the order to make this demarche to the 
British had come after, and in spite of, the observations he 
had made, he would have resigned. He had only realised that 
de Gaulle had already uttered to Makins99 the threat of a 
French withdrawal, when he had obtained a complete version 
of the telegram. This fact however, altered nothing as far 
as he was concerned: he had accepted his post in London 
pour faire un autre travail. Pour partir en guerre 
contre l'Angleterre, un autre s'en chargera. 
He explained that his failure to act upon his instructions 
had placed him in a moral dilemma, and confessed that he had 
been driven to confide in Lord Tyrrell10o • Tyrrell had deemed 
the situation "tragique" and had immediately set about 
arranging a meeting with Cadogan in which, Vienot assured 
98 Vienot a Alger, 16 Novembre 1943, No 1219-1227, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. 
99 Catroux had made the same threat to Casey on de 
Gaulle's instructions. 
100 Lord Tyrrell: former ambassador to Paris, 1928-1934. 
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Massigli, he would say all that he himself had already said 
and more, particularly concerning Spears, "qu'il tient pour 
Ie plus grand responsable et coupable. Et gela aura beaucoup 
plus porte que si c' etai t moi qui l' avais di t" .101 
Faced with such a tortured letter from his friend and 
colleague, Vienot, Massigli replied at great length. He 
pointed out that the Committee's decision to withdraw all 
French troops and personnel from the Levant if things turned 
out badly, had not been taken without first weighing up the 
seriousness of the measure. Nothing would be worse however, 
than 
Ie maintien sur place d' un delegue general de la 
France dans une position humilie et sous Ie contrale 
de fait du representative britannique, alors que, en 
theorie, la responsabilite du mandat continuerait a 
incomber a la France. 
He admitted that between the wars, it had been a firm rule 
of Franco-British relations not to allow Levant disputes to 
impinge upon general Anglo-French relations. Though no doubt 
the rule still held good, Massigli suspected that on this 
occasion, Riad Solh, Nahas Pasha, and Spears had conspired 
to sabotage it. He was certain that Riad Solh, whom Helleu 
had warned not to precipitate matters, would never have 
dared to present the French with a fait accompli "sans avoir 
pris l'avis de ses conseillers naturels". Nahas Pasha was 
obviously exploiting the incident "au profit des plans pan-
arabes du Caire", but Egyptian reactions were all the more 
remarkable, Massigli felt, when contrasted with the attitude 
of prudent reserve maintained by Damascus. 
As the situation in the Levant now seemed to be reaching 
something of a detente, Massigli left it to Vienot himself 
to gauge whether or not to threaten possible withdrawal from 
101 Vienot a Massigli, 16 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigl i , Vol 1480. 
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the Levant in conversation with the Foreign Office. He 
warned however, that if Vienot decided in favour of using 
the threat, it should not be reproduced "dans un document 
ecrit". Massigli explained that he had been pressed only 
that morning by Macmillan for an answer to the British 
demands, and wondered exactly what the British intended to 
do. Only a few weeks before, he had had no cause to doubt 
that Britain was as good as her word, with no intention of 
challenging France's right to preserve her own pre-eminent 
position in the Levant. Yet now, the moot question seemed to 
be whether Spears's success had effected a change in Foreign 
Office thinking, so that 
si les libanais se montraient prets a secouer 
1 'influence franQaise, il n'y avait pas lieu pour Ie 
gouvernement britannique de les decourager et de se 
compromettre a defendre notre position. 
-
Evidently reluctant to contemplate this possibility, 
Massigli drew attention to de Gaulle's speech to the 
Consultative Assembly the previous day. Despite the present 
crisis, this had stressed the Committee's desire to pursue 
a policy of emancipation for the Levant; provided nothing 
untoward happened in the Levant in the meantime, Massigli 
observed, it provided Britain with ample opportunity 
de reconsiderer sa politique et d'envisager la 
situation au Levant avec plus de calme. En tout cas, 
1 'attitude que Ie gouvernement britannique observera 
dans les jours qui viennent, nous eclairera sur ses 
intentions veri tables concernant notre etablissement 
au Levant. 102 
102 Massigli a Vienot, 17 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE CRISIS UNFOLDS 
i) Macmillan Visits Churchill Aboard HMS Renown 
In attempting to bring about a quick and painless 
solution to the Lebanese crisis, the Foreign Office had 
suffered only slightly from immoderate interventions by the 
Prime Minister; fortunately, when such interventions had 
occurred, Eden and the Cabinet had been able to limit the 
damage. As HMS Renown sailed past Gibraltar on the evening 
of 15 November, Macmillan was granted an excellent 
opportunity to temper further the Prime Minister's attitude 
towards the French over the Lebanese affair. He was picked 
up by the Renown, and questioned a great deal about the 
French situation by Churchill. Makins, who joined the party 
for lunch the following day, noted that Churchill 
was in a very bad humour about the French. He fumed 
against de Gaulle and seemed almost anxious to seize 
the opportunity afforded by the Lebanese crisis to 
try and break with him once and for all. 1 
Makins thought that Churchill seemed "very much put out by 
the reorganisation of the Committee". He and Macmillan tried 
to explain to him how the political situation in Algiers was 
moving out of the "Giraud/de Gaulle" phase and that a new 
epoch was in the making. 2 It was Macmillan's belief that new 
and healthy forces were emerging in Algiers, signalled by 
the arrival of representatives of the Resistance from France 
to join the Consultative Assembly. These men, he was sure, 
were "by no means slavish or adulatory supporters of de 
1 Makins to Strang, 18 November 1943, FO 800/432. 
2 "b"d 22. 
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Gaulle"; they were completely independent and would provide 
"a strong and critical opposition". 3 
Although Macmillan recognised that Churchill was "still 
violently anti-de Gaulle" , and that the Prime Minister 
feared "a sort of de Gaulle dictatorship, hostile to Britain 
and mischievous, if not dangerous", he nonetheless tried 
again, in conversation with him on the morning of 16 
November, to explain his own views about these new forces, 
which would challenge de Gaulle's authority to a certain 
extent. Macmillan went on to describe the Lebanese situation 
as "a test case": if the affair was handled with "some tact 
as well as energy", and ultimata were avoided "except if 
absolutely necessary", Britain would gain the support of 
Catroux, Massigli and at least half, if not two thirds, of 
the Committee, placing de Gaulle in a minority of three or 
four. He felt obliged to point out however, that while 
Spears remained in Beirut, "there would be open and bitter 
warfare between us and the French". Churchill, he recorded, 
"did not much like this". 4 
Though Macmillan had found Churchill "enormously" 
interested in his theories, they seem to have had little 
impact in reality. Makins noted that the Prime Minister was 
disposed to listen to their argument "but obviously did not 
altogether accept it". 
He said he did not mind de Gaulle in a Committee but 
he would not tolerate him in a position of supreme 
authority. He wanted a strong and friendly France, 
but he did not see that arising under de Gaulle's 
leadership. 5 
3 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entries for 15 and 16 November 
1943, pp 293-95. 
4 ibid. 
5 Makins to Strang, 18 November 1943, FO 800/432. 
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As the ship approached Algiers on 16 November, the Prime 
Minister did not disembark but defied Macmillan's advice and 
sent for his old friend, General Georges, who had recently 
been ousted from the Committee, "in order to mark his 
displeasure with de Gaulle". 6 Though he was not with the 
Prime Minister very long, "according to Desmond Morton7 , he 
had time enough to make a bitter personal attack on de 
Gaulle and so to add fuel to the Prime Minister's anger". 8 
During the course of the afternoon, Churchill sent a chaser 
telegram to Casey, enquiring whether the Lebanese Ministers 
had yet been released and reinstated. He demanded to know 
moreover, whether Spears was being "properly supported", and 
whether, presuming the goodwill of the population, there 
were sufficient British troops to take over effective 
control. In conclusion, his telegram had declared: 
It is not intended by His Majesty's Government to 
wait indefinitely for the release of the arrested 
Government of the Lebanon. 9 
6 °b °d l. l. • 
7 According to Makins, Desmond Morton had been 
instructed to disembark at Algiers "apparently for the 
principal purpose of trying to pin on de Gaulle the 
responsibility for the outbreak in the Lebanon". Makins to 
Strang, 18 November 1943, FO 800/432. Macmillan was. to pay 
tribute to the assistance provided by Morton dur.l.ng the 
Lebanese crisis, as he knew Churchill's mind "very well and 
how he will react to a particular way of putting a point or 
an arument". Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 24 November 
1943, P 302. So too, Makins thought he had been "most 
helpful" and appeared "to have a good grasp of the more 
fundamental issues involved". Makins to Strang, 26 November 
1943, FO 800/432. 
8 Makins to Strang, 18 November 1943, FO 800/432. 
9 Churchill to Casey, 16 November 1943, T1976/3, PREM 
3/421. 
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ii) Catroux In Beirut 
Catroux finally reached Beirut early on 16 November and 
was greeted by Helleu and his entourage, most of whom, he 
realised, did not welcome his presence. In his memoirs, he 
claimed that this did not offend him, as he understood their 
mentali ty , which to a large extent mirrored that of the 
entire French community in the Lebanon. He realised that 
these people regarded themselves as guardians and protectors 
of the mandate; their recent behaviour had been determined 
by the fact that they had viewed the unscrupulous dealings 
of Spears and the Lebanese as "un defi a la France qui 
exigeai tune riposte retentissante". 10 
Spears offered the Foreign Office a different 
interpretation as to why the French had been impelled to 
take such action: he believed that a great many Frenchmen in 
the Levant were "real Vichyi tes", who were "corrupt" and 
"not interested in an Allied victory". Most suffered 
additionally "from an inferiority complex since their defeat 
in 1940" which tended "to make them more assertive than they 
would normally be". In the main, their extraordinary 
behaviour had been activated by their "disappointment and 
anger" at discovering that the Lebanese people did not like 
them and were in fact, plainly disillusioned that they, the 
Fighting French, hardly differed from the "old gang". When 
they realised that Christians and Moslems alike longed for 
their departure, their bitterness "exceeded all bounds". 
Unwilling to accept that the fault was theirs, they looked 
for a scapegoat, "and of course, it was the British, who 
were intriguing to get them out of the Lebanon".l1 Thus the 
10 Catroux, op cit, P 414. 
11 Spears to Foreign Office, 17 
E7376/27/89, FO 371/35192. Against this 
Hankey minuted cynically: "So some are". 
November 1943, 
last sentence, 
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two men, on whose shoulders rested the lion's share of the 
reponsibility for resolving the Lebanese crisis, assessed 
the rationale of French behaviour in the Levant. 
Catroux deliberately set out to distance himself from 
Helleu, by refusing to lodge at the Residence des Pins, and 
staying instead in the centre of Beirut. Travelling through 
the city, he was struck by the torn and tattered posters of 
de Gaulle, while those of Churchill were untouched, a 
contrast, he felt, "qui ill ustrai t Ie fond du debat". 12 He 
immediately launched into a series of interviews and 
consul tations to try and form an exact 
situation. One of those he saw first, 
picture of the 
in an entirely 
deserted Petit Serail, was Emil Edde, alone and completely 
unable to form a government. 13 
It was not until 17 November, at 11.00am, that Catroux 
met with Spears for what the latter described as one and a 
half hours of "perfectly cordial but sterile" conversation. 14 
The meeting began badly when Spears reminded Catroux that 
Britain had expected the release of the Lebanese ministers 
over twenty four hours previously. Catroux immediately 
retorted that he was unaware that he was operating under an 
ultimatum and resented that implication. Spears tried 
unsuccessfully to deny the impression he had created of the 
existence of an ultimatum, explaining that there was merely 
a time by which His Majesty's Government expected its 
demands to be met. He pointed out that the Lebanese people 
had so far been kept quiet by announcements that everything 
would be put to rights when Catroux arrived and unless he 
12 Catroux, op cit, P 414. 
13 ibid, Spears to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, 
E7110/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
14 Spears to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, 
E7093/27/89, FO 371/35187; see also Spears, op cit, p 260-
261. 
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now acted promptly, they might turn against him. Spears 
mentioned that in his opinion, if Catroux were to release 
the ministers and restore the position prior to Helleu' s 
arrests and decrees, "there was still a possible chance for 
the French, but that otherwise ... the French position was 
lost". Britain would not back down or give way and "the 
longer the delay, the greater the blow to French prestige". 
Spears believed that the only way Catroux could maintain 
both his personal position and that of France "was to lay 
the blame on Helleu, where indeed, from what he said, it 
rested" . 15 
Catroux protested that he had to take certain 
psychological factors into account, especially the mandatory 
outlook of many of the French, but Spears was unsympathetic. 
He argued that such delaying tactics only fuelled fears 
already current, that the French intended to try and bargain 
wi th the Lebanese for the release of their government. 
Catroux adamantly maintained that France's posi tion 
throughout had been based on the mandate, and that unless he 
was given complete freedom to negotiate in his own manner 
and at his own pace, the French would withdraw from the 
Levant. With some embarrassment, he subsequently refused 
Spears permission to visit the Lebanese detainees at 
Rachaya, and when Spears questioned French rights in the 
matter, Catroux countered with the precedents Britain had 
herself established in Egypt, Burma, India and even in 
Britain itself. The conversation ended politely, though as 
a parting shot, Catroux remarked pointedly that he believed 
that a peaceful solution to the crisis depended largely on 
the Major-General himself. Spears concluded, from the 
meeting, that Catroux was "prepared to go to any length to 
save what he considers to be French prestige, although he 
15 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7093/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
17 November 1943, 
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recognises that the struggle has been engaged on very 
unfavourable ground for France". 16 
Immediately after his meeting with Spears, Catroux 
telegraphed some initial observations to Algiers. The 
conversation had been "dure", albeit "courtoise dans la 
forme".17 He believed that Helleu had acted in the Lebanon 
"en consultant seulement un tres petit nombre de 
collaborateurs". He commented that the Delegue seemed to 
have gained the impression from his brief visit to Algiers 
early in November, 
que vous souhaitez Ie voir agir vigoureusement au 
besoin. II a estime, et avec lui nombre de Fran9ais, 
que Ie prestige de la France aurai t sombre s' il 
n ' avai t pas agi comme ill' a fai t. Cette 
preoccupation legitime en soi lui a fait perdre de 
vue [les] repercussions locales et internationales 
de l'affaire. II a visiblement procede comme aurait 
pu Ie faire un Haut Commissaire a [1'] epoque du 
mandat autoritaire. Cette conception attardee, qui 
a omis de considerer les facteurs actuels du 
probleme franco-libanaise, nous a conduit a une 
impasse dont nous ne sortirons pas sans dommage. 18 
The arrest of the government, Catroux continued, had gravely 
wounded Lebanese national pride and dignity and had 
fortement affecte la confiance qu'on nous accordait, 
et accentue Ie courant qui porte deja les libanais 
vers l'Angleterre. Helleu fait figure de 
colonisateur et Spears de liberateur ... Voici les 
quelques elements du probleme qui en soulignent la 
16 ibid. 
17 Catroux a Alger, 18 November 1943, No 414-17, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575; also printed in Catroux, op 
cit, pp 418-19. 
18 Catroux a Alger, 17 Novembre 1943, No 392-99, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
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complexite, et dont la difficulte fundamentale est 
1 'hypotheque bri tannique. 19 
Catroux evidently thought it best to warn Algiers sooner 
rather than later that he could not foresee France emerging 
from her dilemma unscathed, for he continued: 
Des que j' apercevrai des solutions, je vous en 
aviserai, mais des maintenant, il est evident 
qu'elles nous couteront de sacrifices. 20 
Later that afternoon, Catroux interviewed General Holmes 
and informed him that he appreciated the gravity of the 
military situation and hoped to arrive at a solution within 
the next forty eight hours. He stated that Helleu had acted 
without instructions and that he and Boegner would 
eventually be dismissed. He stressed that he felt 
nonetheless that Britain was "asking a great deal in 
demanding the removal of Helleu and the complete 
reinstatement of the government" .21 From this report 
therefore, it is quite evident that Catroux had gained the 
impression, from his conversations with both Casey and 
Spears, that Britain was demanding the reinstatement of the 
Lebanese government. 
iii) Release Or Reinstatement? 
Yet in reality Britain was not demanding any such thing. 
When Foreign Office officials received Spears's account of 
his meeting with Catroux, they were furious with him. It was 
pointed out that "this remarkable representative" had 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. 
21 CinC,(ME) to CIGS, 17 November 1943, CIC/192, 
E7132/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
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"exceeded his instructions at every turn in what ought to 
have been an important conversation". 22 Firstly, due to what 
was deemed to be Spears's blatant mismanagement and 
mishandling of the situation, Catroux had gained the 
impression that Britain had imposed a time-limit ultimatum 
on his mission, which was patently untrue: the only time-
limi t Britain had set was that Catroux should arrive in 
Beirut by Monday 15 November. Secondly, without authority, 
Spears had urged Catroux for a return to pre-II November 
conditions, implying the immediate restoration of the 
Chamber and of the government, whereas London had not judged 
this practicable until a modus vivendi had been established 
between the French and the constitutional regime. 23 Sir A. 
Cadogan minuted his disapproval: 
Although it is too late, I think we ought to draw 
Sir E. Spears's attention to these departures from 
our instructions, if only to make him more careful 
in the future. 24 
In fact, from the outset, the Foreign Office and the 
Cabinet, had demanded no more than the release of the 
ministers. On 12 November, the Cabinet had taken the 
conscious decision not to increase the British demands to 
include reinstatement. Again, in the Cabinet-approved 
instructions sent to Casey on 17 November, it had been 
decided to impose a time-limit on the French, but there had 
been no mention of increasing the British demands to include 
reinstatement. 
When Spears actually saw these instructions, after his 
interview with Catroux, he was most disconcerted: he 
22 Minute by Sir M. Peterson, 18 November 1943, 
E7093/27/89, Fa 371/35187. 
23 ibid. 
24 Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 18 November 1943, 
E7093/27/89, F0371/35187. 
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strongly challenged the Foreign Office view that the 
Lebanese had behaved at all provocatively, and whilst he was 
"relieved" that the Cabinet had at long last seen fit to lay 
down "a definite schedule", the time-limits prescribed 
seemed to him unduly protracted. 25 What filled him with "the 
gravest apprehension" however, was the apparent belief in 
London that the Lebanese would accept anything less "than 
complete restoration of the Government with full 
constitutional powers" and recognition as such. If Britain 
tried to treat the Lebanese ministers as anything other than 
a government, he argued that the only effect would be that 
"thenceforward, the entire force of public odium would be 
concentrated on us instead of the French", and "our moral 
standing in the Middle East would be completely destroyed". 
He reminded the Foreign Office that the solution of the 
Lebanese crisis was regarded throughout the Middle East "as 
a test case of the sincerity of our attitude towards the 
Atlantic Charter". 26 Having fired off these telegrams, Spears 
sent another to Casey begging him to support these views and 
to call the Prime Minister's attention to the matter. 27 
Complying at once with Spears's request, Casey protested 
both to the Foreign Office and to Churchill that to work for 
the release of the Ministers and not their immediate 
restoration as a government, was "monstrous". 28 His telegram 
to the Foreign Office explained that he had been "greatly 
surprised" by the arrival of instructions that if Catroux 
would release the Lebanese ministers, then Britain was not 
25 Spears to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, No 705, 
E7111/27/89, F0371/35188. 
26 Spears to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, No 704, 
E7111/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
27 Spears to Casey, 17 November 1943, E7111/27/89, FO 
371/35188. 
28 Extract from R. G. Casey's diary, Entry for 17 
November 1943, Box III, File IV, Spears Papers, MEC. 
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demanding their reinstatement. Only the day before, 16 
November, Casey had received a specific enquiry from 
Churchill as to whether the the Ministers had been released 
and reinstated. 29 Instructions from the Foreign Office 
however, appeared "to visualise their physical release only, 
and as private individuals pending parleys with [the] French 
and ourselves". Casey claimed that this had come as a great 
shock, as until now, he had "assumed throughout that the 
release of Ministers meant their release as Ministers, 
i.e. that reinstatement of Ministers was a corollary of their 
release" . 
From his conversations with Catroux, Casey was positive 
that the French General had interpreted the British demand 
for the release of the Ministers as including their 
reinstatement. In a separate telegram to Macmillan, Casey 
emphasised this point: 
No-one in this part of the world has contemplated 
the release of the Ministers without their immediate 
reinstatement. I spoke to Catroux consistently in 
the sense of release and reinstatement and he 
understands the matter in this sense. Mere release 
would not stop trouble in the Lebanon and would 
brand us as condoning French action. 30 
Certainly Casey's feeling is vindicated by Holmes's report 
of his conversation with Catroux. Casey pointed out that the 
release of the Ministers as private individuals would create 
all sorts of problems as to their exact status. Moreover, he 
fel t that to make their reinstatement dependent on the 
outcome of negotiations, during which, even with Britain as 
honest broker, the States would be subject to heavy pressure 
29 Cadogan believed that the matter of reinstatement 
had been "a little obscured by the Prime Minister's 
telegram". Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 18 November 1943, 
E7093/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
30 Casey to Macmillan, 18 November 1943, Box III, File 
IV, Spears Papers, MEC. 
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from the French to conclude 
heavy sanction to impose 
a draft treaty, would be "a 
on the wretched Lebanese 
government", already humiliated by its forcible seizure and 
imprisonment. In Casey's opinion, the French were "the 
greater sinners of the two", and if Britain pressed only for 
the release of the Ministers, she would be seeming to 
condone French behaviour; he "would infinitely prefer that 
the Lebanese ministers be released as a government and that 
we then have our conference with them and the French". 31 
To secure 
instructions and 
additional 
the reply 
backing, 
he had 
Casey 
sent, to 
took his 
a Defence 
Committee meeting on 18 November, which gave him its full 
support. It ruled that given the tense and deteriorating 
situation in the Lebanon, "the mere release (and not 
reinstatement until later) of members of the Lebanese 
government would not ensure internal security in the 
Lebanon ... ,,32 Casey had evidently drafted in the Prime 
Minister's assistance too, for on 18 November, Eden received 
the following brusque enquiry from Churchill in Malta: 
Surely release of imprisoned Ministers means their 
release and reinstatement as Ministers, otherwise 
they will have been overthrown by an essentially 
lawless act?33 
31 Casey to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, 
E7119/27/89, F0371/35188. An entry in Sir Miles Lampson's 
diary records how Casey had informed him of the confusion 
surrounding his instructions. Lampson records that he told 
Casey "I entirely shared his view that anything so footling 
[i.e. insisting only on release of Ministers and not their 
reinstatement] would be intensely damaging to our prestige 
not only with the Moslem world but throughout the world in 
general". Killearn Diaries, Entry for 18 November 1943, MEC. 
32 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E7142/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
18 November 1943, 
33 Churchill to Eden, 18 November 1943, FROZEN 33, PREM 
3/421. 
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That the Foreign Office had not endorsed the notion of 
reinstating the Lebanese Ministers is plain from the report 
of a conversation between Sir Alexander Cadogan and Vienot 
on 18 November. Realising that their quarrel was not with 
Vienot and his colleagues, the Foreign Office had refrained 
as much as possible from making stern representations about 
the Lebanese situation to Carlton Gardens. The policy 
however, backfired to a certain degree, when the French in 
London were forced into a position of requesting that the 
Foreign Office issue such representations, so that they in 
turn might use them to pressure Algiers. On 16 November, 
Roche had seen Cadogan and revealed to him that Vienot was 
in a difficult situation, having received instructions of 
which he "did not altogether approve". (Presumably Roche was 
referring to the telegram Vienot had received instructing 
him to threaten a French withdrawal from the Levant). Though 
he (Vienot) was presently consulting Algiers about them, 
Roche suggested that it might be helpful if Eden would see 
him to repeat and reinforce the representations which 
Macmillan was making in Algiers. Roche explained that Vienot 
had many friends on the Committee, and it was thought that 
his reports of the British representations would undoubtedly 
strengthen Massigli' shand. 34 
Seeing the wisdom of lending force to a voice of 
conciliation, Cadogan had duly recommended that Eden see 
. 
Vienot, but, when Eden's busy schedule did not permit a 
meeting, he saw the Frenchman himself on 18 November. 35 Eden 
had instructed Cadogan to impress upon Vienot both the 
urgency and the gravity of the position. It was feared that 
a dangerous situation might be developing and if Catroux 
indulged in a policy of delay, he might precipitate trouble. 
34 Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 16 November 1943, 
E7159/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
35 A report of the conversation was sent to Casey on 19 
November. See Foreign Office to Casey, 19 November 1943, 
E7036/27/89, FO 371/35186. 
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In reply, Vienot warned Cadogan of his conviction that the 
Commi ttee would be loath to accept Britain's idea of a 
conference to settle the dispute as this would 
internationalise a purely Franco-Lebanese dispute. Cadogan 
however, pointed out that internationalisation of the 
question might provide the Committee with its only escape 
route. When Vienot further warned that the French would find 
it extremely difficult to agree to the reinstatement of the 
Lebanese ministers, he had been reassured categorically by 
Cadogan that Britain had not yet asked for their 
reinstatement and that this was a matter which would have to 
be discussed later. 36 Cadogan therefore reliably informed 
Vienot that Britain would be satisfied with the mere release 
of the ministers on the very day the Cabinet chose to 
reinterpret its demand to include reinstatement. Here surely 
were the ingredients for a classic misunderstanding. 
Eden in fact attended a Cabinet meeting at 5.00pm on 18 
November, already equipped with a draft reply to Casey, 
which adhered to the original British demand for the mere 
release of the Ministers; it argued that Britain's 
insistence on the immediate reinstatement of the government 
would make it remarkably difficult for the French to meet 
Bri tain ' s demands and moreover, would increase the 
likelihood of a deadlock between the French and the 
Lebanese. 
Within the Cabinet however, there was considerable 
discussion of the telegrams from Casey and Spears. Both men 
in their memoirs lay heavy emphasis on the effect in the 
meeting of the "great clamour" which Casey had created over 
reinstatement. Spears is quite adamant in his account that 
were it not for the fuss created, "the Foreign Office would 
have accepted "release" -- not reinstatement -- and the pass 
36 Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 18 November 1943, 
E7159/27/89, F0371/35188. 
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would have been sold".37 Lord Moyne, who was present at the 
Cabinet meeting on 18 November, subsequently wrote to Casey 
privately informing him of the great weight his telegram had 
carried. 38 The point was certainly made and finally carried 
in Cabinet that as Catroux had already been given the 
impression that the release of the Ministers implied their 
reinstatement, Britain could not afford to recede from that 
posi tion, especially as in British eyes, the imprisoned 
ministers constituted the de jure government of Lebanon and 
should therefore be recognised as such. 
It was further agreed that Casey and Speprs should 
endeavour to bring both sides together; to prevent another 
flare-up, it was recommended that once the Ministers were 
released, the Lebanese Parliament should not meet, and that 
some method should be found to ensure that during the 
negotiations, neither side should take any steps to vary 
their position in any way. Despite the fact that Spears had 
gone to great lengths to absolve the Lebanese of any guilt, 
it was contended that they "were not without blame and that 
if the French had not taken such precipitate and unjustified 
action, we might well have thought it right to support 
France against the attitude adopted by the Lebanese". 39 
This attitude on the part of the War Cabinet highlights 
the fundamental difference in thinking between London-based 
officials and those in the Middle East. The Foreign Office 
could not but attach blame to the Lebanese for their rash 
actions. Prevalent in Foreign Office minds was the feeling 
that the only indefensible part of the French action had 
been the arrest of the Lebanese ministers and attendant 
disorders. Had the French confined their action, after the 
37 Spears, op cit, p 258. 
38 Casey, op cit, p 148. 
39 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, 5.00pm, Thursday, 
18 November 1943, CAB 65/36. 
Lebanese provocation, 
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to merely dissolving 
would have found it 
the Lebanese 
difficult Parliament, Britain 
protest. 40 In contrast, Spears et al believed that 
to 
the 
Lebanese would never have rushed through the Reform Bill had 
the French not pushed them into so doing, and that 
provocation was wholly on the French side. 41 
Though Eden was unable to secure Cabinet agreement to 
confine the British demand to require the mere release of 
the Lebanese ministers, he did manage to secure an extension 
of twenty four hours to the time-limit to be imposed on the 
French "as there might be some doubt as to the exact request 
... put to the French and as Catroux might have to refer to 
Algiers" . 42 The telegram eventually despatched to Casey 
offered no apologies or explanations for the confusion about 
reinstatement but merely stated, very curtly, that his 
instructions had always intended that the Lebanese ministers 
should be released to take up their posts. Casey was warned 
however, that on release, the Lebanese should do nothing to 
vary the position from what it had been before 11 November, 
40 See Memorandum by Sir M. Peterson, 17 November 1943, 
E7183/27/89, Fa 371/35189. Peterson had set out to "examine 
and estimate" the French case, and "to draw up such 
arguments as can be adduced in support of French action in 
the Lebanon", in view of the possibility of British 
intervention there. Cadogan commented that while the 
memorandum "put the case very fairly", nothing could justify 
"the manner of the French reaction, which could not have 
been more stupid or deplorable". ibid, Minute by Sir A. 
Cadogan, 17 November 1943. 
41 Spears to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, No 704, 
E7111/27/89, Fa 371/35188. C. W. Baxter recorded that as a 
result of the Cabinet meeting on 18 November, it had been 
decided "to say nothing about Lebanese provocation of the 
French"; he supposed that therefore, Sir E. Spears would 
"have to be left under the impression that we agree with his 
mistaken thesis that no such provocation ever took place!". 
Minute by C. W. Baxter, 19 November 1943, E7111/27/89, FO 
371/35188. 
42 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, 5. OOpm, Thursday, 
18 November 1943, CAB 65/36. The time-limit now was to be 
10.00am on Monday, 22 November 1943. 
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until future procedure (and the telegram stressed that this 
did not necessarily imply a draft treaty but merely some 
form of settlement to last the war) had been negotiated with 
the French under British good offices. The Foreign Office 
could not resist reminding Casey 
that but for French action, we should have continued 
to press the Lebanese government not to take 
unilateral action in the matter of the 
consti tution .•• 
A further telegram warned him that Catroux might possibly be 
"under a misapprehension as to the precise nature of our 
demands". The position was therefore to be made "abundantly 
clear" to him, though he was now to be given until 10.0Dam 
on Monday, 22 November to comply with British demands. 43 Both 
these telegrams were copied to the Prime Minister. 
Casey and Spears must have breathed a sigh of relief. 
However, even if their representations had not had the 
desired effect in persuading the Cabinet to demand 
reinstatement, representations from the United States might 
well have done the trick instead. The American Embassy in 
London had rather belatedly informed the State Department 
on 18 November (actually after the Cabinet meeting had 
occurred and decided in favour of reinstatement) that 
Britain was only insisting on the release of the Lebanese 
ministers and not a return to the staus quo ante. 44 From 
Egypt, Kirk volunteered his opinion that this expedient was 
d .. . ff t" 45 "immoral in concept an pern1c1ous 1n e ec . 
43 Foreign Office to Casey, 18 November 1943, Nos 3648 
and 3649, E7119/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
44 Winant (Ambassador in the United Kingdom) to Hull, 18 
November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, pp 1036-37. 
45 Kirk to Hull, 20 November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol IV, 
p 1038. 
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The State Department was confused: it had recei ved 
information from Algiers that Macmillan had been instructed 
on 13 November to demand the release and reinstatement of 
the ministers. 46 Yet around the same time, other reports from 
different sources mentioned only that Britain was demanding 
the release of the Ministers. 47 Either the discrepancies went 
unnoticed or else it was simply taken for granted that on 
their release, the ministers would automatically resume 
their status. It subsequently seemed however, that Britain 
contemplated a solution which did not involve the 
restoration of the duly elected Lebanese government. By the 
time clarification was sought, the Embassy in London was 
able to reply: 
Opinion has somewhat changed in the Foreign Office 
regarding the restoration of the arrested Ministers 
to authority. It is now felt that the Lebanese 
Government should resume its functions as soon as 
practicable and it is believed that the Lebanese 
Ministers will realise that they should in future 
act less abruptly. 48 
iv) Calculated Indiscretions 
In Algiers Macmillan was by now beginning to be 
extremely worried about the Lebanese situation. He knew that 
the Prime Minister was much annoyed by the affair and did 
not accept the view that Helleu had acted without reference 
46 Wiley (Algiers) to Hull, 13 November 1943, FRUS, 
1943, Vol IV, p 1025. 
47 Kirk to Hull, 13 November 1943, p 1023; Murphy to 
Hull, 13 November 1943, p 1026; Memorandum of conversation 
by Alling, 13 November 1943, p ~029; Wadsworth to Hull, 14 
November 1943, pp 1030-31; all 1n FRUS, 1943, Vol IV. 
48 Winant to Hull, 20 November 1943, FRUS, 1943, Vol 4, 
p 1038; see also ibid, Winant to Hull, 21 November 1943, pp 
1039-40. 
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to Algiers. 49 He felt that Spears was "out for trouble and 
personal glory", whilst Casey was "so weak as to be 
completely in his pocket". He feared that Catroux, always "a 
little leisurely" in his approach, hated Spears so much that 
he might "be led to commit an error of judgment". 50 Moreover, 
as he had stressed to Churchill, Macmillan clearly 
disapproved of the idea of issuing an ultimatum, as London 
now seemed to be contemplating. 
He saw Massigli at noon on 17 November and left him an 
aide-memoire, reminding him of Britain's demands, to which 
no official reply had been received, of the extreme gravity 
and urgency of the situation and of the need for an early 
and satisfactory solution. Massigli professed to be working 
for the release of the ministers and expressed confidence 
that the matter would soon be resolved. He explained that 
though Helleu would never work in the Levant again, the 
Commi ttee would not summarily dismiss him mid-crisis, as 
France would thereby lose "altogether too much face". 51 When 
Macmillan pressed him as to the exact nature of Catroux's 
powers, Massigli replied that Catroux had authority either 
to proceed at his own discretion, or else to consult the 
Commi ttee, but informed Macmillan that it ought to be 
sufficient for the Foreign Office to know that Catroux "se 
trouve sur place, muni de pouvoirs exceptionnels". 52 He 
assured Macmillan that he was anxious to see the matter 
resolved and suggested that de Gaulle's speech to the 
Consultative Assembly had demonstrated the French desire to 
49 Makins to Strang, 18 November 1943, FO 800/432. 
50 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 17 November 1943, 
pp 293-95. 
51 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, 
E7100/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
52 Massigl i a Vienot, 17 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigl i , Vol 1468. 
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deal moderately with the situation. Macmillan stressed that 
what Britain now wanted "were deeds not merely words". 53 
Unfortunately for Macmillan, on the very day of this 
conversation with Massigli, the British Cabinet had decided 
in favour of an ultimatum. Within a matter of hours, he duly 
received a telegram informing him that unless anything 
developed by the evening of 18 November, Casey would fly to 
Beirut on 19 November and announce to Catroux that British 
martial law would be imposed by 21 November54 • Macmillan was 
consequently advised to let the Committee know "that the 
sands are running out". 55 
Macmillan thought the time-limit "rather short" and was 
puzzled by the vagueness of his instructions. He enquired of 
the Foreign Office whether, like Casey, he should also 
inform the French in Algiers of the exact date on which the 
supply of sand would be exhausted, or whether this was to be 
a job purely for the Minister of State? He was informed by 
Peterson that it would be best to leave Casey to deal with 
the matter. 56 Macmillan however, decided to ignore these 
instructions and permitted Eric Duncannon57 , to put out a 
53 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943, 
E7100/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
54 After the Cabinet meeting on 18 November, the 
ultimatum was extended by a further twenty four hours, to 
expire on 22 November. 
55 Foreign Office to Macmillan, 17 November 1943, 
E7102/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
56 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 18 November 1943, 
p 296; Macmillan to Foreign Office, 17 November 1943; 
Peterson to Macmillan, 18 November 1943; both in FO 660/38. 
57 Eric Duncannon: Member of the Minister Resident's 
Staff, Algiers, 1943-44; Second Secretary at Paris Embassy, 
1944-48. 
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"calculated indiscretion", believing it could do no harm. 58 
In a subsequent conversation with Palewski 59 therefore, 
Duncannon mentioned that if de Gaulle could be persuaded to 
send immediate instructions to Catroux in the sense Britain 
required, the " indigni ty of the British ultimatum" could 
probably be avoided. Palewski's reaction however, was not 
encouraging. He stated that de Gaulle "would never accept an 
ultimatum if one was submitted". Duncannon observed that 
Palewski had shifted uneasily in his chair, had thrice 
repeated "Je crois qu'il refusera" and then whined 
plaintively "It would be a pity to break up Anglo-French 
relations over such an issue". 60 
The Foreign Office meanwhile was "disturbed at the 
complete lack of progress and the apparent failure of anyone 
in North Africa to realise the real seriousness of the 
position in the Lebanon, both actual and potential". Given 
the suspicion that Helleu's reporting was "as inept as his 
poli tical sense", Macmillan was requested to make absolutely 
sure that the French were in the picture. 61 At a meeting on 
18 November however, Massigli stubbornly maintained that "in 
his opinion, the incident had been neither so grave as 
[British] information represented, nor so insignificant as 
he had been led to believe from his own sources". 62 The 
58 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 18 November 1943, 
p 296. 
59 Gaston Palewski: Chef de Cabinet to de Gaulle, 1942-
46. 
60 Record of conversation with M. Palewski, by Eric 
Duncannon, 18 November 1943, FO 660/38. 
61 Foreign Office to Algiers, 
E7113/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
18 November 1943, 
62 Macmillan to Foreign Office, No 2409, 18 November 
1943, E7155/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
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Foreign Office was forced to conclude that strong 
representations were not having the necessary effect. 63 
In fact, the meeting between Macmillan and Massigli that 
day was extremely important. Massigli disclosed to Macmillan 
that the French continued to suspect British motives in the 
Middle East. In the past, he observed, the Foreign Office 
and the Quai d' Orsay had successfully combined forces to 
prevent the conflict of French and British Middle Eastern 
interests from affecting more general poli tics and 
diplomacy. He subsequently reported to Catroux that he had 
requested an assurance from Macmillan that the Foreign 
Office would continue to act in the same way, 
ou si, pour des raisons diverses, on estimait a 
Londres, Ie moment est venu de changer de position 
et de revendiquer pour la Grande Bretagne une 
situation eminente dans tous les pays de l'Orient 
arabe?64 
The Committee and particularly de Gaulle, he added, "could 
not resist this interpretation", and de Gaulle was now not 
only threatening a French withdrawal from the Levant, but 
his own resignation too. 65 Macmillan did his best to reassure 
63 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 19 November 1943, 
E7155/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
64 Massigli a Catroux, 18 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
65 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, 
E7155/27/89, No 2409, FO 371/35188. When the Eastern 
Department received this telegram, the opinion of the 
Western Department was sought on the likelihood of de Gaulle 
actually carrying out his threats of withdrawal and 
resignation. R. L. Speaight thought it unlikely that he 
would resign over an issue which did not effect his own 
internal position. He did think, however, that it was very 
likely that he would order a complete withdrawal from the 
Levant if British martial law was proclaimed and announced 
matter of factly that this "would surely be the best thing 
for him to do both from his point of view and ours". Minute 
by R. L. Speaight, 19 November 1943, E7155/27/89, FO 
371/35188. 
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Massigli that British policy was "clear and simple": her 
most immediate aim was to ensure that order reigned in the 
Levant and she had no intention of expelling the French, 
still less of leaping into their shoes. Even if individual 
Englishmen were suspected of "hankering after the lure of 
imperial expansion" , the entire British Government, 
Churchill and Eden included, "had most strongly emphasised 
the honesty and sincerity of our purpose" and was doing its 
best "to rebuild France as a great nation".66 
Though he did not confess as much to London, Macmillan 
had also given Massigli some very strong hints about Casey's 
latest instructions, and pressed him, in the Committee's 
best interests, to have Helleu removed and the Ministers 
released as quickly as humanly possible. This is evident 
from the telegram which Massigli subsequently sent to 
Catroux: 
Pour aut ant que j'ai pu Ie comprendre, on espere a 
Londres qu'un modus vivendi interviendra a tres bref 
delai; faute de quoi, Ie commandement mili taire 
britannique prendrait l'autorite en mains. 67 
More importantly, what is also clear is that Macmillan quite 
specifically informed Massigli that Britain was not 
demanding the reinstatement of the Ministers for the moment. 
Massigli's telegram to Catroux continues: 
J' ai naturellement evi te toute discussion sur la 
solution qui pouvai t etre donnee sur place a la 
crise. Par contre, Ie Ministre [Macmillan] a attire 
avec insistance mon attention sur Ie fait que son 
Gouvernement, s'il demandait la mise en liberte des 
personnages arretes, ne reclamai t pas au premier 
stade, leur reinstallation dans leurs fonctions. Ces 
66 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, No 
2409, E7155/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
67 Massigli a Catroux, 18 Novembre 1943, No 426, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
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personnages devront marne atre informes aue leur 
attitude a ete jugee a Londres provocante. 6 
Massigli evidently left the meeting with Macmillan on 18 
November under the clear impression that Britain was 
demanding only the release of the Ministers and not that 
they be reinstated. That impression had in fact been correct 
until the British Cabinet met at 5.00pm and overruled Eden 
on the matter of reinstatement. For the second time in two 
days, Macmillan's diplomacy in Algiers was nullified by 
Cabinet decisions in London. 
When Macmillan reported his conversation with Massigli 
to London, he was economical with the truth. He mentioned 
only that Massigli had received two telegrams from Catroux, 
who thought that the British demands were "very hard to 
swallow" and had emphasised particularly the difficulty 
involved if the Ministers, once released, automatically 
resumed their governmental positions. He reported that when 
questioned by Massigli as to whether release meant 
reinstatement, he had fudged the issue somewhat by replying 
that Britain wished to get back to a position "before the 
crisis", and had wished to facilitate an "honourable 
negotiation and reconciliation". 69 Yet Massigli' s report to 
Catroux states quite categorically that Macmillan had 
insistently drawn his attention to the fact that Britain was 
not demanding the reinstatement of the Ministers. 
Macmillan's intentions were clear: he sought to exploit 
a certain ambiguity in the British demands to interpret them 
as favourably as possible for the French, hoping thereby to 
allow Massigli the maximum room for manoeuvre. His policy 
came unstuck however, when Catroux on 19 November chose to 
68 ibid. 
69 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, No 
2409, E7155/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
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read aloud the account he had received from Massigli of his 
meeting with Macmillan the previous day, to Casey and 
Spears. Spears, who had received a copy of Macmillan's 
account, was quick to detect and point out to the Foreign 
Office "the very considerable difference in emphasis between 
the two versions", though he elicited no response. 70 
Presumably Catroux only read aloud part of the telegram 
from Massigli, for much of it concerned Spears himself. 
Massigli had mentioned to Catroux that he had additionally 
raised with Macmillan, who had put up rather a feeble 
defence, the question of the Spears and his personal policy. 
Macmillan had assured Massigli that Spears was "a Minister 
taking instructions from His Majesty's Government" and gave 
his word of honour "que c'est M. Eden et non pas Ie General 
... qui determinera en dernier ressort, la politique 
bri tannique". Massigli had however, observed to Catroux: 
"Nous savons malheureusement, d' experience, combien des 
assurances de ce genre sont insuffisantes". In fact, 
Macmillan had felt sufficiently strongly about Spears to 
send a separate telegram to London concerning this aspect of 
his conversation. 71 After reading it, Hankey could only 
minute in agreement: 
I do think French suspicions of 
become ineradicable and that 
serious threat to the success 
efforts we make -- with possible 
on the Allied war effort. 72 
Sir E. Spears have 
they represent a 
of any diplomatic 
grave consequences 
What is plain from the meeting between Macmillan and 
Massigli, is the length to which Macmillan was prepared to 
70 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7195/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
20 November 1943, 
71 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, No 
2410, E7155/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
72 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 19 November 1943, 
E7155/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
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go to assist the French, especially Massigli, in their 
dilemma. Whilst he did his utmost to be as conciliatory as 
possible, Catroux in Beirut was having to deal with the more 
aggressive and confrontational approach of Casey and Spears. 
The discrepancies in the attitudes of the British were to a 
certain extent natural and understandable, but it was 
inevitable that the French would detect them and seek to 
exploit them. Macmillan was unfortunate when Catroux 
unwittingly alerted Spears to his game, with the result that 
Spears, who was already impatient of Macmillan and his 
concern for the French, was to become increasingly 
suspicious of the policy being pursued in Algiers. 
v) Voices of Conciliation 
Macmillan's resolute efforts in Algiers to shore up any 
cracks caused by the Lebanese incident in the Anglo-French 
alliance were matched by those of his counterpart Vienot in 
London. Despite his strong suspicions that certain British 
circles were seeking to take advantage of the French dilemma 
in the Lebanon, Vienot remained firmly convinced that the 
Foreign Office strongly disapproved of such a strategy. 
Seeking to bolster trust in the good faith of the Foreign 
Office, he sought to rationalise the situation, and plied 
Massigli with information which he believed accounted for 
Bri tain' s sensi tivi ty about the Lebanese situation, and 
which Massigli could use to rally those in the Committee 
whose faith in Britain was flagging. One of the reasons for 
Britain's concern, he alleged, was her hope of "une 
accentuation plus marquee de I 'attitude turque favorable aux 
alliees" . 73 He went on to explain that in her attempts to woo 
the Turks, Britain was prepared to guarantee that any future 
Arab Federation would not pursue an anti-Turkish policy; it 
73 Vienot a Massigli, 17 Novembre 1943, No 1264, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. 
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was feared however, that the present excitement among Arab 
nationalists would worry Turkey and render her less amenable 
to British persuasion. 74 
From information gleaned by Dejean and passed to 
Algiers, Massigli tried to explain to Catroux why Britain 
was so concerned to see the matter settled so quickly: 
La hate britannique dans cette affaire, l'interet 
que parait y porter Ie Premier Ministre lui-meme, 
peuvent d ' ailleurs s 'expliquer en partie par Ie 
desir d'avoir cree une situation nette a la vieille 
de la tres import ante conference poli tico-mili taire75 
qui va se reunir en Egypte. 76 
In view of the proposed conference, Vienot had further 
commented: 
On sent des lors combien les evenements du Liban 
sont genants pour Ie gouvernement bri tannique et 
pourquoi il desire obtenir un reglement immediat. 77 
To convince Algiers further of British good faith, 
Vienot drew on conversations he and his staff had had with 
various Foreign Office officials about British policy in the 
74 ibid. 
75 The British were particularly worried that current 
operations in the Mediterranean were suffering as a result 
of the build-up for the proposed cross-Channel operation, 
scheduled for May 1944; Churchill preferred that the Allies 
should attempt to bring Turkey into the war and should 
concentrate their efforts on Italy, the Balkans and the 
Aegean in the immediate future. To resolve the growing 
divergencies of opinion, Churchill had proposed a meeting 
wi th Roosevelt to take place in Cairo and a subsequent 
tripartite meeting with Stalin at Teheran during November 
and December 1943. 
76 Massigli a Catroux, 18 Novembre 1943, No 426, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
77 Vienot a Massigli, 20 Novembre 1943, No 1321, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
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Middle East. He reported at length on a recent conversation 
between one of his staff and an official temporarily 
attached to the Foreign Office, who had spent fifteen years 
in an administrative capacity in various parts of the Middle 
East. This man had attempted to explain the point of view of 
the average Englishman in the Middle East. It was generally 
felt, he had claimed, 
que la Grande Bretagne a dans Ie Moyen Orient, des 
interets qui depassent, sans comparaison possible, 
ceux de la France et qu'elle devait, par consequent, 
se substi tuer a elle. 78 
Imbued with such views himself, the official had returned to 
London in May, and within three days, when he realised that 
Government policy did not coincide at all with his own 
thinking, had offered his resignation. On the advice of his 
chiefs, he had remained in his post simply to observe 
events, and had eventually come to modify his views "en les 
replacant progressivement dans la perspective des relations 
generales franco-britanniques". He confirmed that 
sur ce plan, dans les plus hauts spheres du 
gouvernement, on a la ferme conviction que la France 
doi t maintenir ses positions dans Ie Proche Orient. 79 
The official had insisted that the War Cabinet 
maintained rigorous control over the activities of British 
officials in the Middle East. He was challenged by his 
French colleague with the view that nonetheless, British 
officials and especially the Political Officers, ably 
assisted by Spears, were working for the eviction of the 
French. The British man was stumped by this and could only 
offer an expose on the psyche of General Spears: 
78 Vienot a Massigli, 18 Novembre 1943, No 247, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1243. 
79 ibid. 
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Celui-ci serait nettement francophile, mais, comme 
beaucoup de diplomates qui n'ont en aucun contact 
avec l' administration, lorsqu' il s ' est trouve en 
Syrie, dans un poste administratif, il aurait pris 
tres a coeur ses devoirs d'assurer la prosperite des 
libanaises, ravi taillement par l' OCP etc; il se 
considere, dans une certaine mesure, comme charge 
d'une mission a cet egard, pensant que les 
administrateurs franQais n'ont pas su administrer 
convenablement ce pays. 80 
The official had expressed his own regret that the country 
was not managed by French colonial administrators, who had 
always impressed him by "leurs qualites administratives et 
humaines" . 81 
Vienot also thought fit to forward to Massigli a copy of 
a letter he had received from Professor C. Schaeffer, whose 
testimony Vienot considered valuable because of the close 
relations he had long enj oyed with British specialists, 
particularly the Arab specialists at Chatham House82 • 
Schaeffer described himself as having "une certaine vision 
des lignes generales que [la Grande Bretagne] va suivre dans 
les pays musulmanes". 83 He viewed the Lebanese affair as 
"1 'etincelle lancee dans la poudre", and though France would 
not escape unscathed, he was confident that "il sera 
possible d' evi ter l' explosion" . 84 His letter had continued: 
Je peux vous assurer que rien ne sera fait du cote 
Londres pour tirer avant age de la situation creee 
par une precipitation des deux antagonistes: Liban 
80 ibid. 
81 ibid. 
82 Chatham House was where the Foreign Office Research 
Department was housed. 
83 Professeur C. Schaeffer a Vienot, 17 Novembre 1943, 
forwarded to Massigli by Vienot on 18 Novembre 1943, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 999. 
84 Schaeffer a Vienot, 17 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-
45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
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et Comite. La majorite des specialistes du Foreign 
Office savent pertinemment qu'affaiblir a l'extreme 
la position fran9aise en Syrie et au Liban ou en 
". . . , 
prec1p1tant son depart de ces pays, equivaudrait a 
avancer d'autant Ie depart de la Grande Bretagne de 
Palestine, d'Iraq et d'ailleurs. Aux yeux des 
Arabes, nos deux nations sont egalement detestables. 
lIs acclament les Anglais aujourd'hui pour qu'ils 
aident a debarrasser les pays arabes des Fran9ais. 
Le tour des Anglais viendrait ensuite, et plus 
facilement. 85 
Pierre Francfort was another voice of conciliation 
issuing from London. With Vienot's express approval, he took 
the liberty of writing to Massigli "sur les aspects de la 
question du Levant, vue de Londres". 86 Whilst he realised the 
fact that he had never'visited the Levant exposed him to the 
charge of misunderstanding the particular nature of the 
problems there, he nonetheless felt the better equipped to 
examine those problems objectively and without prejudice. He 
also appreciated that he was open to the charge of being 
tainted by the influence of British conceptions about the 
Arab world, but thought it important to realise that there 
were views different from France's own, as well as a 
different way of tackling problems. 
Britain played a dominant role in the Middle East with 
interests there which she conceived to be more considerable 
than those of France; with remarkable opportunism, she had 
successively employed a variety of policies there. In 
comparison, Francfort considered that French policies were 
practically all bankrupt and were stultified by a rigid 
85 ibid. Giving substance to this observation, Vienot 
reported the following day that, according to the Cairo 
Press Association, the President of the Legislative Council 
of Transjordan had declared that his government "recherchait 
touj ours avec les alliees bri tanniques, moyens d' assurer 
completement l'independance et la souverainete de la 
Transjordanie. Vienot a Massigli, 19 Novembre 1943, No 1298, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
86 Francfort a Massigli, 19 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
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conservatism, which had triumphed over all attempts at 
reform. Her traditional role as protector of the minorities 
was outmoded now that those minorities had woken up to the 
idea of an Arab community. Nor could France rely, in the 
last resort, on the legitimacy of her mandatory rights, for 
neither the Arabs nor the Anglo-Saxons upheld such a 
legalistic conception of the mandate. Besides, Francfort 
reminded Massigli, "nous avons renonc~ au mandat quand gela 
nous a paru l~gitime et ... Ie Comit~ National Fran9ais a, 
d'un trait de plume, chang~ Ie mandat sur Ie Cameroun en 
annexion pure et simple". 87 
In the 
nationalists 
equation 
and the 
of conflict 
Bri tish, a 
between France, the 
factor which Francfort 
believed had to be taken into account was the present 
weakened state of France. It was impossible without real 
political or military means to continue to maintain a 
negative stance, especially when a rethinking of strategy 
could only be to France's advantage. He pointed out that 
even if the pan-Arab idea was not very realistic, one of its 
inherent dangers (and one which the British had cleverly 
foreseen and circumvented), was that it might become an 
anti-British propaganda weapon. By adopting a policy which 
satisfied Arab aspirations, the British had deflected that 
weapon from themselves, but were now directing it towards 
the French, whose policy they perceived to be ruining their 
plans. 
Francfort advocated that France should playa waiting 
game. Inter-Arab rivalries were already manifesting 
themselves and could only increase. When she was stronger, 
France could reassert herself: she could offer assistance to 
Syria and Lebanon and "j ouer au Levant Ie j eu que les 
Anglais se pr~parent a jouer entre l' Egypte, l' Iraq, la 
87 'b'd 22. 
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Palestine etc." Presently, with her outdated and worthless 
conceptions of prestige and influence, France was isolated 
in the Middle East and decried by the Arabs for the well-
known inadequacies of her administration. She should rethink 
her propaganda strategy and her means of influence. In 
leaving the British alone to demonstrate their flair and 
imagination, the French were depriving themselves "de toute 
possibili te de rayonnement". Francfort reminded Massigli 
that as long ago as March, he had suggested that the French 
should 
reprendre dans une certaine mesure, la formule 
d'unite arabe a notre compte pour montrer aux 
Syriens que nous etions decides de satisfaire leurs 
aspirations et meme ales soutenir pour que la Syrie 
prenne parmi les Etats arabes une direction a 
laquelle son evolution avancee et son prestige lui 
donnaient droit. 
In conclusion, Francfort outlined his vision of the role 
France should seek to play: 
Je crois donc ... qu'il faut au Levant, s'il n'est 
pas trop tard, donner des preuves absolues et 
repetees autant en paroles et declarations qu' en 
actes, de notre comprehension et de notre sympathie, 
pour des idees de collaboration dans Ie monde arabe 
qui s' oriente vers Ie systeme des grandes unites 
regionales, idees qui semble devoir inspirer 
particulierement la reorganisation du monde d'apres-
guerre. 88 
88 ibid. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
FASHODA RECALLED 
i) Helleu Appeals To De Gaulle 
If the Foreign Office thought it had trouble with its 
main representative in the Levant States and the subversive 
role he was often suspected of playing, the French were 
beset by similar problems. They had realised how crucial it 
was that the British believed their assertions that Helleu's 
actions had not been authorised by the Committee. With that 
aim in mind, Vienot had assured Mack in conversation on 17 
November that Helleu had acted without reference to Algiers1 • 
Yet only the following day, the press reported that a 
spokesman had claimed that Helleu's decisions had always had 
the full approval of the Committee. Vienot demanded to know 
whether this was now the official viewpoint and pointed out 
that it could not fail "de produire Ie plus facheux effet".2 
Massigli acted immediately: he telegraphed Helleu expressing 
surprise over the declarations being ascribed to him and 
especially a communique from the Delegation Generale which 
had stated that "Ie General de Gaulle et Ie Comi te ont 
approuve les mesures que vous avez prises". He pointed out 
that far from sanctioning his activities, the Committee 
pour sauvegarder Ie prestige fran9ais, a Ie souci de 
vous couvrir alors que Ie Gouvernement britannique 
demande expressement qu' il soi t mis fin a votre 
mission. 3 
1 Minute by W. H. B. Mack, 
E7103/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
17 November 1943, 
2 Vienot a Alger, 18 Novembre 1943, No 1288, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
3 Massigl i a Helleu, 18 Novembre 1943, No 425, Papiers 
Massigl i , Vol 1468. 
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Massigli reprimanded Helleu, pointing out that declarations 
such as he had made 
ne sont pas de nature a faciliter notre tache et a 
nous permettre de trouver la solution de 
conciliation que l'interet superieur de la France 
exige. 4 
To Vienot, Massigli sent a reassurance that Helleu had acted 
on his own initiative and that any reports from Reuters or 
from any other sources to the contrary, were "denuees de 
tou t fondement". 5 
As far as Helleu himself was concerned however, 
considerable confusion still surrounded his position and an 
already awkward situation was being further complicated by 
his refusal to accept that he had been superceded by 
Catroux. On 17 November, he sent a personal telegram to de 
Gaulle, disclosing that he had discovered that Catroux, in 
the presence of a Lebanese personality, had expressed 
disapproval of the arrests. The rumour was already 
spreading, Helleu alleged, that he had been disavowed. 
Declaring that "rna personne a peu d'importance", he went on 
to explain his wider concerns: 
II s'agit de sauver les positions de la France dans 
tout l'Orient et, avec elles, notre prestige. Mon 
avis est donc formel: nous ne pouvons, sur Ie plan 
local, envisager de solution qui comporterai t un 
retour a la situation anterieure. Notre cause est, 
moralement et juridiquement, inattaquable. La 
mauvaise foi de nos adversaires apparait chaque jour 
davantage. Je crois donc qu' en tenant bon, nous 
l'emporteront (sic).6 
4 ibid. 
5 Massigli a Vienot, 19 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
6 Helleu a de Gaulle, 17 Novembre 1943, Service 
Historique de l'Armee de Terre, 4H 308 (3). 
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Helleu seemed almost impervious to the diplomatic furore 
that his actions of almost a week before had raised. He 
evidently found it extremely difficult to come to terms with 
the situation which now obtained in the Levant. He remained 
adamant that France's position was unassailable, and as a 
result, saw no reason for compromise, least of all for a 
climb down by France. He seemed convinced that maintaining 
a firm stand would see France through. He bitterly resented 
Catroux's decision to have as little to do with him as 
possible, and, unwilling to be pushed to one side, he once 
again telegraphed to de Gaulle on 18 November, asking to be 
informed urgently of any solutions Catroux had proposed. He 
advised that it would be a fundamental error not only to 
restore the Lebanese government under Bechara el Khoury but 
even to consider this as an option. Whereas Riad Solh was a 
dangerous agitator, Khoury, he felt, had been unmasked 
"comme un simple agent anglais". The President held personal 
and public responsibility for violating the constitution, 
and as "un affairiste et opportuniste sans scrupules", would 
remain "un simple marionnette aux mains des Anglais".7 
Later that same day, Helleu fired off yet another 
personal telegram to de Gaulle. A communique had been issued 
that morning to the effect that Catroux hoped shortly to 
announce a solution to the present crisis. Having been 
excluded from all his dealings, Helleu expressed his fear 
that Catroux had taken irrevocable decisions "de nature a 
mettre gravement en peril les interets frangais". He felt 
himself duty bound to suggest that Catroux should be ordered 
immediately to defer any decisions which had not first 
received de Gaulle's approval. 8 
7 Helleu a de Gaulle, 18 Novembre 1943, No 1601, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
8 Helleu a de Gaulle, 18 Novembre 1943, No 1606, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
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In yet another personal telegram to de Gaulle, Helleu 
attributed the British haste to force a solution to the 
crisis, as a ploy to prevent the French from gaining any 
breathing space in which to resolve the matter. Given the 
fact that the situation in the Levant was "dans l'ensemble 
tres calme" and that there was no sign of a united Arab 
front materialising, 
les Anglais se rendent compte en effet que ... leur 
intervention sera d'autant moins justifiee devant 
1 'opinion internationale qu'elle sera plus retardee. 
Le faux pretexte de la securite militaire dans Ie 
Middle East (sic) perd chaque jour de sa force. Une 
grande partie de l' opinion locale se lasse de la 
greve et de l'incertitude ... Nous devons donc nous 
efforcer de gagner Ie temps que les Anglais veulent 
nous refuser. 9 
The considerable number of personal telegrams Helleu 
sent to de Gaulle during the Lebanese crisis, as well as 
their content, clearly demonstrate that the Delegue General 
believed that he had the sympathy of his chief and could 
rely on his support. Helleu was evidently convinced that de 
Gaulle was not as well informed about the situation in the 
Levant as he might be. He therefore sought to offer him the 
benefit of his perspective, in the hope that once he 
realised exactly what Catroux was doing and the effects of 
his actions on the French position, he would take steps to 
overrule him. 
Even as late as 19 November, Helleu appears to have been 
behaving as though he was experiencing some dreadful 
nightmare from which he would shortly be roused. He 
telegraphed de Gaulle that it had been proposed to issue the 
following communique, stating that his actions had always 
had the Committee's approval: 
9 Helleu a de Gaulle, 19 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
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Le porte-parole du Comi te de la Liberation 
declare aujourd'hui: 
"Les suggestions d'un desaccord entre les 
membres du Comite de la Liberation National et Ie 
Delegue Fran9ais au Liban, M. Helleu, concernant la 
responsabilite de ce dernier dans les mesures prises 
au Liban sont denuees de fondement. Les mesures 
prises par M. Helleu pour proteger les interets 
fran9ais au Liban, ont re9u toujours l'approbation 
des membres du Comi te National de Liberation". 10 
Helleu expressed his surprise to de Gaulle that Catroux had 
expressly forbidden its publication, claiming that the 
statement was "denue de fondement" and "contraire a la 
veri te" . 11 The very despatch of the telegram implied an 
expectation on Helleu' s behalf at least, that de Gaulle 
would somehow come to his rescue and put everything to 
rights. 
Despite the extreme ambiguity of his position, Helleu 
continued to send telegrams to Algiers for more general 
consumption, asserting that all continued to be well. He 
described a visit of Catroux's to Bkerke on 19 November as 
"une imposante manifestation d'amitie franco-libanaise" and 
claimed that a petition which was presently circulating in 
Beirut, approving his action and "condamnant en termes tres 
vifs les meneurs britanniques", had received numerous 
signatures. 12 
He additionally sent Massigli a lengthy note, distilling 
the views of an unnamed foreign consul13 , who, he claimed, 
10 Helleu a de Gaulle, 19 Novembre 1943, No 1602, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
11 ibid. 
12 Helleu a Alger, 19 Novembre 1943, No 438-441, No 444, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
13 Massigli suspected that the consul in question was 
Delcoigne, the Belgian representative in the Levant. 
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was both impartial and had long experience of the Levant, on 
the origins of the crisis and on the methods to be employed 
to remedy it. The basic premise of the note was that the 
present crisis was the result of "un plan [bri tannique] 
ourdi depuis longtemps pour evincer les droits et interets 
franQais au Levant ..• ". This was all too evident from the 
anti-French campaign presently being waged by the British-
controlled press agencies and radio stations in the Middle 
East. Bri tain ' s Levant policy was inspired by numerous 
motives and served a variety of ends: by manipulating and 
patronising Arab nationalism, Britain hoped to achieve a 
certain prestige among Arab states to offset the bad 
impression being created by the pro-Zionist lobby in 
Palestine and in London; she hoped to rid Syria and Lebanon 
of the trappings of French administration which had hitherto 
cramped her 
politically. 
own freedom to expand economically and 
Wi th the creation of an Arab federation, to 
which Britain would hold "tous les leviers du commande au 
point de vue politique", she would create a system of buffer 
states, "destines a servir de rempart contre une poussee 
eventuelle de la puissance sovietique". Nor would Britain 
stop there: by employing the same tactics and posing as the 
protector of Moslem countries, she would aim for North 
Africa, via Egypt and Libya, "creant ainsi une vaste zone 
imperiale mediterraneenne, englobant tous les pays arabes et 
faisant jonction avec les elements islamiques des Indes". 
Faced with such a "vaste plan d'hegemonie", the consul 
advised that France should take adequate steps to defend 
herself. She should increase her military effectives in the 
Levant, though she should refrain from any provocation of 
Syrian nationalists. A serious propaganda campaign ought to 
be mounted to enlighten the population about the 
implications of the policy of hegemony which Britain was 
pursuing in neighbouring Arab states. France should refuse 
to negotiate any arrangement with the Lebanese which might 
be considered to be of dubious legality internationally and 
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which might lose France prestige. Rather, she should adopt 
a policy of wooing the Syrians and negotiate a provisory 
accord with them, based on the 1936 treaty, and reinforced 
by "une entente speciale". The French could then sit and 
wait for the Lebanese reaction to all this and adopt the 
appropriate attitude accordingly. 14 Helleu had evidently been 
much impressed with this analysis which made Britain's 
Levant policy the linchpin of a much wider and grander 
imperial design and therefore served to justify his own role 
and actions to defend and protect French interests. 
The tone and content of Helleu's various telegrams and 
communications worried Massigli considerably. He confided in 
a letter to Vienot that Helleu 
temoigne dans ses communications d'une assurance qui 
me fait craindre que certaines instructions lui 
aient ete donnees avant son depart d' ici dont j e 
n' aurais point eu connaissance ... il Y a aussi 
certaines declarations de portes-paroles dont on ne 
peut retrouver l'origine et qui sont bien etranges, 
de memes certaines emissions de Radio Brazzaville. 15 
Massigli suspected therefore that he had perhaps not been 
party to all that had been said about the Levant during 
Helleu's stay in Algiers. Subsequent events served only to 
heighten his suspicions and fulfil his worst forebodings. 
ii) De Gaulle Overruled 
Macmillan was growing more and more gloomy about 
prospects of a settlement. Frustrated by the bombardment of 
telegrams from London, Beirut and Cairo, most of which were 
14 Helleu a Massigli, 19 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
15 Massigl i a Vienot, 20 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1480. 
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"ei ther unnecessary, foolish, obscure or undecipherable", he 
privately accused the Cabinet of "dithering". Makins too, 
expressed disillusion with the instructions winging their 
way to Algiers, and confessed that there had been 
some difficulty in discerning the policy of His 
Majesty's Government in the Lebanese affair. 
Admirably balanced and judicious telegrams have 
issued forth, presumably from the Eastern 
Department, but they have alternated with much more 
violent and rigid instructions. We seem at the 
moment to have got ourselves into a position from 
which we cannot withdraw without losing face or go 
on without a serious quarrel with the French. I 
suppose we accept the injury to Anglo-French 
relations which must follow from our taking over in 
the Levant States. My principal doubt is whether we 
really want to do this and whether it will not 
merely mean that the populations of the States will 
turn against us rather than against the French. 16 
Macmillan further believed that Spears wanted "a 
Fashoda" and was "determined to elevate himself and to 
degrade the French". In complete contrast, he was convinced 
that he himself, given the opportunity, could secure all 
that Britain required from the French, without alienating 
reasonable and moderate Frenchmen or destroying the progress 
made over the previous year. 17 In a telegram to the Foreign 
Office, he warned that in his opinion, the Committee, on 
present form, would not meet Britain's demands, but would 
simply allow events to take their course: 
They ( i. e. the French) will then take refuge in 
injured innocence and appeal to the sense of 
chivalry of the world as a great country of whose 
temporary weakness unfair advantages are being taken 
for imperialistic ends. 18 
16 Makins to Strang, 18 November 1943, FO 800/432. 
17 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 19 November 1943, 
p 297. 
18 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 19 November 1943, No 
2415 E7178/27/89, FO 371/35189. , 
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Yet at a meeting between 10.00am and 1.00pm on 19 November 
Macmillan's pessimistic forecast about the Committee was not 
borne out. 
The Committee met to discuss Catroux' s proposals for 
dealing with the Lebanese situation. Catroux had informed 
the Committee that his investigations in the Levant had 
served only to convince him further of how deep a wound 
Helleu's action had inflicted on Lebanese national pride. On 
17 November, he had sent Bart19 on an unsuccessful mission to 
try and tempt the rump Lebanese government out of hiding. 
The Delegue Adjoint had however, been met by a firm refusal 
from the government even to negotiate with the French before 
the release of the interned ministers. 2o The interviews he 
had conducted himself had been no more successful and even 
the Maronite Patriarch was insisting on the release of the 
Government. 21 The Lebanese people, Catroux reported, had 
evidently united as never before in a climate of protest 
which, if allowed to continue, could only lead to trouble. 
For the moment everyone was holding back, awaiting the 
outcome of his presence, the effects of British pressure and 
wondering whether the Syrians would eventually climb down 
off their fence: 
En bref, la si tuation etai tune si tuation 
preinsurrectionelle, dont l'evolution dependait du 
.. d d" .. 22 caractere e mes eC1Slons. 
19 M. Bart: appointed the new Delegue Adjoint for the 
Lebanon. 
20 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7109/27/89, FO 371/35187. 
17 November 1943, 
21 Spears to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, 
E7140/27 /89, FO 371/35188; Spears to Foreign Office, 19 
November 1943, E7166/27/89, FO 371/35189. Spears comment7d 
that it was "a remarkable instance of the strength of publlc 
opinion" that the Patriarch had taken this stance. 
22 Catroux, op cit, p 416. 
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In the wake of several bombing incidents23 , including one 
in the Petit Serail, in which four Lebanese gendarmes were 
.. d 24 C 1nJure , atroux had advised the Committee that, in view of 
the risks inherent in the situation, he thought it necessary 
to act quickly to satisfy public feeling. He outlined how he 
considered the situation might best be handled: he proposed 
releasing the Ministers, but restoring only Bechara el 
Khoury to his former position with a new Cabinet; he 
proposed restoring the Chamber but not allowing it to 
reassemble for a few weeks. If Bechara el Khoury proved 
unaccommodating, then Catroux warned that he saw no solution 
other than a return to the constitutional position prior to 
Helleu's arrests. Though he realised that this would be a 
bi tter blow, he thought it would prove "moins funeste a 
notre prestige et a notre position que les consequences de 
troubles a la repression desquels l'etranger serait 
forcement mele". Whatever the position, the Delegue would, 
by arrete, nullify the constitutional reforms which the 
Chamber had passed. 25 
Massigli himself was surprised and pleased by the 
disposition demonstrated by the Committee on 19 November to 
fall into line with Catroux's proposals. Writing to Vienot 
23 Spears to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, 
E7132/27 /89, FO 371/35188; Spears to Foreign Office, 18 
November 1943, E7208/27/89, FO 371/35189. 
24 This incident took place on the evening of 17 
November. Algiers was informed that the four gendarmes had 
submi tted written testimonies and that they "declarent et 
jurent sur Ie coran, que ce sont des "military police" 
britanniques qui ont jete la bombe". Beyrouth a Alger, 18 
Novembre 1943, No 431, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
The testimonies of the four gendarmes, Abdala Boukhari, 
Aduan Omari, Moussa Yaghi and Mohamed Makouk, can be found 
in Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre, 4H 308. 
25 Catroux a Alger, 18 Novembre 1943, No 418-22, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. Also printed in Catroux, op 
cit, pp 416-17. 
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the following day, Massigli gently chided him for 
underestimating "l'importance de l'intrigue" he had had to 
face. His struggle with the Committee had been rendered all 
the more difficult up until now since "les opinions moderees 
n'y etaient defendues que par des hommes pour qui Ie General 
n' avai t que mepris ou soupc;:ons". 
Massigli explained that he had 
On 19 November however, 
received strong support 
within the Committee for accepting Catroux's proposals from 
Le Troquer, Frenay and Astier and commented that "c;:ela 
change pour moi beaucoup de choses". He had succeeded 
finally in bringing the majority of the Committee "sauf les 
compagnons de la premiere heure, a prendre position pour les 
solutions de compromis". 26 
In fact, Massigli had confided to Macmillan immediately 
after the Committee meeting, that de Gaulle had actually 
proposed the despatch of an intransigent reply to Catroux, 
but after a lengthy discussion, had been overruled. The 
reply finally despatched to Catroux authorised Helleu' s 
recall when he considered French face would suffer least. It 
also authorised the physical release of the President and 
his Ministers, though Bechara el Khoury was to be urged to 
form a new government with a new Prime Minister, which would 
then negotiate its position with the French. 27 
Though Massigli had emphasised what a responsible and 
governmental attitude the Committee had demonstrated, he had 
also confessed to Macmillan that to ensure a favourable 
decision by the Committee, he had been obliged to make great 
play with the assurances Macmillan had offered the previous 
evening, about the underlying principles which motivated 
British policy towards the Levant, and especially his 
26 Massigli a Vienot, 20 November 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1480. 
27 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 19 November 1943, No 
2417, E7165/27/89, Fa 371/35189. 
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insistence that Britain was not demanding the reinstatement 
of the Lebanese ministers. The contentiousness of the 
reinstatement issue was only just beginning to dawn on 
Macmillan. In a telegram to the Foreign Office, he indicated 
that it was not easy to reconcile Casey's latest 
instructions that the Lebanese personalities should be 
released as President and Ministers and not as private 
individuals, with the report of Cadogan's conversation with 
Vienot, when the latter had been assured that Britain was 
not asking for reinstatement of the Lebanese government. 28 
As far as Macmillan could now discern, the Committee 
seemed poised to comply with Britain's demands. It had 
authorised Catroux to deal with Helleu and to release the 
Ministers. However, Macmillan realised only too well from 
his conversation with Massigli and from a recent statement 
the Committee had issued, that while the French might 
release the government, they would never agree to its 
restoration to power29. For Britain now to step up its 
demands and to insist on the reinstatement of the government 
would completely upset the apple-cart and certainly 
invalidate his claim that by using his own methods, he could 
get all that Britain wanted from the French. He expressed 
the hope to London that the question of automatic 
reinstatement "would not prove insurmountable". 30 
iii) Une "Demarche Comminatoire" 
Unfortunately, evidence in Algiers on 19 November that 
the Committee was about to yield even in part to Britain's 
28 'b' d :1.. :1.. • 
29 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 19 November 1943, No 
2420, E7189/27/89, FO 371/35189. 
30 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 19 November 1943, No 
2417, E7165/27/89, FO 371/35189. 
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demands, came far too late to forestall Casey who had been 
instructed to fly to Beirut and issue Catroux with an 
ultimatum failing some definite indication by the evening of 
18 November that France was about to comply with Britain's 
demands. Casey duly flew to Beirut on 19 November, whereupon 
Catroux was summoned to a 5.30 meeting at Spears's house. 
In accordance with his plans to try and persuade Bechara 
el Khoury to resume his position with a new Cabinet, Catroux 
had interviewed the Lebanese President on the evening of 18 
November. Despite Khoury's internment and his attempt to 
justify the Lebanese action, Catroux reported to Algiers 
that the Lebanese President remained "Ie serviteur de 
l'entente franco-libanaise" and was "fidele it la France et 
n'avait jamais adhere it la cause britannique ni la cause 
arabe" . 31 Catroux had outlined for the President the terms 
which Helleu had been authorised to offer the Lebanese and 
suggested that if he would now accept them, he would be 
restored to power, provided that he disbanded Riad Solh's 
Cabinet. Bechara el Khoury however, refused to have anything 
to do with such a scheme. 32 
Undeterred, Catroux had seen Riad Solh on 19 November. 
The Prime Minister explained that his reactions had been 
provoked by the attitude of Helleu and his staff. He claimed 
that he would have behaved differently had he been afforded 
more consideration. He actually offered his resignation to 
Catroux, though he did so in the certain knowledge that his 
colleagues and compatriots would never accept this. 33 Catroux 
31 Catroux it Alger, 19 Novembre 1943, No 445-453, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. See also Catroux, op cit, pp 
419-20. 
32 ibid. For Bechara el Khoury's acount of his meeting 
with Catroux, see A. Susser, Western Power Rivalry and its 
Interaction with Local Politics in the Levant, 1941-46, 
(University of Tel Aviv, 1986), pp 448-49. 
33 Catroux, op cit, P 420. 
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claims that at this stage in his negotiations, faced with 
the continued intransigence of the Lebanese which seemed set 
to wreck his own plans for compromise, he had decided to 
recommend to the Committee that the Ministers should be 
released and that they should all resume their functions. 
However, he claims that "une demarche comminatoire de Casey 
me fit differer rna prise de position". 34 
Indeed, at the 5.30 meeting with Spears and Casey, the 
Frenchman was presented with an aide-memoire, referring to 
the French non-compliance with British demands. 35 It went on 
to state that if the Committee would reinstate the Lebanese 
government by 10.00am on 22 November, Britain would propose 
a conference under her auspices to negotiate a modus vivendi 
for the duration of the war. If the Committee failed to 
comply by that time, then Britain, for reasons of military 
necessi ty , would declare martial law and British troops 
would release the imprisoned Lebanese. The aide-memoire 
stressed that Britain's action would involve no political 
consequences, and should not be taken to represent any 
intention to substitute British for French influence in the 
Levant. 36 
According to Casey's account, Catroux accepted the 
situation "calmly" and 
"friendly throughout". 
discussed 
34 "b"d 22. 
paragraph 
37 
the 
The 
by 
tone of the discussion was 
text of the aide-memoire was 
paragraph to prevent any 
35 See Casey, op cit, p 145; Spears, op cit, p 262-66; 
Catroux, op cit, P 420-22. 
36 Beirut to Foreign Office, 19 November 1943, 
E7160/27/89, FO 371/35188. The complete text of the aide-
memoire is printed in full in English in Spears, op cit, pp 
265-66 and in French in Catroux, op cit, pp 420-21. 
37 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E7160/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
19 November 1943, 
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misunderstanding and Catroux made several observations on 
it. He disputed Britain's right to declare martial law, and 
enquired whether martial law would be enforced in Syria as 
well as the Lebanon. He warned that the Committee would 
never agree that the settlement of the Lebanese affair 
should form the subj ect of a tripartite conference and 
further pointed out that the time-limit Britain wished to 
impose was extremely short. He claimed that he had not 
wasted a moment since his arrival, but was hampered in his 
task by the slownesa of telegraphic traffic between the 
Levant and Algiers. 38 Casey assured him that to expedite 
matters, the text of the aide-memoire would be telegraphed 
to Macmillan and communicated to Massigli, though he pointed 
out that " in any event, the two British demands were 
unchanged and had been in Massigli' s hands for a week". 39 Yet 
in fact, as Casey knew very well, he had himself been 
obliged to question the Foreign Office about the exact 
interpretation of the British demands only the previous day. 
Though Casey made no reference in his account to the Foreign 
Office of any such comment, Catroux claims in his memoirs 
that he actually pointed out that the restoration to power 
of the government had not formed part of Britain's demands 
on 13 November. 40 As a parting shot, Catroux declared that 
for him, the aide-memoire conjured up memories of the 
Fashoda incident. Casey, as an antipodean, failed to 
38 Spears was extremely sceptical about Catroux' s lament 
about the slowness of telegraphic traffic. Reflecting on the 
meeting the following day, he recalled that Catroux had read 
aloud a telegram from Massigli "which had obviously reached 
him within a very few hours of despatch", having forgotten 
that he had previously assured them that it took "two to 
five days to receive telegrams from Algiers". Spears to 
Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, E7195/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
39 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E7160/27/89, FO 371/35188. 
40 Catroux, op cit, p 422. 
19 November 1943, 
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understand the reference and was obliged to request an 
explanation from Spears, who willingly obliged. 41 
Despite the apparent urgency of the situation, Catroux 
did not report the British ultimatum to Algiers until 
10.00am the following morning. Although he considered it was 
the Committee's responsibility to decide how best to 
respond, he examined the options: France might refuse to 
meet Britain's demands, provisionally withdraw from the 
Levant and redeploy all her personnel, thereby preserving 
her national dignity and her rights, at least theoretically. 
Yet such a solution would mean the final loss of the Levant, 
as, in Lebanese eyes, the French would be withdrawing 
because they had no desire to make amends for what was 
generally regarded to be an illegal act of violence akin to 
totali tarian methods. Moreover, if Britain was left to 
release the government and to re-establish normal 
constitutional life, France would be completely discredited. 
Thus, despite the harsh nature of the British demands, 
Catroux was inclined to recommend 
Ie geste genereux d'oubli et de reparation que Ie 
Liban attend de nous ... un geste total concernant 
la remise en place de tous les internes. 
All things considered, then, Catroux advocated capitulation 
to the British demands, though in view of the position of 
influence he enjoyed personally in the Levant, he still 
hoped to accomplish a solution "sans faire subir A la France 
d t ·" 42 une perte e pres 1ge . 
41 Casey to Foreign Office, 19 November 1943, 
E7160/27/89, FO 371/35188; Catroux, op cit, p 421; Spears, 
op cit, p 263. 
42 Catroux A Alger 20 Novembre 1943, No 456-61, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. Also printed in Catroux, op 
cit, p 422. 
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In a second telegram to Algiers, Catroux tried to 
justify his verdict, by describing the reality of the 
situation which France faced: Edde was without support and 
1 'opinion libanaise, presque totalement, et celIe de 
la Syrie entiere, attend de nous la reinstallation 
de tous les internes car les mesures prononcees par 
Helleu ont profondement emu la dignite nationale et 
jete Ie discredit sur la France et Ie Comite. 
Catroux was convinced that unless the government was freed 
and reinstated, popular unrest would merely grow and 
paralyse the formation of any other government as well as 
provoking certain trouble. He emphasised again however, that 
he was sufficiently well-placed personally "de faire au 
benefice de la France Ie geste total du pardon". 43 
Shortly after the despatch of these telegrams on the 
morning of 20 November, Catroux met with Spears, who pressed 
him as to what instructions he had received from Algiers. 
Catroux eventually revealed that he was to reinstate the 
President "if he deemed this opportune"; the other ministers 
were also to be released, but to be deprived of office 
permanently. All decisions regarding the future of Helleu 
had also been left to him. When Spears pointed out that this 
"so-called solution" would be 'unacceptable to Britain or 
indeed to any other interested power, Catroux made "very 
little effort" to defend the Committee. He claimed however, 
that it had not witnessed, as he had done, the strength and 
unanimity of public feeling in the Lebanon, but "saw the 
question mainly in terms of prestige and face-saving". 
According to Spears, Catroux hinted strongly that he had not 
come to Beirut with full powers, but that had he had a free 
hand, the crisis would have been satisfactorily resolved by 
then, an assertion which Spears did not doubt. The 
conversation, he reported, had been "entirely cordial" and 
43 Catroux a Alger, 20 Novembre 1943, No 462-64, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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Catroux, who "was in his most amenable frame of mind", had 
"evidently been impressed by the firmness of the line we had 
taken last night". He had hinted 
even more clearly that de Gaulle was the only 
stumbling block. Massigli •.. and the newer members 
of the Commi ttee were perfectly aware of the new 
spirit of democracy in the world and would not have 
attempted to put the clock back. 
Spears felt that Catroux thought that the matter "was now 
for London and the Committee to decide" but "did not believe 
that de Gaulle would give way". 44 
iv) "Historians Will Not Fail To Observe ... " 
Early on 20 November, despite his reluctance to do so, 
Macmillan was obliged to present Massigli with the text of 
the aide-memoire already delivered by Casey to Catroux in 
Beirut the day previously. (Catroux did not telegraph his 
own report to Algiers until 10.10am on 20 November). Due to 
Duncannon's "calculated indiscretion" about a time-limit, 
Massigli must have gathered that a British time-limit was 
imminent. In addition, he had received a telegram from 
Vienot, who had learned 
d'une source tres serieuse que Ie gouvernement 
britannique aurait decide que l'etat de siege serait 
proclame au Levant lundi prochaine si, d'ici la, une 
solution n'etait pas intervenue. 45 
Massigli claimed nonetheless, to be "much moved by the 
shortness of the period allowed in the ultimatum". Intent on 
doing all he could to assist his colleague in his struggle 
44 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7191/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
20 November 1943, 
45 Vienot a Alger, 19 Novembre 1943, No 1317-18, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. 
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wi th the Committee, Macmillan agreed not to deliver the 
aide-memoire formally until after a proposed Committee 
meeting that morning, during which Massigli hoped to obtain 
agreement to the immediate dismissal of Helleu, as well as 
to the release of the Ministers without resort to the 
Bri tish ultimatum. 46 
If Massigli was surprised by the shortness of the time-
limit, he must have been even more surprised by the 
discrepancy between Britain's original demand for the 
release of the Ministers and the present demand in Casey's 
aide-memoire for their release and reinstatement, and he 
seized upon this immediately. Only two days before, 
Macmillan had categorically assured Massigli that Britain 
was not demanding the reinstatement of the government. He 
now confessed to the Foreign Office that he was "still not 
clear on this point" and as far as his conversation with 
Massigli had gone, had "done [his] best to confuse the 
issue" . 47 Macmillan reminded the Foreign Office that the 
original demands "dealt with physical release and did not 
necessarily imply the reinstatement of powers"; it seemed to 
him "essential that this point should be made clear beyond 
doubt", for it would be "dangerous to risk the future of 
Anglo-French relations on a point so ill-defined and on 
which we appear so undecided". 48 
46 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, No 
2423, E7193/27/89, FO 371/35189. 
47 ibid; Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 20 November 
1943, p 298. 
48 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, No 
2424, E7193/27/89, FO 371/35189. Another aspect of his 
instructions which Macmillan queried was the ruling that the 
Lebanese government should do nothing to alter the position 
from what it was before 11 November, i. e. prior to the 
arrests. Macmillan wondered whether this then meant that the 
Reform Bill, passed by the Lebanese on 8 November, was to be 
regarded as a fait accompli? The Foreign Office merely 
replied that this would be dealt with during the 
negotiations for a modus vivendi. Macmillan to Foreign 
Office, 20 November 1943; Foreign Office to Macmillan, 20 
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As soon as the Committee meeting ended on the morning 
of 20 November, Massigli hurried to inform Macmillan that 
he had gained the Committee's approval for the immediate 
recall of Helleu, as well as for the release of the 
Ministers. Thinking that he had thereby as good as satisfied 
Bri tain ' s demands, he made an "earnest plea" that the 
ultimatum should be extended "to allow of further discussion 
of other issues involved" , i. e. the question of 
reinstatement, especially in view of the slowness of his 
telegraphic communication with Catroux. Relaying this 
request, Macmillan urged t,he Foreign Office "to consider 
most seriously the acceptance of such a solution". He 
continued: 
I find it difficult to believe that it is in the 
interests of His Majesty's Government to force a 
breach with the French Committee on an issue 
narrowed to this point ... we ourselves take the 
view that the [Lebanese] Prime Minister acted 
precipitately in passing reforms; it might not be 
unreasonable at least to negotiate about the exact 
composi tion of the new Ministry. Moreover, the 
French, having made these two major concessions 
would have granted our original demands as presented 
here on 13 November. 49 
Macmillan's continual pleas to London for clemency for 
the French had already outraged Spears, who commented 
angrily that the French Committee appeared "to have no 
conception of the principles of democratic Government". The 
Lebanese government, he maintained, was the product of 
genuine elections and Bechara el Khoury would never agree to 
form a new government, nor would the country permit him to 
do so. As for the French insistence that any negotiations 
must be purely Franco-Lebanese, Spears wondered "what the 
November 1943, E7197/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
49 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, 
E7190/27/89, F0371/35189. 
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rest of the world would think of our connivance at such a 
grim farce in which the lamb would sit down alone with the 
wolf at the conference table?" 50 
Spears confessed in his memoirs that 
[his] two greatest worries were the Foreign Office, 
which ••• resembled a jelly-fish, and a stinging one 
at that, drifting as de Gaulle willed, and Algiers, 
where Macmillan wilted in the ran~e of that 
irascible man's overpowering presence. 5 
To counter any effect Macmillan's pleas for leniency 
might be having, Spears stressed to the Foreign Office that 
Britain would have "failed utterly in the eyes of the whole 
of the Middle East if the Ministers upon their release, are 
not treated as a government". He argued that since Britain 
had never ceased to recognise the Ministers, "our original 
demand for release could only have implied in logic their 
release with a view to enabling them physically to resume 
the functions which they are constitutionally entitled to 
perform". In his view, it would be "absolutely fatal" to 
allow the French to insist on the nomination of a new 
government, and he confidently claimed to have no doubt that 
Bri tain would abide by its decision not to accept this. 52 
Negotiations with the President alone, apart from being 
constitutionally unsound, would also be totally unacceptable 
to public opinion in the Lebanon and throughout the Middle 
East. For once the Foreign Office considered Spears' remarks 
"impossible to controvert". 53 
50 Spears to Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, 
E7186/27/89, FO 371/35189. 
51 Spears, op cit, P 272. 
52 Spears to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, 
E7224/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
53 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 20 November 1943, 
E7165/27/89, FO 371/35189. 
491 
In line with the Cabinet decision of 18 November about 
reinstatement, over which he himself had been forced to back 
down, Eden ruled that the French contention that as they had 
yielded on the recall of Helleu and the release of the 
Ministers, their restoration to power was not an issue, 
would not do. 54 Two telegrams were accordingly despatched in 
quick succession to Algiers, emphasising that the Lebanese 
ministers, "on being released, must clearly resume their 
functions".55 Macmillan's hopes that the question of 
reinstatement would not prove "insurmountable" were rapidly 
evaporating. Though due in Cairo, he decided to remain in 
Algiers to continue his efforts to persuade London to his 
way of thinking. He would obey instructions and inform 
Massigli that Britain insisted on the reinstatement of the 
Lebanese government, but for good measure, he issued another 
plea for a postponement of the 10.00am 22 November time-
limit, commenting: 
Historians will not fail to observe that the 
solution now proposed is an acceptance of [the] only 
formal demand made on [the] French Committee ... on 
13 November 1943. The new demand, namely the 
automatic reinstatement of the Ministers as a 
Government which Sir A. Cadogan informed Vienot on 
18 November ... had not yet been put forward, has 
only now been made to Catroux on 19 November and 
communications are so bad that the Committee has not 
. d h· t 56 yet rece1ve 1S repor . 
Macmillan argued that if Britain accepted the recall of 
Helleu and the release of the government, this did not 
necessarily constitute acceptance of the French contention 
54 "b"d 22. 
55 Foreign Office to Macmillan, 20 November 1943, 
E7165/27/89, FO 371/35189; Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 20 
November 1943, E7194/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
56 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, 
E7204/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
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that a new government was required, but merely paved the way 
for a conference at which that contention could be 
discussed. He continued: 
We are, it seems, endangering the Anglo-French 
relationship and undoing the work of many months 
toil for a difference which is now much reduced. 
Moreover, the vote at this morning's Committee shows 
a development of independence and judgment which 
needs to be fostered. I hope you will pass this on 
to the Prime Minister. 57 
Just in case Churchill failed to see the telegram, 
Macmillan sent another directly to him, stressing that the 
Committee's concessions to date satisfied the only formal 
demands Britain had ever made on the Committee. He continued 
to argue that Casey's aide-memoire had introduced what was 
"essentially a new demand". Given that this was the case, 
and taking into account Cadogan's assurance to Vienot, the 
slowness of telegraphic traffic and the encouraging signs of 
independence being displayed by the Committee, Macmillan 
earnestly recommended that Churchill allow an extension of 
the time-limit on the French. 58 
Within the Foreign Office it did seem that there was "a 
reasonable chance" that matters might still be settled 
amicably, if a little extra time was allowed to sort out the 
reinstatement matter. Nonetheless, it was considered 
essential that there should be no relaxation of pressure on 
the French to release the ministers and to begin 
negotiations for a modus vivendi. A decision was therefore 
taken in the morning of 21 November to extend the time-limit 
by forty-eight hours, to expire at 10.00am on Wednesday 24 
57 ibid. 
58 Macmillan to Churchill, 20 November 1943, PREM 3/421. 
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November59 , and telegrams were despatched urgently to Casey 
and Spears informing them accordingly. 60 The telegrams 
explained that Britain was happy to accept the French recall 
of Helleu and the release of the ministers, but insisted 
that they reinstate the ministers, as they were the 
constitutional government of the Lebanon and recognised as 
such. They, and not Edde, were the persons with whom the 
modus vivendi would have to be arranged, though the manner 
in which they exercised their functions in respect of any 
reform or modification of the status quo, would be a matter 
for negotiation. 
A short telegram rather abruptly instructed Macmillan to 
refer to Casey's instructions and ordered him to await 
Cabinet instructions. 61 A further telegram attempted to 
explain the inconsistencies he perceived in Foreign Office 
instructions: it was admitted that Britain originally 
intended to demand only the release of the government and 
the recall of Helleu, but if the French failed to oblige, 
then it had been decided that reinstatement should also be 
demanded; when Casey met Catroux on 15 November, however, he 
had taken the line that Britain's demands included 
reinstatement and in view of the French failure until then 
to meet Britain's demands at all, it had subsequently been 
decided to support that attitude. Realising that there would 
be justifiable indignation and probably trouble throughout 
the whole Middle East if the ministers were only released, 
Britain had to demand reinstatement too. On the other hand, 
if the government was reinstated and allowed an entirely 
free hand, it was feared that they might "precipitate a 
59 Note for Secretary of State by R. M. A. Hankey, 21 
November 1943, E7204/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
60 Foreign Office to Casey, 21 November 1943; Foreign 
Office to Spears, 21 November 1943, E7204/27/89, FO 
371/35190. 
61 Foreign Office to Macmillan, 21 November 1943, FO 
226/245. 
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series of disputes possibly more serious than the present 
one"; thus, Britain also had to insist on the negotiation of 
a modus vivendi. No attempt was made to explain Cadogan's 
conversation with Vienot on 18 November. 62 
v) The Prime Minister Takes Over 
On 21 November, Massigli presented Macmillan with the 
text of a communique which the French Committee proposed to 
issue at 5.00pm that day. Macmillan commented: 
The French decision is rather clever. It makes it 
appear to be done by them on their own, or on 
Catroux's advice. It recalls Helleu: it liberates 
and restores to his functions the President of the 
Lebanon republic: it liberates only (and leaves the 
point of their status obscure) the Ministers. But it 
does appear at least a voluntary decision and does 
save some face. 63 
Although he knew there would be "further trouble" over the 
reinstatement of the Ministers, for the moment, Macmillan 
was satisfied to have got this far. 64 
In Beirut however, Spears was far from satisfied. The 
day had begun badly when a member of the French Air Force on 
road patrol shot at a military car containing two British 
soldiers, seriously wounding a Major Morton within.65 
62 Foreign Office to Macmillan, 21 November 1943, 
E7193/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
63 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 21 November 1943, 
p 299. 
64 ibid. 
65 Spears to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, 
E7242/27 /89, FO 371/35190; Beyrouth a Alger, 21 Novembre 
1943 No 1005, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. The 
Fren~h account alleged that the British car failed to stop 
at a checkpoint, and recounted a similar incident several 
days previously, when the British car in question had 
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Agitation grew considerably when publication of the French 
communique revealed that the Committee intended to play 
false by reinstating only Bechara el Khoury. Spears reported 
that he had received an urgent note from the Lebanese 
government warning of the "incalculable consequences" which 
any further delay in reaching a solution would have. 66 There 
were numerous explosions allover Beirut throughout the 
night and Edde, a prime target, realising the game was up, 
hurriedly departed in a French van, for an unknown 
destination. 67 
Spears had done his best to stress to London the 
extremely dangerous situation which now obtained. The strike 
in Beirut, despite French bribes and threats, remained 
"virtually complete", and represented, Spears believed, a 
striking testimony to the strength of public feeling. 
Patience was "at breaking point" and he feared that British 
counsels of restraint would soon be insufficient to maintain 
order: various Lebanese deputies were tired of waiting and 
many were proposing to return to their constituencies to 
stir up active revolt. "All", he noted, "were urged to 
refrain from giving the French 
bloodshed and I think they will 
any excuse for further 
follow my advice". 68 In 
Syria, students had gone on strike to protest at the lack 
of action from their government. Jamil Mardam had informed 
Catroux on 21 November that unless the Lebanese government 
were reinstated, the situation would get out of hand, and 
French prestige in Syria would be doomed. Spears commented 
that Catroux himself was now of this opinion, but was afraid 
knocked down the guard which tried to stop it. 
66 Spears to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, 
E7250/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
67 Spears to Foreign Office, 22 November 1943, 
E7257/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
68 Spears to Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, 
E7210/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
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that the Committee and de Gaulle could not be made to see 
this. 69 
Casey provided additional support by backing Spears up 
solidly. He informed the Foreign Office that he feared 
"trouble on a big scale" as the situation in Lebanon and 
also in Syria, was "very close to breaking point". Only the 
daily expectation that a satisfactory solution was imminent 
held people in check, but he expected an eruption before the 
new deadline on 24 November. He explained that while he 
understood and appreciated the desire to give the French 
more time, this could not be 
at the expense of many lives in the Levant and a 
much more difficult situation for our army to have 
to tackle if it comes to martial law in the end. 70 
Spears observed similarly that "the present outward "calm" 
[was] entirely illusory". The Committee's attempts 
to gain time by proposing further discussions on a 
point which in reality admits of no compromise, are 
liable, if successful, to plunge [the Levant] into 
bloodshed and disorder. 
Moreover, if disorders did occur, "a very grave 
responsibility" would rest on Britain "for failing to cope 
with the situation in time".71 
At a meeting at 4.00pm on Sunday 21 November, Eden found 
the Cabinet in total agreement with his view that while it 
69 ibid; Spears to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, 
E7249/27/89, FO 371/35190. See also Catroux, op cit, p 422-
23, for text of letter Jamil Mardam addressed to Catroux on 
21 November 1943. 
70 Casey to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, 
E7223/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
71 Spears to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, 
E7224/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
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was "very tempting" to accept Macmillan's opinion that now 
the French had conceded so much, the immediate reinstatement 
of the Ministers should not be insisted upon, "in practice, 
this would not provide any real solution of the difficulty". 
Given that it now appeared that Catroux had not been 
invested with plenipotentiary powers as had previously been 
thought, it was decided that diplomatic efforts should be 
concentrated on the Committee itself and that Macmillan 
should remain in Algiers until the matter was satisfactorily 
resol ved. Al though concern had been expressed lest some 
proposed British troop movements in the Levant on the night 
of 21-22 November caused "undesirable repercussions", Eden 
voiced the opinion that "on the whole the effect of these 
moves would probably be salutary". It was finally agreed 
that the decision of whether or not they should proceed 
should be left to the authorities in Cairo. 72 The Cabinet 
directed that a telegram should be sent to Macmillan, 
recapitulating the situation and requesting clarification on 
any doubtful points. The "essential point" the telegram 
should make was that 
the Ministers, once released, should be free to 
resume negotiations for a modus vivendi with their 
status as Ministers unimpaired. Otherwise there was 
a risk that the negotiations would degenerate into 
a discussion of what personalities should be 
included in a new Lebanese government. 73 
Consequently, on 22 November, Macmillan received a 
telegram asking whether it was correct to presume that 
disagreement with the French was now limited purely to the 
status of the Ministers. It explained that the French 
proposal merely to release the Ministers would create 
72 Casey to Foreign Office, 20 
E7202/27/89, FO 371/35190; Conclusions 
meeting, 4.00pm, Sunday, 21 November 1943, 
November 1943, 
of War Cabinet 
CAB 65/36. 
73 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, 4.00pm, Sunday, 
21 November 1943, CAB 65/36. 
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certain difficulties: as the Ministers would definitely 
refuse to enter negotiations as private individuals, another 
deadlock would ensue and the modus vivendi negotiations 
which Britain hoped would comrnence.within twenty four hours 
of their release would be delayed indefinitely. Even if 
negotiations were begun with the President alone, which the 
French might well suggest, they would then "turn primarily 
on the question of finding new Ministers acceptable to the 
French instead of being concentrated on the constitutional 
issue". The Cabinet had therefore decided not to yield on 
the question of status; the French would have to meet this 
demand by the deadline as no further extension was possible. 
By way of small compensation however, it was pointed out: 
It may make things a little easier for the French if 
the expression "reinstatement" of the Ministers is 
not used. Instead, we should maintain that [their] 
status is unaffected by their imprisonment and that 
therefore on release, they continue as before to be 
the legally constituted Ministry unless removed by 
consti tutional process. 74 
Macmillan replied that he had informed the French by 
letter that Britain believed that the arrested Lebanese had 
never lost their status and on their release, they were to 
be treated as Ministers with whom the modus vivendi 
negotiations would be conducted. He doggedly continued to 
press for a certain degree of latitude for the French, given 
that it would appear to most people that they had succumbed 
to British pressure. He admitted that he was avoiding a 
meeting with Massigli for the moment, as the latter would 
certainly ask whether martial law would still be applied on 
24 November over the reinstatement issue; despite his clear 
instructions, Macmillan still professed to be uncertain 
about the matter. He correctly suspected that the French 
74 Foreign Office to Macmillan, 21 November 1943, 
E7191/27/89, Fa 371/35190. 
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were attempting to arrange a deal with the President, 
involving a change of Ministry: 
It looks to me as if this whole dispute will 
ul timately turn on the person of Riad Solh. Of 
course I realise the great strategical and political 
importance of the maintenance of our prestige in the 
Middle East, but will you declare martial law ... on 
this single point? Will public opinion at home 
support this attitude or may we not create 
undeserved sympathy for de Gaulle? I think the 
Americans will regard such action as hankering after 
imperialistic expansion. They are already very 
suspicious. Ironically, the only beneficiary will be 
de Gaulle himself. 75 
Though the Cabinet met at 5.30 on 22 November to discuss 
the situation, the matter had effectively been taken out of 
its hands. On 21 November, the Prime Minister had arrived at 
Alexandria and had then flown directly to Cairo for the 
Sextant Conference76 , where he was able to acquaint himself 
more fully with the Lebanese situation. He telegraphed to 
Eden on 22 November that he was "much disturbed" to learn of 
the further postponement of the ultimatum, and hoped no 
trouble would arise in the Levant in the meantime. "We ought 
not", he admonished, "to risk loss of life and widespread 
disorders to save de Gaulle's face". In view of his recent 
75 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 22 November 1943, Nos 
2448 and 2449, E7248/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
76 See M. Gilbert, op cit, p 559. Gilbert states that 
Churchill flew to Cairo "where he was to stay in the villa 
of Lord Moyne, the Minister Resident". Churchill actually 
stayed at Casey's villa, loaned to the Minister Resident by 
its owner, Chester Beatty. Lord Moyne was in fact Deputy 
Minister Resident at Cairo between 1942 and 1944. The first 
two sessions of the Cairo (or Sextant) Conference took place 
on 23 and 24 November and discussed the Far Eastern 
offensive and the pros and cons of the proposed cross-
Channel offensive as against the Mediterranean campaign. The 
Conference was adjourned for Churchill and Roosevelt to fly 
to Teheran for a conference with Stalin between 28 November 
and 1 December. The fifth and final session of Sextant 
occurred on 6 December. See M. Gilbert, op cit, pp 560-601. 
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arrival and his lack of "Macmillan's slant" , the Prime 
Minister had thus far refrained from intervention, but 
intended, as Eden was anyway shortly due to join him77, "to 
take over the handling of the situation from noon Tuesday", 
[ i. e. 23 November]. 78 
In Cabinet, Eden agreed that the Lebanese situation, 
from now onwards, might indeed "be much better handled in 
the Middle East than in London", a view which received 
general assent. The view was expressed however, (a tribute 
to Macmillan's efforts), "that as the concessions made by 
the French went a considerable way to meeting [Britain's] 
demands, it was unnecessary and might be embarrassing to 
leave the original ultimatum unchanged", leaving Britain 
obliged to impose martial law if the Government was not 
reinstated. It was considered that it might be better to 
withdraw the threat to impose British martial law by 10. aDam 
on 24 November, but to make it clear that Britain reserved 
the right to proceed with such an imposition should it be 
deemed necessary in the future. 79 
A telegram was consequently drafted, setting out the 
situation as viewed from London. It was thought that 
everything now seemed to depend on the local reaction to the 
French concessions. If they were favourably received, and 
the French and the Lebanese at least began to communicate, 
then the Cabinet thought it would be "a false step" to 
declare British martial law, and especially unwise to do so 
purely because the French had failed to comply over 
reinstatement. Britain had no desire to declare martial law 
if at all avoidable: it would tie British troops in the 
77 Eden arrived in Cairo on 25 November 1943. 
78 Churchill to Eden, 22 November 1943, FROZEN 66, PREM 
3/421. 
79 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, 5.30pm, Monday, 
22 November 1943, CAB 65/36. 
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Lebanon and probably in Syria too and such a serious breach 
in Anglo-French relations would create a gift-wrapped 
opportunity for German propagandists. Moreover, the effects 
on American opinion and on the French resistance would be 
far from salutary. While it was felt therefore, that no 
definite date for action should be set, thereby assisting 
the more moderate members of the Committee, it was also 
appreciated that the imposition of a time-limit on the 
French had done some good. It was therefore proposed, 
provided the local situation allowed, to keep the threat of 
a possible imposition of martial law hanging over the 
French, in the hope of bringing them into line over 
reinstatement. It then might be possible "to adjust the 
remaining differences under the threat of martial law but 
without resort to it". A copy of this telegram was sent to 
Churchill, which ended "Of this, you are clearly the best 
judge, since you are much nearer the theatre than we are 
••• ,,80 With this disclaimer, the War Cabinet and the Foreign 
Office largely relegated themselves to the role of 
spectators for the final stages of the Lebanese drama. 
80 Eden to Churchill, 22 November 1943, GRAND No 153, 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
THE CRISIS RESOLVED 
i) The Problem Of Helleu 
Catroux had warned Algiers in a telegram on 20 November 
that the problem of Helleu and his continued presence in 
Lebanon had become a matter of some urgency. He had advised 
that a successor for Helleu must be found without delay and 
suggested Vienot or perhaps Chataigneau in the interim. 1 In 
fact, the question of what to do with Helleu was proving a 
headache for Massigli, there being considerable reluctance 
within the Committee, mainly from de Gaulle, to disavow him. 
After a struggle however, with only de Gaulle and two others 
against him, Massigli managed to gain the Committee's 
agreement to Helleu's recall. 2 He telegraphed Catroux 
advising him that if Helleu's presence in Beirut was 
complicating his consultations and if his departure would 
ensure the success of his mission, "dans son element 
indispensable (elimination de Riad Solh du pouvoir)", he was 
authorised to inform the Delegue that he was urgently 
required in Algiers. 3 This decision, Massigli explained, 
represented "un compromis pour l' immediat" and one which, he 
suggested, Catroux might find useful when pressing Casey for 
a postponement of the British ultimatum. 4 
1 Catroux a Alger, 20 Novembre 1943, No 462-64, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
2 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 20 November 1943, p 
298. 
3 Massigli a Catroux, 20 Novembre 1943, s.n., Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
4 Massigli a Catroux, 20 Novembre 1943, No 437, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
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After publication of the French communique on 21 
November, Massigli ordered Catroux, if he had not already 
done so, to instruct Helleu to return to Algiers and, in the 
interim, to make Chataigneau Delegue General. This proved to 
be a great deal easier said than done: Catroux presented 
Helleu with an invitation to leave immediately for Algiers 
"pour fournir personellement, et dans Ie plus bref delai, un 
complement d'information sur Ie developpement de l'affaire 
libanaise". Helleu continued to be obstructive: he replied 
that he would not depart until he had received a direct 
order to do so from de Gaulle. 5 Catroux requested that a 
telegram in the required sense be issued without delay "car 
il est convenable que M. Helleu qui tte Ie Levant sans 
retard" • 6 De Gaulle duly despatched a telegram for Helleu, 
emphasising that he would be most interested to hear his 
reports and offering him " 1 ' expression de mon ami tie" . 7 
Acknowledging receipt of the telegram the following day, 
Helleu announced that his attitude was, "et restera 
toujours, absolument reservee"; he promised to refrain from 
expressing any opinion of a political nature before reaching 
Algiers, but requested a few days' grace to arrange his 
affairs. a 
Catroux evidently felt the need to try and explain his 
attitude towards Helleu in greater depth. He reassured de 
Gaulle in a subsequent telegram that he would not permit 
Helleu's departure to assume "Ie caractere d' une brutale 
disgrace". He felt obliged to inform his chief however, 
5 Helleu a de Gaulle, 21 Novembre 1943, No 1638, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
6 Catroux a de Gaulle, 21 Novembre 1943, No 1639, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
7 de Gaulle a Helleu, 21 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
a Helleu a de Gaulle, 22 Novembre 1943, No 1642, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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that long before his more recent transgressions Helleu had 
lost all prestige with the Syrians and Lebanese: 
On savai t trop que l' age avai t use en lui les 
ressorts du travail, qu'il ne suivait pas les 
affaires, et, qu'a certaines heures de la journee 
il cessait d'etre lucide, ce dont je viens de faire' 
a deux reprises, la constation personnelle. C'est 
vo~s dire combien il m'a ete penible de devoir, pour 
su~vre vos recommendations personnelles, me 
solidariser et solidariser la France avec M. Helleu 
aI' occasion d' un acte de force qu' il persiste a 
regarder comme un acte de haute opportunite 
politique, alors qu'il a souleve l'indignation du 
peuple libanaise et provoque Ie fracas international 
que vous savez. C'est pourquoi il ne convient, a mon 
avis, que Ie Comi te paraisse Ie couvrir, car Ie 
Levant et Ie Monde ne Ie comprendraient pas. 9 
Ironically, Catroux was also obliged to report to 
Algiers that Baelen and Boegner, who had both been closely 
associated with Helleu' s actions, had resigned and that 
their continued presence in Beirut had also become 
impossible. 10 Shortly afterwards, the text of Baelen' s letter 
of resignation was transmitted to de Gaulle by Helleu, along 
with a letter from Boegner avowing that he endorsed Baelen's 
sentiments completely. Baelen's letter consisted largely of 
a diatribe against the British, and read as follows: 
9 Catroux a de Gaulle, 23 Novembre 1943, No 1614, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
10 Catroux a Alger, 21 Novembre 1943, No 483, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. Casey had mentioned in a 
previous telegram that he was implementing steps to ensure 
the safety of General Spears "against the possibility of 
interference on the initiative of ill-intentioned 
individuals". (Casey to Foreign Office, 20 November 1943, 
E7202/27/89, FO 371/35190). Spears's comment on the news of 
the resignation of Baelen and Boegner and their imminent 
departure for Algiers was: " I am now safe", the strong 
implication being that Baelen and Boegner were the "ill-
intentioned individuals". (Spears to Foreign Off ice, 22 
November 1943, E7324/27/89, Fa 371/35192). "Elimination of 
Boegner is big news", observed Hankey. (Minute by R. M. A. 
Hankey, 24 November 1943, E7328/27/89, Fa 371/35192). 
505 
Quel que doive etre Ie reglement de la crise 
suscitee par l'Angleterre a propos des [rapports] 
Fra~co-Libanais, cette crise a deja fait apparaitre 
clal..rement que les vues et les methodes de la 
politique anglaise ne different pas, en 
I 'occurrence, des vues generales et des etapes 
connue de la politique Hitlerienne: sollicitations 
des principes pour des fins pratiques, preparation 
du terrain par la corruption de personnes 
interposees, campagnes de mensonges, menaces de 
force. Cette constation me pri ve de la sereni te 
necessaire a l'accomplissement d'une tache qui exige 
des contacts avec la legation britannique, la 
Mission Spears, et les nombreux organismes que Ie 
Gouvernement de Londres a installes au Levant a 
titre civil ou militaire. J'ai l'honneur en 
consequence, de me demettre en vos mains, les 
fonctions que j'exerce ... ll 
Catroux was subsequently informed however, that "dans les 
circonstances presentes", it was impossible to accept the 
resignations from Baelen and Boegner; though the pair should 
not remain in Beirut, Catroux was instructed to order them 
to return to Algiers, where they would be granted "une 
nouvelle affectation".12 Whether this was an indication of 
the extreme shortage of qualified staff suffered by the 
Committee or rather an expression of loyalty to two loyal 
compatriots who had unwittingly become scapegoats in a 
diplomatic incident, is difficult to assess. 
ii) Catroux Advocates "Le Geste Genereux" ... 
Yet if finally Massigli had succeeded in persuading de 
Gaulle and the Committee to give way over the recall of 
Helleu, he had been less successful over other issues: he 
was obliged to inform Catroux that the Committee persisted 
in thinking that Riad Solh "ne doi t pas etre rappele au 
11 Helleu a de Gaulle, 23 Novembre 1943, No 1653, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
12 Alger a Catroux, 23 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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pouvoir actuellement" and adamantly maintained that any 
conference which might be convened must be purely Franco-
Lebanese. If, notwithstanding the concessions France had 
made in her communique, the British went ahead and 
proclaimed martial law on 22 November as threatened, 
(Massigli was as yet unaware of the British decision to 
extend the deadline), Massigli disclosed that the Committee 
had decided that French officials should remain at their 
posts while refraining from any collaboration with the 
British authorities, and all troops should be confined to 
barracks. 13 Massigli added that a letter had been sent 
warning Britain that if she carried out her threat of 
declaring martial law, she must bear full responsibility for 
ensuing events as well as for the deplorable consequences 
which would unfold for future Anglo-French relations. 14 
In addition to these instructions from Massigli, Catroux 
received a personal communication from de Gaulle, claiming 
that these decisions represented the unanimous verdict of 
the Committee. In particular, he repeated 
que si le sentiment du Comite s'est trouve acquis au 
retablissement de Bechara el Khoury dans ses 
fonctions, il est formellement oppose au rappel de 
Riad Solh et de ses collegues actuellement. D'autre 
part, j'insiste aupres de vous pour que Ie retour de 
M. Helleu prenne 1 'aspect d'un appel en consultation 
et non pas un desaveu brutal. 15 
De Gaulle was sure that Catroux shared his opinion that 
Helleu's situation was inextricable due to "des odieuses 
intrigues de l' Angleterre". Alluding to that section of 
13 Massigli a Catroux, 21 Novembre 1943, No 444, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
14 These observations had been contained in a covering 
letter attached to the French Committee's communique. 
15 de Gaulle a Catroux, 21 Novembre 1943, No 446, 
Papiers Massigl i , Vol 1468. 
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French opinion which was unwilling to condone weakness, 
especially in the face of British meddling, he stated that 
he saw no advantage in condemning Helleu's act of force. He 
continued: 
Je doute que les Anglais executent maintenant leurs 
menaces de prendre Ie pouvoir au Liban sous couvert 
de la loi martiale. Si toutefois, ils Ie faisaient, 
Ie Comite pense unanimement que nous ne devrions a 
aucune prix, nous accrocher a une posi tion 
impossible .16 
In these circumstances, de Gaulle advised Catroux that all 
French officials should be withdrawn from their posts and 
troops confined to barracks. If the British maintained "leur 
usurpation", all French personnel would have to assemble in 
Beirut and "Ie dernier stade serait Ie depart de Beyrouth 
pour l'Afrique du Nord". In conclusion, de Gaulle offered 
his opinion 
qu'il y a interet a convaincre Bechara el Khoury, 
car a la limite, nous n'hesiterons pas a proceder de 
la sorte, Ie laissant a la discretion des Anglais. 
Ceci peut contribuer a lui faire entendre raison. 17 
At 8.30pm on the evening of 21 November, Catroux 
informed Algiers that he had asked Casey for a forty eight 
hour extension of the ultimatum. Mentioning the certainty of 
insurrection and the inevitability of British intervention 
unless something was done, Catroux offered his opinion 
que nous devons opter entre deux decisions: celIe de 
maintenir l'internement de la totalite des 
prisonniers ou celIe de remettre en liberte et en 
fonctions tous les internes sans exception. Je me 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid. 
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suis prononce et je me prononce pour cette seconde 
solution. 18 
In a strictly personal and lengthy reply to de Gaulle, he 
sympathised with his chief's predicament: 
Je con90is pleinement la haute preoccupation 
nationale qui inspire vos reactions devant les 
injonctions britanniques. Je les ressens aussi. 
He asserted however, that he stood by his previous 
recommendation -- the reinstatement of the entire Ministry 
-- "car, A cOte du conflit franco-britannique, je ne dois 
considerer que les suites du grave differend franco-
libanais". Catroux explained that if France vacated the 
Lebanon, she would not only surrender her reputation as the 
mother of liberty, but would also leave the field entirely 
free for her rivals, most notably the British, who would 
derive 
Ie benefice de restaurer les libres institutions que 
nous avons suspendues. Et il serai t funeste que 
notre depart du Liban soit attribue A notre refus de 
retablir, en meme temps que la Constitution, les 
hommes qui en dirigaient les rouages et en qui s'est 
cristallise. Ie sentiment national depuis qu'ils ont 
ete ecartes. 19 
Catroux went on to try and explain again that French 
coup d'etat tactics had sorely disappointed the Lebanese, 
who in trying to rationalise them, had tended to attribute 
them to a mistake by the Delegue General, which they 
expected the Committee to correct. If reparation was made, 
then all would be forgotten; otherwise, the Lebanon would 
turn decisively against the French Committee. Moslems and 
Christians alike solidly backed Bechara el Khoury and Riad 
18 Catroux A Alger, 21 Novembre 1943, No 481-82, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
19 Catroux A de Gaulle, 21 Novembre 1943, No 1635, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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Solh and were confident of outside support. Lebanese 
national feeling had at last taken shape and the mandate had 
been deemed abolished. Catroux was quick to point out 
however, that these developments did not mean that French 
advice would henceforward be spurned: 
On demande seulement que [les conseils] soient 
donnes discretement et que les apparences de la 
souverainete et de l'independance soient 
t '" 20 respec ees ... 
Catroux tried to convince de Gaulle that all was not 
lost provided "nous savons faire genereusement Ie geste 
qu'on attend de nous, qui relevera notre prestige et nous 
permettra une reprise d'influence avec une equipe fran9aise 
renouvelee bien entendu". This was why he had insisted upon 
the release and reinstatement of all the ministers and he 
remained convinced that if he carried these measures out in 
the Committee's name, they would not be viewed as 
concessions made purely as a result of British injunctions. 
When all was said and done, however, Catroux promised that 
unless he received other instructions to quash them, he 
would carry out the orders which he had received regarding 
the application of martial law and withdraw all officials 
and troops. He explained however, that he had forbidden the 
garrison at Rachaya to oppose a British operation to release 
the interned Ministers but that "afin de materialiser l'acte 
de violence accompli par les Britanniques, la porte de la 
ci tadelle sera tenue fermee et devra etre forcee par eux". 21 
Thus, even though the French would not actually resist the 
British, the fact that they would be obliged to storm the 
door of the fortress would symbolise their act of aggression 
against the French. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
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Catroux attempted to postpone a 10. OOpm meeting with 
Spears on the evening of 21 November, but on the latter's 
insistence, was forced to attend. After a statement by 
Holmes, Catroux was now aware that the British ultimatum had 
been extended until 10. OOam on Wednesday 24 November. He 
informed Spears that he had referred urgently to Algiers but 
unless he received an absolute veto from the Committee he , 
intended to reinstate the Government. Spears warned him that 
if he was forbidden by Algiers, Britain would be obliged to 
declare martial law at 10. OOam on 24 November. Catroux 
claimed to understand this point and the fact that Britain 
recognised the imprisoned Ministers as the constitutional 
government of the Lebanon. 22 Spears remarked that if on the 
other hand, the Committee did allow Catroux to act as he 
proposed, "the next step would be the conference on British 
soil to negotiate a modus vivendi". Predictably, Catroux 
balked at the idea of France negotiating under British 
auspices on a footing of equality with Lebanon, "this tiny 
state" ; he maintained as a general line that the 
negotiations should be conducted between the mandatory power 
and the mandated territory without foreign intervention. "He 
also made it quite clear," Spears reported disgustedly, 
"that he was thinking entirely in terms of the 1936 
Treaty" . 23 
Immediately after his meeting with Spears, Catroux 
telegraphed Algiers yet again: the terms of the Committee's 
communique, he commented, led him to believe 
que vous n'avez pas exclu l'hypothese que, lors de 
mes negociations avec Bechara el Khoury pour Ie 
retablissement de la vie constitutionelle, je puis 
remettre en place Ie President du Conseil et ses 
ministres. Ainsi que j e vous 1 ' ai marque avec 
22 Spears to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, No 735, 
E7252/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
23 Spears to Foreign Office, 21 November 1943, No 736, 
E7252/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
511 
insist~nce, c ' est avec cette condition seule que 
nous resoudrons la crise localement. Hormis cette 
solution, nous courons a un echec des plus graves 
que j e me refuse a affronter. 24 
Catroux obviously resented the implication in the 
Committee's communique of 21 November that it was on his 
recommendation that the decision had been taken to release 
all the Ministers but to reinstate only Bechara el Khoury. 
This mistake, he commented in his memoirs, "etait de nature 
a compromettre la solution du conflit".25 His annoyance was 
evident and expressed in a heavily critical telegram 
despatched in the afternoon of 22 November. He informed 
Algiers that whatever general advantages the communique had 
been thought to possess, its issuance had been most 
maladroit as far as the Levant was concerned, especially as 
it had been published before he had had the opportunity to 
comment, still less to prepare, guide and enlighten public 
opinion as to how to react. The Lebanese people were 
insistent that their government would have to be reinstated; 
merely to release the government was insufficient and would 
result only in a greater defiance and a stricter observation 
of the strike than hitherto. He expressed his anger thus: 
Je deplore que Ie Comite ne m'ait pas suivi en cette 
importante matiere et j'insiste de la faQon la plus 
pressante pour qu' il revise sa position. Je suis 
certain en effet que portes par l' opinion, les 
anciens Ministres s'installeront eux-memes au siege 
de Gouvernement et reprendront leurs activites. En 
pareille hypothese, je ne recommencerai pas 
1 'operation d' Helleu en les faisant chasser manu 
militari et nous serons en presence d'un 
Gouvernement soutenu par la population, reconnu par 
les bri tanniques et non acceptes par nous ... Je 
signale par ailleurs que la redaction du Comi te 
attribue a mes propositions la totalite des mesures 
qui ont ete decidees alors que je me suis prononce 
24 Catroux a de Gaulle, 21 Novembre 1943, No 1639, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
25 Catroux, op cit, P 424. 
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nettement contre la non-reinstallation des 
Ministres. Ceci n'est pas pour faciliter rna tache. 26 
iii) Released But Not Reinstated 
The Lebanese ministers were released eleven days after 
their ordeal had begun, at 11.00am on 22 November, to a 
rapturous reception from immense crowds in Beirut. 27 
Considerably less than rapturous was the welcome they 
received from Catroux. He saw both Khoury and Solh shortly 
after their return to Beirut, and immediately attempted to 
persuade the President to dissolve his government "as a 
gesture of reconciliation and regard for France". 28 Khoury 
claimed he had no moral justification to dissolve his 
Cabinet, and would lose all credibility if he did so. He 
could only part company with his ministers by dismissing 
them and he was adamant that he had no grounds for doing 
this. Finally and above all, public opinion would not 
tolerate the eviction of Riad Solh; even though the latter 
was prepared to resign, his departure from the political 
scene would create serious trouble. 
According to Spears's report of the meeting, Catroux 
promised that he would telegraph urgently to Algiers and 
request authority for the government to remain in office; in 
the meantime, he suggested that Bechara el Khoury should 
function without ministers. Khoury refused categorically, 
26 Catroux a Alger, 22 Novembre 1943, No 485-87, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
27 Spears to Foreign Office, 22 November 1943, 
E7254/27/89, FO 371/35191; Spears to Foreign Office, 22 
November 1943, E7324/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
28 Spears to Foreign Office, 22 November 1943, 
E7328/27/89, FO 371/35192; Catroux a Alger, 22 Novembre 
1943, No 488-91, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
Catroux's telegram is printed in full in Catroux, op cit, pp 
424-45. 
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announcing that he would install himself and his Ministers 
by Wednesday 24 November "whatever the reactions of Algiers 
might be". Spears commented that general feeling among the 
returned ministers appeared to be "that all that is 
necessary from now on is to reinstall themselves and ignore 
the French completely ••. "; they regarded themsel ves as 
independent and wanted no French interference. 29 
Spears reported that Catroux had given him "the most 
positive assurances" that he would expend all his energy in 
trying to get the Committee to reconsider its position about 
reinstatement. 3o Catroux was certainly as good as his word. 
He informed the Committee of the gist of his meeting with 
the two Lebanese, and continued thus: 
Aujourd'hui, devant l'enthousiasme de l'accueil que 
re90ivent les internes, je suis si persuade qu'en 
decevant Ie sentiment public, nous risquerions de 
graves aventures et nous nous alienerions 
defini ti vement les populations des deux pays, que j e 
ne me sens pas Ie droit d'executer vos instructions. 
Celles-ci me paraissent surtout con9ues en vue de 
resister aux exigences britanniques et elles 
omettent par trop les facteurs psychologiques et 
humains. C'est parce que j'ai cette matiere sous les 
doigts que je ne peux pas m'y rallier. 
Je pourrais certes notifier simplement la 
decision du Comi te au President restaure et vous 
remettre rna demission. Mais cette methode 
n'eviterait pas les consequences et ne ferait 
qu'accroitre l'excitation des esprits et servir les 
Britanniques. Mon devoir est, dans la circonstance 
- - j em' en excuse aupres du Comi te - - de ne pas 
sui vre ses instructions. Je donnerai donc demain 
apres-midi a Bechara el Khoury, mon agrement a la 
reinstallation de son ministere. J' aurai Ie 
sentiment en ce faisant, d'avoir non seulement evite 
la ruine de notre cause, mais aussi redresse notre 
29 Spears to Foreign Office, 22 November 1943, 
E7328/27 /89, FO 371/35192; Spears to Foreign Office, 23 
November 1943, E7306/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
30 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7247/27/89, FO 371/35190. 
22 November 1943, 
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credit. II nous faut en effet, faire ici desormais 
une politique positive et nouvelle. 31 
Catroux thus felt sufficiently strongly about the 
reinstatement issue and the emotion it was arousing in the 
Levant, to propose acting on his own initiative to reinstate 
the Lebanese government. 
He continued to worry however, that his reports had had 
insufficient impact in Algiers, especially on de Gaulle. On 
23 November, he despatched another lengthy telegram, in 
which he attempted to describe the harm done to the French 
cause by the small group of men who had surrounded and 
inspired Helleu. These men had no more conception now of the 
mistakes they had made and the damage they had committed 
than they had done before the coup de force of 11 November. 
Otherwise well-gifted, they had not known when to throw 
themselves wholeheartedly into the life of the Lebanon and 
to call a halt to their daily squabbles with the Spears 
Mission. They were completely unaware that a vulnerable and 
sensitive Lebanese nationalism had been born and was growing 
before their very eyes, which could not endure a rigid 
tutelage, still less a regime of force. "L'art de Spears", 
Catroux observed, "a ete de discerner ce phenomene, de 
l'encourager et de Ie soutenir". This growth of nationalist 
spirit meant that the Lebanese government took the 
proclamation of independence seriously and regarded the 
mandate as abolished in practice. The suspension of the 
constitution and the brutal imprisonment of the Government 
had been resented as an affront to national dignity and, 
Catroux observed, had been taken to represent French 
decadence: 
Et il faut bien que l'on sache que Ie coup du 10 
Novembre a produi t comme une cristallisation de 
31 Catroux a Alger, 22 Novembre 1943, No 488-91, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. Also printed in Catroux, op 
cit, pp 424-25. 
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l'idee nationale et a, plus que la defaite de 1940 
affaibli la foi et 1 'admiration des Libanais pour 1~ 
France. 
On ne reconnait plus en nous les fils 
spirituels de la Revolution fran9aise.32 
Catroux's telegram ended with an impassioned plea: 
C'est pourquoi notre redressement doit etre effectue 
sur Ie plan moral, lA od nous avons peche contre 
l'esprit en employant la force. C'est pourquoi nous 
ne reprendrons notre figure que par une reparation 
totale de notre erreur. C'est pourquoi nous devons 
adapter notre comportement politique aux 
susceptibilites du sentiment libanais; pourquoi 
enfin, comme je vous l'ai telegraphie, je ne peux 
pas, sans nuire A la France, executer la decision du 
Comite. Notre situation morale qui est notre seule 
force ne peut etre sauvegardee et refaite qu'a ces 
condi tions . 33 
iv) Macmillan's and Massigli's "Little Conspiracy" 
It was small wonder, in view of the fierce opposition de 
Gaulle was raising to the idea of reinstatement, that when 
Macmillan finally saw Massigli at 10. OOpm on 22 November 
about the Lebanon, the latter was "very depressed". 34 
Macmillan had been avoiding meeting Massigli, and as he had 
predicted, one of the first questions the Frenchman uttered 
was whether Britain intended to enforce her new deadline 
( i . e. imposi tion of British martial law at 10. OOam on 24 
November) over the one outstanding point of reinstatement. 
He disclosed that he had received a telegram from Catroux 
32 Catroux a de Gaulle, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, 
Catroux, op cit, p 426. 
23 Novembre 1943, No 1614, 
Vol 1005. Also printed in 
33 ibid. 
34 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 22 
p 299. Macmillan and Mu~phy had already 
earlier in the day, on a d1fferent matter. 
November 1943, 
seen Massigli 
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who proposed reinstating the government on his own authority 
unless expressly forbidden to do so by the Committee. 
Massigli was therefore hoping that the Committee, at its 
next session, might be brought to allow the reinstatement of 
the Lebanese government, purely on the basis of Catroux's 
advice and without the Damoclesian device of the British 
ultimatum. 
With this hope in mind, the pair engaged in a "little 
conspiracy". It was arranged that Macmillan would write an 
appropriate letter35 , restating the British position, which 
he would delay despatching until after Massigli had departed 
for the Committee meeting arranged for the following 
morning. Then, if Massigli was asked during the Committee 
meeting, whether or not the British ultimatum still applied, 
he could reply that he did not know. 36 
According to Macmillan the ruse "worked out well". The 
French Committee assembled at 10.00am on 23 November, 
whereupon de Gaulle had remarked facetiously that he 
supposed their task was to discuss another British 
ultimatum. Massigli was able to deny this as Macmillan's 
letter did not arrive until 11.30am. Instead, he read aloud 
Catroux's telegram, which warned that the situation had 
forced him to the conclusion that he must reinstate the 
35 The letter acknowledged the French concessions and 
singled out reinstatement as the only outstanding 
difficul ty. It described the strained situation in the 
Levant and the general opinion that it could not be 
stabilised unless reinstatement occurred. It referred to the 
measures of military security which Britain had authorised 
would be put into operation on 24 November and requested an 
early decision from the Committee on the matter of 
reinstatement in view of the need to inform His Majesty's 
Government with all possible expediency. Macmillan to 
Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, PREM 3/421. 
36 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entries for 22 and 23 
November 1943, pp 299-300; Macmillan, Blast of War, pp 428-
29; Macmillan to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, 
E7310/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
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ministers on his own authority. (As Massigli later informed 
Catroux, the Committee had no idea that de Gaulle had 
already replied to Catroux in its name, insisting that Riad 
Solh must not be reinstated, and that Catroux had in fact 
subsequently decided that he could not disobey the 
Committee.) 
After consideration of this information from Catroux, 
the Committee decided that Catroux should be permitted to 
proceed as he had outlined and reinstate the government. It 
seemed that all that was left for the Committee to do was 
to place the seal of approval on his proposals. There had 
nonetheless been, as Massigli later told Macmillan, "a most 
painful scene": de Gaulle had been "in a terrible mood and 
had been very rude to him". Massigli had twice offered his 
resignation, though this had been refused by acclamation. 
After a considerable struggle, he was finally able to swing 
the Committee to agree to the reinstatement of the Lebanese 
Ministers "by a good majority -- only de Gaulle, Pleven and 
Diethelm against him". 37 
Massigli's own private correspondence confirms the 
seriousness of the situation he had faced. He wrote to 
Vienot on 24 November, that the Lebanese affair had 
occasioned 
une crise tres serieuse au sein du Comite meme, dans 
laquelle Ie President [de Gaulle] s'est trouve en 
fai t isole avec quelques fideles. Un echange de 
propos assez vifs entre Ie General et moi m'am~ne a 
donner rna demission; j' ai dO la reprendre a la 
demande du Comi te en raison du debat en cours a 
l'Assemblee. Cela vous donne, en tout cas, Ie 
38 ton ... 
37 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 23 November 1943, 
p 300. 
38 Massigl i a Vienot, 24 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigl i , Vol 1480. 
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To Hoppenot39 , Massigli wrote of "un vif incident entre Ie 
General et moi"e Helleu, he explained, "avait tout a fait 
perdu la tete, ainsi que ses jeunes Turcs, et il faut, une 
fois de plus, raccomoder la porcelaine cassee ... "40. A 
letter to Monnet described "une grande bagarre entre lui [de 
Gaulle] et moi; des mots vifs ont ete echanges". 
Fortunately, Massigli continued, the situation had 
eventually been resolved satisfactorily "en empechant tout 
discours incendiaire", and Massigli added significantly, 
"autres folies que 1 'on avai t preparees" . 41 Massigli 
entrusted a note for Catroux to Count Ostrorog42 , describing 
his difficulties and the scene with de Gaulle. "Mais il faut 
que vous sachiez ceci: la grande majorite du Comite etait 
avec moi et notamment les hommes de la Resistance Ie 
Troquer, qui est excellent, d'Astier, et meme Ie groupe de 
la Resistance de l'Assemblee. La suite n'est plus que 
chronique" . 43 
Certainly Massigli 
individual members of 
acknowledged his debt both to 
the Committee and also to the 
39 Henri Hoppenot: representative of the CFLN in the 
United States. 
40 Massigli .. Hoppenot, 25 Novembre 1943, Papiers a 
Massigli, Vol 1481. 
41 Massigli .. Monnet, 24 Novembre 1943, Papiers a 
Massigli, Vol 1484. 
42 Count Stanislas Ostrorog: of "a Bosphorus 
background" ; had served in China and then in Syria, as 
Assistant High Commissioner in the 1930s; he had,been,F1rst 
Secretary in Moscow until 1940 and then served V1chy 1n the 
Far Eastern Department before rallying to the Free French. 
Algiers pointed out that he was often confused with his 
brother who was rumoured to be a Vichy agent. See 
Z292/192/17, FO 371/36051 and F~ ~26/41. He was posted to 
the Levant after the November cr1S1S. 
43 Massigli a Catroux, 25 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigl i , Vol 1484. 
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Consultative Assembly. He particularly praised Le Troquer44 
as "une recrue de tout premier ordre ... avec lequel je 
m'entends parfaitement sur toutes les questions essentielles 
et qui vient de m'etre un grand appui dans l'affaire 
libanaise" . 45 In a letter to Vienot, Massigli again singled 
out Le Troquer with the interesting comment: 
"Encore 
quelques semaines et Le Troquer sera Ie leader du Comite; 
j'en suis tres heureux car nous nous entendons parfaitement 
et reagissons de meme sur les points essentiels". 46 
Massigli was evidently also delighted with the way the 
Consultative Assembly was shaping up. In a previous letter 
to Vienot, he had expressed his intention of utilising the 
Assembly: 
Je voudrais aussi me servir de 1 ' Assemblee 
consultative. II y a 18 quelques hommes de qualite 
et, dans l' ensemble beaucoup de bon sens et de 
prudence dans Ie domaine exterieur. 47 
Several days later, Massigli was able to record: 
L'Assemblee a reagi exactement comme il Ie fallait 
et je me suis senti tres fort dans la discussion 
d'hier, de pouvoir faire etat d'une deliberation du 
groupe de la Resistance, qui m'avait convoque 
quelques heures auparavant et qui m ' avai t expose 
44 Andre Le Troquer: Commissioner for the Interior, then 
Minister for War; described by Macmillan as "a 
straightforward, if rather silly little man", he had not 
long since arrived in Algiers. Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry 
for 17 November 1943, p 295. 
45 Massigli 8 Monnet, 24 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1484. 
46 Massigli 8 Vienot, 24 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1480. 
47 Massigli 8 Vienot, 20 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1480. 
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nettement son sentiment. D'Oll un rechauffement de la 
temperature pro-alliee ••• 48 
v) De Gaulle Counter-Attacks 
However great his struggles, Massigli had at least been 
successful. Immediately after the Committee meeting, the 
shortest of telegrams was quickly despatched to Catroux: "Le 
Comite, reuni ce matin, a pris acte de votre initiative".49 
In a more lengthy telegram, Massigli confirmed that the 
Committee was aware of and upheld Catroux's initiative and 
added his own words of approval: 
Personnellement, je desire vous exprimer rna complete 
solidarite. La decision que vous avez prise etait 
celIe qui, au point de vue ou en etaient les choses, 
menageait Ie mieux l'interet franQais. La plufart de 
nos collegues partageaient ce point de vue. 5 
He informed Catroux: 
[Le Comite] a pris acte de vos decisions et n'a pas eu 
ales approuver, les considerant comme acquises; il 
croyait en effet, que vous preniez dans l'apres-midi 
meme, les mesures envisages. 
Yet what most of the Committee members had not realised, 
when they met on the morning of 23 November was that de 
Gaulle had already despatched a reply to Catroux's letter 
proposing to reinstate the Ministers on his own authority. 
It was only later on 23 November, when a telegram from 
Catroux arrived, referring to a telegram from de Gaulle 
48 Massigli a Vienot, 24 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1480. 
49 Alger a Catroux, 23 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
50 Massigli a Catroux, 23 Novembre 1943, No 442, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
521 
about which the Committee had known nothing, that Massig1i 
began to realise what had been going on. 51 
As the Committee was assembling in Algiers, Catroux had 
been appalled to receive the following telegram from de 
Gaulle: 
Etant donne l'ultimatum ang1ais que Ie monde entier 
connait et qui est toujours suspendu sur nous, vous 
ne pouvez rappeler Riad Solh sans que ce rappel 
prenne Ie caractere d'une humiliation infligee A 1a 
France par l' Angleterre. 52 
De Gaulle had instructed Catroux to inform Casey 
que votre mission de reconstruction de la vie 
consti tutionelle au Liban est impossible sous la 
menace bri tannique et que vous ne la reprendrez 
qu'une fois cette menace [sera] retiree. Le Comite 
deliberera sur ce point demain matin et fera 
connaitre pUbliquement sa position vis-A-vis du 
chant age anglais. J'evoquerai moi-meme la question 
demain apres-midi A l'Assemblee consultative et je 
ne doute pas de son sentiment. En tout cas, vous ne 
pouvez rappeler Riad Solh tant que Ie Comi te s' y 
oppose. Or, il s' y oppose. 53 
In view of the bitter reference to the British 
ultimatum, "que Ie monde entier connait", it is possible 
that de Gaulle was particularly enraged by the leakage of 
news of the ultimatum in Algiers, which Macmillan reported 
the following day.54 Owing to the fact that it was believed 
that the leakage had come from French sources anyway, there 
was not a great deal of sympathy for the French plight: 
51 Massigli A Catroux, 24 Novembre 1943, No 454, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
52 de Gaulle a Catroux, 22 Novembre 1943, No 450(?), 
Papiers Massigli, Vol 1468. 
53 ibid. 
54 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, 
E7300/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
522 
Casey, whilst insisting that both Cairo and Beirut had been 
careful not to allow the impression of an ultimatum to gain 
confirmation, thought that "any reasonably intelligent 
newspaper man" might have guessed that "in the 
circumstances, something that might be called an ultimatum 
had been lodged". 55 The Foreign Office similarly felt that it 
had done what it could to suppress news of the ultimatum "in 
order to save French face", but if they let the news out 
themselves, there was little that could be done. 56 
Whatever had inspired de Gaulle's rage, the telegram he 
despatched certainly stopped Catroux in his tracks. The 
extent of his shock is evident from a conversation he had 
wi th Spears on the afternoon of 23 November, when he 
revealed to the British Minister that early that morning, 
just as he resolved to recognise the Solh government, he had 
received "a most categorical and, he hinted, violent 
communication from the Algiers Committee, ordering him to 
state that the present Lebanese Government was illegal and 
that the National Committee reserved all its rights". From 
what Catroux said, Spears gained the impression "that had he 
been so minded, he could, on the strength of this 
communication, have attempted to use force". Catroux gave 
"the most positive assurance that he would not use force in 
any form" and agreed that to do so, "would have the gravest 
consequences" and "in all likelihood [would] lead to a 
massacre" . 57 
Catroux also mentioned to Spears that he would "tone 
down" the communication as much as possible, before 
55 Casey to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, 
E7302/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
56 Foreign Office to Macmillan, 24 November 1943, 
E7302/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
57 Spears to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, No 755, 
E7312/27/89, FO 371/35191; see also Spears, op cit, pp 275-
76. 
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transmitting it to him. In fact, the words of the communique 
he finally presented corresponded almost word for word with 
the original telegram, but it may have suited Catroux to 
allow Spears to believe that this was the toned down 
version. 58 Catroux believed, erroneously, that this telegram 
had been sent with the Committee's approval and consent. He 
commented disappointedly that it was quite obvious to him 
that Massigli and his colleagues in Algiers "were very much 
in the dark as to the real situation here". Their refusal to 
compromise seemed to prove that they had no appreciation of 
the depth of feeling the democratic issue had aroused, and 
of the fact that "there was in the Lebanon an absolutely 
solid -- and thanks to Helleu -- completely intransigent 
public opinion to deal with". 59 Catroux did not discover 
until several days later, when Massigli wrote to him, 
explaining that "Ie telegramme que vous avez recu dans la 
matinee du mardi 23 [Novembre], etait ignore de moi", that 
the Committee as a whole had no knowledge of the 
communication he had received. 60 
This bombshell from Algiers seems to have presented 
Catroux with no moral dilemma: having previously stated that 
he was of a mind to proceed with the reinstatement of the 
government on his own initiative, he had also stated that he 
would not do so if expressly forbidden by the Committee. He 
therefore replied immediately: 
Je ne puis evidemment prendre une autre position que 
celIe du Comite et de l'Assemblee. Je renonce donc 
58 The communique referred firstly to Casey's aide-
memoire of 19 November and stated that as Catroux's mission 
to re-establish constitutional life in the Lebanon was being 
carried out "sous la menace britannique", unless that threat 
was withdrawn, his work would be halted. Spears to Foreign 
Office, 23 November 1943, E7312/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
59 ibid. 
60 Massigli a Catroux, 25 November 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
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au dessein que j'avais forme de rappeler Riad Solh. 
J'en aviserai cette apres-midi Bechara el Khoury.61 
In a later conversation with Spears, Catroux explained his 
failure to carry out his threat to reinstate the government 
by his unwillingness to expose publicly the complete 
disuni ty between himself and the Committee. 62 His telegram to 
Algiers pointed out that France would be faced with a fait 
accompli as the government would simply reinstate itself and 
he had insufficient means to oppose it; besides which, to do 
so, "serait a l'heure presente, la plus lourde des erreurs". 
He promised however, that he would officially ignore the 
reinstated government. 63 
At 3.00pm on 23 November, Catroux saw Khoury and 
informed him "que Ie Comi te estimai t que Ie retour au 
pouvoir de Riad Solh et de ses ministres n'etait pas 
actuellement possible". 64 The President retorted defiantly 
that public opinion "n ' accepterai t pas actuellement Ie 
congediement du cabinet Riad Solh", a fact which Catroux 
could hardly deny. He at least conceded that, in the 
interests of maintaining public order, he would not 
forcefully oppose the reinstallation of the ministers. 65 
Later that afternoon, Bechara el Khoury and his government 
reoccupied their offices and Riad Solh appealed for a return 
to work. Spears reported that a formal parliamentary session 
61 Catroux a Alger, 23 November 1943, No 497-98, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. Written on this telegram are 
the words "Lu au Comite Ie 25 Novembre". 
62 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7347/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
24 November 1943, 
63 Catroux a Alger, 23 Novembre 1943, No 1650, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
64 Catroux a Alger, 23 Novembre 1943, No 500-501, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
65 ibid. 
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could not take place due to the immense crowds swelling 
around the Parliament buildings. 66 
vi) The British Ultimatum Withdrawn 
Upon hearing that Massigli had carried the Committee on 
the issue of reinstatement, and also oblivious of the 
telegram which de Gaulle had despatched to Catroux, without 
the knowledge of the Committee, Macmillan delightedly dashed 
off a telegram containing the good news, and assuming now 
that British military intervention would not take place. 67 
Retracing events, he eagerly emphasised that the decision to 
recall Helleu and to release the President and ministers had 
been freely made by the French Committee 
before they had the text of the Casey aide-memoire. 
The final point of reinstatement of the Ministers 
has also been achieved without recourse at this end 
•.. to the threat of a time-limit. 
Whilst he admitted that this might seem a minor achievement, 
he stressed that it had always been his aim to get the 
French to do Britain's bidding without "too great a sense of 
humiliation", and he believed that he had been largely 
successful. Though the pill the French had been obliged to 
swallow had been bitter, and had been rendered even less 
palatable by the knowledge that they shouldered the blame 
for the affair, Macmillan thought "the broad statesmanlike 
view" which the Committee had adopted, as well as the 
66 Spears to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, No 756, 
E7307/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
67 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, 
E7299/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
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influence undoubtedly exercised by the new men in the 
Consul tati ve Assembly, represented a "considerable gain". 68 
Reflecting on the situation again later that day, 
Macmillan observed that in fact, "the most immediate feature 
in the picture is a further defeat for de Gaulle". He 
reported that Massigli had commented that de Gaulle must 
surely be feeling the difference "between his almost 
dictatorial authority a few months ago and the present 
si tuation. The new members of the Cabinet are much more 
independently minded than the old and the new Assembly is 
confronting de Gaulle, who has no Parliamentary experience, 
wi th a new problem". 69 
However sympathetic Foreign Office officials might have 
felt to Macmillan, who was doing his utmost to stress the 
satisfactory outcome of the crisis and how excellently the 
French had behaved, at this stage in the crisis, they were 
able to exert little influence on events in the Lebanon, 
since all initiative had effectively passed to the Middle 
East. At noon on 23 November, the Prime Minister had placed 
himself in full charge of the matter. From his attitude to 
de Gaulle and his previous interventions in the affair, it 
might have been expected that once this happened, a hard-
line policy towards the French would ensue. This certainly 
seemed a very strong possibility when at 9. 30am on 23 
November, Churchill telephoned Casey to complain about "the 
wishy-washy telegrams" he was receiving from London. (The 
telegram to which Churchill referred was probably that sent 
by Eden on 22 November, offering the Cabinet's advice that 
it would be "a false step" to declare British martial law 
purely over the issue of reinstatement). Casey had not seen 
68 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, 
E7310/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
69 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, No 
2470, E7319/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
527 
the telegram in question, but thought it best to see the 
Prime Minister personally. Accompanied by General Wilson, he 
saw Churchill and described the situation to him "in 
objective terms", with the result that a fairly conciliatory 
reply was despatched to Attlee. 70 
Casey later sent Spears a secret and personal copy of 
Churchill's response to his deputy and the Cabinet. It 
stated that after the release of the imprisoned ministers by 
the French the day before, it now seemed "very likely" not 
only that the ministers would resume their functions at some 
point later that day, but also that there would be a session 
of the Lebanese Parliament. It continued: 
If the French wisely abstain from violent 
interference either towards members of the 
Government and Parliament or against the populace, 
we shall in fact have obtained satisfaction for the 
greater part of our request. In these circumstances, 
it is not proposed to march in and establish martial 
law from 10.00am tomorrow morning. Our declaration 
of martial law will remain in suspense. At any 
moment however, the French, by firing on crowd, or 
by some other imprudence, may incite a renewal of 
crisis in a dangerous form, in which case of course, 
the troops will have to move in, as we cannot allow 
widespread disorder and bloodshed to happen. 71 
Churchill therefore did exactly as the Cabinet had 
suggested, despite his initially hostile reception to their 
proposals. He did however, send Macmillan the same telegram 
wi th the additional warning that "French anxieties about 
expiration of ultimatum should not be relieved in any way". 72 
On receipt of news of Churchill's decision not to impose 
martial law, Spears requested permission to so inform 
70 Casey, op cit, pp 146-47. 
71 Casey to Spears, 23 November 1943, FO 226/245. 
72 ibid. 
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Catroux, who would be bound to ask him what the position 
was. Casey sought Churchill's advice about a suggestion from 
Spears that he should inform Catroux that it was not 
proposed to impose martial law for the moment, but that such 
action might subsequently be necessitated by the security 
si tuation. 73 Churchill, despite the fact that in the meantime 
he had learned from Algiers that the Committee had decided 
to acquiesce in the reinstatement of the ministers, approved 
this strategy. However, he did observe that now "Britain 
might even turn the balance slightly the other way, by 
seeing that the Lebanese Ministers played their part 
properly now that they had been reinstated". 74 
Having troubled to ascertain exactly what he should tell 
Catroux about the suspension of martial law, Spears 
proceeded to ignore his instructions. Minutes prior to his 
meeting with Catroux at 9.00pm that evening, he too received 
Macmillan's news that the Committee had now decided to agree 
to Catroux's plan to reinstate the entire Lebanese 
government. He decided however, "to tell Catroux only that 
the Committee had given way ... ". Justifying his decision, 
Spears announced: 
I think it much better to leave the French 
everywhere under the impression that there had been 
no question of further postponement on our part and 
that martial law would have been ~fplied immediately 
had they not accepted our terms. 
Casey thought it only logical to advise the French that the 
threat of martial law no longer applied, with the proviso 
that it of course always remained open to Britain to declare 
martial law, if she deemed the security situation warranted. 
73 Casey to Churchill, 23 November 1943, PREM 3/421. 
74 Note dated 23 November 1943, PREM 3/421. 
75 Spears to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, No 757, 
E7322/27/89, F0371/35192. 
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He informed Churchill that he had instructed Spears and 
Macmillan to so inform the French76 , though both 
representatives thought that it went without saying that 
Britain reserved the right to impose martial law at any time 
in the future if the situation required. 77 
Poor Catroux, who had received no word from Algiers must 
have been extremely relieved, if a little confused, to hear 
that the Committee had given way. At 00.45am on 24 November, 
he despatched a telegram to Massigli which he ordered be 
given absolute priority. In it, he described how he had seen 
a telegram from Macmillan, "aux termes duquel Ie Comi te 
aurai t approuve mon ini tiati ve". The second part of the 
telegram makes it fairly plain that he had received the 
first and even the second of Massigli's telegrams, 
despatched in haste after the Committee meeting on 23 
November but had been confused by their references, for he 
commented: 
J'interprete dans ce sens votre telegramme dont la 
redaction me parait sybilline; j'en aviserai Bechara 
el Khoury des demain matin. 78 
Hence on 24 November, Catroux wrote another letter to 
Khoury requesting that he consider as null and void his 
letter of the previous day, as the Committee had now 
accepted his advice about reinstating Riad Solh and his 
Cabinet. Catroux expressed his happiness at having brought 
a grave crisis, which he had personally deplored, to a just 
76 Casey to Churchill, 24 November 1943, PREM 3/421. 
77 Spears to Foreign Office, 24 November 
E7378/27/89; Macmillan to Foreign Office, 24 November 
E7327/27/89; both in FO 371/35192. 
1943, 
1943, 
78 Catroux a Alger, 24 Novembre 1943, No 502, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
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and reparatory end. 79 He and Chataigneau subsequently called 
on the President and Prime Minister to seal French 
recogni tion of the government. He informed Algiers that 
amicable toasts and greetings had been exchanged with the 
Lebanese. The town of Beirut was entirely back to normal and 
the population was satisfied. The only fly in the ointment, 
he observed, was the attitude of the French community: "Par 
contre, nos compatriotes n'approuvent point dans leur 
ensemble rna decision". 80 
vii) Eden's Directive on the Levant 
With the arrival in Egypt of Eden, Cadogan and Macmillan 
on 24 November, the centre of policy formulation switched 
even more markedly to the Middle East. Casey in particular 
was quick to take advantage of the presence in Cairo of the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to set forth his views 
on the Levant situation and how it might best be tackled. In 
a lengthy note to Churchill, he stated that the situation as 
it stood on 24 November was satisfactory, but forecast that 
the future held difficulties and dangers. In his estimation, 
the Lebanese were likely to be intransigent: they would have 
the bit between their teeth and would be firmly against a 
treaty. They would probably ignore the French but, realising 
that their ordeal was not yet over, would at least listen to 
the British. The French, by contrast, would be desperate to 
conclude a treaty in order to salvage what they could from 
the wreck of their position in the Levant, though he felt 
that they would be disposed to accept a treaty with less 
meat on it than they would hitherto have considered. 
79 Spears to Foreign Office, 24 November 1943, No 761, 
E7347/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
80 Catroux a Alger, 25 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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Casey predicted that the Syrians and the Lebanese would 
co-operate closely in defying the French, who would be doing 
all in their power to lessen the blow to their prestige and 
to cushion North Africa from any knock-on effects. In such 
circumstances, Casey prescribed the remedial action he 
thought necessary. He believed that the situation should be 
allowed to calm down and that the Lebanese should be advised 
not to seek to implement the constitutional amendment act of 
8 November, but rather to treat it as "a gesture of 
principle". Britain should not insist upon playing the 
honest-broker in the negotiations but rather should allow 
the French to realise for themselves that a conference with 
British involvement probably represented "the only way they 
can save face and save something out of the wreck of their 
position in the Levant". Britain should leave both sides 
well alone and "wait a little", though she should actively 
try to calm the Lebanese down, for, as he pointed out, 
we have something important at stake. It does not 
suit our book to have engagements torn up. We have 
our position in Egypt and Iraq to consider. If these 
Middle Eastern people see one of their number (and 
the least of them) successfully defying the 
authority of a (one-time) great power -- we may have 
the Egyptians and the Iraquis taking note of the 
lesson. 81 
Equallly determined to make a contribution and to try 
and fashion what he considered an appropriate policy, was 
Macmillan, who almost immediately upon arrival in Cairo, had 
been summoned to meet Churchill. The Prime Minister had 
listened "with unusual patience" to the story of the 
Lebanese affair as seen from Algiers. He seemed "impressed", 
Macmillan recalled, by the argument 
81 Casey to Churchill, 24 November 1943, PREM 3/421. 
Churchill circled Casey's sentence about waiting a little 
and wrote "I agree". Minute by Churchill, 26 November 1943, 
PREM 3/421. 
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that de Gaulle had been diverted from extreme 
courses by his own people and that this method was 
much more effective than British and American 
pressure especially if openly used which 
merely played into de Gaulle's hands and enabled him 
to appeal sucessfully to French pride and 
sensi ti veness. 82 
Macmillan certainly availed himself of every opportunity 
to press his views about the Lebanese affair during his time 
in Cairo. After his meeting with Churchill, he met Cadogan 
at 10.00pm at the British Embassy for a talk "on current 
French affairs -- more especially the Levant crisis". 83 His 
diary records a luncheon on 25 November with Churchill, at 
which Eden was present, during which he had "some 
interesting talk about French and Near East, and some sharp 
tiffs".84 Late in the afternoon on 25 November, he met with 
Casey for talks "particularly on Lebanon and Syria". 85 On 26 
November at 7.00pm he had a talk with General Wilson who 
gave "a very interesting account of the situation in the 
Lebanon •.. He [Wilson] thought Spears's account exaggerated 
and went so far as to say that as long as Casey and Spears 
were in charge, nothing would ever be solved. The French 
hatred for Spears was unbelievable". 86 
The actual task of hammering out a policy which took 
account of all these considerations and view-points fell to 
Eden. Macmillan records that at a meeting on 26 November to 
finalise matters, he had "a bit of a struggle" with the 
Foreign Secretary, though the latter was "very helpful". The 
policy, which eventually gained Churchill's concurrence, was 
82 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 24 November 1943, 
p 302. 
83 ibid, P 303. 
84 ibid, Entry for 25 November 1943, p 304. 
85 ibid, p 305. 
86 ibid, Entry for 26 November 1943, p 306. 
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embodied in a telegram from Eden to the Foreign Office, and 
owed something to the influence of both Macmillan and Casey. 
It spoke of the intransigent and difficult attitude the 
Syrians and Lebanese would inevitably adopt towards the 
French. Britain might be able to break any deadlock which 
arose and "to help the French save something out of the 
wreck of their position in the Levant States". Due to 
British insistence on elections in the first place and the 
prominence of her subsequent role in the recent crisis, it 
was felt that she would be able to exert a little more 
influence. 
Britain's objective, Eden outlined, was for France to 
achieve a position in the Levant broadly corresponding to 
her own in Iraq. It was not in British interests that the 
Levant States "should by unilateral action succeed in 
breaking all political ties with France". If French 
authority was flouted in the Levant, there might well be 
harmful repercussions both for the prosecution of the war in 
North Africa, and upon Britain's own interests in Egypt, 
Iraq, Palestine and elsewhere. It was proposed that the 
actual question of a treaty would be better broached at the 
end of hostilities, when a formal liquidation of the mandate 
would be possible and France would be in a position to 
conclude a treaty. In the meantime, a modus vivendi was 
required which would ideally encompass the terms of a 
projected treaty. It was suggested that perhaps a draft 
treaty might be drawn up and ratified when circumstances 
permi tted. Macmillan's point that British insistence on 
participation in the modus vivendi negotiations would 
embarrass the more moderate contingent on the Committee was 
accepted. Britain would not therefore force her good offices 
on the French; instead, she would wait in the wings until 
she could be of assistance. As far as the Lebanese were 
concerned, Britain should, through General Spears, counsel 
moderation on them. They should be brought to recognise what 
they owed Britain for her support and they should be 
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encouraged to regard their action in unilaterally amending 
the constitution "as a gesture of principle, balancing the 
assertion of principle on the French side" and not to force 
the issue by passing further constitutional amendments 
pending negotiations. High level discussions with the French 
would be given further consideration on Eden's return. 87 If 
the Levant situation should deteriorate in any way and 
thereby endanger military security, it was always open, as 
a last resort, to declare martial law, provided the security 
position imperatively demanded it. 88 
Both the Foreign Office and Casey copied Eden's 
directi ve to Beirut, reminding Spears that it was to be 
taken as His Maj esty' s Government's policy and was to be 
acted upon wherever possible "within the limits of what is 
practicable".89 Macmillan, who had played a large role in 
shaping the directive, adjudged it "very reasonable", and 
saw it as forging a middle way between the French and the 
Levant people. As he interpreted it, Britain was to make 
clear to all and sundry that she had no desire to see French 
interests in the Levant overthrown. As part of this 
strategy, the Syrians and the Lebanese (and especially the 
latter), would have to be deflated, and it should certainly 
be made plain to them that they could not rely on Britain to 
eject the French, but only to ensure that they received a 
fair deal. The French similarly would have to be told that 
their only hope lay in a liberal and progressive policy, 
wi thout which their Near East interests would inevitably "go 
under in the end". The major reservation which Macmillan 
entertained about the successful execution of the policy 
87 Eden and Churchill left Cairo on 27 November for the 
Teheran Conference which was due to commence on 28 November. 
88 Eden to Foreign Office, 26 November 1943, FROZEN No 
163, PREM 3/421. 
89 Foreign Office to Beirut, 
E7319/27 /89, FO 371/35192; Casey to 
1943, PREM 3/421. 
27 November 1943, 
Beirut, 28 November 
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centred entirely on "whether Louis Spears can or will 
address himself to the uncongenial task of "deflating" the 
Lebanese". He believed that the rOle of popular hero had 
rather gone to Spears's head and wondered sarcastically 
whether "he was ever so cheered and applauded in Carlisle". 90 
The Eastern Department was beset by similar worries: as long 
as Spears remained, difficulties were inevitable. The fact 
that he was persona non grata with the French only made the 
si tuation ten times harder for all concerned. 91 Worst of all, 
Peterson lamented, was that he could simply not be trusted: 
now that the Lebanese were released and reinstated, it was 
his duty to try and make them a Ii ttle less obstinate 
towards the French, "even at the cost of a little of his 
, 
fictitious popularity", which so far, he showed no sign of 
doing. 92 
90 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 26 November 1943, 
pp 305-6. Spears was Member of Parliament for Carlisle. 
91 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 24 November 1943, 
E7328/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
92 Minute by Sir M. Peterson, 25 November 1943, 
E7328/27/89, FO 371/35192. In a s~pa~ate minute, Peterson 
again expressed his fear that Brl taln would get nowhere 
until Spears was replaced. His criticism continued: "I saw 
him in the cinema the other day, getting out of his car and 
walking around, waving to the Beirut crowd. A, more 
professional diplomat woul~ hav~ known eno~gh to stay ln the 
background during the row . Mlnute by Slr M. Peterson, 3 
December 1943, E7486/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
THE AFTERMATH 
i) Participation Or Abstention 
Wi th the release and eventual reinstatement of the 
Lebanese ministers, the immediate crisis in the Lebanon was 
resolved. Spears, always keen to fight his corner, was 
already anticipating further trouble over the negotiations 
for a modus vivendi and immediately set about preparing to 
do battle again. He began by attempting to persuade the 
Foreign Office of the need to establish certain ground rules 
which he considered an essential prerequisite for the 
success of any future negotiations. He had already gathered 
the strong impression from his conversations with Catroux 
that the French intended to use the 1936 Treaty as a basis 
for discussions with Syria and the Lebanon; this, he knew, 
would never be acceptable to the Levant people. 1 Similarly, 
he believed a conference based in Beirut would be doomed to 
failure and might well exasperate the Lebanese into taking 
some really provocative action. Instead, he argued that a 
conference on British soil, perhaps Cyprus, was vital. At 
the Foreign Office, Mack expressed considerable doubt about 
the wisdom of a British venue. He believed it "would only 
lead to another crisis and Britain would be on a bad 
wicket" .2 
Spears further warned that it was absolutely essential 
for Britain and the United States to restate their attitude 
towards the mandate " in the most unambiguous terms" for 
1 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7256/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
22 November 1943, 
2 Spears to Foreign Office, 22 November 1943, 
E7256/27/89, FO 371/35191; Minute by W. H. B. Mack, 24/25 
November 1943, E7238/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
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negotiations to be possible between the French Committee and 
the Levant States. He remonstrated with the Foreign Office: 
This crisis might never have arisen had not our own 
equivocal attitude led the French to assume that 
they had our support in backing a mandatory position 
which was incompatible with their pledges and ours 
to the States, and which was totally unacceptable to 
the latter. 3 
He claimed in a lengthy despatch several days later that the 
Syrians and Lebanese had always believed that the original 
French proclamations of independence constituted a promise 
to end the mandatory regime as soon as the Allied invasion 
was complete, and had offered their co-operation to the 
Allies on that basis. He had closely analysed those 
proclamations and failed to see how anyone could dispute 
"that it was the clear duty of the French to treat the 
mandate as a dead letter in practice from [1941] onwards and 
in advance of the negotiation of treaties". If that argument 
was conceded, then it followed logically "that from the same 
date, the two states became free agents as regards the 
conclusion of such treaties". However much Britain wished to 
see France enjoy a position in the Levant similar to her own 
in Iraq, that desire was not shared by the Levant peoples 
themselves; moreover, Britain's desire for something 
certainly did not confer on her the right to insist on its 
fulfilment. 4 
Spears also criticised the Foreign Office for seemingly 
condoning the French intention to withhold various rights to 
use as bargaining counters to strengthen their position in 
subsequent treaty negotiations; such behaviour, he claimed, 
3 Spears to Foreign Office, 24 November 1943, 
E7377/27/89, FO 371/35192. A copy of this telegram in FO 
226/245 reads "asserting" and not "backing a mandatory 
posi tion" . 
4 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7712/27/89, FO 371/35195. 
26 November 1943, 
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was "wholly incompatible with the principles on which 
mandates are granted". He believed that the French might 
succeed in negotiating a modus vivendi provided they 
retained only their reserved rights, (i.e. those reserved by 
Catroux in his proclamation of independence); furthermore, 
no matter how distasteful this might seem, he believed that 
they would have to accept British assistance, for without 
it, they would find it "extremely difficult", if not 
impossible, to reach a modus vivendi with the Levant States. 
Bri tish prestige with the Lebanese stood "very high" at 
present: whilst there was nothing, within reason, that they 
would not do for the British, "there is nothing that they 
would do for the French on a basis of purely bilateral 
negotiation" . 5 
Yet just as Spears attempted to convince the Foreign 
Office that the only hope of progress in the Levant lay in 
British participation in the negotiations between France and 
the States, Macmillan was attempting to do the opposite. 
Reflecting on events in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis, he observed that the affair had been handled "with 
very reasonable success, since we have got what we wanted 
without making things too difficult for the French 
Committee".6 He recognised that this had been made possible 
largely due to the consummate skill and diplomacy of his 
French colleague and co-conspirator, Massigli, whom he 
greatly admired. According to Macmillan however, Massigli 
had been "terribly disheartened" by the whole business in 
the Levant, agreeing privately that Britain was "in the 
right". His chief aim now, he had professed, was to restore 
Franco-Bri tish friendship to its old basis, and he had 
appealed for Macmillan's assistance in this. In return for 
all his efforts over the past weeks, he had made "an earnest 
5 'b'd 22. 
6 H. Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 24 November 1943, 
p 301. 
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appeal" that Britain now do her bit and abandon her proposal 
to participate in the modus vivendi negotiations between 
France and the Levant States; he argued that it was 
preferable that the interested parties dealt directly with 
one another, without intermediaries and exp~ained that to 
secure Britain's abstention from the negotiations would be 
"very helpful" to him. As a quid pro quo, Massigli had 
suggested high level, informal discussions in London, 
Algiers or Cairo, 
"to reach a clear Franco-British 
understanding ... as to the whole future of the Near East". 7 
His suggestion was entirely sincere since a few days later 
he wrote to Catroux: 
De plus en plus, je suis convaincu qu' une ample 
explication franco-britannique sur les questions du 
Moyen Orient et du monde arabe sera, a bref delai, 
indispensable ... J'aimerais etre sur que vous etes 
d' accord ... 8 
Massigli's proposals were accorded a mixed reception in 
London. His latter suggestion seemed ideal to Hankey, who 
minuted: 
It would be a great advantage if we could profit by 
the present dispute ... to endeavour to reach a 
proper understanding with the French, who, it may be 
supposed, must now be beginning to realise the 
necessity for making an advance in the direction of 
Lebanese independence. 
However, Hankey was doubtful about the idea of Britain 
abstaining from the modus vivendi negotiations. The Lebanese 
were in a difficult frame of mind and the French 
intransigent; he was convinced that bilateral negotiations 
would quickly break down and another crisis might well 
7 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, 
E7319/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
8 Massigli a Catroux, 25 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
540 
result. He believed that what the French really wanted was 
to avoid having Spears at any conference, a desire wi th 
which he could only sympathise and which, he commented, 
any sane person must regard ... as reasonable, 
because it is common knowledge that Sir E. Spears 
does not want an agreement between the French and 
the Lebanese and, personal attitudes and personal 
feelings being what they are, it would be pure 
ineptitude on our part to insist on his presence at 
the discussions if we really want an agreement. 9 
What Hankey failed to appreciate was the fact that the 
French were opposed to British participation in the modus 
vivendi negotiations per se, regardless of the identity of 
the representative, though Spears obviously topped the 
league of British undesirables for the French. Hoping 
therefore to accommodate the French by excluding Spears from 
the negotiations, but ensuring British participation, Hankey 
proposed inviting Massigli and Catroux to London to join in 
a little subterfuge. If they could be persuaded to accept 
British participation in modus vivendi negotiations in the 
Middle East, then Spears would be recalled to London for 
consultations just as the negotiations were due to commence; 
Hamilton, assisted either by Lascelles or Furlonge, could 
attend on Britain's behalf. 10 It is most unlikely, had this 
plan ever been put into operation that Spears would have 
stood for being outmanoeuvred in this manner, but the fact 
that Hankey even contemplated such a trick is proof of the 
desperate lengths to which the Foreign Office was prepared 
to go to remove their enfant terrible from the Levant, even 
temporarily. 
9 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 25 November 1943, 
E7319/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
10 ibid. J. A. Hamilton had been Charge d'Affaires in 
Beirut until early 1943 but was now acting as Arab adviser 
to the Minister of State; D. W. Lascelles and G. W. Furlonge 
were First Secretary and Consul respectively at Beirut. 
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The considerable extent of Hankey's worries about 
Spears's ability to wreck the modus vivendi negotiations is 
confirmed by French sources. Vienot reported a conversation 
between one of his staff and Hankey, during which the latter 
had tried to convince his French counterpart that the 
Foreign Office had no desire to provoke the Committee's 
suspicions or to upset Anglo-French relations, and was 
perfectly willing to stand aside from negotiations between 
France and the Levant States. Hankey had still insisted that 
most of his colleagues nonetheless believed that in view of 
Lebanese intransigence, British arbitration and conciliation 
would probably be salutary. The Frenchman had himself 
countered that 
quelleque soi t auj ourd ' hui 
intentions du General Spears, 
un prejuge psychologique 
intervention impossible. 
la sinceri te des 
il y a, a son egard, 
qui rendait son 
Vienot had furthermore expressed grave doubts about the 
efficacity of counsels of moderation to the Lebanese from a 
man who had actively fostered their unrest for several 
months. He recorded that Hankey had been forced to agree and 
had in fact recognised that "si des conseils de moderation 
devaient etre donnes aux libanais, ce ne pourrait etre que 
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par une personnalite britannique en qui nous puissions avoir 
confiance".l1 
In truth, Hankey almost certainly believed that Britain 
was "at the partl..' ng of the ", waves ; el..ther an agreement would 
be brought about between the French and the Lebanese or 
another dispute would occur, which might unsettle the entire 
Middle East. Furthermore, he worried that if a dispute did 
occur, Britain would be forced to take over Lebanon and 
possibly Syria too, to ensure the maintenance of order, 
thereby imposing a grave strain on her relations with the 
French. Given this possibility, he argued that, 
if importance is really attached to carrying out the 
policy of keeping the French in the Lebanon, we must 
seriously set about arranging an agreement between 
them and the Lebanese as soon as possible. 12 
ii) The War-Path Resumed 
Foreign Office worries about the instability of the 
Levant situation were only confirmed as disturbing telegrams 
continued to arrive from Spears. Several described 
11 Vienot a Alger, 2 Decembre 1943, No 1563-66, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1006. Vienot stressed to Massigli 
that he had been informed by someone who had just returned 
from th~ Levant that the departure of Spears (and also that 
of Furlonge) from the Levant was "indispensable". Otherwise, 
it was maintained, the Syrians and Lebanese would refer to 
him at every step of the negotiations and in effect, the 
French would be reduced to negotiating with Spears himself. 
Vienot a Massigli, 21 Decembre 1943, No 332, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. Two days later, he took up the matter 
of Spears with Cadogan and informed him "qu'aucun reglement 
franco-libanais ne serai t possible tant que ce dernier 
[Spears] serait sur place et qu'en ce cas quels que fussent 
les termes de ses instructions, l' homme restai t ce qu' il 
etai t, avec son temperament et ses rancunes". Vienot a 
Alger, 23 Decembre 1943, No 2048, Guerre 1939-45, Alger 
CFLN, Vol 1243. 
12 Minutes by R. M. A. Hankey, 25 November 1943, 
E7307/27/89, FO 371/35191 and E7319/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
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Parliamentary sessions in Damascus, the main feature of 
which appeared to be inflammatory and intransigent speeches 
from the government and the deputies, which all seemed to 
indicate that the Syrians were set to follow the Lebanese 
example and repudiate the French mandate. 13 Furthermore, the 
Lebanese were insisting that their Reform Bill of 8th 
November was still valid14 , and Spears, despite Foreign 
Office instructions that the application of the Reform Bill 
was a matter for the modus vivendi negotiations, was urging 
Catroux to abrogate Helleu's decree which declared it null 
and void. There seemed little doubt that unless negotiation 
could be initiated between the Levant States and the French, 
a crisis would almost certainly flare up again. 
The horizon was not brightened by the still smouldering 
resentment Spears evidently felt at his exclusion from the 
ini tial stages of the recent Cairo conversations on the 
Lebanon, given that Macmillan had been present. Spears 
directed much of his wrath towards the policy formulated at 
those discussions, which Eden's directive had encapsulated. 
He recorded bitterly that it was apparent either that he had 
failed to make clear "the strength of Syrian and Lebanese 
determination to avoid the conclusion of treaties with 
France at any stage", or alternatively, that this had been 
appreciated but considered unimportant. Once again, in a 
lengthy, two-part telegram, Spears attempted to acquaint the 
Foreign Office with the fundamentals of the Lebanese case. 
He argued that the Lebanese had always considered the 
13 Spears to Foreign Office, 26 November 1943, 
E7473/27/89 and Spears to Foreign Office, 28 November 1943, 
E7486/27/89; both in FO 371/35193; Spears to Foreign Office, 
4 December 1943, E7633/27/89, FO 371/35194; Spears to 
Foreign Office, 10 December 1943, E8103/27/89, FO 371/35196. 
14 Spears to Foreign Office, 30 November 1943, 
E7532/27 /89, FO 371/35193; Spears to Foreign Office, 30 
November 1943, E7594/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
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mandate as abolished, at least morally if not technically. 
They acknowledged that during the war, France exercised 
certain rights, but were adamant that afterwards, France was 
morally obliged to terminate the mandate, leaving them free 
to decide the terms, if any, of their future relationship 
wi th her. Spears considered this position "unassailable"; 
moreover, he believed that other governments, to whom the 
Lebanese would appeal, would view the case on its intrinsic 
merits and would incline to a similar view. Britain's 
judgment however, was always clouded by her need to protect 
her own position in Egypt and Iraq. 
He maintained that the Levant States had never intended 
to negotiate treaties with the French and recent events had 
only hardened these convictions. As for Eden's proposal that 
they should initial draft treaties as a prelude to the 
formal conclusion of treaties, Spears maintained that this 
would be tantamount to the Levant States putting their heads 
"at least half way through the noose". Whilst appreciating 
Britain's role during the crisis, the Lebanese also believed 
that it would have been dishonourable for Britain to have 
behaved any differently or to have done any less. The States 
were convinced that if they had been left to their own 
devices during the crisis, they could have eradicated French 
rule once and for all; consequently, they saw no reason to 
allow anyone to dictate to them now. They would contemplate 
negotiations for a modus vivendi, only provided a reasonable 
definition of the limitations on their sovereignty as 
required by the Allied war effort was drawn up and endorsed 
by Britain. 15 
To further illustrate his case, Spears described the 
fruitless conversations that Catroux had already had with 
the Syrians and Lebanese. The Syrians had argued that they 
15 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7564/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
30 November 1943, 
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would only negotiate with the French on a basis of complete 
equality; they recognised neither France's mandatory 
authority nor the right of the French Committee to conclude 
a treaty and had insisted upon the immediate transfer of all 
the attributes of sovereignty they presently lacked. 16 
Catroux had met with equal intransigence from the Lebanese, 
who had similarly rejected out of hand the idea of 
negotiating any treaty with the French. 17 
Members of the Eastern Department, who had largely 
agreed with Eden's directive and given it their full 
support, were irritated by Spears' observations, which as 
ever, did not seem "to take the larger factors of policy 
into account". Sir Orme Sargent believed that Spears had 
finally overplayed his hand, while Sir Maurice Peterson 
thought it was now obvious that Spears was unwilling to pay 
lip service any longer to the Foreign Office contention that 
Britain had no desire to eliminate France from the Levant. 
He pointed out that from the very start of the recent 
crisis, Spears had failed to use his influence to check 
Lebanese provocation of the French, and had even denied the 
fact that they had been provocative. His relations with the 
French had been such that "it was useless to expect them to 
take him into their confidence". 18 As Hankey later observed: 
The whole trouble is, [that] Sir E. Spears is 
determined to get the French completely out of the 
Levant States regardless of our conception in London 
of British interests or the Secretary of State's and 
the Prime Minister's instructions. It is becoming 
16 See Catroux a Alger, 26 Novembre 1943, No 520-9, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575, for an account of 
Catroux's meeting with representatives of the Syrian 
Government. 
17 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7555/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
30 November 1943, 
18 Minutes by R. M. A. Hankey, 11 December 1943, Sir 
Orme Sargent, 4 December, and Sir M. Peterson, 4 December; 
all in E7564/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
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futile to send [him] instructions and he will 
certainly wreck the modus vivendi negotiations 
unless we recall him. This is my considered advice. 19 
Yet with the persistence of lemmings, the Eastern 
Department despatched a series of telegrams to Spears, which 
attempted once more to explain the premises on which British 
policy was based, and which he was to regard "as in the 
nature of instructions". 20 Britain recognised that the Levant 
mandate had been vested in the French State but was now 
exercised by the French Committee of National Liberation. In 
1941, she had endorsed the Committee's promise to embark 
upon a course leading to the termination of the mandate, 
provided the French retained certain rights and powers 
essential for the prosecution of the war. However closely 
Catroux's proclamations were scrutinised and whatever they 
said about Levant independence, it 
reprovingly that they also clearly 
was pointed 
stated that 
out 
the 
independence and sovereignty of the Levant States should be 
consecrated by treaties of alliance with France, pending 
which the States were to enjoy substantial independence. It 
was granted that the Committee had been unjustifiably slow 
in dismantling the mandate. Britain however, saw no 
inconsistency between the continued existence of the mandate 
or the future existence of a treaty of alliance and the 
enjoyment by the Levant States of considerable sovereignty 
and independence. 
It was claimed that in deference to the States' 
susceptibilities, Britain had always dissuaded the French 
from flaunting their mandatory authority, but Spears was 
reminded that British rights in the Levant derived from the 
Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements concluded with the French, 
19 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 3 December 1943, 
E7564/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
20 Foreign Office to Spears, 12 January 1944, 
E7712/27/89, FO 371/35195. 
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who in turn derived their rights from the mandate. The 
mandate therefore remained the foundation of the French 
position in the Levant and hence, of Britain's own position 
there. To avoid a renewal of the crisis, the parties had to 
be brought to reach an agreement to last the war. Britain 
could not afford to let either of the States take unilateral 
action which might disturb the peace and create another 
crisis: 
Were this precedent to be established in the 
Lebanon, it might well prejudice [Britain's] own 
posi tion in Egypt and other parts of the Middle 
East. 
Spears was therefore instructed to use his own influence 
with the Lebanese to ensure that constitutional progress was 
made in agreement with the French. He was reminded that it 
was essential that they did not refuse to negotiate 
altogether with the French, and that it might be helpful to 
point out to them that their complete independence depended 
entirely on an eventual Allied victory.21 
In addition to his resentment at not having participated 
in the first stage of the Cairo conversations, Spears had 
been incensed by what he considered to be Macmillan's 
unwarranted tributes to the attitude of the National 
Commi ttee and especially to the evolution of de Gaulle 
throughout the Lebanese crisis. 22 During the first few days 
of December, he had dashed off several telegrams to London 
pointing out that numerous factors, including Helleu's press 
statement on 13 November asserting that de Gaulle was in 
21 Foreign Office to Spears, 14 December 1943, 
E7486/27 /89, FO 371/35193; Foreign Office to Spears, 23 
December 1943, E7594/27/89 and Minute by W. E. Beckett, ,26 
November 1943, E7601/27/89, both in FO 371/35194; Fore1gn 
Office to Spears, 12 January 1944, E7712/27/89, FO 
371/35195. 
22 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7583/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
1 December 1943, 
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full agreement with the measures he had taken, and de 
Gaulle's attitude throughout, indicated that the General 
"almost certainly" gave Helleu instructions before the 
latter left Algiers on 6 November, to "use force" against 
the Lebanese if they proceeded with their Constitutional 
Reform Act. Spears conceded at least that it was unclear "to 
what extent the Committee individually or collectively knew 
and approved beforehand of what was afoot". What was clear, 
he maintained, "is that they publicly backed Helleu's action 
until the very last moment, when under pressure, and in face 
of Catroux' s reports, they gave way". 23 
Furthermore, Spears had informed London that in his 
opinion, Macmillan had had the wool well and truly pulled 
over his eyes by Massigli. Spears did not deny that Massigli 
was obviously concerned about Anglo-French relations, but 
believed that it was impossible for him not to have had 
prior knowledge of certain communications made to Catroux, 
which he had never mentioned to Macmillan. Spears referred 
in particular to instructions sent to Catroux on 22 
November, which French sources now reveal to have emanated 
from de Gaulle personally. Massigli certainly had no 
knowledge of these instructions and again, French sources 
contain his own letter to Catroux, explaining that he only 
gleaned knowledge of the instructions from a subsequent 
reference to them in a telegram from Beirut. 
Spears was equally uncharitable about Catroux. He 
observed that his evolution from his first conversation with 
Casey in Cairo on 15 November, to his final conversation in 
Beirut on 26 November, made "an interesting study". Spears 
accused the Committee and Catroux of still thinking in terms 
of "face-saving" and Catroux of showing "no indication of 
realising the need for a speedy solution or of meeting our 
23 ibid. 
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demands until the day after he received Casey's aide-
me "moire" [. 20 N b ]24 1.e. ovem er . 
In a further telegram, he announced that it was 
"perfectly obvious that his [Catroux ' s] and the National 
Commi ttee ' s eventual acceptance of our demands was due 
solely to our subsequent ultimatum and that nothing less 
would have sufficed to restore the status quo". 25 Spears was 
determined that no-one should be fooled "by current French 
propaganda lines "that but for the brutal British ultimatum, 
a satisfactory solution would have been reached much 
sooner" ." He hoped that means would quickly be found "to 
scotch this mischievous falsehood at a high level". 26 
There was indeed recognition within the Foreign Office 
that Britain would "not have got satisfaction out of the 
French if we had not been extremely firm with them ... ,,27 
Spears's claim, however, was not entirely just: though 
Catroux might have maintained an obstinate front in 
discussions with Spears, he had early on realised the depth 
of public feeling and the need for a speedy solution and had 
stressed both these factors to Algiers. Al though he had 
originally proposed a plan which involved releasing all the 
Ministers but reinstating only the President, he had also 
warned Algiers of the unlikelihood that such a plan would 
succeed and stressed that he saw no alternative to restoring 
the constitutional position as it was prior to Helleu' s 
arrests. 
24 ibid. 
25 Spears to Foreign Office, 3 December 1943, 
E7615/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
26 Spears to Foreign Office, 3 December 1943, 
E7615/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
27 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 6 December 1943, 
E7615/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
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The Eastern Department did its utmost to assure Spears 
that equal pressure was being put on the French to make them 
understand how urgent a settlement had become. The need for 
them to take a further step towards independence for the 
Levant States was now imperative: 
While we do not want in the least to interfere 
directly, the last crisis has shown only too clearly 
that if the situation is allowed to drift, and above 
all, if the French take a legalistic stand on the 
theoretical existence of the Mandate and continue to 
refuse to make the concessions which are necessary 
to Arab nationalism, we are all of us going to find 
oursel ves in Queer Street. Quite apart from our 
promises to the Levant peoples, we cannot afford to 
risk local disorders, due to reasonable popular 
discontents in Syria and the Lebanon, touching off 
Palestine at this juncture of the war (and 
incidentally at the outset of the Presidential 
campaign in America). 28 
It was therefore decided that, if another crisis was to be 
avoided, the time had come "to push the French down the road 
which they must follow". 29 Instructions were accordingly 
despatched to 
Massigli the 
Macmillan requesting that he stress to 
urgent necessi ty of pressing on with 
discussions for a modus vivendi and for progress towards 
Lebanese independence: any difficulties the French caused 
now would certainly hinder progress and "inevitably lead to 
a state bordering on revolution". The instructions 
continued: 
We do not wish to urge our good offices upon 
[Massigli] if he does not want them, but you should 
tell him that we are pressing the Levant States not 
to be unreasonable and you should leave him in no 
28 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 30 November 1943, 
E7688/27/89, FO 371/35195. 
29 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 30 November 1943, 
E7486/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
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doubt of our close interest, both moral and 
strategic, in an early settlement of this question.30 
In fact, Macmillan had 
conversation about the Levant , 
already had an encouraging 
though with Catroux, the day 
after the latter's return to Algiers. The Frenchman had been 
"rather tired and depressed", and had complained bitterly 
about the humiliation of the British ultimatum. He had 
reasserted his conviction that Helleu had acted "without any 
precise instructions"; he had however, admitted that Helleu 
had behaved with "extraordinary folly", alleging that he had 
"probably misinterpreted a general expression of support 
which he had received from General de Gaulle". The latter, 
he confided, had "much calmed down" and his mood had 
definitely changed from the truculence and obstinacy which 
his telegrams early in the crisis had revealed. Catroux 
confirmed Macmillan's belief that de Gaulle had been heavily 
influenced by the attitude of the Consultative Assembly, 
which was "definitely pro-British" and most resolutely 
opposed to any rupture in Franco-British relations. 
Still more promisingly, Catroux had informed Macmillan 
that he intended to ask the Committee for an entirely free 
hand to deal with the Levant States, without which he would 
refuse to return there. He wanted to try and start direct 
negotiations immediately upon his return and spoke of "a 
series of individual arrangements ... to be brought together 
under a preamble as a single document which would be a 
provisional treaty". He stated additionally that he thought 
an agreement was possible, but, despite reassurances from 
Macmillan that this was not the policy of His Maj esty' s 
Government, voiced fears that if the States thought they 
could rely on British support, their intransigence would 
only increase and confound his plans. Thus both Catroux and 
the Foreign Office shared the same awful vision of Spears 
30 Foreign Office to Macmillan, 4 December 1943, 
E7486/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
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working in league with the States to sabotage French efforts 
to reach an agreement. Undoubtedly spurred on by this grim 
prospect, Catroux was prompted to intimate that he was 
prepared to contemplate a change in the status of the French 
representative to the rank of ambassador; he quickly 
stipulated however, that this would of course require "an 
equal change in the character of the Spears Mission". 
Despite the Frenchman's attitude that if the Committee 
was required to make certain sacrifices, then he expected 
Bri tain to make at least equal sacrifices, Macmillan was 
convinced that Catroux recognised that the problem had to be 
settled " in the spirit of the times". He observed that 
Catroux seemed to place a great deal of hope in the new 
Committee and Consultative Assembly for a more progressive 
policy than had been evident hitherto, and expressed his 
conviction that he would "make a great effort to reach a 
settlement". Macmillan ended his report with a plea that 
British influence should be similarly exerted to help 
Catroux in his task. 31 
This news from Macmillan, which seemed to confirm that 
Catroux at least was moving in the right direction, thereby 
justifying the faith the Foreign Office had placed in him, 
encouraged the Eastern Department. It was thought that the 
Levant States would probably agree to Catroux' s idea of 
separate agreements which corresponded generally to 
Bri tain 's own idea. Sir Maurice Peterson was despondent 
however, and minuted ruefully "We shall never get anywhere 
. IS' I d" 32 More rashly Hankey unt11 Genera pears 1S rep ace . , 
recorded optimistically that he thought he could detect "the 
beginnings of hope of an agreement"; he too, quickly 
31 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 1 December 1943, 
E7582/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
32 Minute by Sir M. Peterson, 3 December 1943, 
E7486/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
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corrected himself, remembering that Catroux had stipulated 
tha t " the only h f ope 0 • •• succeeding is that British 
influence is not used, behind the scenes or otherwise, to 
prevent an understanding being reached. We have, I am sorry 
to say", Hankey observed, "absolutely no guarantee on this 
point" . 33 
iii) Cairo Conversations 
As the Teheran Conference drew to a close on 1 December, 
the Sextant Conference resumed in Cairo on 4 December, and 
provided an excellent opportunity for further high-level 
discussions on the Levant situation, and for attempting once 
more to bring Spears to book. Macmillan, who had departed 
Cairo whilst "the Emperors" were temporarily away in 
Teheran, returned on 4 December, not without some 
trepidation. He realised that he might well be regarded as 
having made trouble over the Lebanese affair, and knowing 
full well the extent of Churchill's loyalty to old friends 
such as Spears (sometimes excessive loyalty, Macmillan 
thought), he was uncertain about his future. 34 Macmillan's 
fears were not borne out however, as a conversation in the 
early hours of 5 December with both Roosevelt and with 
Churchill revealed; he found the President "still very 
cri tical of de Gaulle and the French", whereas after a 
subsequent private conversation on France, he recorded that 
33 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 3 December 1943, 
E7582/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
34 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 27 November 1943, 
p 307. Macmillan believed that the Mediterranean command, 
Algiers and Cairo, would be united under one commander and 
reasoned that if there was to be only one commander, there 
would be only one Resident Minister. He was kept guessing 
however, as to "whether Casey or Macmillan will be 
liquidated". See War Diaries, Entry for 5 December 1943, p 
319. 
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Churchill "still opposes in argument but accepts in reality 
a great part of my views". 35 
Macmillan was also relieved to discover that at a 
meeting with Casey at noon that day on the Lebanon, the 
Minister Resident appeared to be taking "a more moderate 
view" . 36 He was not too optimistic however, for though he 
recognised Casey was "intelligent", "absolutely honest, 
patriotic and devoted", he also considered him "weak" and 
inexperienced, which 
Spears's pocket". 37 
meant that he was "completely 
Macmillan believed that Spears 
in 
had 
"forced his policy too far and too unscrupulously"; he had 
failed to realise that it was possible to be firm with the 
French without being rude to them. 38 Casey's present 
moderation Macmillan attributed entirely to the absence of 
Spears. 
Indeed, when Spears himself reached Cairo, Macmillan 
noted at a meeting at noon on 6 December that he was "in 
great fighting form". 39 At a much larger meeting the 
following day40, Spears was slightly less vociferous, though 
he made his opinions known. From the very outset, Eden made 
it plain that regarding the problem of the Levant States, 
one of his primary concerns was to ensure that the Levant 
35 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 5 December 1943, p 
318. 
36 ibid. 
37 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 25 November 1943, 
p 305. 
38 ibid. 
39 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 6 December 1943, p 
319. 
40 The meeting took place at the British Embassy at 
3.30pm and was attended by Eden, Casey, Macmillan, Killearn, 
Spears, Cadogan, Sir William Croft, Morton, Makins and 
Lascelles. See Memorandum of meeting, 7 December 1943, FO 
660/41. 
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governments did not unilaterally terminate the eXisting 
mandatory regime, thereby setting a precedent which might 
sooner or later be followed by other countries in the Middle 
East; Lampson made the point that this might easily have 
awkward repercussions for Britain in Palestine and even 
possibly in Egypt. 
In the course of further discussion, Eden made plain his 
desire to "save French face". It was pointed out that as the 
mandatory regime could not be altered during the war, what 
Britain ideally required was a negotiated agreement between 
France and the Levant States, pending a more general 
settlement at the end of hostilities. Cadogan observed that 
to achieve this end, Britain "might have to put a Ii ttle 
pressure on the Lebanese". Spears explained that from what 
he had understood, it was Catroux's intention to settle the 
various points at issue with the Levant States one by one 
and to bind together all the agreements under one preamble. 
He advised that great discretion would be required in 
suggesting to the Lebanese that they should concede to the 
French any point to which they attached real importance. In 
particular, if the preamble were to include any reference 
to the pre-eminent position of France, the Lebanese would 
refuse to have anything to do with it. He was anyway afraid 
that the Lebanese would have nothing to do with the French. 41 
These observations from Spears allowed Eden to make his 
own position crystal clear. He stated quite pointedly that 
the Lebanese "must not get the impression that anything they 
did would enjoy [British] support". Britain should use her 
influence with the Lebanese "to help the French. He wished 
to adopt an impartial attitude but he was afraid that the 
Lebanese view of impartiality was that [Britain] should 
support them against the French". He again repeated that "he 
41 Memorandum of meeting at British Embassy, Cairo, 7 
December 1943, 3.30pm. FO 660/41. 
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wished to help the French and to save French face as much as 
possible" . 42 From Eden's point of view, it was Lampson who 
made the crucial point: the Ambassador 
presumed [British] policy still was to act in the 
Levant with an eye to the effect in Metropolitan 
France. In other words we must subordinate what 
seemed to be our best policy from the local angle to 
fit in with higher policy which dictated we must not 
humble the French too much. 43 
From his account in Fulfilment of a Mission, Spears also 
grasped what Eden was trying his utmost to get across, but 
his comments make it plain that he thought very little of 
such a policy. He states that Eden 
was obviously anxious that nothing which happened in 
the Levant should make our task in France itself 
more difficult. This was indeed the Foreign Office 
policy in a nutshell. De Gaulle was an awful 
nuisance, of course, but behind that as the 
backdrop, you could see that these officials from 
London thought of themselves relaxing with the 
French, living in their beautiful country, enjoying 
its excellent cuisine, its pleasant and easily-
reached capital. 44 
From this jaundiced and ungracious diatribe, it seems 
that Spears viewed Foreign Office policy towards France as 
little more than an insurance policy for a ticket to the 
good life once the war was over. 
It is quite plain that the emphasis of the meeting had 
been that a people under mandate "should not be permitted to 
42 ibid. 
43 Trefor Evans (Ed), The Killearn Diaries, 1934-1946, 
Entry for 6 December 1943, p 270. Killearn mistakenly dates 
the meeting as taking place on 6 December; both Spears and 
Macmillan date the meeting as 7 December, which is born out 
by the official record. 
44 Spears, Fulfilment of a Mission, pp 280-82. 
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terminate the mandatory arrangements without appropriate 
agreement with the mandatory power". 45 Both Lampson and 
Macmillan left the meeting with the clear impression that 
the Lebanese would have to tone down their behaviour. 
Lampson recorded that the general feeling was that the 
Lebanese would now have to put "a little water in their 
wine", and that Britain would have to ensure "that they 
didn't take the bit too much between their teeth and run 
amuck". He commented that Spears "seemed to think he would 
be able to get things fairly straight and prevent a real 
rumpus, in which I hope he is right but suspect that he is 
being over-optimistic". 46 From his own point of view, 
Macmillan had found the meeting "quite satisfactory". He 
considered that "the final decision -- which was to damp 
down the Lebanese a bit and induce them to reach an 
arrangement which would secure to the French a position 
rather like ours in Iraq was the right one". What 
concerned him most however, was his considerable doubt about 
Spears's ability to carry out the decision "in the spirit 
(or even in the letter) unless he gets a very straight talk 
from Winston", which he admitted he was trying to arrange. 47 
Churchill did see Spears on 9 December but the meeting 
was to prove something of a mixed blessing. Spears recalled 
that Churchill was "very friendly and even affectionate 
throughout the interview"; he told him that he had "done 
very well in extremely difficult circumstances ... had shown 
restraint and judgement and had found a solution on 
democratic lines". The Prime Minister had stressed that 
Spears should remain in the Levant to carry out his 
difficult task. He had however, warned Spears of "the danger 
45 ibid. 
46 T E ans (Ed), op cit, Entry for 6 December 1943, p 
. v , 
270. 
47 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 7 December 1943, pp 
320-21. 
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inherent in the position in the Levant which might raise 
issues of positive danger to ourselves in other parts of the 
world. What people might learn to do against the French in 
the Levant might well be turned to account against us later. 
We should discourage the throwing of stones since we had 
greenhouses of our own - - acres and acres of them ... " 48 
Spears, for his part, promised that he would "keep things 
ticking over until the end of the war", though it 
remained to be seen which part of the interview he was to 
take to heart. 49 
iv) Taking The British To Task 
Though Massigli was anxious to see Franco-British 
relations quickly restored to normal, as were most of his 
colleagues, there nonetheless existed amongst many French a 
strong determination that the British should be made to 
realise how shabby their recent treatment of them had been. 
Beirut was informed that it was intended to present Britain 
with a note about her attitude over the Lebanese affair and 
was asked to provide Algiers with " les faits precis qui 
peuvent etre reproches aux autori tes bri tanniques" . 50 
Meanwhile, until the case for the prosecution was compiled, 
Vienot, in numerous conversations with members of British 
officialdom, let it be known that the "brutality and 
precipitancy" of Britain's behaviour had occasioned bitter 
disappointment amongst the French. 
He had already reproached the British on several 
occasions over the attitude of the press and especially 
Reuters during the Lebanese crisis. Particularly great 
48 Spears-Churchill Interview, 9 December 1943, Casey's 
villa, Mena, Box II, File VII, Spears Papers, MEC. 
49 ibid. 
50 Alger a Beyrouth, 29 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1006. 
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irri tation however, had been caused by a press statement 
issued by Spears on 22 November in which he had stated that 
he believed that Catroux was contemplating a solution to the 
crisis which corresponded closely to that which the British 
government herself considered necessary (i.e. release and 
reinstatement). He had continued: 
What remains to be seen, is whether General de 
Gaulle and the National Committee will come to the 
same realisation quickly enough. 51 
Vienot had immediately protested vigorously to Sir Orme 
Sargent about the statement, which he claimed was incorrect 
and which would render "plus difficile encore la solution de 
la crise". He argued that throughout Spears had "abused his 
position in order to work against the French and this was a 
striking case of unwarranted interference on his part". Orme 
Sargent replied by stressing Britain's responsibility for 
maintaining order in what was a battle zone and drew 
attention to the failure of either the Committee or Catroux 
to take early remedial action; he did, however, promise to 
demand an explanation from Spears. 52 The French in fact 
proceeded to present a formal protest to the British about 
the matter, pointing out how regrettable it was that Spears 
should have interfered so openly in what was a Franco-
Lebanese dispute; his statement had constituted "a veritable 
act of pressure" and was certainly not calculated to 
facilitate either a solution of the crisis or a return to 
calm. 53 
51 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7304/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
23 November 1943, 
52 Vienot a Alger, 23 Novembre 1943, No 1376-7, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005; Minute by Sir Orme Sargent, 
23 November 1943, E7408/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
53 Makins to Foreign Office, 
E7487/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
28 November 1943, 
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Spears's statement, which drew an untimely distinction 
between the views of General Catroux and de Gaulle, had 
aroused similar indignation amongst many British, who had 
criticised it as being impolitic. Patrick Reilly, on 
Macmillan's staff in Algiers, thought that the Committee had 
"much justification for their protest". 54 In London, a 
Parliamentary Question was tabled for 2 December, asking 
whether the statement had been made with the Secretary of 
State's approval. 55 In his defence, Spears had claimed that 
not only had Casey approved the statement, but it had also 
been read in part over the telephone to Catroux prior to its 
issuance. For fear of drawing attention to the episode and 
causing any further embarrassment to Anglo-French relations, 
the Question was subsequently withdrawn, at the Foreign 
Office's request. 56 
At the meeting on 23rd November with Sir Orme Sargent, 
Vienot had not confined his complaints to the issue of 
Spears's press statement, but had seized the opportunity to 
draw attention to "la gravite des procedes employes par Ie 
gouvernement britannique dans l'affaire du Liban et avant 
tout sur "1 'ultimatum" " He informed Algiers subsequently • 
that he was convinced that his representation had had some 
impact: he had developed his arguments forcefully and 
moreover he was known to be dedicated to the cause of good 
Franco-Bri tish relations. Orme Sargent "n' a defendu qu' assez 
mollement l'attitude prise par Ie gouvernement britannique" 
and what was more, he had gained the strong impression 
54 Minute by P. Reilly, 27 November 1943, FO 660/40. 
55 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 30 November 
E7487/27/89, FO 371/35193; Parliamentary Question by 
Lloyd for 2 December, E7543/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
1943, 
Major 
56 Spears to Foreign Office, 23 November 1943, 
E7304/27/89 FO 371 35191; Spears to Foreign Office, 29 
November 19'43, E7508/27 /89, FO 371/35193; Foreign Office 
minute, 7 January 1944, E7543/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
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que l'emploi vis-A-vis de nous, de procedes aussi 
brutaux, a ete inspire plutot par M. Churchill que 
par Ie Foreign Office. 57 
In attempting to analyse the British reaction to the 
Lebanese crisis for Algiers, Vienot pin-pointed a whole 
variety of factors which had probably contributed to its 
severity. He explained that Britain was particularly aware 
of the volatility of the Middle East and was correspondingly 
sensitive about any slight Arab reaction. He thought 
nonetheless that there had been a definite tendency to 
exploit the crisis as an opportunity for Britain to try and 
increase her prestige at France's expense. Vienot was 
certain that the British government had been under some 
pressure from the military to expedite matters as quickly as 
possible and he knew that the imminence of the two major 
Allied conferences in Cairo and Teheran would have provided 
further impetus. 
Another vital factor contributing to the British 
reaction, Vienot believed, was the doubt existing in British 
minds that Helleu had acted without instructions: the 
British had been worried all along that they were perhaps 
being faced with" "un coup de tete" du Comite et du General 
de Gaulle". He had been questioned insistently on this 
issue; Orme Sargent in particular had expressed regret that 
the Committee had not disavowed Helleu at the very outset, 
which "aurai t tout arrange et evi te tout incident". This 
inquisi tion clearly signified to Vienot that the British 
government "s'etait trompe sur l'origine de la crise". He 
believed that Orme Sargent himself deplored the fact that 
57 Vienot A Alger, 24 Novembre 1943, No 1393, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005; Minute by Sir Orme Sargent, 
23 November 1943, E7408/27/89, FO 371/35192. (An edited copy 
of Vienot's report is printed in de Gaulle, L'Unite 1942-44, 
pp 602-603). 
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this misunderstanding had led to "une conduite si brutale et 
precipi tee" . 58 
From what he had gleaned in conversations, Vienot was 
also convinced that two things in particular had created the 
worst possible impression on the British: one was the 
Commi ttee 's refusal in Algiers to respond to Macmillan's 
demarches early in the crisis, and the other was Catroux's 
first conversation with Casey in Cairo: 
D'une part, ils [les Britanniques] ont eu Ie 
sentiment que nous voulions systematiquement 
"minimiser" et "localiser" l'incident, Ie tenir pour 
negligeable, et d'autre part que nous les menacions 
et de faire appel contre eux a l'opinion interieure 
frangaise et a l'opinion internationale. Au moment 
ou nous avions les plus fortes raisons de tenir les 
Bri tanniques pour des allies peu loyaux sur Ie 
terrain du Levant, ceux-ci nous ont accuse de 
vouloir nous montrer nous-memes peu fideles et peu 
reconnaissants sur Ie terrain de la politique 
generale. 59 
Vienot subsequently laid even heavier stress on the role 
which Catroux's conversation with Casey in Cairo had played 
in escalating the crisis. In a separate note to Massigli 
written "en grande hate", he disclosed precise details 
sur 1 'origine du fameux "ultimatum" au sujet des 
affaires libanaises; et c'est dans une large mesure 
Catroux qui en est responsable. La conversation 
qu 'il a eue avec Casey ... a fait une impression 
deplorable. 
According to Vienot's information, Catroux had apparently 
created the impression that the French were completely 
unwilling to listen to reason; Casey had consequently 
despatched a somewhat alarmist telegram to London as a 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
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result of which he had been instructed to present Catroux 
with the ultimatum: 
C 'est un geste de peur d' un part d ' exasperation 
d ' ' autre part. On n'en est d'ailleurs pas tres fier 
aujourd'hui et on s'en rend compte qu'on a manque de 
sang-froid" . 60 
Another important factor in explaining the British 
attitude, Vienot believed, had been the personal prejudice 
which Churchill and large sections of the British public 
harboured towards de Gaulle. Many influential people had 
come to regard de Gaulle as an enemy of Britain, and, 
believing him to be personally involved in orchestrating the 
Lebanese incident, saw no reason to help him. Lastly, Vienot 
was convinced that the British government and again, 
particularly Churchill, had yet to understand the full 
significance of the recent changes in the Committee; they 
had failed to appreciate sufficiently its representative 
nature and "governmental" character now it was restructured. 
Yet whatever excuses Vienot had discovered to account for 
the British attitude, he was forced to conclude that "En 
resume, les Anglais se sont montres brutaux, hatifs et peu 
clairvoyants ... " . 61 
In addition to all Vienot's representations, the French 
did eventually compose a note of protest to the British 
concerning the crisis in Franco-British relations provoked 
by the Lebanese affair. It criticised the methods which 
Britain had not hesitated to contemplate, which were 
" inadmissible" between Allies and the execution of which 
would have had the gravest consequences. The note took issue 
with Britain's plea that the deteriorating situation in the 
60 Vienot a Massigli, 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
27 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
61 Vienot a Alger, 24 Novembre 1943, No 1393, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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Levant had forced her to act as she had. It pointed out that 
the French command had sufficient forces at its disposal to 
restore order, had it been disturbed. The note observed that 
any disruption which had occurred most unfortunately owed 
its origin to the spread of tendentious and inaccurate 
reports from British-controlled radio stations and press 
agencies. Moreover, Spears's action in publicly taking sides 
against Helleu "n' a pas peu contribue a jeter Ie trouble 
dans les esprits". Attention was drawn to the contradiction 
between the solemn declarations of principle uttered by 
Churchill and Eden and these more recent events. The letter 
of protest ended however, in a more conciliatory vein, by 
suggesting the need for frank explanations to create an 
entirely new atmosphere and to dissipate the present 
uneasiness. 62 
The note was presented to Macmillan on the evening of 
1st December, yet for all its severity, Macmillan's account 
of its delivery indicates that, as far as he and Massigli 
were concerned, the note was merely a matter of formality 
to be taken with a large grain of salt: 
It was six typewritten pages. I said, "Tell me, I am 
not a diplomat, what do I do with this? Must I read 
it?" "No", said Massigli,"you need not read it. You 
must send it, though, to your Governmen~~'. "Fine", 
I said, "I will. Will you have a drink?" 
The episode is proudly related by Macmillan; he felt that 
Massigli at least had always understood that he had tried to 
help him, and the "easy manner" in which the matter was 
dispensed with was "a sign of confidence and good 
62 Algiers to Foreign Office, 2 December 1943, 
E7928/27 /89, FO 371/35195; Resume of French note sent to 
Vienot 4 December 1943, No 284, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, 
Vol 1000. (PREM 3/421 contains an English translation of the 
note) • 
63 Macmillan, War Diaries, Entry for 1 December 1943, 
p 312. 
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fellowship" . 64 In forwarding a copy of the note to London 
, 
Algiers pointed out that Massigli had said "that the only 
really important thing in it was the last sente M nce ... r. 
Macmillan gathered that the rest •.. need not be taken too 
seriously" . 65 Casey, when he learned of the note, found 
himself unable to take such a relaxed view and hoped that 
Britain would not accept "without adequate reply this 
deliberate slap in the face by the French Committee". 66 
Dundas commented sensibly: 
If we wish to improve our relations with the French, 
there seems little point in slapping back. 
On Cadogan's instructions, the French note, along with the 
earlier protest about Spears's statement, remained 
unanswered. 67 
v) The British Make Amends 
Yet if the French were determined to heap complaints and 
accusations on the British, there were many British who were 
equally determined to turn the other cheek. Vienot remarked 
that, despite his plain speaking, Sir Orme Sargent (and Sir 
William Strang who was also present) had paid sincere 
attention to his comments. More importantly, he observed: 
lIs ont manifeste Ie vif desir de voir se liquider 
et s'effacer 1 'incident, et les relations franco-
bri tanniques reprendre leurs cours normal: celui 
d'une alliance que des rivalites locales au Levant 
64 ibid. 
65 Algiers to Foreign Office, 2 December 1943, PREM 
3/421. 
66 Casey to Foreign Office, 
E7634/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
4 December 1943, 
67 Minutes by C. A. F. Dundas, 7 December 1943, and Sir 
A. Cadogan, 13 December 1943, E7634/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
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ne sauraient affecter gravement et qui demeure au 
premier plan des preccupations fondamentales de 
l'Angleterre. 
Moreover, Vienot had high hopes that the excessive reactions 
of British press and opinion at the height of the crisis 
would eventually redound to France's advantage. He thought 
that he had already detected signs of such a change: 
Beaucoup d' hommes reconnaissent "qu' on est aIle trop 
loin". Un gAne se manifeste. On peut esperer que, 
demain, ce sera un regret, sinon un remords. 
Vienot however, was determined to capitalise on this display 
of remorse from the British and to extract some profit for 
France's suffering. He announced to Algiers: 
Je m' efforcerai d' en tirer quelque benefice pour 
notre politique: les obstacles peuvent, en certain 
cas, Atre utilises comme tremplins. 68 
Over the next few days, Vienot showered Algiers with 
reports demonstrating the obvious eagerness of many British 
to mend their fences with the French. On 26 November, he 
claimed to have seen the first indications in the press of 
the backlash he had anticipated and thought it quite 
possible that France might shortly reap the benefit of this 
development. Sir Orme Sargent took a leading role in the 
Foreign Office campaign to mollify the French over the 
Lebanese incident, informing Vienot in a separate encounter 
on 26th November "combien on etai t heureux que I' affaire 
soit reglee et ne vienne plus encombrer les relations 
franco-bri tanniques" . 69 Again on 30 November, Dej ean reported 
68 Vienot .. Alger, 24 Novembre 1943, No 1393, Guerre a 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
69 Vienot .. Alger, 26 Novembre 1943, No 1444, Guerre a 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
567 
that a colleague, prior to departing for Algiers, had spoken 
with Sir Orme Sargent. The latter had declared that: 
l'affaire libanaise n'etait qu'un incident qui ne 
saurait affecter d'une forme durable les rapports 
franco-bri tanniques. 70 
He had apparently expressed himself "en termes elogieux au 
suj et du Comi te d ' Alger" , commenting 
gouvernement britannique, Ie Comite 
that "Au yeux du 
est Ie veritable 
gouvernement fran<;:ais". 71 This remarkable desire of the 
Bri tish to atone for their crimes and to practise "une 
politique d'apaisement" only confirmed Vienot's belief that 
"on est secretement gene de la brutalite des moyens qu'on a 
employe vis-a.-vis de nous".72 
Nor in the task of conciliating the French was Sir Orme 
Sargent the sole campaigner: Vienot had a lengthy 
conversation with Attlee on 26 November, when the Deputy 
Prime Minister did his best to smooth his old friend's 
ruffled feathers. Vienot had frankly admitted Helleu's 
mistakes but had complained of the role played by a variety 
of British officials net plus specialement par Ie General 
Spears"; he alleged that "the initial step taken by the 
Lebanese ... was due to a conviction that they could count 
on British support". Attlee had denied that there was any 
ground for such an allegation. His own experience had shown 
that 
both Britain and France in their dealings with 
Asiatic peoples were apt to be hurt at the lack of 
gratitude for past help ... and the national 
tendency was to ascribe to the influences of another 
Power what was really due to the rising tide of 
70 Dejean .. Alger, 30 Novembre 1943, No 400, Guerre a 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
71 ibid. 
72 Vienot .. Alger, 26 Novembre 1943, No 1444, Guerre a 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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impatience of European 
Vienot had additionally mentioned his suspicions that 
the Lebanese incident had been used as an opportunity for a 
display of hostility towards the Committee and even the 
French people themselves. Attlee however "s'est excuse de la 
violence de la presse liberale et socialiste anglaise en 
l'attribuant a une attitude traditionelle adoptee en matiere 
coloniale par les partis de gauche". He had explained that 
the Labour movement "was always suspicious of governments 
run by Generals" and claimed that now that the Committee had 
disavowed Helleu, it would find its position strengthened in 
the realms of democratic opinion. Vienot had also criticised 
the shortness of time which Britain had allowed the French 
to resolve the crisis, but Attlee countered that the French 
had seriously underestimated the gravity of the local 
situation, and that military necessity had forced Britain to 
insist on a speedy settlement of the affair. 73 
The French were also able to find comfort in public 
cri ticism from certain prominent British figures, of the 
government's conduct throughout the Lebanese crisis. Most 
notable were the rebukes administered by Harold Nicolson, 
the outspoken champion of the French. In the House of 
Commons on 14 and 15 December, Nicolson had confessed that 
he failed to understand why, when it was declared British 
policy to restore France to her former position of 
independence and prestige, the government seemed in all its 
actions, to be following a contrary policy. Whilst he 
conceded that the government was perfectly right to insist 
on the release of the Lebanese government, he argued that 
the matter might have been handled more tactfully. Britain 
73 Vienot a Alger, 29 Novembre 1943, No 1525-28, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005; Record by C. R. Attlee of 
conversation with Vienot, 26 November 1943, E7688/27/89, FO 
371/35195. 
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would do well to remember that in Syria and Lebanon, France 
had behind her centuries of tradition and moreover, that 
there was hardly a Frenchman who was not convinced that 
Britain's primary aim was to evict France from the Levant. 
These interventions on behalf of France were gratefully 
acknowledged by Vienot. 74 
Vienot had declared that he would do his best to extract 
some benefit for France from Britain's display of remorse. 
Discussing the Lebanese affair with Richard Law75 , he set 
about doing just that. He began by expressing his fear that 
though locally the crisis might be over, it was far from 
resolved on the more general plane of Franco-British 
relations. Vienot attempted to explain how much offence 
Casey's brutal ultimatum had caused and how unnecessary it 
had been. From the very outset, he claimed, the French 
Committee had intended to settle the crisis "dans un esprit 
d'equite et de comprehension qui aurait donne pleine 
satisfaction a tous les interesses". Law, Vienot recorded, 
had sought to justify the British precipitancy by alleging 
that neither the Committee nor Catroux seemed to realise 
sufficiently the gravity of the affair and the need for an 
urgent settlement. It was those very considerations which 
had prompted Casey's demarche, which had been decided upon 
only reluctantly and with regret. Law claimed that he was 
not ashamed of Britain's behaviour though he confessed to 
have been unhappy about it. Vienot stressed how necessary it 
was "de dissiper l' atmosphere facheuse qui regnai t depuis 
l'ouverture de la crise" and then quickly offered a 
suggestion as to how how this might best be done: he 
74 See Vienot a Alger, 16 Decembre 1943, No 182; Vienot 
a Massigli, 16 Decembre 1943, No 319; Guerre 1939-45, Alger 
CFLN, Vol 1243; Foreign Office to Algiers, 16 December 1943, 
E7949/27/89, FO 371/35196. 
75 Richard K. Law: Parliamentary Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office 1941-43; appointed Minister of State late 
September 1943. 
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reminded Law that the Committee was still awaiting a 
response from Britain to her request for inclusion in the 
military operations destined to open a second front. 76 Time 
was pressing and in the absence of a decision in principle, 
there was a real risk that the second front would be opened 
without the participation of the three divisions the 
Committee was offering: 
L'interet britannique s'accordait avec notre 
legitime demande. La presence de troupes fran9aises 
aux cotes des allies donnerait son maximum de 
retentissement psychologique au debarquement. Le 
grand mouvement d'enthousiasme populaire qui 
permettrait d'etablir les relations franco-
britanniques sur une base durable avec Ie concours 
ardent de l'opinion publique, s'en trouverait 
renforce. 77 
It is quite evident what Vienot was about. He hoped to trade 
on Britain's embarrassment over her rough treatment of 
France to secure a positive response to issues on which the 
Committee was at issue with the Allies. 
76 A definite commitment to launch Operations Overlord 
and Anvil ( the cross-Channel invasion of France and a 
subsidiary diversionary invasion of Southern France) had 
been taken at the Teheran Conference and the Free Fren,?h 
were most anxious to secure Allied agreement to thelr 
participation in the operation to liberate France. 
77 Vienot a Alger, 27 Novembre 1943, No 1492, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
REFORMATION AND REASSESSMENT 
i) Clearing Out The Augean Stable 
The British were obviously keen to see Catroux commence 
negotiations as soon as possible with the Levant States, 
though they had few illusions about the enormous 
difficul ties he would face. For Catroux himself, who was 
primarily concerned with salvaging as much as he could of 
France's prestige and position in the Levant, negotiations 
with the Syrians and Lebanese may well have presented a less 
daunting prospect than the more immediate task of dealing 
with the bitterly hostile and firmly entrenched French 
administration and civilian community in the Levant. Catroux 
knew that he could not afford to shirk his responsibilities 
and embarked immediately on a "purge" of those officials 
most directly involved in the recent crisis. Almost on 
arrival in Beirut, he had advised Algiers that Helleu, 
Baelen and Boegner would have to 
endorsed this advice. Helleu had 
go and Massigli had 
proved less than co-
operative, though his two staff were more accommodating; 
amongst others whose services were dispensed with were 
Gautierl , the head of Sfirete, and Capitaine Moret2 , both of 
whom had been closely involved with the arrests of 11 
1 Spears to Foreign Office, 25 November 1943, 
E7402/27/89, FO 371/35192. Spears later reported that 
Gautier had been appointed to the "very important post of 
Prefet of Oran". His informant had remarked, "with some 
justification", he noted, that it was impossible to believe 
that de Gaulle and the Committee disapproved of what had 
happened in the Lebanon when Gautier was rewarded thus. See 
Spears to Foreign Office, 17 December 1943, E8100/27/89, FO 
371/35196. 
2 Beyrouth a Alger, 24 Novembre 1943, No 504, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1573. 
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November; similarly, M. David, the delegue in Beirut, was to 
be replaced, as was M. Rozek, an adviser on Eastern affairs.3 
Spears commended Catroux's "most laudable beginnings at 
clearing out the Augean stable of the Delegation", but 
nonetheless feared, especially from the tone of recent 
articles in the French press4 , that "the Bourbons were still 
in control".5 Though Catroux did in fact promise to put a 
stop to the violently anti-British polemics which featured 
regularly in French newspapers6, other signs indicated that 
he faced considerable opposition from wi thin the French 
community. Urged by Spears to abrogate all Helleu's decrees 
of 10th November, 
wisdom of this 
Catroux had privately agreed with the 
advice. All the decrees were in fact 
annulled, with the exception of Article One, which nullified 
the Lebanese Constitutional Reform Bill, and the preamble 
which asserted that fresh elections would be necessary. 7 When 
Spears tried to persuade Catroux to abrogate the remaining 
sections, on the grounds that their continued existence was 
likely to provoke the Lebanese Chamber8 , the Frenchman 
confessed that, having recently convened a meeting of all 
French officials and officers in Beirut, "the temper and 
attitude was so ugly and opposition to the policy he had 
3 Note d'un bon informateur concernant la situation au 
Liban, 6 Decembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Vichy Levant, Vol 
30. 
4 For example, "La Syrie" had recently contained what 
Spears considered to be "a most impertinent attack on 
Bri tish intervention in the crisis". Spears to Foreign 
Office, 25 November 1943, E7405/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
5 "b"d l.. l.. • 
6 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7445/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
7 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7305/27/89, FO 371/35191. 
8 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7347/27/89, FO 371/35192. 
26 November 1943, 
23 November 1943, 
24 November 1943, 
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followed so strong, that he did not dare ... to carry out 
this step". Spears continued: 
The a:titude of a great many Frenchmen here is quite 
unbe11evable. It can only be described as that of a 
slave merchant to an escaped slave. 9 
There were even persistent rumours, he reported, that 
certain elements among the French were planning a putsch 
against the Lebanese; in an attempt to foil any such 
attempt, the Lebanese government had all been sleeping under 
one roof under a heavy gendarmerie guard. 10 
The resistance which Helleu had offered to his summons 
to Algiers for consultation, and especially his personal 
appeals to de Gaulle, had been another indicator of the 
nature and extent of opposition which Catroux faced. Helleu 
had refused to accept his recall to Algiers unless confirmed 
by General de Gaulle to whom he had appealed personally. 
Massigli had been obliged to write to him, expressing 
surprise that he had not yet responded to the Committee's 
request and reminding him that he was administratively 
responsible to the Commissariat aux Affaires Etrangeres. 11 
Massigli had also written to both Catroux and Chataigneau, 
revealing that he had been "extremement peine de l' etat 
anarchique que revele Ie systeme des telegrammes 
personnels" . 12 There had been several other occasions during 
9 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7445/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
26 November 1943, 
10 ibid. P. Reilly, on Macmillan's staff in Algiers, 
thought that the allegation about a possible putSC? seemed 
"hardly credible", but admitted "it does look as :f there 
may well be further trouble". See Minute by P. Re11ly, 28 
November 1943, FO 660/40. 
11 Massigli a Helleu, 27 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
12 Massigli a Catroux et Chataigneau, 25 Novembre 1943, 
Papiers Massigli, Vol 1468. 
574 
the recent crisis when both incoming and outgoing telegrams 
had come to light, the existence of which had been unknown 
to both Massigli and the majority of the Committee; 
justifiably annoyed, Massigli decided to try and put a stop 
to the whole system of personal telegrams which had so 
undermined his authority. 13 
Nonetheless, Helleu was still managing to communicate 
directly with de Gaulle by telegram as late as 26 November. 
Possibly hoping to cause trouble for Catroux and to save 
some of his own skin, Helleu notified de Gaulle of the 
unsettling effect Catroux's measures were having: 
L'emotion provoque dans tout Ie pays par les mesures 
prises par Ie General Catroux est immense. Un 
discours prononce par lui a Damas, devant les 
sommites politiques, militaires et relations de la 
colonie fran9aise a re9u un accueil glacial. 
Independamment des considerations de politique 
general dont je ne suis pas juge, je souhaiterais 
que Ie Comite ... ne se prononce definitivement sur 
les mesures contredictees par Ie General Catroux 
avant que j'ai pu etre moi-meme entendu. Je crois 
savoir que Ie General Catroux qui tte Ie Levant 
dimanche. Moi-meme, je ne pourrai pas etre avant 
mercredi a Alger ou j'arriverai avec un fort 
important dossier. 14 
In fact, Helleu left Beirut the very next day, still 
protesting his "innocence" . 15 Speaking to an American 
journalist whilst passing through Cairo, he insisted that he 
had acted only in conformity with instructions from the 
Algiers Committee. To reinforce his argument he had pointed 
13 Massigli a Catroux et Chataigneau, 25 Novembre 1943, 
Papiers Massigli, Vol 1468. 
14 Helleu a de Gaulle, 26 Novembre 1943, No 1686, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
15 Beyrouth a Alger, 29 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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to his long experience in the diplomatic world, acquired 
over thirty eight years of service. 16 
ii) A Psychoanalysis Of The Cabinet Politique 
If Massigli had not already realised the extent of the 
task Catroux faced in the Levant, it was admirably brought 
home to him by one G. Bonoure, who offered him his own eye-
witness observations. Bonoure imagined that Massigli and his 
colleagues in Algiers must be wondering and failing to 
understand how the events in the Lebanon had come about. 
From his insight, Bonoure offered to "faire la psychoanalyse 
du Cabinet Politique de Beyrouth" and to explain 
comment un acte si pareil, si contraire a nos 
traditions, a nos moeurs, a tout ce qu'on attend de 
nous dans Ie monde, a pu etre con9u et execute ... 
comment il se peut se faire que des diplomates aient 
resolu un jour de passer la parole aux flics et aux 
mi traillettes . 17 
Bonoure alleged that after the resounding election 
defeat, the governing clique within the Cabinet Politique, 
filled with spite, resentment and self-reproach, had been 
forced to stake everything on one last throw of the dice. 
They had felt compelled to precipitate a violent crisis to 
divert attention from their own failures. Inspired by the 
Neroistic principle of "Du moins nous finirons en beaute", 
the protagonists had conceived of the coup as 
un expedient aventureux pour tenter de sauver une 
partie perdue, ou du moins achever la faill~te en 
gloire ... un de ces defis a 1a fortune ou l' on 
16 Note, 11 Decembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Vichy Levant, 
Vol 30. 
17 G. Bonoure a Massigli, 27 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
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hasarde tout en pens ant que l'eclat 
compensera la ruine. du geste 
One of the group had even likened the French action to a 
card game, in which the imposition of Edde was seen as the 
trump card. Bonoure continued his diagnosis: 
Les dirigeants de notre politique au Levant savaient 
qu'ainsi, ils escamoteraient la responsibilite 
qu'ils avaient assumees sur Ie plan local. L'affaire 
cesserai t d' etre une affaire libanaise qui avai t 
fait eclater leur incapacite a tous les yeux. Elle 
passait sur Ie plan international. Elle devenait une 
affaire anglo-franQaise ou ils apparaissaient comme 
les champions valeureux de nos interets imperiaux, 
ou ils beneficiaient de la revol te du sentiment 
national franQais souleve contre l'alliee deloyale 
et perfide. Par cette substitution, ils se sauvaient 
eux-memes. Au lieu d' etre des brouillons et des 
debiles, ils devenaient les heros.18 
Bonoure claimed that since his return to the Levant in 
August, he had noticed that it was plain to everyone that 
France was courting disaster. His Syrian and Lebanese 
friends, Moslem and Christian alike, had come to him daily, 
out of genuine concern, to ask if the French had really lost 
their heads. In fact, Bonoure stated, there was no longer 
any head to lose: throughout the intensely busy pre-election 
period and even during the elections themselves, Helleu had 
remained ensconced in his mountain residence, while his 
subordinates, right down to provincial advisers, schemed and 
poli ticked. 19 Bonoure claimed that in twenty years of the 
mandate even at its worst moments, he had never witnessed , 
18 ibid. 
19 Lady Spears observed in her personal account of the 
Lebanese crisis that Helleu "would disappear for days, the 
gossips said ~ith a supply of whisky bott~es~ leavi~g 
Boegner and Baelen in charge of the Grand Serall 1 t 
wasn't long before Boegner held everything Fr~nch, inc~uding 
his miserable chief, in his scrawny, prehenslle fanatlca~ly 
anti-British hands". Mary Borden, Journey Down A Bllnd 
Alley, p 213. 
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"Ie spectacle d'une pareille decomposition". The French had 
been simultaneously hateful and ridiculous, but what he 
found was most difficult to come to terms with was to now 
watch those responsible for the crisis "enveloppes dans les 
plis du drapeau ..• se rengorger en pretendant que dans 
cette affaire, ils ont ete les seuls vrais patriotes". 20 
Bonoure argued that however much one tried to blame the 
wicked British, it was "pueril d'accuser un rival dont les 
desseins, jamais changes, sont connus depuis vingt ans, qui 
depose de la force materiel Ie et a qui notre carence 
imbecile remet tous les atouts de la partie". From the very 
outset, France had played into England's hands by deciding 
upon force: 
Nous avons acheve nous-memes magnifiquement Ie 
succes que son travail, sa continuite des vues, son 
effort perseverant, lui avaient assure aux 
elections. L'Angleterre avait ici Ie prestige de la 
force materielle; nous lui avons ajoute Ie prestige 
de la force morale. Spears doit bien rire. 2 
Catroux's job had been extraordinarily difficult, 
Bonoure stressed. The public response to the arrests had 
been unprecedented 
violent. Beirut had 
unanimous, 
never seen 
passionate 
the like 
and 
of 
even 
such 
demonstrations before. The country had been on the verge of 
insurrection: 
Tu penses bien que Ie dernier cireur de bott7s connait notre faiblesse et sait que nous avons tro1S 
bataillons seulement pour soutenir notre politi~ue 
nazie. Catroux, dans Ie retablissement qu'il a fa1t, 
nous donne Ie Levant une seconde fois. 
20 G. Bonoure a Massigli, 27 Novembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
21 ibid. 
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Bonoure emphasised that France must now undertake "une 
politique de reconstruction veritable, hardie et 
determinee", and put an end once and for all to the period 
of disorder and confusion which presently held sway. He 
recalled a quote from Sainte Beuve: "Les hommes manquaient 
encore aux choses et il est souvent inflige aux societes en 
detresse de les desirer longtemps". Utilising the dictum, he 
concluded: " Les choses du Levant manquent des hommes: ne 
nous les laisse pas desirer trop longtemps". 22 
iii) New Blood Required 
The call for a thorough reshuffle and renewal of Levant 
personnel in the Levant was one which was being made to 
Algiers with increasing frequency and insistency. Echoing 
Bonoure's appeal, Count Stanislas Ostrorog, newly arrived 
from Algiers, considered that the current French authorities 
were "frappees de lethargie" and required a complete shake-
up, if they were going to engage in the struggle "contre la 
maree anglaise qui risque de tout submerger". He advised the 
elimination of certain officials and their replacement, 
above all, by "des fonctionnaires efficients . . . [qui] 
connaissent l' art de plaire". 23 
Catroux agreed completely with both Bonoure and Ostrorog 
about the need to settle the Levant personnel problem 
urgently and was himself making strong recommendations to 
the Committee on that very matter. He saw the need to settle 
the post of Delegue General as a first priority. To 
stabilise the Levant situation, he considered a man of 
prestige and authority was required, who must be, above all 
else, politically astute. In the present climate, there 
22 ibid. 
23 Extraits d'une lettre personnel Ie de s. Ostrorog, 8 
Decembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1006. 
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could be no recrudescence of the petty struggles and 
conflicts which had besm~rched 
• relations between Helleu and 
General de Lavalade. Catroux thought the post should be 
entrusted to a military general, one who possessed the 
relevant attributes, and who could combine the mili tary 
command with the political authority. He proposed General 
Beynet for the job, as a man "qui possede de l'autorite et 
qui, dans ses sejours dans ce pays-ci, a connu les gens et 
les choses". He additionally suggested that the Delegue 
General be assisted by a Delegue Adjoint, a role which he 
considered Chataigneau would fill admirably.24 
Alternatively, if this suggestion did not commend 
itself, Catroux thought that a civilian notable might do, 
provided he was a skilled negotiator and politician. Though 
Massigli was his first choice, Catroux recognised his 
present indispensability, and instead, proposed Vienot, who 
had an excellent reputation in the Levant25 ; as a civilian, 
he should be assisted by a loyal military commander of 
quality, perhaps General St. Didier. Catroux thought that 
both General de Lavalade and General Monclar should go, the 
former because he had offended the civilian authorities and 
the latter not only because of his quarrels with the British 
in Lattakia, which still rankled, but also and primarily 
"[parce] qu' il est reste l' homme des debut du mandat". After 
offering suggestions for various other posts26 , Catroux 
24 Catroux a Alger, 27 Novembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. Catroux had originally thought that 
Chataigneau might replace Helleu, but changed his mind, 
realising that he did not poss~ss t~e corr~c~ psychology,and 
outlook required by the new Sltuatlon. Gener~l,de T~sslgny 
was considered but rejected as he was not famlllar wlth the 
Levant and had never handled political problems. 
25 Vienot as Deputy Foreign Minister to the Blum 
government, had played a major role in negotiating the 1936 
treaties with the Levant States. 
26 Catroux suggested that Binoche shoul~ he,ad th~ ~ilrete 
Generale and that Boujard ought to be Secreta~re Generale, 
while Ostrorog ought to remain in Damascus. 
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addi tionally requested the despatch of five or six hand-
picked young officers or diplomats, whose specific brief 
would be to reestablish and renew contacts with the 
Levantines, an aspect of policy which had hitherto, he 
observed, been "entierement abandonne aux britanniques". 
Most importantly, the new Delegue Generale should realise 
que l'independance est devenue une realite, que les 
susceptibilites sont vives et qu'il n'est plus 
possible d'agir sur les gouvernements par 
intervention directe, et qu'il faut s'imposer a eux 
par Ie talent et la persuasion. 27 
Though Catroux had obviously done his best to rid the 
Levant of all those most directly responsible for the coup 
d'etat, the task of filling their posts with untarnished, 
forward-thinking personnel of the type he desired, could not 
be completed overnight. Meanwhile, the prospect of Catroux's 
imminent departure forced Spears to admit that he was 
nervous about what would happen in his absence, as 
Chataigneau had "little authority" and de Lavalade was "an 
old woman".28 Catroux too informed Algiers that the Lebanese 
government and numerous French and Lebanese individuals had 
all begged him to remain in the Levant several weeks longer, 
alleging that the firm re-establishment of public order and 
good relations between the two countries depended purely on 
his presence and personal standing; he had received similar 
pleas from Damascus and confessed that he shared the fears. 
Although torn by conflicting responsibilities, Catroux 
decided that it was his duty to return and to inform the 
Committee in Algiers without delay of lila situation 
27 Catroux a Alger, 27 Novembre 1943, No 533-9, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
28 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7445/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
26 November 1943, 
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affligeante ou Ie coup du 10 novembre nous a fait descendre 
et de laquelle il faut sortir avec Ie minimum de dommages". 29 
Before leaving the Middle East on 30 November30 , Catroux 
had conversations with the two Levant governments. Both had 
stressed their continued refusal to recognise the French 
Committee as entitled to conclude a treaty and demanded the 
transfer to themselves within the shortest possible time of 
all the attributes of sovereignty. Faced with such 
intransigence, Catroux had informed them that he was 
prepared to drop the idea of a treaty until the end of the 
war and would negotiate a number of separate agreements with 
the States which might then be bound together by some 
preamble conceding the French a position in the Levant. 31 
Catroux additionally informed Algiers that he had 
convened meetings of all French officials and officers in 
Damascus and Beirut "afin d' apaiser Ie ressentiment ou de 
dissiper l'etat de marasme". He had explained recent events 
to them as well as "les raisons qui ont motive Ie reglement 
de l'affaire". He continued: 
Je les ai invites a garder leur sang-froid et leur 
courage et a conserver la conviction que nous 
surmonterions cette epreuve. J'ai lieu de croire que 
j 'ai ete compris. 32 
29 Catroux a Alger, 28 Novembre 1943, No 541-2, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
30 Casey to Foreign Office, 30 November 1943, 
E7523/27/89, FO 371/35193. 
31 ' Off' e 30 November 1943, Spears to Forelgn lC , 
E7555/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
32 Catroux a Alger, 28 Novembre 1943, No 543, 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1005. 
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Spears, who had attempted to monitor these gatherings, was 
on the whole impressed with Catroux's performance; he felt 
the Frenchman had done his best to impress on his 
compatriots the realities of the situation. That Catroux had 
been reported as accusing Britain of inflicting "a second 
Fashoda" on the French Spears was prepared to forgive, as he 
realised that Catroux was probably afraid of losing his 
authority over his men unless he took an anti-British line. 
More importantly Catroux had stressed the need for the 
French to cultivate a new attitude towards the Syrians and 
Lebanese; he warned his conseillers in particular to 
remember always that they were servants to and not masters 
of the governments to which they were accredited. 33 The 
Eastern Department welcomed these reports. Catroux seemed to 
be taking a sensible line and his attitude towards his 
officials was deemed "salutary, whatever he may have said 
about Great Britain". "We must help Catroux", minuted 
Hankey, "He is our only hope in this mess". 34 
iv) Transferring The Blame 
The weeks after the crisis were difficult for those 
French who had survi ved Catroux' s "epuration". Just as 
Catroux, on arrival in the Levant, had distanced himself 
from Helleu and his cronies, there were others who felt the 
need to dissociate themselves from the acts of the disgraced 
Delegue General. Most notable amongst these were General 
Chadebec de Lavalade and General Bapst, who circulated a 
note on 2 December to all French officers, exonerating 
themselves and by implication, the Army, from any part in 
the arrest of the Lebanese government. They claimed that 
33 Spears to Foreign Office, 30 November 1943, 
E7556/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
34 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 3 December 1943, 
E7556/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
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ill-intentioned individuals were seeking to compromise the 
Army, by imputing to it a share of responsibility for the 
crisis. The note denied that they personally had had prior 
knowledge of Helleu' s plans; it explained that on the 
evening of 10 November, they had merely been informed that 
the military review scheduled to take place the following 
day, would not take place, that demonstrations were expected 
and that certain military precautions ought to be taken in 
case of trouble, and finally that arrests would occur. De 
Lavalade's note continued: 
Les noms des personnes a arreter ne me furent pas 
precises. Dans mon esprit et tels que les faits 
m' avaient ete presentes, ces arrestations 
eventuelles devaient etre la consequence et non la 
cause des manifestations. C'est entre 5h et 6h, Ie 
11e [Novembre], que Ie General Humblot et moi-meme 
fumes informes que Ie President et les Ministres 
avaient ete arretes. C' est entre 8h30 et 9h que 
j'appris la dissolution de la Chambre et Ie choix de 
M. Edde. Les des etant jetes, notre devoir etait 
clair: faire bloc, sans recriminer, derriere Ie 
Representant de la France. 35 
Thus the Army absolved itself of any responsibility in the 
planning of the arrests and carefully avoided exposing 
itself to accusations of disloyalty: once the arrests had 
been made, it was claimed, there had been no option but to 
fall in behind Helleu and maintain solidarity. 
Civilian members of the French establishment 
demonstrated an equally marked tendency in lengthy post-
mortems to abstain from any criticism of the French 
administration of which they were part; they strove instead 
to play down the extent of the crisis and to play up the 
role of the British, at whose feet the blame for everything 
was laid. Chataigneau sent Massigli several such reports: 
35 Note par General Chadebec de Lavalade et General 
Bapst, 2 Decembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 
1000. Also contained in SHAT, 4H/308/3. 
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one, an eighteen page document on the unfolding of events 
during the crisis, sought particularly to minimise the scale 
of the troubles. It claimed that the strike had been partial 
and that the demonstrations in Beirut had initially been 
strictly localised, until the closure of the American 
University on 13 November swelled the ranks of the 
demonstrators. Apart from Tripoli and one or two other 
areas, the entire country had been undisturbed, contrary to 
the impression which Reuters had sought to convey. 
Chataigneau was positive that, had the British ultimatum not 
been met, Britain would have taken control in the Levant: 
l'autorite militaire britannique aurait proclame 
1 ' etat de siege et pris en main Ie contrale de 
l'adminstration du pays. Tout un personnel 
d' officiers venus de toutes Ie Proche Orient, de 
Libye, de 1 'Afrique Orientale, etait a pied d'oeuvre 
pour se substituer aux conseillers fran9ais dans les 
administrations libanaises. 36 
There was no denying, Chataigneau stated, that the 
French position in the Lebanon "a subi une atteinte au cours 
des recents evenements". 37 In contrast, he pointed out in a 
separate report that the British were enjoying a swell in 
prestige: 
L'appui publique donne par eux au Gouvernement Riad 
Solh, les encouragements qu'a tous les echelons ils 
ont prodigues au mouvement de resistance cont~e les 
mesures de forces prises par M. Helleu, et enf1n, Ie 
succes de ce mouvement, consacrent leur puissance 
aux yeux d'une opinion que les manifestations de la 
f . . t 38 orce 1mpress1onnen . 
36 Chataigneau .. Massigli, 9 Decembre 1943, No a 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
37 ibid. 
38 Chataigneau .. Massigli, 9 Decembre 1943, No a 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
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Chataigneau assiduously provided Algiers with a catalogue 
of incidents which he maintained incriminated the British. 
To illustrate how the British were continuing to attempt to 
usurp the French authorities in their relations with the 
Levant States, he cited their continued efforts to become 
involved in the distribution of paper. 39 He insisted that 
British offers of financial assistance for irrigation work 
near Tyre and in the Southern Bekaa region provided "une 
preuve nouvelle des dispositions de la mission Spears a se 
substituer A cette dAIAgation ... ,,40 Criticism was also 
levelled at General Holmes who, under orders from General 
Spears, had threatened to take over the distribution of 
general supplies in Beirut, when it was discovered, after a 
visit to General de Lavalade on 14 November, that no 
satisfactory arrangements had been made to feed the 
population of Beirut during the strike. 41 These attempts 
"tendaient donc A substi tuer, sans raison valable, des 
agents bri tanniques a des agents frangais et a laisser 
croire A la population que la ge ArmAe pourvoyai t a ses 
besoins" . 42 
39 Beyrouth a Alger, 14 Decembre 1943, No 582-83, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1023. Paper supplies had proved an 
endless source of antagonism between the French and the 
British. Britain actually supplied the paper and then 
decided on the quantities to be allocated to the French and 
to the Levant states. The actual distribution to the Levant 
States was undertaken by the French. The French usually 
complained about the quantity allocated, and the Committee 
in Algiers had approached the Soviet Union as an alternative 
source. See Garreau(Moscou) a Beyrouth, 6 Decembre 1943, No 
481, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
40 Chataigneau A Massigli, 10 Decembre 1943, No 604-5, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1575. 
41 Notes by Army Commander on Military Security 
Situation, November 1943, WO 201/982. 
42 Chataigneau A Massigli, 9 December 1943, No 357, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
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Another report brimming with accusations against the 
British was one filed by Colonel Oliva Roget, the Delegue at 
Damascus, on the origins of the Lebanese crisis and its 
repercussions in Syria. According to Oliva Roget, Britain's 
behaviour in Syria and Lebanon had to be viewed against the 
much wider back-drop of her imperial designs. He alleged 
that Britain was seeking to create a barrier against 
American competition in the Middle Eastern oil fields and 
against Russian expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The barrier she hoped to erect was Arab Union, "et la mise 
a l' ecart de la France facili terai t ... l' operation". I f the 
Bri tish scheme did not necessarily involve the complete 
eviction of the French from the Levant, it certainly 
required that France did not retain a position in the Levant 
superior to Britain's own. Britain had cunningly recognised 
the need, therefore, to attack France in the Lebanon, the 
stronghold of her position in the Middle East: whereas she 
had hardly intervened in the Syrian elections, it had been 
a different story in the Lebanon, where she had openly 
entered the fray and with considerable success. Indeed, it 
was the election of an Anglophile, pan-Arab and militant 
chamber, the report maintained, which had paved the way for 
the crisis: 
L'erreur cruciale de la Delegation Generale n'est 
pas l'incident du lIe novembre. C'est d'avoir perdu 
des elections que nous pouvions gagner. 
Despite concentrating their main efforts on the Lebanon, 
the British had not ignored Syria completely: they had 
attempted unsuccessfully to incite the Syrian population to 
provoke trouble over events in the Lebanon. More success had 
been achieved however, with members of the Syrian 
Parliament, whose fiery speeches Oliva Roget was certain had 
been inspired by British bribes. 43 He insisted however, that 
43 Chataigneau had similarly reported that it seemed 
incontrovertible that the speech of one Syrian deputy, Fakri 
Bey, was the result of a British bribe in the region of 
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it was only when Lebanese success seemed sure that the 
Syrians, "litteralement assailli par les Anglo-Saxons", had 
jumped on the band-wagon and begun their own assault on the 
French. 
Oliva Roget went on to cite numerous specific examples 
of grave British discourtesies towards the French and their 
attempts to incite the Syrians during the Lebanese crisis. 
He complained about Major R. A. Beaumont44 , who had 
encouraged the Syrian deputies to vote a motion of 
solidarity with the Lebanese, and had advised students to 
listen to radio broadcasts which had been emitting "des 
injures a la France" and "de veritables appels a l'emeute". 
Colonel Brenan45 had been in Damascus over three weeks before 
even attempting to pay a courtesy visit to Oliva Roget 
himself; Colonel Summerhayes at Aleppo46 had hinted that he 
was to restrict relations with the French "au seules 
necessi tes du service"; similarly, Lt. Col. Di tchburn47 had 
refused to dine with Colonel des Essars, and seemed unable 
to set a future date on which he would be free to do so. 
Various other reports had reached Oliva Roget causing him to 
believe that even officers of the Ninth Army had been 
instructed to intervene openly in local affairs, with the 
result that on 26 November, uniformed British soldiers had 
been sighted amongst demonstrators. 48 Two other British 
£5,000. 
44 Major R. A. Beaumont:Vice Consul, Damascus. 
45 Colonel Brenan:Political Officer, Damascus. 
46 Colonel C. H. Summerhayes:Consul, Aleppo. 
47 Lt. Col. Di tchburn : Political Liaison Officer, Lattakia. 
48 The 
explaining 
discharged 
226/241. 
Spears Mission vehemently denied this accusation, 
that the man sighted had been a local indivi~ual, 
from the British Army. See correspondence ln FO 
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agents, Stirling49 and Al tounian50 , had stayed in Damascus 
during the troubles, but , Oliva Roget commented, "il est 
difficile de juger 1 'action de ces deux officiers ... lIs se 
sont montres tres prudents". Furthermore, the Ninth Army had 
offered protection to the dissident government at Bchemoun 
and had even posted a permanent liaison vehicle there, to 
alert the Army in case of French attack. 51 Commenting on 
Oliva Roget's report, Chataigneau observed that: 
Sur l'activite des anglo-saxons, Ie rapport abonde 
en informations precieuses. II faudrait tout citer 
en ce qui concerne notamment Ie travail sournois de 
dissociation entrepris par la Mission Spears, ses 
intrigues, ses appels publics et confidentiels a 
1 ' emeute, ses insolences calculees aI' egard des 
autori tes francaises. Le Colonel Oliva Roget ne 
semble pas avoir une impression meilleure de la ge 
Armee anglaise. Du moins ont-ils ete plus discrets. 52 
v) Delenda Est Mission Spears 
Given the deeply entrenched suspicion and residual 
resentment which the French community in the Levant felt 
towards Britain, which had only been heightened by the 
Lebanese crisis and Britain's role in it, it is hardly 
surprising that men such as Chataigneau and Oliva Roget 
should seek to denounce the British and to transfer blame to 
49 See Lt. Col. W. F. Stirling, op cit, pp 223-224. 
Stirling had been summoned from Deir ez Zor to act as 
General Holmes's personal liasion officer with the Syria 
government. 
50 See again Stirling, op cit, pp 217-218 o~ Altounian, 
a former doctor, now a British intelligence offlcer. 
51 "La crise libanaise et ses repercussions politiques 
en Syrie", Colonel Oliva Roget, 18 Decembre 1943, No 548/SP, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1006. 
52 Chataigneau a Massigli, 21 December 1943, Guerre 
1939-35, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
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Spears and his Mission, from themselves and the French 
establishment to which they unquestionably belonged. Yet the 
same bitterness and hostility towards Spears was 
demonstrated by Frenchmen who had had no part in the crisis, 
who had arrived in the Levant only in its aftermath, who 
were therefore blameless and had no apparent reason to seek 
a scapegoat and to discredit the British, except perhaps as 
an expression of solidarity with their compatriots. One such 
a man was Ostrorog, who within a week of his arrival, was 
despatching reports on British interference in Levant 
affairs. Though he conceded that for the most part the 
French could not produce "des preuves categoriques", he 
asserted vehemently 
qu'etant donne ce qui se passe ici depuis deux ans, 
I 'atmosphere generale et la conviction des individus 
... il n'est pas possible aux Anglais de pretendre 
qu'ils restent neutres en Syrie et au Liban et 
qu'ils ne s'efforcent pas, par tous les moyens, d'y 
prendre une place privilegiee. Le fait meme que Ie 
General Spears ... est maintenu ici, et que malgre 
toutes nos preventions, justifiees ou injustifiees 
a son egard, on nous impose sa presence, montre de 
quelle maniere les autorites britanniques pretendent 
mener leurs affaires. Je vous signale ces faits non 
dans un esprit d'indignation vaine, mais parce 
qu 'ils expriment la reali te. 53 
Writing to Massigli, Ostrorog persisted in inveighing 
against the pernicious influence of General Spears: 
L'impression generale et dominante qui se degage est 
que Ie General Spears et Madame Spears menent une 
campagne acharnee pour arriver a chasser la France 
des Etats du Levant. Aupres des libanais, ils ne 
font point mystere de leur desir et s'efforcent par 
tous les moyens d'elargir Ie fosse entre la France 
et Ie Liban. A cet effet, tous les moyens leur sont 
bons et la these generale qu'ils soutiennent est que 
53 Extrai ts d ' une letter personnelle de Stas. i . e. 
Stanislas Ostrorog, 8 Decembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger 
CFLN, Vol 1006. 
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1a France a regu des b1essures trop mortelles pour 
pouvoir soutenir son role dans Ie Levant. 54 
Ostrorog was well aware that his continual harping 
the subject of Spears might seem obsessive to those 
Algiers. In a separate letter, he wrote: 
Au risque de passer pour un maniaque et la victime 
d'idees fixes, je dois revenir encore sur Ie cas 
Spears. Venu depuis quinze jours A peine et dans les 
sentiments que vous connaissez, j e ne puis ... 
passer pour suspect ni subissant de maniere 
excessive les influences locales. 
on 
in 
But, he continued, information he had received from Gwynn at 
the American Legation55 and from the Lebanese themselves was 
conclusive and unanimous: 
Le General et Lady Spears continuent de faire tout 
ce qu'ils peuvent pour ruiner notre situation. II 
n'y a pas un fonctionnaire frangais dont ils 
n'attaquent l'attitude et la personnalite. Tout 
moyen leur est bon pour nous discrediter. Ne croyez 
pas que je m'echauffe. J'ai vu Spears tout au long. 
Nous n'avons parle que monde et societe parisienne 
-- car il est snob -- mes relations sont excellentes 
avec les Anglais et les Americains et vous pouvez 
etre assure que tout sera faite pour detendre ici la 
si tuation. Mais j e repete que rien de solide ne 
pourra etre fait aussi longtemps que l'Angleterre 
n'aura pas chan~e son representative: delenda est 
mission Spears. 5 
However impassioned his plea, Ostrorog was largely 
preaching to the converted. The Committee had long since 
recognised the need for the removal of Spears before 
54 Ostrorog a Massigli, 14 Decembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
55 William Gwynn: United States Consul, Damascus. 
56 Extrai t d' une lettre 
Ostrorog a M. de Gouringaud, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1006. 
regue de Beyrouth du Comte 
sans date, Guerre 1939-45, 
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relations between Britain and France in the Levant 
deteriorated any further. The Committee felt, with a certain 
degree of justification, that it had done its bit by 
removing Helleu, 
responsible for 
Boegner, Baelen and others primarily 
the Lebanese crisis. Indeed, that there had 
been "a great French house-cleaning", had been recognised by 
the British. 57 The French, however, evidently believed that 
the British would set their own house in order and had 
placed far too much hope in Macmillan's confident assertions 
that Spears would shortly be given his marching orders. 58 
This hope was kept alive by rumours from Cairo that "un 
remaniement important aurait lieu sous peu dans 
l'organisation politique et militaire britannique du Moyen 
Orient" .59 It was believed that this would be one of the 
results of Churchill's prolonged visit to the area, and this 
seemed confirmed as Vienot had already informed Algiers on 
21 December, that the nomination of Casey for the 
Governorship of Bengal was certain. 60 But the reshuffle which 
Churchill had overseen whilst in Cairo, removed Casey but 
left Spears untouched. 
The considerable concern of the French over Spears was 
matched only by that displayed within the Foreign Office. 
Members of the Eastern Department realised only too well 
57 Borden, op cit, p 227; Holmes to Wilson, 3 December 
1943, 9A/9/ADC, WO 201/984. 
58 Note 2 Decembre 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, 
Vol 1006. The note referred to a conversation between 
Massigli and Macmillan on 23 November, at, ~hich Macmillan 
had insisted on the desire of the Brltlsh Government 
"d'effacer au plus tot, les traces regrettables que 
l'incident libanais pourrait laisser dans les rapports 
franco-britanniques". Massigli had replied that if this was 
the case, then the recall of Spears was imperative, and 
Macmillan had not demurred. 
59 De Benoist a Alger, 22 Decembre 1943, No 386, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1241. 
60 Vienot a Alger, 21 December 1943, Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1593. 
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that they possessed little or no influence in the matter of 
Spears's removal. Early in December, Hankey minuted that 
whilst the Foreign Office saw "no objection ... to the 
abolition of the Spears Mission", it required the French to 
make "the necessary advances". 61 Less than a week later 
however, Hankey had decided to throw caution to the wind and 
to take the matter in hand himself. He minuted to Sir A. 
Cadogan on 9 December: 
At the risk of speaking out of turn, I wish to make 
a serious and most urgent plea for the removal of 
Sir E. Spears from the Levant States. There is no 
doubt at all that his continuance there is a real 
danger to British interests. While [he] has 
correctly estimated the need for a progressive 
policy towards Arab Nationalism, I submit that we 
can no longer afford to keep in Beirut a person who 
is persona non grata with the French. As has 
recently been seen, the French are capable of almost 
any folly there, and we should not accept a state of 
affairs in which we have no influence at allover 
the French authorities. If they create another 
incident like the last when the Palestine question 
becomes more acute, (as it certainly will), we may 
well find ourselves faced with a situation of real 
danger in all Arabic speaking parts of the Middle 
East at once. At the lowest reckoning, it would 
require many divisions of troops to cope with it. 62 
Hankey went on to describe Spears as oozing and 
disseminating hatred of the French; he failed conspicuously 
to carry out Eden's instructions and notoriously pursued his 
own policy. Hankey was convinced that Britain's strategic 
interests, along with her obligations to the Arab states and 
to the new France, could never be met unless she could 
somehow effect an agreement between the French and the 
Levant States, a task which Spears could never fulfil. He 
realised that Spears enjoyed "the special support of the 
61 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 3 December 1943, 
E7582/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
62 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 9 December 1943, FO 
954/15. 
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Prime Minister", and that his removal was therefore "a 
matter of some delicacy".~ If he was to be extracted from 
Beirut, it would have to be to a post of at least equal 
importance and standing: Hankey suggested the Governorship 
of Bengal or Hong Kong, the High Commissionership of 
Australia or South Africa, or even a junior Ministerial 
appointment. He felt that should Eden urge a change in 
Beirut, he would have support from "several other Ministers 
• • • [and] in particular from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer" • 64 
Hankey's appeal was heartily endorsed by his colleagues. 
R. L. Speaight put his name to the plea and expressed the 
opinion that his colleague, W. H. B. Mack, who was ill, 
would also agree; C. W. Baxter and Sir M. Peterson both 
expressed their entire approval. 65 Even Sir A. Cadogan 
admitted that he did not think that anyone would contest the 
soundness of Hankey's views. He added however, that "the 
difficulty remains that we have to convince the Prime 
Minister of the necessity of making a change ... ". He saw the 
only hope as an attempt to persuade Churchill that 
wherever the fault may lie, the feeling between Sir 
E. Spears and the French is, and is likely to 
remain, such that we cannot hope for good Anglo-
French collaboration in this critical theatre. That 
is the fact which has to be faced. The French 
removed Helleu on our demand: if we could make a 
change of Minister, we might make a fresh start. 66 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had been 
greatly annoyed by Spears' obstructions over the Anglo-
French Financial agreement. 
65 Minutes by C. W. Baxter, R. L. Speaight and Sir M. 
Peterson, 9, 10 and 13 December 1943, respectively, FO 
954/15. 
66 Minute by Sir A. Cadogan, 13 December 1943, FO 
954/15. 
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Eden saw these minutes on 17 December. Whilst 
appreciating the strength of feeling about Spears amongst 
his staff, he could do little in the absence of Churchill, 
who had fallen seriously ilIon 11 December en route from 
Cairo, and had taken refuge in Roosevelt's villa near 
Carthage. 67 Hankey meanwhile busied himself in despatching 
letters to numerous individuals, asking for assistance in 
finding a suitable alternative post for Spears. "I do feel", 
he minuted, "that unless we do something about it, we'll 
never get rid of "our old man of the sea" ". 68 He complained 
to Sir M. Peterson that "This business of getting rid of 
Spears is hanging fire. It will only go if we create an 
opportuni ty". 69 Unfortunately for Hankey, the opportunities 
he created, (he had further suggested the possibilities of 
Governor of Gibraltar or Ceylon, or the post of Resident 
Minister, west Africa), came to naught. When prodded by 
Cadogan, Eden insisted that he had taken the matter up with 
the Prime Minister on his return, "but got no change out of 
him".70 In fact, Churchill had sent Spears a telegram on New 
Year's Day, informing him that he had "done very well". 71 
Under such circumstances, the Foreign Office would be 
obliged to wait many more months before they were rid of the 
constant thorn in their side. 
67 The Prime Minister remained at Carthage until 27 
December 1943, whereupon he flew to Marrakesh for a p~riod 
of convalescence. He did not return to London untl1 18 
January 1944. See M. Gilbert, op cit, pp 604-607, pp 620-
626. 
68 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, undated, FO 954/15. 
69 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 14 December 1943, FO 
954/15. 
70 Foreign Office minute, undated, FO 954/15. 
71 Churchill to Spears, 1 January 1944, FO 954/15. 
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vi) The Bright Horizon 
The denouement of the Lebanese crisis left senior French 
officials in the Levant pondering France's predicament. What 
stands out in the reports, reviews and assessments 
subsequently filed to Algiers, is the continual optimism and 
the constant pains always to highlight the silver lining of 
the dark clouds which now threatened the French position in 
the Levant. In the short period during which he was left in 
charge, Chataigneau never succumbed to defeatism in his 
reports to Algiers. It was perfectly normal, he noted, that 
for a while the Lebanese President and his Ministers should 
be feted as heroes and martyrs, and that because of the 
Bri tish ultimatum, British prestige should soar. Whilst 
admitting that these factors were not especially propitious 
for the maintenance of French influence, he emphasised other 
factors which "jouent dans Ie sens d' une reprise de nos 
positions perdues".72 
Chataigneau believed that as a direct result of the 
crisis, British ambitions were now exposed for all to see. 
He drew great comfort from this and believed that the French 
could capitalise on this. He was convinced that "en depit 
d'une poussee intense de nationalisme aggressif, Ie 
sentiment pro- fran<;:ais est loin d' etre mort". To support his 
claim, Chataigneau recounted a recent experience in a 
cinema, when the dual appearance of the Kings of England and 
Egypt in a newsreel aroused no response from the audience, 
whereas a few moments later, General de Gaulle's image was 
enthusiastically acclaimed. Other reports had reached him 
that in certain areas, people were tearing down the new 
Lebanese flag and replacing it with the tricolour. "Ces 
72 Chataigneau a Massigli, 29 Novembre 1943, No 337, 
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reactions" , he declared, "emanent des chretiens 
commencent a comprendre que, grace a la faiblesse 
President Bechara el Khoury et la poussee panarabe, 
musulmans sont en voie d' instaurer leur dictature ... ". 73 
qui 
du 
les 
The awakening of the Christian community to the dangers 
of pan-Arabism and to the inevitable threat of the 
resurgence of confessional strife was a direct result of the 
recent crisis, and Chataigneau realised France might easily 
exploit this new concern to shore up her own position in the 
Levant. His reports tended to lay a heavy emphasis on the 
increasing anxiety becoming manifest among Christians: the 
enthusiasm and excitement which had accompanied the release 
of the ministers had begun to die down and was giving way 
to "un certain recueillement mele d'inquietude it l'endroit 
de l'avenir". Principally the Christians of Mount Lebanon, 
who had traditionally looked to France for protection, had 
begun to reflect upon the consequences for themselves of any 
further weakening in France's position: 
II est manifeste que, pour les meilleurs d' entre 
eux, cornme par la masse elle-meme, Ie souci de 
l'independance s'accompagne du souhait plus au moins 
avoue, du maintien de l' ami tie efficiente de la 
France. 74 
Ostrorog too demonstrated much the same determination to 
turn France's present misfortunes to her eventual advantage. 
He had observed in his conversations with Syrian politicians 
and personalities that France was no longer feared in the 
Levant; while this he deemed, implied a certain loss of 
prestige, it also opened up "de nouvelles possibili tes 
73 ibid. 
74 Chataigneau a Massigli, 9 December 1943, No 355, 
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d ' entente" • 75 Ostrorog saw a defl.' nl.' te opening for France to 
re-establish her position by playing upon the fears 
beginning to assail the Syrians about the degree of 
influence which Britain was attempting to exert over them. 
From a talk he had had with Saadullah Jabri, Ostrorog 
reckoned that he could 
sans inconvenient, eveiller certains inquietudes qui 
d'ailleurs existent A l'etat latent, et provoquer 
chez les Syriens, de salutaires reflexions sur les 
dangers eventuels d'un tete-A-tete avec 
I' Angleterre. 76 
According to Ostrorog, Jabri had apparently admitted that he 
hoped to reach an entente with France to withstand British 
ambitions. In a separate conversation, Fares Khoury 
allegedly stated that the difficulties which the French had 
faced during recent months had been "l'oeuvre des Anglais", 
and had commented that any settlement between France and 
Syria was therefore entirely dependent on a Franco-British 
entente. Ostrorog himself concluded that Syrian leaders were 
seriously worried by British intentions and felt unable to 
withstand the pressure being put upon them; they were thus 
"desireux de trouver chez nous une comprehension suffisante 
pour arriver sans violence A un ajustement des relations 
franco-syriennes qui reserve l'avenir en n'excluant pas la 
France du Levant". 77 
Whatever encouraging signs were perceived for a 
continued French role in the Levant, there were still many 
pi tfalls to be avoided. Chataigneau warned in particular 
against complacency, and sent Algiers an article from the 
local press which had not, he insisted, been inspired by the 
75 Ostrorog A Massigli, 8 Decembre 1943, Papiers 
Massigli, Vol 1468. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid. 
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French authorities. It indicated clearly that Franco-
Lebanese friendship would survive all vicissitudes, "a 
condition toutefois que la France sache definitivement 
renoncer a ses tentations d'imperialisme". The soundness of 
this advice Chataigneau heartily endorsed: 
J'estime que c'est dans cette voie que doit 
s ' exercer notre action. Nous devons montrer aux 
Libanais Ie vrai visage de la France, exalter ses 
vertus traditionelles de liberalisme, ne pas laisser 
croire un seul instant que ceux de la Resistance 
pourraient lutter et mourir pour asservir d'autres 
peuples. Rien ne saurait etre mieux accueilli par 
tant de Libanais, qui hier encore acclamaient la 
France et peuvent tres bien se tourner a nouveau 
vers elle, pour peu que se precisent les menaces des 
Britanniques et surtout les dangers d'un 
imperialisme arabe d ' inspiration irakienne ou 
egyptienne" . 78 
Chataigneau believed that France still possessed the 
means to encourage and even to speed up the evolution in 
Christian thinking he had detected: he boasted that he 
himself had just undertaken a reorganisation of French 
propaganda services, "qui rend pres du tiers des periodiques 
arabes du Liban largement accessibles d' ores et dej a, a 
notre influence et doit permettre, a breve echeance, 
d'atteindre une fraction encore plus import ante de la presse 
libanaise" . 79 Chataigneau evidently saw no inconsistency in 
advocating in one paragraph of a report that France should 
extol her traditional liberalism to the Lebanese, and in the 
next, boasting of how he had secured the wherewi thaI to 
better influence large sections of the Lebanese press. 
In another telegram, Chataigneau argued that in the 
past, many French, civilian and military, had opposed the 
slightest hint of a liberal policy, seeking thereby to 
78 Chataigneau a Massigli, 29 Novembre 1943, No 337, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1000. 
79 ibid. 
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ensure that France continued to enjoy her mandatory 
privileges. In reality, this had only weakened her position: 
pa~eil17 P?litique, si elle etait reprise, aurait 
au~ourd hU1 d~s consequences plus graves encore. Du 
fa1t d: la presence des Anglais et de la volonte qui 
appara1t chez eux de saisir toute occasion favorable 
pour.subst~tu~r leur autorite a la notre, Ie jeu qui 
cons1stera1t a opposer secretement des obstacles aux 
administrations locales, favoriserai t directement la 
realisation des ambitions britanniques. Quels que 
soient les services dont il s'agit, nous devons donc 
nous efforcer, en preparant leur abandon aux Etats, 
de surmonter tout depit et toute mauvaise humeur et 
chercher, au contraire, a donner aux Syriens comme 
aux Libanais, les moyens d'assurer la marche normale 
de ces services lorsqu'ils en auront pris la 
responsabili te. 80 
Chataigneau was not the only voice advocating that 
France should mend her ways in the Levant if she hoped to 
maintain her position there. In London, Vienot had been 
giving the matter considerable thought and telegraphed 
Massigli that one of the arguments most often invoked 
against France "avait ete [1'] insuffisance de notre 
administration au 
interested circles 
Levant". The 
was that 
view widely held in 
the system of French 
administration which had succeeded in Africa, had failed 
miserably in Indochina and the Levant. He believed that 
recent events in the Lebanon had exposed the French 
administration to international criticism and provided the 
Allies with a golden opportunity to interfere. He warned 
that the Allies might now suggest that French conduct should 
be underwritten by international guarantees: 
Le moment pourrai t donc etre venu pour nous de 
reconsiderer les principes de notre politique 
coloniale qui devraient s 'orienter vers une 
association plus etroite des populations indigenes 
a I 'administration et des concessions plus larges au 
"self-government". Une declaration publique aurait 
80 Chataigneau a Massigli, 14 Decembre 1943, No 368, 
Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1009. 
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un effet considerable et esquisserait une certaine 
confiance dans la renovation de notre esprit liberale. 
Only by seizing the initiative herself did Vienot believe 
that France could avoid outside pressure to reform and only 
thus could she herself derive "Ie benefice morale" from that 
reform. 81 
vii) A Blueprint for the Future 
The French Committee in Algiers, meanwhile, did seem to 
be taking on board the advice being thrust upon it. 
Determination to tackle Levant problems was signalled by the 
appointment of a three man Commission of Enquiry to 
investigate and report its findings. 82 Furthermore, on 3 
December, a press statement was issued, approving the 
measures Catroux had already taken in the Levant and 
announcing that he would return shortly to effect a 
settlement. 83 Massigli subsequently confirmed to Macmillan 
that the Committee had been much impressed by Catroux' s 
expose on the Levant, that de Gaulle had made no trouble, 
and that Catroux had been invested with full powers to deal 
wi th the situation there. 84 
81 Vienot a Alger, 7 Decembre 1943, No 1692-96, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. 
82 Alger a Beyrouth, 7 Decembre 1943, No 494, Guerre 
1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1592. The three men were:Andre 
Hauriou, formerly of the University of Toulouse, now 
attached to the Commissariat aux Affaires Etrangeres, M. 
Astier, attached to the Commissariat aux Affaires 
Economiques, and Pierre Lapie, attached to the Commissariat 
d'Education Nationale. 
83 Algiers to Foreign Office, 3 December 1943, 
E7599/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
84 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 4 December 1943, 
E7647/27/89, FO 371/35194. 
601 
Catroux had originally planned to leave for the Levant 
on 7 December, but postponed his departure. 85 He was 
undoubtedly the instrumental force, whilst at Algiers, in 
the production of a document, dated 8 December, entitled 
"Instructions Concernant la Politique a Suivre au Levant", 
as much of its content is based on his observations. This 
document was intended to become the blueprint for French 
policy in the Levant in the months to come and as such 
, , 
merits a detailed examination. It claimed that the central 
aim of French policy in the Levant since 1941 had been 
d'obtenir, qu'avant la fin des hostilites, 
l'hypotheque qu'y possede la France, fat sanctionne 
par des traites d'amitie et d'alliance qui seraient 
conclus avec la Syrie et Ie Liban. 86 
Even when, on behalf of the Committee, Catroux had declared 
the two countries independent, he had stipulated that 
independence would only become effective after the 
conclusion of such treaties; numerous approaches to the 
States, however, for discussions to implement either the 
1936 treaties, or for the negotiation of completely new 
treaties, seemed always to have been rejected. The States 
had refused to recognise French rights and lately had even 
begun to harbour some hostility towards the French; they did 
now agree to the need to regulate their relations with 
France, at least provisionally, for the duration of the war, 
but would only negotiate on a basis of complete equality and 
insisted that any modus vivendi be reached by a series of 
separate accords rather than by a more general over-all 
agreement; additionally, they were demanding the immediate 
85 Algiers to Foreign Office, 4 December 1943, 
E7631/27 /89, FO 371/35194; Algiers to Foreign Office, 7 
December 1943, E7719/27/89, FO 371/35195. 
86 "Instructions Concernant la Poli tique a Sui vre au 
Levant", 8 December 1943, Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 
1000 et 1006. 
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tranfer to themselves of t· cer a1n powers which France 
presently controlled. 
The document stated that while the Committee had a 
strict obligation not to surrender any French rights in the 
Levant except by virtue of an international agreement, it 
could not forcefully ensure that these rights were 
respected, nor impose the conclusion of treaties upon the 
States. Though intending to fulfil their promise of leading 
Syria and the Lebanon to real independence, the Committee 
was equally resolved 
a sauvegarder, en depit des difficultes du moment, 
et par les moyens adaptes a la situation presente, 
1 'essen tiel de la position de la France au Levant. 87 
It went on to outline the Committee's intended policy 
given the present circumstances. It had been decided that, 
wi th certain exceptions, responsibil ty for the Interets 
Communs should be tranferred to the States. Services of an 
essentially mandatory character would remain attached to the 
Delegation Generale, as would the Office des Changes "en 
raison des necessites de la guerre economique". The Service 
d'Information et Radiodiffusion, "essentiel notre 
propagande", would also be retained, as would all the 
findings of the Service Geologique, "notamment pour les 
recherches des gites petroliferes". Though the Committee was 
ready, in principle, to transfer responsibility for certain 
aspects of security to the States -- rights of passage, 
frontier and Bedouin control -- an agreement was required 
which would take into account the reponsibili ty of the 
French military command in these matters, whilst hostilities 
lasted. As far as the Committee was concerned, the States 
would become responsible for the maintenance of internal 
order, and a certain number of Troupes Speciales would be 
87 'b'd l. l. • 
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placed at their disposal, though the total transfer of these 
forces could not be envisaged during the war. 
It was advocated that these concessions be strongly 
recommended to the States, as bearing witness to "[Ie] bon 
vouloir du Comite ainsi que de son desir de manifester 8 la 
Syrie et au Liban, sa ferme volonte de favoriser, 
conformement 8 ses promesses, leur accession 8 une 
independance reelle". However, it should also be carefully 
stressed that the Committee's friendly attitude did not 
signify that France had in any way modified her juridical 
view of her relations with Syria and the Lebanon or their 
independence. In that respect, France's position remained 
unaltered from Catroux's proclamations of 27 September and 
26 November, 1941. She still hoped to define her relations 
wi th the Levant States by means of a treaty, and was 
prepared to negotiate a provisional settlement to last the 
duration of the war, whether in the form of a general 
overall agreement or a series of specific agreements. 
The document continued: 
Telle est, pour l' immediat, la poli tique que Ie 
Comite a juge necessaire d'adopter au lendemain de 
la crise franco-libanaise. Imposee par les 
circonstances, elle aboutit non pas en droit mais en 
fait, 8 rendre inoperants ce qui nous rest~it des 
prerogatives du mandat, ainsi que les reserves 
incluses dans les declarations d'independance. Elle 
nous permet par contre, de nous maintenir au Levant. 
Et c' est 18 Ie facteur que nous devons exploiter 
pour essayer d'y retablir la situation de la France. 
Here indeed, was the crux of the matter. The defeat which 
the Lebanese crisis had represented for French policy was 
quickly forgotten; the concessions to the States which 
France was being forced to make, were viewed as a necessary 
evil, as something in the nature of a tactical retreat, from 
which France could regroup her forces to try and recapture 
Syria and the Lebanon. 
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The difficulties and obstacles France would face in this 
renewed assault on the Levant were evidently not considered 
insurmountable. The document concedes that once the States 
achieved real independence, it would be difficult to exert 
any political influence over them. But it went on to assert 
that even if direct intervention in the internal affairs of 
the States became impossible, the Delegation Generale and 
individual delegues appointed to each State, could still 
fall back on what personal influence they might be able to 
wield. Moreover, 
territoire, de 
France still retained "repartis sur Ie 
nombreux moyens d'action, directe ou 
indirecte, et dont Ie maintien en place concretisera la 
persistance de la presence de la France". In future, the 
Committee expected the entire fabric of the French community 
in the Levant to reinforce and protect France's position: 
technical advisers and bureaucrats who still retained posts 
in the central administration of the States, magistrates, 
provincial advisers and even officers in the Services 
Speciaux "que nous transformerons, s'il Ie faut, suivant Ie 
precedent bri tannique, en officiers poli tiques ou de la 
Securi te mili taire". The list continued, mentioning as other 
sources of influence "l'Armee fran<;:aise ... les entreprises 
fran<;:aises d' interet public ... 1 'important appoint des 
oeuvres laYques ou confessionelles d'assistance et surtout 
d 'enseignement qui par leur caractere desinteresse, 
demeurent un instrument primordial d' influence et d' action". 
It was up to the Delegue General to encourage these 
elements, to guide their conduct and to direct them towards 
the same goal "qui est d'affirmer que la France demeure [au 
Levant] et de lui attirer consideration et amitie". 
The entire French community in the Levant and not just 
the personnel of the Delegation Generale should be 
instructed that it was their bounden duty to cuI ti vate 
friendly relations with the Syrians and Lebanese," de leur 
temoigner des egards auxquels ils sont si sensibles, et 
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d'abandonner une attitude de hauteur distante si peu 
justifiee ou de critique dedaigneuse qui si souvent les a 
blesses". The French community must thoroughly appreciate 
that the Levant people were now imbued with a growing 
national spirit and a real attachment to their independence; 
moreover, they realised and intended to capitalise on the 
fact, that France of 1943 was not that of 1918, not only 
because of France's defeat, "mais surtout parce que trop de 
Fran9ais se sont montres, par leur ego.l.sme, leur fauts 
d'education et leur mediocrite, trop inferieurs a l'image 
qu'on faisait d'eux". 
Top posts in the Levant should be filled with "des 
hommes de choix et de bon aloi qui sachent s'imposer et qui 
aient le gout de voir et de savoir". French enterprises 
would have to get rid of their exploi tati ve image and 
demonstrate that their activities were for the good of Syria 
and Lebanon. The favour which the French system of education 
enjoyed had not been affected by her political and military 
decline, as the numbers of students returning to French 
educational establishments testified. Full scope was 
therefore to be given to French cultural establishments and 
a French Uni versi ty should be created in the Levant. 88 In 
this field, where France's true strength lay, the outlook 
was wide open and bright. 
The strategy, then, was to hold on and endure by as many 
of the means outlined as possible. The possibility always 
existed that, whilst this slow work of reclamation ensued, 
external or internal developments might provide France with 
opportuni ties "de rentrer en scene". France's most immediate 
difficulties had been created by the weakness of her own 
posi tion, by the cohesion of Syrian and Lebanese 
88 For further details about the possible creation of a 
French University in the Levant and other educational 
projects which the Committee proposed, see Guerre 1939-45, 
Alger CFLN, Vol 1029. 
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nationalism, and by "Ie jeu destructeur de la poli tique 
britannique. L'heritage d'un mandat imprudent et les erreurs 
des hommes ont fait Ie reste". The Committee believed in the 
resurrection of France and moreover that "cette resurrection 
aura son prolongement au Levant". The Lebanese, whom France 
had so inopportunely united against herself, would once 
again dissolve into a morass of confessional and clan-
related antagonisms, and the Christians would face the 
prospect of absorption by Islam. The Syrians too would watch 
the rebirth of particularism and face external assaults on 
their frontiers. The solidarity which both countries 
presently displayed would soon melt away when they began 
playing the constitutional game for real. Once the need for 
an arbiter and protector began to make itself apparent, 
"L'heure de la France pourra a nouveau sonner". 
There remained the problem of Britain. Despite Foreign 
Office assurances, British policy 
a vise a nous deloger de nos positions au Levant et 
a exploite a cette fin, l'argument puissant de 
1 ' independance. Elle y est en ce moment parvenue 
avec notre imprudent concours. Notre divorce avec Ie 
Liban marque Ie succes de l'effort des britanniques 
qui, pour la reussite de leur projet arabe, ne 
pouvaient tolerer que Ie Liban demeurait isole de 
l'ensemble sur la fagade Mediterraneenne. 
Nonetheless, the French were not despondent; even if the 
Bri tish succeeded in usurping France, they could hardly 
afford to welcome total independence for Syria and Lebanon, 
for they knew only too well that any concession made to 
these two States would provoke demands for similar 
concessions from Iraq and Egypt, not to mention Palestine 
and Transjordan. There was still a possibility therefore, 
that France's policy might be harmonised with that of 
Bri tain, and eventually France might secure "les trai tes 
dont nous avons fait notre but et qui nous echappent en ce 
moment" . 
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The final paragraph of the document neatly summarised 
what should now become the golden rules of French policy in 
the Levant: 
Attendre, demeurer sur place, nous adapter aux 
conditions du moment, eviter les erreurs 
psychologiques du passe, reconstruire notre credit 
moral sur son fondement liberal et intellectuel. 
Reserver nos droits strictement, rechercher une 
entente avec la Grande Bretagne, tels sont les 
lineaments de la poli tique de conservation et de 
reprise que nous devons tenter au Levant. 89 
89 " Instructions Concernant la Poli tique a Sui vre au 
Levant", 8 December , uerre 194 G 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vol 
1000 et 1006. 
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EPILOGUE 
En route from Cairo on 9 December, Eden and Cadogan paid 
an unscheduled visit to Algiers; at a meeting that day with 
Massigli, Eden took the opportunity to tell the French that 
the British government was now "prepared to put some 
pressure upon the Lebanese and Syrian governments to make 
reasonable agreements with the French".l When he received a 
report of the meeting, Spears was quick to interpose, 
expressing the hope that this declaration would not make the 
French more intransigent and that what was meant by 
"reasonable agreements" was "a short-term arrangement only, 
not one which commits the States now to a defini tion of 
their postwar relations with France".2 He pointed out that 
whilst for the moment, Chataigneau was proving most co-
operative, the whole atmosphere would change if Catroux 
returned "in an unyielding mood". A suggestion by Massigli 
for talks in London about the Levant had worried Spears, who 
suspected that the French aimed at disposing of the Levant 
question without reference either to the Syrians or 
Lebanese; this would be quite unacceptable and, he warned, 
"Sykes-Picot has not been forgotten here".3 
Nonetheless, to the great surprise and pleasure of the 
Foreign Office, Spears saw the leaders of both the Syrian 
and Lebanese governments and informed them that Britain 
expected them to negotiate a modus vivendi with the French 
in a conciliatory spirit; this they professed they were 
willing to do, now that Catroux had effectively shelved the 
1 Macmillan to Foreign Office, 10 December 1943, 
E7772/27/89, FO 371/35195. 
2 Spears to Foreign Office, 13 December 1943, 
E7831/27/89, FO 371/35195. 
3 'b'd 1. 1.. • 
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treaty question. 4 Furthermore, Catroux had returned to the 
Levant on 16 December and in a "most friendly and 
satisfactory talk" on 18 December, Spears was surprised to 
find the Frenchman's views and intentions "entirely 
reasonable" . 5 On 22 December, in what was acknowledged to be 
a major step forward, Catroux signed a tripartite agreement 
with the Syrians and Lebanese which provided for the 
transfer of full responsibility for the Interets Communs to 
the Levant governments from 1 January 1944, and other powers 
by specific agreements to be concluded in the near future. 6 
The agreement was enthusiastically welcomed by the States 
and by Spears, who commented: "Thus is closed, in an 
eminently satisfactory manner, the dangerous crisis of last 
month" . 7 
That these agreements, as has been claimed, marked the 
" effective beginning of Syrian and Lebanese independence" 8 is 
substantially correct. Yet despite the appearance of an all-
round satisfactory arrangement, this was very far from the 
case. Many problems remained unresolved and the Levant 
States were to battle for real independence for three more 
bitter years. The war was to end, Churchill and de Gaulle 
were to disappear from the political scene and protests were 
to be made to the United Nations before the last Allied 
troops were to evacuate Syria and Lebanon in August 1946. 
Moreover, the Levant was to continue to dog and upset Anglo-
4 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7945/27/89, FO 371/35195. 
5 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E7959/27/89, FO 371/35196. 
17 December 1943, 
18 December 1943, 
6 Spears to Foreign Office, 23 December 1943, 
E8054/27/89, and E8067/27/89, both in FO 371/35196; Catroux 
a Alger, 22 Decembre 1943, No 669, Guerre 1939-45, Alger 
CFLN, Vol 1000. 
7 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E8054/27/89, FO 371/35196. 
8 Kirk, op cit, p 285. 
23 December 1943, 
610 
French relations throughout that period and, some would 
argue, even until 1967, when de Gaulle, as President of 
France, belatedly sought to extract revenge for what he 
deemed the British betrayal of France in the Levant and 
vetoed Britain's second application for membership of the 
European Economic Community.9 
Initial developments late in 1943 and early 1944 seemed 
to indicate that the French had perhaps turned over a new 
leaf. The Foreign Office had been pleased to witness the 
removal of many of the less desirable French elements in the 
Levant and had hoped to reciprocate, perhaps by the removal 
of Spears10 • The grave misgivings of the Foreign Office about 
Spears's conduct were given added reinforcement when on 21 
February 1944, Duff Cooper, now installed in Algiers as 
British representative to the CFLN, wrote to Churchill and 
expressed his grave concern that Spears had become 
"definitely, if not violently, francophobe" and represented 
"a fatal impediment to improved Anglo-French relations". 11 
Though unwilling to contemplate his removal, Churchill was 
sufficiently perturbed to warn Spears in a letter about his 
"pro-native and anti-French" tendencies and the fact that he 
had become "bitterly anti-French". He observed that de 
Gaulle had become increasingly "encadre" and had recently 
sustained several defeats at the hands of the Committee. 
Relations with de Gaulle and the National Committee were on 
the whole improving and he reasserted that Britain had no 
wish to destroy French influence in Syria and Lebanon. 
Trying to temper Spears's attitudes he trotted out the maxim 
9 See Gaunson, op cit, p 181; also Mansur, Great Britain 
and the Birth of Syrian and Lebanese Independence, 
International Studies, Vol 16, No 2, April-June 1977, p 273. 
10 During late 1943 and early 1944, the Foreign Office 
had been deluged with complaints from the French about the 
activities of General and Lady Spears. See E157/20/88, 
E183/20/88 and E341/20/88, all in FO 371/40110. 
11 Duff Cooper, op cit, pp 322-323. 
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"Surtout, pas trop de zele". 12 Churchill despatched a curt 
response to Duff Cooper and to Eden who had tried to 
capitalise on the situation, informing both that he had no 
wish to remove Spears. 13 
As 1944 progressed, the new Delegue, General Beynet 
proceeded to quietly transfer most of the legislative and 
administrative functions of government to the Levant States, 
including responsibility for censorship, internal security 
and Bedouin control, thereby further cementing their 
independence. It was clear however, that the French were 
merely doing what they had to and biding their time until 
~e.a.ssert: themselves 
such time as France was restored, when they might
A
• They 
were determined not to make any concessions with regard to 
the use of the French language; moreover, problems quickly 
surfaced over the local troops in the Levant, both the local 
gendarmerie and the Troupes Speciales. 
The French had refused to surrender control of the 
25,000 Troupes Speciales at their disposal and were 
convinced that a campaign by the local governments to secure 
their transfer early in 1944 had been initiated by Spears. 14 
The Levant States had intended these troops to form the 
nucleus of their future armies; though willing to leave them 
at the disposal of the Allied command for the duration of 
the war, they wished, as a matter of prestige, to secure 
their formal transfer as soon as possible. The French 
however, viewed the Troupes Speciales as their principal 
remaining bargaining counter and remained adamant that they 
could not be transferred except as part of a treaty 
settlement. The Levant States would not admit any connection 
12 Churchill to Spears, 10 March 1944, Box II, File VII, 
Spears Papers, MEC. 
13 Duff Cooper, op cit, p 323; Woodward, op cit, p 294. 
14 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 26 January 1944, 
E612/217/89, FO 371/40310. 
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between the two issues and negot;at;ons h 
•• on t ese subjects 
quickly foundered early in 1944. 
Whilst to a certain extent the Foreign Office 
sympathised with the French desire to retain a bargaining 
counter, French good faith was called more openly into 
question over their refusal to supply the gendarmerie, 
(responsibility for which had been transferred to the local 
governments), with the necessary arms and equipment to 
successfully carry out its duties. Various disturbances in 
the early months of 1944 had amply revealed the complete 
inability of the gendarmerie to cope against the lawless and 
well-armed bands which operated in certain regions, yet the 
French continued to palm the Syrians and Lebanese off with 
offers of insufficient and obsolete equipment at 
extortionate prices. Spears suspected that French reluctance 
to arm the gendarmerie was inspired primarily by their 
desire to maintain a hold over the country.15 
In desperation, the Levant governments turned to the 
British and soon a major row developed with the French. The 
Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay were in the process of 
establishing an Anglo-French Committee to examine the 
gendarmerie matter in a spirit of friendly consultation and 
co-operation. Meanwhile, the British military authorities, 
who fully recognised the need for the gendarmerie to be 
adequately equipped, authorised Spears to inform the Syrians 
and the Lebanese that Britain would supply them with the 
arms and equipment they required; despite his awareness of 
the negotiations afoot in London, Spears duly informed the 
15 A frustrated Spears angrily pointed out to the 
Foreign Office that it must now be clear that the French had 
no more intention of honouring the agreements of 22 December 
than of implementing their original promise of independence, 
nor any desire to ensure that the local governemnts could 
effectively discharge their responsibility for maintaining 
internal security. Spears to Foreign Office, 23 June 1944, 
E3718/217/89, FO 371/40312. 
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local governments and during July, the British authorities 
in the Middle East handed over considerable quantities of 
supplies and equipment to the gendarmeries. 
The French complained to the Foreign Office on 17 July 
and Massigli made a strong protest to Duff Cooper, who found 
himself in the unfortunate position of being unable to 
defend the British action. Spears had quite patently ignored 
the instructions with which he had been issued. Massigli 
made a further personal appeal to Eden through Duff Cooper, 
questioning whether British government policy or a more 
personal policy was being carried out in the Levant. Duff 
Cooper added his own comment that "things can only go from 
bad to worse in the Levant so long as Spears remains there". 
Spears's insubordination and his general handling of 
matters in the Levant had now reached such a stage that Eden 
was able to successfully press for his recall to London for 
consul tation. 16 Initial resistance from Spears17, on the basis 
that his presence was vital in the Levant in view of the 
tense situation which prevailed there, was overruled and on 
24 July, he obeyed and flew to London. Once in the capital, 
he sought to impress upon Eden his fears that the French 
Commi ttee was thinking of "put the clock back by violent 
means" in the Levant. 18 
Eden however, was sceptical; he doubted that any future 
French government would seek to recover by force what it had 
already given away, or that the French would have either the 
time or the inclination for "escapades in the Eastern 
16 Eden to Churchill, 5 July 1944, E4006/217/G89, FO 
371/40313. 
17 Eden to Spears, 19 July 1944; Spears to Eden, 21 July 
1944, E4368/217/89, FO 371/40314. 
18 Spears to Eden, 15 August 1944, E5237 /23/89, FO 
371/40302. 
614 
Medi terranean". Eden claimed that he read the si tuation 
which had developed since last November differently from 
Spears and replied: "To my mind, the resounding defeat which 
the French sustained vis-a-vis the local governments at that 
time, tilted the balance somewhat unduly against them. And, 
whilst we must continue to urge the French to make gradual 
progress, it is perhaps even more necessary to exercise some 
restraint on the two States lest they should be tempted to 
think that all is now over bar the shouting and that there 
is no need for them to make some constructive and permanent 
effort to regularise their future relations with the 
French" . 19 
At a series of high-level discussions on the Levant on 
23 and 24 August in London20 , Spears was given further 
evidence of the way the wind was now blowing. The Spears 
Mission was the object of a bitter French attack as a result 
of which the British agreed to do what they could to reduce 
the multiplicity and strength of British organisations in 
the Levant. Furthermore, the British undertook to consider 
making some new declaration at a sui table moment stating 
that they would welcome an agreement between the French and 
the Levant States to conclude treaties to determine their 
future relations. 21 Spears informed Eden by letter that the 
meetings with the French had done nothing to allay his 
apprehensions concerning French inability to learn the 
lessons of the past in their dealings with the Levant 
States; he went on to explain his conviction concerning the 
"extraordinary depth of feeling" against a treaty amongst 
19 Eden to Spears, 25 August 1944, E5237/23/89, FO 
371/40302. 
20 These discussions had been urged by Massigli as he 
believed that "the Levant was the danger spot in Anglo-
French relations". Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 5 July 
1944, E4122/217/89, FO 371/40313. 
21 See E5185/23/89 and E5144/23/89, FO 371/40302, for 
records of the proceedings of these meetings. 
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the Syrians and Lebanese and that nothing in present 
circumstances would induce the Levant States to sign a 
treaty with the French. 22 
At a subsequent meeting between the two men on 1 
September, the Levant situation was discussed more fully. 
Eden stressed his belief that the position between the 
Levant States and France should be "properly regularised 
by a treaty or some other analogous arrangement". Eden hoped 
that Spears would work to this end and in no way encourage 
the Syrians or Lebanese to flout French authority. Though 
with little enthusiasm, Spears eventually replied that he 
would try to bring this about. He spoke of the dangers to 
Britain of the French position in Syria and suggested that 
Eden might consider a British treaty with the Levant States 
to counterbalance the French one, an idea which Eden firmly 
rej ected. Spears was additionally issued wi th a formal 
directive which stated that he was to work for the 
establishment of a practical modus vivendi that would pave 
the way for the eventual conclusion of treaties between the 
States and the French. 23 
In addition to this attempt to force Spears to work for 
a treaty, over recent months the Foreign Office had been 
conspiring against him; several of his most loyal staff had 
been transferred and in his absence, G. Mackereth, described 
by Spears as "the planted consul", had been instructed to 
report any evidence that Spears had been pursuing an anti-
French policy.24 Work was additionally being carried out on 
how the Spears Mission might be reduced in size with a view 
22 Spears to Eden, 28 August 1944, E5278/23/89, Fa 371 
40302. 
23 Minute by Eden, 1 September 1944; Directive to 
Spears, 1 September 1944, E5415/5178/89, FO 371/40347. 
24 Spears, op cit, pp 294-295. See Beirut lo Foreign 
Office, 27 July 1943, E4806/23/89, FO 371/40302. 
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to its eventual liquidation. 25 Moreover, Eden had kept up the 
pressure on Churchill to consider the removal of Spears. 
Throughout July and August, as the liberation of France 
progressed and the prospect of the establishment of a 
provisional French government loomed, Eden had stressed to 
Churchill the wisdom of making new arrangements in the 
Levant. The Prime Minister had finally succumbed and a 
compromise had been reached between the two men whereby 
Spears was permitted to return to the Levant though for a 
limi ted period only. When informed of this arrangement, 
Spears immediately appealed to Churchill for an assurance 
that he might remain in the Levant until at least the end of 
the war with Germany. He was informed by Churchill on 5 
September that he had not kept his francophobia "wi thin 
reasonable bounds" and that as the Prime Minister had had 
great difficulty in securing his return at all, he should 
not expect his tenure to last much beyond the end of the 
year. 26 
With a time-limit imposed on his mission, Spears 
returned to the Levant and promptly saw various 
representatives of the Syrian government. He informed them 
that Britain attached great importance to the fact that they 
should finalise their relations with France by the 
conclusion of a treaty. He met, as he had predicted, with 
complete opposition from the Syrians and accusations of 
British betrayal. 27 The Syrians maintained their 
intransigence in subsequent discussions with the French; 
they sought to enlist the support of the United States and 
peti tioned Churchill and Eden. The Foreign Office were 
25 See E5239/5178/89, FO 371/40347. 
26 Woodward, op cit, pp 302-303; Gaunson, op cit, pp 
155-156. 
27 Spears to Foreign Office, 
E5681/23/89, FO 371/40302. 
16 September 1943, 
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considerably annoyed with Spears's heavy-handed approach and 
suspected that he had deliberately set out to create a local 
crisis to prove that he was right and the Foreign Office 
wrong · Rather than bringing trouble to a head when Arab 
unity discussions were imminent, he was instructed not to 
press the matter further. 28 
In a letter to the Syrians on 1 October, Eden tried to 
explain that Britain considered that a treaty with France 
was necessary to terminate the mandate finally.29 Churchill 
however, was eager to moderate the rather pro-French line 
which British policy now seemed to be following. He had 
previously minuted to Eden that Britain had never committed 
herself to striving to secure France a privileged place in 
the Levant, and that to continue try to achieve a special 
position for the French would lead Britain into the greatest 
difficulties with the Arab world. 30 He subsequently observed 
that Eden's letter to the Syrians did not make clear the 
essential point that whilst Britain freely admitted a 
predominant position for France, it was up to France to 
actually procure that position for herself, by negotiations 
with the Syrians. He summed up his attitude thus: "We are no 
obstacle but we are not obligated to pull their barrow up 
the hill for them". 31 Eden defended himself by pointing out 
that given Spears's well- known bias, it was undesirable to 
emphasise that point too strongly, and he was sure that the 
28 Foreign Office to Spears, 20 September 1944, 
E5681/23/89, FO 371/40302; E6103/23/G89, FO 371/40304. 
29 Foreign Office to 
E5855/23/89, FO 371/40303. 
Beirut, 1 October 1944, 
30 Minute by Churchill, 27 September 1944, E5855/23/89, 
FO 371/40303. 
31 Minute by Churchill, 2 October 1944, E5855/23/89, FO 
371/40303; see also Moyne to Foreign Office, 26 September 
1944, E5898/23/89, FO 371/40304. 
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French had no illusions as to the extent of British support 
for their position. 32 
Eden was certain that Spears had been instrumental in 
provoking and encouraging Syrian intranSigence and seized 
upon the opportunity once again to demand his removal; 
Churchill continued to staunchly defend him by pointing out 
that he could playa vital role in averting another crisis 
and refused to recall him. Spears was warned that he should 
do all he could to ensure that none of the parties "upset 
the apple-cart" and that he should cease to press for the 
transfer of the Troupes Speciales for the moment; Churchill 
also sent him an appeal to ensure that the Levant States did 
not precipitate another crisis. 33 
Reports about the worrying situation in the Levant 
continued to reach the Foreign Office and conversations 
which Eden had with Lord Moyne in Cairo in mid October 
confirmed that the situation in the Levant was "a stubborn 
one and full of menace". 34 The Syrians and Lebanese had 
increased their pressure for the transfer of the Troupes 
Speciales and were threatening to resort to violence. The 
French were still obstinately refusing to consider the 
matter except as part of treaty negotiations and had made 
repeated requests to the British Commander-in-Chief for 
permission to reinforce their troops in the Levant; 
furthermore, Beynet had stated that as certain resolutions 
of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress had 
precluded the possibility of a treaty between France and the 
32 Eden to Churchill, 6 October 1944, E5855/27/89, FO 
371/40303. 
33 Foreign Office to Spears, 2 October 1944; Churchill 
to Spears, 3 October 1944, E5900/23/89, FO 371/40304. 
34 Eden to Cadogan, 11 October 1944, E6370/217/89, FO 
371/40318. 
Lebanon, Catroux's 
invalidated. 35 
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declaration of independence was 
By the end of October however, Spears reported despite 
repeated French pleas for a treaty, the Syrians had never 
wavered in their refusal, nor in constantly reiterating the 
demand for the immediate transfer of the Troupes Speciales; 
Beynet had informed him that "about as much progress had 
been made as if they had been riding a merry-go-round". 36 The 
Foreign Office could only conclude: "We really are sitting 
on a volcano [in the Levant] unless we bring about an 
agreement. The present situation cannot last". 37 
Whilst tension reigned in the Levant, Churchill and Eden 
visi ted Paris in November for Armistice Day; de Gaulle's 
administration had recently been recognised as the 
provisional government of France by both the United States 
and Britain, and they met with a rapturous reception. After 
the more public official duties, private talks ensued in 
which the spirit of good-will continued to reign supreme and 
"not an unpleasant word [was] said, although nearly every 
subj ect, including Syria, was covered". 38 Churchill restated 
that Britain had no ambitions to usurp France in Syria and 
Lebanon and de Gaulle confirmed that he adhered to his 
promise of independence to the two States, though he 
qualified the word independence and explained that he meant 
by this the sort of independence Britain had established in 
Iraq and Egypt and did not mean that France would resign her 
dominating influence. Bidault, de Gaulle's new Foreign 
Minister, stated that what France wanted was to remain in 
35 See E6552/217/89, FO 371/40318. 
36 Spears to Foreign Office, 31 October 1944, 
E6708/23/89, FO 371/40305. 
37 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 2 November 1944, 
E6652/217/89, FO 371/40318. 
38 Duff Cooper, op cit, p 341. 
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the Levant "with such advantages as the treaties may grant 
us" and observed that the persistent Anglo-French quarrel on 
the matter was "like a thorn which must be extracted in the 
interests of our relations". 39 
A further conversation between Eden and Bidaul t the 
following day was only slightly less cordial. Bidault 
reiterated that France intended to keep her promises to the 
Levant States though she would not surrender any rights to 
which she was entitled. Eden said he thought there were "no 
essential differences between the British and French points 
of view", and that at the present stage, "it was merely a 
question of procedure". Eden suggested a compromise over the 
transfer of the Troupes Speciales whereby the French would 
agree to transfer a percentage now and the rest at some 
later stage. Bidaul t initially balked at this idea; he 
argued that any concession now would merely provoke further 
claims and mentioned that any transfer of Troupes would 
necessitate the despatch of an equivalent number of 
reinforcements to the Levant. Eden pointed out that the 
dispute had ranged now for some six months and the demands 
of the States would not diminish with the passage of time; 
he strongly deprecated the idea of despatching 
reinforcements. The conversation proceeded no further, 
though the French did agree to take up and discuss Eden's 
compromise suggestion. 40 
In the interests of preserving the atmosphere of good-
will and co-operation which prevailed, the Paris talks had 
failed to address any of the real problems at stake in the 
39 Record of informal discussion at the Ministere de la 
Guerre, 3.00pm, 11 November 1944, E7627/217/G89, FO 
371/40318; see also Kersaudy, op cit, pp 377-382. 
40 Record of conversation between Bidaul t, Massigli, 
Chauvel and Eden Duff Cooper and Cadogan, 12 November 1944, 
FO 371/40318. D~ff Cooper recorded that all went well ,in 
these conversations until the question of the Levant wh1ch 
"defied solution". Duff Cooper, op cit, p 341. 
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Levant. From the Foreign Office's point of view, however, 
the talks had one major satisfactory outcome: shortly after 
their return from Paris, Eden succeeded at last in 
persuading Churchill to invite Spears to resign. The 
resignation and the appointment of Terence Shone in Spears's 
place was announced on 5 December, along with a statement to 
the effect that no change in the policy of His Majesty's 
Government was contemplated. 41 The feeling at the Foreign 
Office was that as under Spears, British influence had never 
been brought into play to promote a treaty settlement 
between the Levant States and the French, "we still don't 
know what we can do if we try patiently". 42 
The departure of Spears, however, brought no miracle 
cure for the Levant and the problems which had been swept 
under the carpet during the Paris talks quickly resurfaced. 
The Foreign Office came under fire both from the British 
Middle East authorities and from Spears on his return to 
London. Both denounced the lack of coherence in British 
policy towards the Middle East and condemned the attempt, by 
simultaneously supporting the Arabs, the Zionists and the 
French, to run with the hare and to hunt with the hounds. 43 
In the Levant meanwhile, the Syrians in December had 
abolished the teaching of French in primary schools and 
relegated French to the same place as English in secondary 
schools. 44 The French had docked a light cruiser at Beirut 
41 Text of communique issued 
E7473/5178/89; Spears to Churchill, 
E7600/5178/89; both in FO 371/40347. 
5 December 
30 November 
1944, 
1944, 
42 Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 10 December 1944, 
E7501/23/89, FO 371/40307. 
43 Killearn to Foreign Office, 24 December 1944, 
E7876/27/89, FO 371/40307; reports of speech by Spears to 
Royal Empire Society, 17 January 1945, in Times ~nd Daily 
Express, 18 January 1945; article by Spears ~n Sunday 
Express, 28 January 1945, cited by Gaunson, op Clt, P 164. 
44 See Kirk, op cit, p 289; Longrigg, op cit, p 346. 
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and proceeded to despatch twenty tanks to Damascus, 
ostensibly due to accomodation difficulties.45 
Once again, the Levant situation seemed full of 
threatening possibilities and Shone's telegrams provided 
scant room for comfort. On taking up his post, Shone had 
been optimistically informed by Eden that provided France 
pursued a policy in accordance with their obligations and 
promises, French and British interests were "not 
fundamentally opposed". Yet in the face of Syrian and 
Lebanese intransigence, which thwarted French aims and 
ambitions, British and French interests quickly came into 
conflict and posed Britain with the eternal dilemma of 
whether to honour her promises to the Arabs or those to the 
French. Shone reported that he had found the Syrian and 
Lebanese attitudes towards treaties with France to be "even 
harder" than he had imagined and foresaw "a pretty sticky 
time before long". He saw no hope of persuading the Syrians 
to enter into a treaty with the French without entirely 
forfei ting British influence46 
Indeed, the prospects for the New Year did not look 
good: in late January a series of anti-French demonstrations 
erupted in Damascus and other Syrian towns, in the midst of 
which, Bidault 
determined to 
announced 
preserve her 
that France 
pre-eminent 
was absolutely 
posi tion in the 
Levant and to maintain order there. The Levant governments 
retorted that bringing out French troops only served to 
increase the tension and that it was they who were 
responsible for the maintenance of order.47 
45 Beirut to Foreign Office, 
E7874/23/89, FO 371/40307. 
24 December 1944, 
46 Shone to Foreign Office 30 December 1944, E8/8/89; 
Shone to Foreign Office, 8 Janu~ry 1945, E207/8/89; both in 
FO 371/45556. 
47 Kirk, op cit, pp 290-291. 
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A warning from the British that they could countenance 
no action likely to create a threat to security was backed 
up by a concerted diplomatic effort to bring the two sides 
together. A request was made for American assistance in 
which the State Department acquiesced. The Syrians were 
warned that Britain could not support their continued 
intransigence towards the idea of a treaty; the situation 
could not remain static and they would have to face up to 
realities. Early in February, they were persuaded to 
approach Beynet for French desiderata. Simultaneously, Duff 
Cooper was instructed to advise the French to behave with 
the utmost moderation and tact. 48 
Even Churchill and Eden tried their hand with the 
Syrians when, en route from Yalta, they met Shukri Quwatli 
at Cairo. 49 Assurances were offered that Britain had no 
intention of replacing the French in the Levant; Churchill 
warned however, that whilst the French must recognise Syrian 
independence, the Syrians must not "throw the French out 
altogether". He went on to emphasise that the Syrians must 
give "something reasonable" and "a position of some sort" to 
the French. The Syrians were urged to begin negotiations and 
settle the question "without serious quarrels" and moreover, 
whilst British troops were in the Levant to strengthen their 
hand. 50 In a speech to the Commons on his return, Churchill 
48 Shone to Foreign Office, 4 February 1944; Foreign 
Office to Paris, 6 February 1944; both in E821/8/89, FO 
371/45558. 
49 De Gaulle did not participate in the Yalta 
conference; his exclusion however, which seemed to imply 
that France was no longer regarded as a Great Power, made 
him particularly paranoid about the policy decided upon 
there and he was convinced that Churchill had contrived to 
persuade Stalin and Roosevelt to allow him a free hand in 
Syria and Lebanon. 
50 Record of Cairo conversations, 17 February 1945, 
E1415/8/89, FO 371/45560. 
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again stressed Britain's determination to respect the 
independence of the Levant States, and to use her best 
endeavours to preserve a special position there for France. 
Though expressing his belief that these aims were not 
incompatible, he sought to shift responsibility for their 
attainment from British shoulders however, by commenting 
that it was not for Britain alone to defend either Levant 
independence or French privilege; significantly, he pointed 
out that both Russia and the United States had recognised 
the independence of the Levant States whereas neither had 
recognised the special position of any other country there. 
Though it was reported on 18 February that Beynet had 
been instructed to begin negotiations with the Levant 
States, on 24 February, Duff Cooper was obliged to ask 
Bidaul t why the French had still not communicated their 
terms to the Levant States though the reply he obtained was 
considered very unsatisfactory. 51 Conversations in London 
wi th Bidaul t between 25 and 27 February proved no more 
successful. Bidaul t assured Eden that France desired a 
position in the Levant similar to Britain's own in Iraq and 
that Beynet had been instructed to sound the Syrians out 
about a treaty which would provide France with military and 
air bases, a pre-eminent position for her ambassador and 
educational and cultural safeguards amongst other things. 
Eden merely warned Bidault of the strength of opposition he 
was likely to face. 
Despite the manifestly urgent need for some progress in 
the Levant, Beynet saw fit to return to Paris for further 
instructions early in March, announcing in Algiers en route 
that the Levant situation was "satisfaisante" and what 
51 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 24 February 1945, 
EI340/8/89 and EI386/8/89; both in FO 371/45560. 
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difficul ties existed were "solubles". 52 In fact, the 
situation in the Levant was giving cause for considerable 
concern: a serious incident had occurred in the Alaoui te 
region of Syria. The Syrian gendarmerie had been routed by 
the followers of a religious sheikh, Suleiman Murshid, and 
once again the vexed question of arms for the gendarmerie 
had been raised in an acute form. 53 
On 28 March, Duff Cooper saw Bidault and warned him that 
he would shortly be obliged to speak to him about the 
Levant. In reply, Bidault said that he hoped very much that 
that would not be the case, that "a new chapter had opened 
... that the difficulties were disappearing and ... [that] 
he himself was doing everything possible to improve 
relations". When pressed on the matter of the Troupes 
Speciales and the gendarmerie, Bidaul t had advised Duff 
Cooper to speak with Beynet but "expressed confidence that 
all would be well". At a meeting the following day, when the 
subject was once again discussed, Bidault assured Duff 
Cooper that he and Beynet were doing everything in their 
power to bring about a satisfactory solution. He hinted 
however, that his difficulty "was of course with the Head of 
Government, whose resistance would inevitably be stiffened 
by any British intervention". 54 Cooper himself agreed that it 
would probably be harmful to see de Gaulle at the moment, 
who was much more likely to be reasonable if no pressure was 
brought to bear on him. 55 
52 Algiers to Foreign Office, 16 March 1945, E1980/8/89, 
FO 371/45562. 
53 See Kirk, op cit, pp 292-293. There was some evidence 
that the French had supplied the rebels with arms. See 
Foreign Office to Paris, 30 March 1945, E2102/8/89, FO 
371/45562. 
54 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 29 and 30 March 1945, 
E2102/8/89, FO 371/45562. 
55 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 31 March 1945, 
E2163/8/89, FO 371/45562. 
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Nonetheless, Duff Cooper did see de Gaulle on 5 April; 
both men agreed that Britain and France had "no conflicting 
interests in the Levant" and that it was a great pity that 
the area should form such "a bone of contention" between the 
two countries. When Duff Cooper pointed out that small 
questions like the arming of the gendarmerie and the Troupes 
Speciales should be easily settled, de Gaulle replied that 
they would be easier to deal with if there was not such a 
large British military presence in the Levant. If the French 
were to give up their position now, it would look like "they 
were simply handing over to the British". 56 This was now to 
become the main French excuse for not handing over the 
Troupes Speciales. 
As everything waited in the Levant on Beynet's return, 
a slight detente was achieved. By late April however, Shone 
was obliged to report that fundamental positions had not 
radically altered: the French were determined to preserve as 
much of their present position as they could, whereas the 
States were as determined to concede no preference or 
privilege to France. Both States were confident that Britain 
would not permit the French to reinforce their troops in the 
Levant or to permit a repetition of the 1943 coup. Shone 
fel t bound to observe that the local French were quite 
capable of the latter and stressed that if Britain did allow 
56 The British were reducing their military presence in 
the Levant, but were reluctant to let de Gaulle know exact 
figures as this would put ideas into his head about claiming 
the overall command of Allied troops. French suspicions had 
been fuelled by the building of permanent stone barracks in 
which to house their troops, and even the Foreign Office 
admitted that there were certain worrying signs that the 
British military authorities had become accustomed to their 
presence i~he Levant States and were extremely reluctant to 
depart. See Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 5 April 1945, and 
various Foreign Office minutes, E2261/8/G89, FO 371/45562 
and E3829/8/89G, FO 371/45570 
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French reinforcement, disillusionment in the States would 
be so great that there would almost certainly be trouble. 57 
Towards the end of April however, it was learnt that the 
French did intend to reinforce their troops in the Levant, 
by despatching two French cruisers with three battalions of 
troops to coincide with Beynet' s return. Duff Cooper saw 
representatives of the Quai d' Orsay and on 30 April de 
Gaulle himself, to protest that this action risked creating 
disturbances in the Levant and ruining the present 
favourable atmosphere for negotiations. De Gaulle however, 
referred to Britain's long-standing desire to replace the 
French in the Levant and stated that as long as Britain 
retained her forces there, he could not be asked to reduce 
his; as regards the relative prestige of Britain and France 
the matter was a serious one. 58 A letter from Duff Cooper to 
Eden on 4 May restated his conviction that de Gaulle "firmly 
and honestly believes that it is our aim to oust the French 
from the Levant and to take their place there". 59 
In view of the critical situation, the Foreign Office 
implored the Prime Minister to intervene with de Gaulle. 60 
Despi te his reluctance to do S061, Churchill, after 
consultation with both the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of 
Staff, sent a personal telegram to de Gaulle informing him 
that he was disturbed that the Levant question was still 
57 Shone to Foreign Office, 27 April 1945, E2706/8/89, 
FO 371/45563. 
58 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 30 April 1945, 
E2733/12/89, FO 371/45588. 
59 Duff Cooper to Eden, 4 May 1945, E3036/8/G89, FO 
371/45563. 
60 Orme Sargent to Churchill, 1 May 1945, E2733/12/89, 
FO 371/45588. 
61 Churchill thought a direct interv~ntion by ~im ~ould 
only lead to his receiving "some insultlng answer . Mlnute 
by Churchill, 3 May 1945, E2733/12/89, FO 371/45588. 
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being regarded from the angle of Anglo-French 
Churchill offered further reassurances about 
rivalry. 
British 
intentions in the Levant and warned against poisoning the 
atmosphere just as negotiations were about to commence; 
furthermore, he offered to withdraw all British troops as 
soon as France and the Levant States had concluded a 
treaty. 62 
De Gaulle replied on 6 May by cataloguing French 
interests in the Levant. He noted Churchill's offer to 
withdraw British troops, but pointed out that the situation 
in the Levant might already have been regulated were it not 
the belief of the Levant States governments that they could 
avoid any form of engagement with France by relying on the 
support of Britain, a belief which was only encouraged by 
the presence of British troops and agents. He announced that 
Beynet was due to return and commence negotiations and 
expressed the hope that Britain would refrain from 
intervention. He drew particular attention to the 
unfavourable impression which had already been created by 
the arrival in the Levant of a new British battalion from 
Palestine. 63 
British efforts to prevent the arrival of French troops 
failed and on 7 May, a Senegalese battalion arrived at 
Beirut, though the local governments were assured that these 
troops were a relief battalion rather than reinforcements. 
As had been predicted, in the days following the arrival of 
French troops, a number of incidents and clashes occurred 
between the French and the Levantine populations. Further 
62 Churchill to de Gaulle, 4 May 1945, E2733/12/89, FO 
371/45588. 
63 De Gaulle to Churchill, 6 May 1945, E2925/12/G89, FO 
371/45589. The movement of the British battalion ha~ ~een 
necessary according to the British military. author~ tles, 
though its timing was considered by the Forelgn Offlce to 
have been most unfortunate. 
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French troops were expected and Shone commented: "The stage 
is therefore set. Once again the French have demonstrated 
their extraordinary inability to guage the temper of the 
local populations and consequences of their own actions. All 
information ... suggests that when the arrival of 
reinforcements is made known, the French awakening will be 
as rude as i t was in November 1943". 64 
Meanwhile, Beynet had returned to the Levant and was 
followed several days later by the arrival of a further 
contingent of French troops. On 18 May, Beynet made known 
the French requirements which included educational and 
cultural conventions, economic concessions and a strategic 
understanding to provide the French with bases throughout 
the Levant as well as French retention of the Troupes 
Speciales until at least the end of the war. 65 A day later 
however, on the grounds that the French proposals and the 
pressure to which they were being subjected were 
incompatible with their independence and sovereignty, the 
Syrians and Lebanese broke off negotiations. 66 
Shone's complete disillusionment with British policy is 
evident from a despatch he sent to London on 18 May. He 
wrote that even if extensive troubles did not break out, he 
was convinced that "recent events have proved conclusively 
that our policy here which virtually amounts to assisting 
the French to secure a privileged position, simply will not 
work". Shone explained that neither the States nor the 
French had any real intention of seeking an agreement and 
both sides knew that their respective desiderata were "poles 
apart". The French hoped to achieve what they wanted "by 
64 Shone to Foreign Office, 13 May 1945, E3040/8/89, FO 
371/45563. 
65 Kirk, op cit, p 295. 
66 Shone to Foreign Office, 22 May 1945, E3292/8/89, FO 
371/45564. 
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delaying tactics and brandishing the big stick", whereas the 
States believed that even without Britain, they could 
command sufficient backing from world opinion to enable them 
to resist French demands. Both sides believed they had time 
on their side and were digging themselves in ever more 
firmly, whilst Britain's own position was steadily being 
weakened. Shone questioned whether it was so certain that 
Britain's present policy was the one best suited "to make us 
friends with the French. For the past three and a half years 
we have been told that the French "will never forget" this 
or that action on our part or that we must adopt some line 
of policy "so as not to estrange the French" . Yet Shone 
believed that the French would happily forget things if it 
suited them to do so, and maintained, echoing Spears' own 
sentiments, that they would accept a British line of policy 
"if it is once made clear to them that we intend to adopt it 
and are prepared to use means open to us to support it". 
Shone condemned British policy as neither helping the French 
to get what they wanted nor gaining their goodwill; 
moreover, it was rapidly destroying British power to either 
help the Levant States or herself. The tightrope he had 
walked for almost five months was now "sagging dangerously". 
As both Britain and the United States were in agreement that 
de Gaulle's actions were "mischievous", Shone asked whether 
it was "really impossible for us to stop him, dependent on 
us as he is for so much? ,,67 
Despite Britain's best efforts to entreat both sides to 
refrain from provocation68 , the Levant situation deteriorated 
rapidly; on 19 May, anti-French demonstrations throughout 
67 Shone to Sir Ronald Campbell, 
E3179/8/G89, FO 371/45564. 
18 May 1945, 
68 See Foreign Office to Paris, 25 May 1945, E3397/8/89; 
Foreign Office to Beirut, 25 May 1945, E3376/8/89; Duff 
Cooper to Foreign Office, 26 May 1945, E3411/8/89; Sh?ne to 
Foreign Office, 26 May 1945, E3419/8/89; all ln FO 
371/45565. 
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Syria quickly developed into riots and soon reached the 
stage of open conflict between French troops and local 
civilians in which many lives were lost. On 28 May, the 
Syrian Foreign Minister informed Shone that events had 
overtaken him and that he could no longer be held 
responsible for internal security. 69 In view of the Prime 
Minister's determination that Britain should not become 
involved, and his desire to concert his actions with those 
of the United States, it was decided in London to merely 
watch the situation very carefully and to take future 
decisions in the light of further developments. 7o 
On 29 May, the French under the command of General 
Oliva-Roget subjected Damascus to two heavy bombardments; 
bitter fighting and further bombardments continued 
throughout the next two days.71 Shone and Grigg, the Minister 
Resident, now begged for British intervention to put a stop 
to the French actions and fears were expressed about 
possible Iraqui and Egyptian assistance to the Syrians. At 
a Cabinet meeting on 30 May, to discuss the situation, 
Churchill remained adamant that Britain should avoid 
shouldering alone the burden of restoring the situation and 
thought that American support should first be secured for 
whatever action she took. It was decided that, dependent on 
American approval, a telegram should be sent to de Gaulle 
informing him that the British, to prevent further bloodshed 
and in the interests of the security of the entire Middle 
East, had authorised their Commander-in-Chief to intervene. 
69 Shone to Foreign Office, 28 May 1945, E3436/8/89, 
F0371/45565. 
70 Foreign Office Minute by Sir R. Campbell, 28 May 
1945, E3557/8/G89, FO 371/45566. 
71 Beirut to Foreign Office, 29 May 1945, E3498/8/89; 
Beirut to Foreign Office 30 May 1945, E3511/8/89 and 
E3533/8/89; all in FO '371/45566. On the actions and 
behaviour of General Oliva-Roget in Damascus, see F. 
Kersaudy, Le Levant, in De Gaulle et la nation face aux 
problemes de defense, 1945-1946, (Paris, 1983), pp 255 256. 
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In order to avoid a collision between French and British 
forces, de Gaulle was requested to order French troops to 
wi thdraw to their barracks. The telegram also reaffirmed 
Bri tain 's intention to withdraw all her forces from the 
Levant upon the satisfactory conclusion of a treaty between 
the Levant States and France, and suggested tripartite 
discussions in London as soon as order was restored. 72 
Whilst awaiting President Truman's assent, Massigli, 
(now French Ambassador to Britain) was seen by both 
Churchill and Eden late in the evening after the Cabinet 
meeting on 30 May and advised of British intentions; the 
Ambassador deplored the decision and urged that the greatest 
care be taken in stating these intentions in order to 
minimise the danger to Franco-British relations. Late that 
same evening, in view of reports received from Beynet the 
Levant to the effect that calm had been restored, Bidault 
telegraphed to Beynet instructing French troops to cease 
fire, though General Oliva-Roget denied receiving this order 
until late on 31 May. 73 On the morning of 31 May, Sir R. 
Campbell saw Massigli and the latter once again emphasised 
the importance of the manner in which the communication was 
made to the French government. Massig1i asked whether the 
instructions had been sent to the British Commander-in-Chief 
or whether the situation was still in suspense, pending 
Truman's reply. He was informed that the instructions might 
74 be put into effect at any moment. 
Meanwhile, the British Cabinet, still unaware of the 
French order to cease fire, and in view of reports of 
72 See E3552/8/89, FO 371/45566; Conclusions of War 
Cabinet meeting, Wednesday, 30 May 1945, 6.30pm, CAB 65/53. 
73 See F. Kersaudy, Le Levant, in De Gaulle et la nation 
face aux problemes de defense, p 259. 
74 Foreign Office Minute, 31 May 1945, E3677/8/89, FO 
371/45568. 
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continued fighting in Damascus, had decided that, despite 
the lack of response from Truman, Britain should now 
intervene. 75 Telegrams were accordingly despatched to Beirut 
and to Paris and at 3.45pm, Eden made a statement to that 
effect in the House of Commons. 76 The critical situation 
which prevailed was not helped by the fact that the telegram 
to Paris arrived at 2.50 and, as de Gaulle was unavailable 
at that time, was transmitted to Palewski for communication 
to him without delay. 77 De Gaulle did not recei ve the 
telegram until three quarters of an hour after Eden's 
statement in the House and regarded the ultimatum as an 
intolerable humiliation particularly as he believed that 
Britain was already aware that he had given the order to 
cease fire. In fact, Massigli did not reach Eden with news 
of the cease fire until after the statement in the House and 
the order had been given to intervene. 
It is alleged that de Gaulle, when he received news of 
the British decision to intervene, ordered Beynet to resist 
British forces, though Beynet refused to obey those orders 
foreseeing their dire consequences. 78 On 1 June, British 
forces assumed control in the Levant; order was quickly 
restored when French forces in Syria were withdrawn to their 
barracks and over the following weeks, along with French 
civilians, they were gradually evacuated to the relatively 
safe haven of the Lebanon. By mid-June this process was 
virtually complete. 
Given the severity of the crisis, and its exacerbation 
by poor communications and misundersatndings, it was 
75 Conclusions of War Cabinet meeting, Thursday, 31 May 
1945, 11.30am, CAB 65/53. 
76 ibid. 
77 Paris to Foreign Office, 31 May 1945, E3679/8/89, Fa 
371/45568. 
78 Kirk, op cit, p 298. 
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inevi table that the recriminations which followed in its 
wake would be bitter. In a press interview on 2 June79 , de 
Gaulle launched a bitter attack on the British, which was "a 
mixture of falsehoods, half truths, suppressions of 
inconvenient facts and insinuations against Britain". He 
generally suggested that the trouble in the Levant was due 
entirely to the British; he spoke of the maintenance of 
600~00 British troops throughout the Middle East and of the 
activities of numerous British agents in the Levant who had 
stirred up agitation against French interests. Moreover, in 
what was regarded as a face-saving device, de Gaulle now 
attempted to internationalise the dispute and emphasised his 
readiness for discussions on the entire situation in the 
Middle East. 8o In another press interview on 7 June in Paris, 
General Oliva-Roget levelled some equally bi tter charges 
against the British. 81 
On 4 June, Duff Cooper endured a "stormy interview" with 
de Gaulle. The latter "could not have been more stiff if he 
had been declaring war", though in Duff Cooper's estimation, 
he was "genuinely convinced that the whole incident [had] 
been arranged by the British so as to carry out their long-
planned policy of driving the French out of the Levant in 
order to take their place". He warned Duff Cooper that 
although France was not in any position to open hostilities 
against Britain, France had been insulted and betrayed, a 
79 See Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 3 June 1945, 
E3710/8/89, FO 371/45568; Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 3 
June 1945, E3711/8/89, FO 371/45569. 
80 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office: 3 June 1945, 
E3712/8/89, FO 371/45569. Britain had no wlsh t~ see he~ own 
shortcomings in the Middle East the subJect 0 an 
international conference and still less Russian 
participation in any such conference. 
81 See Kirk, op cit, P 300. 
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fact which she could not forget. 82 De Gaulle's bitterness 
even extended to cancelling a ceremony at which he had been 
due to confer war decorations on some British officers; at 
a subsequent review of French troops, he angrily ordered out 
of the procession the small contingent of ambulances run and 
financed by Lady Spears since the outbreak of war and 
dedicated to the care of the Free French. 83 
De Gaulle was to be profoundly disappointed however, 
with the more general reaction in France to events in the 
Levant, which did nothing to reduce the popularity of the 
British: none of his own Ministers were remotely interested 
in a conflict with Britain over the Levant and this feeling 
was echoed in the press. De Gaulle's threat to denounce the 
modus vivendi which had been arranged between the French and 
British military authorities drew forth a counter-threat of 
resignation from Beynet. 84 In the Consultative Assembly on 20 
June, a resolution in favour of a Franco-British alliance 
was unanimously passed. 85 
It is nonetheless remarkable that less than a month 
after the death of Hi tIer and the German surrender at 
Rheims, the situation in the Levant had reduced Britain and 
France to a paper war. As well as marking a critical period 
in Anglo-French relations, the May crisis in Syria also 
"effectively marked the end of the French era in the Middle 
82 Duff Cooper, op cit, p 354-355; Kersaudy, ~e Levant 
in De Gaulle et la nation face aux problemes de defense, p 
260. 
83 Duff Cooper, op cit, p 355. 
84 Kersaudy, Le Levant, in De Gaulle et la nation face 
aux problemes de defense, p 260. 
85 J. W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 
1945-1951, (Leicester, 1984), pp 9-12. 
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East" · 86 Henceforward, the British realised that to continue 
to talk of a special position for the French in the Levant 
was pointless and would do untold damage to her own standing 
in the Middle East and the sooner the better the French came 
to the same realisation. Prospects for a settlement of the 
situation improved with the imminence of the conference at 
Potsdam as wider issues came to dominate the thinking of all 
parties to the dispute. On 8 July, the French government 
announced that to accede to Syrian and Lebanese wishes to 
form national armies, it was taking steps to transfer the 
Troupes Speciales87 to their control. With this decision, the 
Levant situation passed from the critical list. 88 
By now the Foreign Office was even more convinced that 
"a close Anglo-French alliance [was] very much in the 
interests of [Britain]" and they soon discovered that Ernest 
Bevin, the new Labour Foreign Secretary, was only too 
willing to lend his support to the policy. Bevin quickly 
realised however, that no progress in this direction could 
be achieved before the Levant issue was settled, but saw 
himself as ideally placed to bring about such a settlement, 
having no feelings of personal antagonism towards de Gaulle 
such as Churchill had developed. 89 
86 Wm Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle 
East, 1945 1951. Arab Nationalism, the United States and 
Postwar Imperialism, (Oxford, 1984), p 170. 
87 Large numbers of the Troupes Special,es had anyway 
deserted French command during the troubles ln May and had 
placed themselves at the disposal of the local governments. 
Kirk, op cit, p 303. 
88 Kirk op cit, p 303. A. W. de Porte, De Gaulle's 
Foreign poli~y, 1944-1946, (Camb., Mass., 1968), pp 149-151. 
d "Western 89 Sean Greenwood , ~E~r~n~e~s~t~B~e~v~i~n~,:---~F~r-;a~n~c~e=-=a=:::n::-_-u:i~~:;:;-; 
Union": August 1945-February 1946, European History 
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Even despite these promising signs, the Levant issue was 
to occupy Anglo-French attention for many more months. The 
si tuation was not helped by de Gaulle's continued 
intransigence and his determination that France should 
retain something of her position in the Levant, in contrast 
wi th the more reasoned and flexible approach of Bidaul t, 
Massigli and Chauvel. 90 The last six months of 1945 witnessed 
a series of laborious negotiations dedicated to finding a 
resolution which would please everybody; on 13 December 
1945, agreement 
evacuation plan, 
was tentatively reached on 
though less than a month later, 
wrecked by de Gaulle. 
a joint 
this was 
Events were now to overtake the British and French. On 
20 January, de Gaulle resigned and shortly afterwards Bevin 
and Bidault agreed to try and salvage the December 
agreement. 91 By this time however, the Syrians and Lebanese, 
tired of constant rounds of negotiations which altered 
nothing, had announced their intention of bringing the issue 
of the presence of French and British troops on their 
terri tory before the United Nations. In February 1946, 
Britain and France suffered the joint humiliation of being 
reprimanded by the United Nations Security Council and were 
forced to expedite their evacuation. 92 The final ignominious 
departure of British troops from the Levant took place in 
June 1946; the remnants of the French forces were close on 
their heels in August. 93 Thus the gaping wound which for so 
long had disabled the Anglo-French alliance was effectively 
cauterised. 
90 J W Y B~'~t~~~' ~L-£:-=r~a~n~c~e~a:.:n~d~t.::..:h:.:.e=-U-=-=-=n:.=i--=t~y_o_f_E_u_r_o---,p,,-e----,-, • . oung, _rl 1, 
1945-1951, pp 18-23. 
91 ibid, pp 22-25. 
92 Louis, op cit, p 171; de Porte, op cit, p 171. 
93 Sachar, op cit, p 330-331. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Of the innumerable problems which tried and tested the 
endurance of the Anglo-Free French alliance during the 
Second World War, the Levant was perhaps the most serious 
and the most constantly recurring. As Kersaudy has so 
picturesquely described, "the intricate combinations and 
repercussions of developments in the Levant were for ever 
merging in a sort of hideous witches' brew that simmered 
constantly and occasionally bubbled over. From this hideous 
cauldron sprang forth ninety per cent of the quarrels 
between de Gaulle and Churchill until the end of the war".l 
Yet in view of the legacy of mistrust and suspicion which 
both powers had inherited concerning their relationship in 
the Levant, it was small wonder that their partnership there 
was so troubled. The atmosphere of mutual rivalry and 
hostili ty which had built up over the centuries had long 
since gained a momentum all of its own and, to a certain 
extent, had stacked the cards against the success of any 
joint Anglo-French venture in the Levant. 
The annals of history were filled to overflowing with 
precedents to which the two powers, and especially the 
French, could look to justify their continued distrust and 
suspicion. More importantly, the First World War was within 
the memory and even the experience of most of the 
protagonists during the Second World War. It was all too 
easy to compare the more formally titled McMahon-Hussein 
correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement with the 
Bri tish endorsement of Catroux' s proclamation of Levant 
independence and her assurances to respect the pre-eminent 
and privileged position of France. A comparison between 
Allenby's victorious advance and the uneasy joint Anglo-
French occupation of the Levant during 1918 and 1919 and 
Operation Exporter and the subsequent establishment of an 
1 Kersaudy, op cit, p 198. 
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Anglo-Free French condominium in Syria and Lebanon, was 
equally obvious. Similarly, the pejorative term "Lawrencian" 
all too readily sprang to French minds when describing the 
antics of Spears and his dedicated team of Arabophiles. 
From 1940 onwards, Britain and the Free French as allies 
faced mortal danger from the Axis threat. There was every 
reason to hope and expect that historical precedents and 
traditional rivalries even in the Levant, might somehow have 
been transcended in the common fight against the common foe. 
Yet this did not happen. To adopt the line that as the 
course of Anglo-French relations in the Levant had never run 
smooth, a troubled relationship between Britain and the Free 
French there during the Second World War was a foregone 
conclusion, is to adopt too fatalistic and simplistic an 
approach. As the annals of history provide only part of the 
answer, one is left to seek other explanations elsewhere, 
starting perhaps, with the circumstances of the time. 
The motive which inspired the joint Anglo-Free French 
invasion of the Levant, namely that of defending the area 
against Axis infiltration, was at least mutual to both 
Allies. Rudely awakened to the vulnerability of her position 
in the Middle East by the Rashid Ali coup and the subsequent 
Axis exploitation of the Vichy link in Syria and Lebanon, 
Britain had been forced to reappraise her policy of reliance 
on Vichy neutrality and to contemplate an invasion to 
protect her wide interests in the Middle East. Nonetheless, 
the decision was only reluctantly taken and activated purely 
by military expediency. Though the Free French were equally 
determined that the Levant should not fall victim to the 
Axis their motives for invasion were more complex and more , 
numerous. The Levant was regarded, next to North Africa, as 
one of the most prestigious parts of the French Empire and 
the Free French eagerly grasped the prospect of invasion as 
a golden opportunity to extend their influence and control. 
They also recognised the urgent need to protect the Levant 
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States from falling under the sway of Anglo-Saxon domination 
as circumstances seemed to threaten. 
In their desperate circumstances, the Allies had 
espoused the idea of a proclamation of Levant independence 
to ease the path of their invading armies. Though realising 
the potential for trouble the idea contained, as a means of 
countervailing Axis appeal and securing the goodwill of the 
Arab population, the British had viewed the proclamation as 
militarily expedient. The French too had regarded the 
proclamation of independence as expedient, not only 
militarily by ensuring Arab quiescence and thereby assisting 
the progress of the armies, but also politically, by 
facilitating the establishment of their control. With only 
limited personnel and resources at their disposal, it was 
easier for the Free French to establish their authority over 
the Levant States in the guise of liberators rather than 
that of conquerors. 
The extent of the commitment to the proclamation of 
independence between the two Allies was however, 
different and this quickly spelled trouble for 
quite 
their 
alliance. Once the British had endorsed the Free French 
proclamation of Levant independence, they were obliged to 
stand by it or else face renewed charges of perfidy and 
betrayal from the Arabs, not only in the Levant but 
throughout the Middle East. The British realised that their 
own position in the Middle East could stand or fall 
depending upon how their actions in the Levant were 
assessed. From the Arab point of view, the Free French had 
stolen a ride into the Levant with the British invasion 
forces; the British were seen as the paymasters of the 
French and therefore expected to exercise a considerable 
degree of control over them and their behaviour. 
Given these Arab expectations, it was inevitable that as 
the war situation ebbed and flowed, so did British pressure 
on the Free French to uphold their promise of independence 
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to the Levant States. Notwithstanding the implications of 
the proclamation of independence for her own Middle Eastern 
empire, it should be remembered that it was always a good 
deal easier for Britain to don the cloak of liberalism and 
to occupy the higher moral ground when dealing with the 
independence of territories in which her own predominance 
was not at stake. Throughout the period of the Second World 
War, Britain, whilst steadfastly upholding the Free French 
pledge to the Levant States, was always quick to quash any 
suggestions that her own activities in the Middle East be 
subject to scrutiny and for example, moved swiftly to censor 
all references in the Egyptian press to Transjordanian 
claims for independence sparked off by the Lebanese crisis 
in November 1943. 
Though the French too, had their fair share of broken 
promises to the Arabs, most notably the non-ratification of 
the 1936 treaties, they were less able to afford, and 
possibly less inclined, to be sensitive about such matters. 
After the humiliation of 1940, de Gaulle was fighting to re-
establish France as a Great Power and to resurrect the 
French Empire; he had certainly not engaged in a fratricidal 
conflict to install the Free French in the Levant States 
only subsequently to relinquish control of those 
terri tories. De Gaulle never had any real intention of 
fulfilling Arab aspirations for unfettered independence as 
he realised that to do so would encourage a chain reaction, 
with far-reaching consequences for France's North African 
Empire. The Free French claimed to represent the real voice 
of France; to simply surrender the historic position of 
France in the Levant and to gain nothing in return was out 
of the question. De Gaulle had been subjected to vicious 
assaults from Vichy for his actions in the Levant, in which 
he had been depicted as nothing more than a British puppet, 
carelessly discarding parts of the French empire to be 
rapidly swallowed up by perfidious Albion; he knew too, that 
were he to cede an inch of French control in the Levant, he 
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would face similar attacks from elements within his own camp 
and do much to alienate sympathies with his cause. 
Of all the factors which made de Gaulle determined to 
defend the position of France in the Levant, perhaps the 
most important was his fear that if the French relaxed their 
control, the British would immediately step into their 
shoes. Anthony Hartley has pointed out that one of the main 
themes of de Gaulle's Memoires de Guerre is the idea that 
France's allies would always seek to take advantage of her 
weakness to further their own interests. De Gaulle was 
imbued with the idea that all nations, even those allied 
together in a common cause, were potential rivals. 2 Judging 
from her actions in the past, de Gaulle was convinced that 
Britain aimed to erode and finally eliminate French 
influence in the Levant and to replace it with her own, as 
part of a grand design to establish her hegemony throughout 
the Middle East. He seems to have remained impervious to the 
British government's countless promises and assurances that 
this was not the case; British behaviour during the 
armistice negotiations at St. Jeanne d'Acre and the 
activities of Spears in championing the independence of the 
States, only served to fuel his suspicions. 
There were thus a number of problems inherent in the 
Anglo-Free French venture in the Levant which were likely to 
bedevil the future course of relations between the two 
powers. A further source of trouble quickly became apparent 
in the difficulties experienced in instituting a joint 
system of occupation, which the Lyttelton-de Gaulle 
agreements came to embody. In the anomalous situation which 
was created, 
British, with 
overall military command was vested in 
their clear preponderance of troops3, 
2 Anthony Hartley, op cit, p 7. 
the 
and 
3 Given the relative British and Free French positions, 
and their disparate contributions both in the general war 
effort and in Operation Exporter, it is easily apparent why 
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territorial command in the Free French. Britain had no other 
aim in the Le t th van an to win the war and military 
considerations consequently dominated her thinking and her 
actions there, often at the expense of regard for French 
susceptibili ties. The Free French, conscious of being so 
conspicuously outnumbered by their British allies, were 
forced into a very poor second place; they struggled 
constantly however, to reassert their own authority and that 
of France and sought to emphasise their own role whilst 
doing their utmost to minimise that of the British, often 
with disastrous consequences for Anglo-Free French 
relations. 
These few basic problems alone, inherent at the very 
outset of the jOint enterprise, were more than sufficient to 
upset the Anglo-Free French alliance in the Levant, without 
taking into account the numerous other problems which only 
gradually surfaced along the way. Hardly a year of the war 
was to go by without a serious crisis between the two powers 
in the Levant. Why 1943 has merited such special and 
detailed attention is that the particular circumstances of 
that year threw all these problems into relief. 
1943 was the year which witnessed a collection of Allied 
military victories. In the early months of that year in the 
Russian arena, the Germans were driven from the Caucasus and 
defeated at Stalingrad. During the summer of 1942, the 
Allies had staunchly withstood Rommel's push towards Egypt; 
late 1942 had seen the successful launch of Operation Torch; 
these two events combined made possible the eventual 
elimination of all Axis forces from North Africa by the 
spring of 1943 and with this the clearance of the Axis 
overall military command should have gone to the British. 
Nonetheless, the British became increasingly reluctant to 
even consider relinquishing control of that command and 
certainly in the latter stages of the war, sought to keep 
from de Gaulle the real numbers of their troops in the 
Levant in order to avoid the issue being raised. 
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threat from a vast section of the M dOt e 1 erranean. Following 
on from these Mediterranean successes, Sicily was attacked 
by the Allies in July; only weeks later Mussolini fell 
, 
southern Italy was invaded and by 3 September, the Italian 
government had surrendered. For the first time in the war, 
the Allies felt there was hope that the Axis might be 
defeated. 
As a direct result of these Allied victories, and 
especially Operation Torch, which was to light the way for 
the establishment of de Gaulle's movement on French 
terri tory, the position of the Free French had improved 
substantially. Most notably, 1943 was to prove a maj or 
milestone on de Gaulle's own route to power. At the 
beginning of the year, he was still counted as no more than 
the leader of a resistance movement, albeit a fairly 
significant one. Though the Free French controlled certain 
portions of the French Empire, the movement lacked the legal 
status of the Polish or the Belgian governments in exile and 
was almost entirely dependent on Britain for financial 
assistance. By the end of 1943 however, de Gaulle and his 
movement had a valuable base in Algiers, on French 
territory, from which to carryon the fight against the Axis 
and to work for the liberation of France. Moreover, by 
gradually overshadowing and finally outmanoeuvring Giraud, 
the main contender for his position, de Gaulle had 
established himself as the undisputed leader of the 
movement. 
This most fortunate conglomeration of circumstances 
throughout the course of 1943 all augured so well for the 
future of de Gaulle's Free French movement. It therefore 
seems a strange irony that 1943 should also have witnessed 
the effective loss of the French position in the Levant. At 
the end of 1942, de Gaulle's role as guardian and protector 
of the French mission in the Levant was relatively unsullied 
and the French mandate remained intact. Yet by the end of 
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1943, Syria and the Lebanon had emerged as two independent, 
self-governing nations, 
was nothing more than 
tatters. 
the French position in the Levant 
perilous and the mandate was in 
The responsibility for this can be ascribed in a certain 
degree to those very circumstances which had made 1943 augur 
so well for the Allies. By a policy of delay, obstruction 
and procrastination, the Free French during 1941 and 1942 
had managed to hold off British pleas that the pledge of 
independence to the Levant States be honoured. They had even 
managed to weather the direct assaults launched on their 
position by General Spears and Casey. The Allied military 
successes in North and West Africa, however, removed from 
the French armoury the final weapon in their defence against 
this onslaught. They were no longer able to plead that the 
critical military situation which threatened the Middle East 
precluded the holding of elections in the Levant States. 
Rommel was on the retreat, but Spears, supported by the 
Foreign Office, was to launch a new offensive in the early 
months of 1943, which the French proved incapable of 
withstanding. Elections were announced in both Syria and 
Lebanon by late March; shortly afterwards, the campaigns 
were in full swing. 
Another direct result of the Allied military successes 
was the establishment of the Free French in North Africa. 
The Levant States and Spears who had championed their cause, 
now watched the burgeoning position of de Gaulle's Free 
French movement and listened wi th considerable and 
increasing apprehension to the claim which it asserted more 
and more frequently of speaking for France. The increasing 
assertiveness of the Free French soon made itself manifest 
in all manner of ways in the Levant itself. In resisting the 
campaign launched by the Free French to extract a far-
reaching treaty from them in return for their independence, 
the Levant States had relied on the dubious status of the 
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Free French movement as a primary defence. With the 
formation of the CFLN in early June 1943 and its subsequent 
recognition by Britain and the United States in August that 
year, that defence was rapidly becoming obsolete. It is 
evident therefore, that the States, assisted by Spears, 
decided that- they must quicken the pace of their quest for 
independence whilst the going was good; otherwise, they 
feared that they would soon face an organisation which could 
legitimately claim to represent France and their grand 
opportunity would be lost. 
One of the most serious and frequent complaints which 
the Free French had levelled against the British during the 
course of their partnership in the Levant, was their 
inabili ty to reconcile the statements which the British 
government had repeatedly made that they had no interests in 
the Levant except to win the war, with the activities of 
British officials on the spot and especially those of 
Spears. 1943 was a year when this charge on the part of the 
Free French was levelled with considerable justification. 
Spears was determined to follow up his success in 
forcing the Free French to announce elections by ensuring 
that the French were afforded no opportunity of rigging 
those elections. He feared that unless British influence 
could somehow be brought into play to neutralise French 
efforts to sway the elections, both countries would be 
saddled with Chambers which were packed with stooges who 
would all too willingly sign any treaty proposals the French 
might care to place before them; he was quite happy 
therefore, to lend every possible assistance to nationalist 
candidates who would oppose the French. By bringing to bear 
all the influence he could possibly muster, and at the cost 
of considerable acrimony with the Free French and the 
Foreign Office, Spears did in fact manage to ensure the 
relative freedom of the elections by transforming them into 
liB . t' h" and "French" a straightforward contest between r1 1S 
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candidates. The local politicians happily availed themselves 
of whatever stick they could to beat the French and welcomed 
the British intervention. 
Nor did Spears' efforts cease there. He went on to play 
a significant role firstly in the Lebanese Presidential 
election contest between the nationalist Bechara el Khoury 
and the pro-French Emile Edde and secondly in the formation 
of the strongly nationalist Lebanese Cabinet under Riad 
Solh. In the letter Spears wrote to Casey after he had 
secured the election of Khoury, he positively gloats over 
the defeat which he had managed to inflict on the Free 
French. No matter how many allowances one tries to make for 
Spears, for the difficulties of his position, for his 
frustration with the Free French for hampering the progress 
of the Levant States towards independence and for hindering 
the Allied war effort, it is impossible to read this letter 
without realising that one of his primary aims in the Levant 
was to destroy French influence. Yet the flip side of the 
coin is that as Spears had claimed all along, the Free 
French had sought to do everything possible to maintain 
their hold over the Levant and especially the Lebanon by 
influencing the elections and by supporting the candidature 
of Edde for President. 
That Spears was permitted to remain in the Levant as 
long as he did was due largely to the fact that he enjoyed 
the full confidence and support of the Prime Minister. Any 
number of representations by the French and by the Foreign 
Office failed to wake Churchill up to the havoc and damage 
his protege was wreaking on the already strained Anglo-
French alliance. On the contrary, Spears's continued 
personal interventions with the Prime Minister about the 
Levant rather alerted the latter to French misdemeanours 
there and added to his misgivings about de Gaulle and all 
things French. 
The length 
personnelle" in 
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"politique 
tragedy for 
of Spears's tenure and the 
which he engaged represented a 
Anglo-Free French relations. the course of As repeated 
complaints about his activities achieved no amelioration in 
his behaviour, the Free French were forced to conclude that 
Spears was in fact executing the official though undeclared 
policy of His Majesty's Government. Yet as Gaunson correctly 
points out: "In concentrating on Spears, it is easy to lose 
all sense of proportion and perspective". 4 Though Spears 
contributed in a major way to the lamentable state of Anglo-
French relations in the Levant, he alone cannot be saddled 
with entire responsibility and deeper and wider determinants 
must be taken into account. 
A study of the French documents for 1943 reveals that 
the Foreign Office problems with Spears were to a large 
extent mirrored on the French side. There was considerable 
dissatisfaction within Carlton Gardens and later at Algiers 
with the performance of Helleu, especially over the role he 
played in precipitating the seating crisis and subsequently 
in the Mokkadem affair. The dearth of qualified and 
experienced personnel which afflicted the Free French 
movement was probably an important factor in his remaining 
in office as long as he did (along with other less desirable 
elements on the staff of the Delegation), but so too was the 
support of de Gaulle, which was made clear over the Mokkadem 
incident and again during the Lebanese crisis. 
Both the British and the Free French encountered major 
difficul ties with their principal representatives in the 
Levant, the British on a more long-running basis with Spears 
and the Free French with Helleu during 1943. Whilst this was 
a problem in itself, it was also a symptom of a more deep-
rooted problem, namely the fundamental divergencies 
experienced by both powers between their Middle East 
4 Gaunson, op cit, p 190. 
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officials and those based in London and Algiers, and 
especially the inability of the latter to impose their 
on the former. Though this was not a problem endemic to 
Levant or particular to 1943, the conflict between the 
more 
will 
the 
two 
parties was particularly extreme in the Levant in 1943, and 
therefore serves to highlight and emphasise the problem. 
The Foreign Office had struggled for some time to 
inculcate in Spears and their Middle East officials in 
general, more respect for the Free French position in the 
Levant. Furthermore, Spears had been exhorted on numerous 
occasions to view official British policy towards the French 
in the Levant and the consequences of his own action against 
the wider background of more general Anglo-Free French 
relations. Foreign Office policy aimed to assist in the 
achievement of Levant independence, hoping that thereby 
Britain might reap the benefit of this policy of liberalism 
elsewhere in the Middle East. Yet equally, the Foreign 
Office asserted that it had no desire to evict the French 
from the Levant and hoped that the French might secure a 
pre-eminent and privileged position there. Regardless of the 
intrinsic contradiction, this policy was religiously adhered 
to with a twofold aim: firstly, Britain was anxious that if 
the French were slung unceremoniously out of the Levant, the 
focus of Arab attention would automatically switch to 
Britain's activities and a dangerous precedent would have 
been set which would inevitably have serious consequences 
for her own position in the Levant; secondly, Britain had no 
desire to alienate the sympathies and support of the French 
people during the war by presiding over the French downfall 
in the Levant and moreover, looked to a postwar future in 
which an Anglo-French alliance would provide a solid bedrock 
on which to found British policy towards Europe. 
Yet in the face of total opposition from the vast 
majority of British officials in the Middle East to the idea 
that the French should retain any future role in the Levant, 
650 
the Foreign Office was completely powerless to ensure that 
its policy was carried out. Spears found himself able to 
misinterpret, completely ignore, or to exceed his 
instructions when it suited his purposes to do so; 
furthermore, he carefully monitored the reports of his 
activities to the Foreign Office to ensure that London only 
learned what he wanted it to know. Whilst Spears was one of 
the worst offenders, it is unfair to suggest that he was the 
only perpetrator of this crime. Probably with less dubious 
intent, Casey, when instructed to present Britain's demands 
to Catroux in Cairo during the November crisis of 1943, 
failed to seek clarification of the ambiguity in those 
instructions; he assumed that the British demand for the 
release of the Lebanese ministers also meant their 
reinstatement. The demands he consequently put to Catroux, 
forced the Foreign Office into adopting a more severe line 
with the French than originally had been intended. Macmillan 
too, over the same issue, deliberately sought to 
misunderstand his instructions in order to avoid increasing 
the pressure on the French. 
The Free French were similarly plagued by the 
recalcitrance of their officials on the spot. Witnessing the 
day to day erosion of French influence in the Levant by her 
British ally, the majority of French personnel grew 
increasingly bitter and resentful. In the absence of a 
sufficiently firm policy directed from Algiers and lacking 
a strong hand at the helm of the Delegation Generale, a 
clique of officials with extremely reactionary views was 
able to take the running of French policy in the Levant 
largely into its own hands. By producing late or inadequate 
reports on the situation, the staff at the Delegation was 
able to gloss over the scale of its intervention in the 
internal affairs of the States in their attempt to reassert 
French authority; in the case of the elections, Algiers was 
kept badly informed whilst the officials tried to minimise 
the extent of the French defeat. Moreover, dissatisfaction 
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with the policy being pursued by Algiers was manifest in 
repeated requests, after the election defeat, for a firmer 
line to be adopted and in the calls for reinforcements to be 
despatched to the Levant. This innate capacity of officials 
on the spot to wreck any policy with which they disagreed is 
an important factor to be taken into account in any study of 
any subject. In a study of Anglo-Free French relations in 
the Levant, where feelings ran so high, where the 
disagreements were so evident and where there existed a body 
of officials on both sides sufficiently strong-willed to try 
and circumvent their instructions and willing to take the 
consequences of their actions, it is a factor of primary 
importance. 
The Foreign Office found itself open to considerable 
criticism not only for its inability to impose its will on 
its representatives in the Middle East, but additionally, 
under attack from those very officials for the lack of a 
coherent and unified policy in the region. Criticism on that 
score is to a limited extent justified, but should be 
mitigated by remembering that the Foreign Office officials 
did not start off with a blank sheet and of necessity had to 
take into account obligations and commitments which they had 
had no part in making; in addition, they were obliged to 
engage in a constant struggle to assert the primacy of 
Foreign Office views over those of other government 
departments where the situation had often been assessed 
differently. In the desperately complicated Middle East, the 
Foreign Office was frantically trying to juggle too many 
conflicting priorities in circumstances which were far from 
favourable. 
The conflicts in British policy in the Middle East were 
all too readily apparent. Britain was attempting to please 
the Arabs by granting them independence, yet at the same 
time, in her own interests, she was seeking to maintain a 
considerable degree of influence over them. She was trying 
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to do this without antagonising either the Jews to whom she 
had promised a national home in Palestine and whose welfare 
commanded considerable American concern, or the French, to 
whom she had promised a privileged and pre-eminent position, 
and whose future support in the European arena was deemed 
vital. All this was somehow to be achieved without upsetting 
either American or Russian susceptibilities. A tall order 
indeed and one in which success would have been little short 
of miraculous. 
In addition to balancing all these external 
considerations, Foreign Office policy was not formulated in 
a vacuum, and had to take into account a variety of internal 
conflicts and considerations. Most notable with regard to 
British policy towards the French was the constant battle 
which the Foreign Office was obliged to wage against the 
prejudice of Churchill towards de Gaulle, a prejudice which, 
despite the best efforts of the Foreign Office, was 
refuelled continually by Roosevelt and often by Spears. The 
Foreign Office and the Cabinet frequently had to pullout 
all the stops to prevent Churchill impetuously breaking off 
relations with de Gaulle and all the dire consequences which 
that would have entailed. 
This fundamental conflict at the heart of British 
foreign policy towards France and de Gaulle meant that 
contradictory messages were often picked up by the Free 
French. Churchill never tired of stating that when the chips 
were down, he would always choose the open sea and Roosevelt 
before Europe and de Gaulle. Yet Foreign Office officials 
often created a quite contrary impression. After an 
interview with Strang on 2 July 1943, Vienot was to report 
that "pour la duree des hostilites et pour les lendemains 
immediates de la guerre, [Ie gouvernement britannique] 
considere une harmonieuse collaboration entre la Grande 
Bretagne et les Etats Unis comme la necessite primordiale au 
point de vue poli tique et au point de vue mili taire. Le 
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Foreign Office ne perd cependant pas de vue qu' a longue 
echeance, les rapports franco-britanniques presentent pour 
la Grande Bretagne une importance plus grande encore que les 
relations anglo-americaines".5 
For the Free French at least, matters were more 
straightforward. The only conflict in their priorities was 
their promise of independence to the Levant States when they 
had no intention of granting it. Their main problem was how 
to extricate themselves from that position without causing 
too much antagonism with Britain. The Free French already 
suffered considerable confusion from the contradictions in 
British official policy towards the Levant and the obiter 
dicta and actions of officials on the spot. But in their 
position and in their assessment of the situation, they were 
obliged to rely on the old maxim that actions spoke louder 
than words. 
The problematic Anglo-French alliance in the Levant 
undoubtedly served to exacerbate the difficulties of the 
Churchill-de Gaulle relationship. Whilst both men were 
generally far too preoccupied with a multitude of other 
issues to take an interest in the day to day affairs of the 
Levant, on numerous occasions their attention was drawn to 
matters there by special appeals from their respective 
representatives. In the aftermath of Casablanca, stories of 
petty French behaviour in the Levant only added to 
Churchill's wrath against de Gaulle and the latter was 
continually incensed by reports of British interference in 
Levant affairs. Yet conversely, the very characters of 
Churchill and de Gaulle and the difficult relationship 
between them contributed a good deal to the discord which 
prevailed in the Levant, which became something of an arena 
for the battle of their wills. In the face of numerous 
5 Entretien avec W. Strang, 2 Juillet 1943, Guerre 1939-
45, Alger CFLN, Vol 1238. 
654 
attempts by the Foreign Office to displace him, Churchill 
loyally defended his protege, Spears, for being the only man 
he knew who would stand up to the French; de Gaulle was 
equally loyal in his support for Helleu and his attempts to 
protect the French position in the Levant against British 
encroachments. 
In view of the encouragement and support which Anglo-
French officials in the Levant knew they enjoyed at the 
highest level from de Gaulle and Churchill, and of the love-
hate relationship between the two leaders, what is to be 
marvelled at is the fact that the Levant did not have even 
more of an impact on Anglo-French relations. That this did 
not happen was largely due to the dedicated team of 
diplomats, both British and French, who struggled constantly 
to keep the alliance on an even keel, and sometimes even to 
prevent it from sinking without trace. 
At the level of Foreign Secretary, Eden and Massigli 
were both sincerely committed to the belief that an Anglo-
French alliance was essential for the future of their 
respective nations. Eden had stuck by the Free French 
through thick and thin; though often critical of French 
behaviour in the Levant, it was he who spearheaded the 
campaign to remove Spears in an attempt to limit the damage 
that he continually inflicted on Anglo-French relations. The 
extent of Eden's loyalty to the Free French was even to 
cause Churchill to threaten to break with him. 
Similarly, Massigli worked unceasingly to promote better 
relations with the British. He even sympathised to an extent 
wi th British misgivings about certain 
policy in the Levant and for example, 
case, he did his best to remove the 
aspects of French 
over the Mokkadem 
cause for those 
misgivings. During the Lebanese crisis, Massigli undoubtedly 
believed that Helleu had behaved with great ineptitude. 
Moreover, he was considerably perturbed by his suspicions 
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that perhaps de Gaulle's part in the whole affair was 
greater than he cared to contemplate. Massigli was 
nonetheless a Frenchman and his attitude towards the Levant 
reflected that. If he disapproved strongly of the methods 
which Helleu had employed against the Lebanese, he was, like 
most Frenchmen, not really dissatisfied with the resul t 
achieved; once the arrests had taken place, the Committee, 
Massigli included, were unanimous in their desire to take 
advantage of the opportunity presented, to try and secure 
the removal of Riad Solh from power and thereby to prevent 
any further erosion of French influence in the Levant. 
Yet the Lebanese crisis and his role in its resolution 
also served to demonstrate Massigli's unstinting efforts to 
reduce the impact of the affair on Anglo-French relations at 
considerable risk to his own standing with de Gaulle. 
Through Vienot, he requested representations from the 
British which he might use to help the more moderate members 
of the Committee to see reason. His letters to Vienot, which 
describe his blazing rows with de Gaulle and his repeated 
threats of resignation, are testament to the strength of his 
convictions that the crisis ought finally to be resolved 
honourably in the manner stipulated by Britain. What was 
most alarming was the extent to which the crisis stretched 
Massigli's faith in the British almost to breaking point. He 
revealed considerable doubts to Vienot that perhaps events 
in the Lebanon and the increasingly harsh stance that 
Britain was driven to take against the French, signified the 
beginning of a sea change in Foreign Office thinking. 
Massigli's worth to the Anglo-French alliance was 
certainly recognised and appreciated by the Foreign Office. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Lebanese crisis, the 
Foreign Office was disturbed to learn from French sources 
that de Gaulle intended to replace Massigli as Commissioner 
for Foreign Affairs. Sir Orme Sargent observed that 
Massigli's departure "would be a disaster from every point 
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of view -- including de Gaulle's. It would be quite natural 
for de Gaulle to make Massigli the scapegoat for any 
humiliation he suffers over the Lebanese business. We shall 
certainly come off worst in the bargain if we keep General 
Spears and in return lose Massigli!" Even though it was 
appreciated that any representations by Britain on 
Massigli's behalf might make de Gaulle "more stiff-necked", 
it was considered worth the risk to let him know that the 
removal of the Massigli would adversely affect the 
Committee's reputation and would be viewed by His Majesty's 
Government with disquiet. 6 
The efforts of Massigli and Eden to preserve the Anglo-
French alliance, especially during its more critical hours, 
were certainly matched by those of Vienot in London, Catroux 
in Beirut and Macmillan in Algiers. Though not an Anglophile 
of quite the same stamp as either Massigli or Vienot, 
Catroux had always been concerned by the state of Anglo-
French relations in the Levant and appreciated the need for 
a united Allied front in the face of increasingly strident 
nationalist claims. Unlike de Gaulle, Catroux was a 
pragmatist in the matter of French prestige, and was 
sufficiently astute to know when to retire gracefully, 
albei t to prepare for a later come-back. He had conceded 
over elections when he realised that he could no longer hold 
out against both the force of British arguments and local 
popular pressure; he was to do the same during the Lebanese 
crisis. He had initially entertained hopes of resolving the 
crisis in a manner favourable to France but when he 
recognised that this was impossible, he had recommended 
acceding to British demands and cutting French losses. His 
reports on the Levant situation were invaluable to Massigli 
in his battles with de Gaulle in Committee meetings. 
6 Minutes by W. H. B. Mack and Sir Orme Sargent, 23 
November 1943; Foreign Office to Macmillan, 24 November 
1943, Zl1958/5/G69, FO 371/35135. 
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Likewise, Vienot, an ardent Anglophile, was untiring in 
his efforts to alleviate the damage being done to the French 
position by Helleu's actions in the Levant. He was himself 
surprised and disappointed by the severity of the British 
reaction to the crisis and suspicious that certain elements 
of the British establishment were seeking to use the 
incident to take advantage of France and to create trouble 
for de Gaulle. He nonetheless remained firmly convinced that 
this was not official British policy and did everything 
possible to convince the Foreign Office that the Levant 
incident was a minor aberration and not symptomatic of the 
policy which might be expected from the Free French in the 
future. He provided vital support and reassurance to 
Massigli when the latter began to doubt British policy. 
In addition to the support with which Catroux and Vienot 
were able to provide Massigli in his struggle to force de 
Gaulle to settle the Lebanese crisis peaceably and without 
resort to a show-down as he had threatened, it should be 
remembered that not long before the crisis had erupted, two 
events had occurred on the political scene in Algiers, which 
were to prove to be of major significance during the 
Lebanese crisis. The first of these was the enlargement of 
the Committee and the second, the creation of the 
Consultative Assembly. The import of both these events for 
the successful resolution of the crisis is not to be 
overlooked. Massigli was himself to repeatedly acknowledge 
and applaud the assistance he received in the Committee from 
its newer members who were less under the sway of de Gaulle 
and therefore more able to advocate a moderate line. 
Similarly, the sentiment of the more independent members of 
the Consultative Assembly was overwhelmingly in favour of a 
firm alliance with Britain and not even the emotive issue of 
the Levant deflected them from this course. Both these 
positive factors were crucial in deterring Churchill from 
adopting a much more severe policy towards the Free French 
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by persuading him that at very long last, de Gaulle was "in 
commission" . 
Since taking up his post in Algiers, Macmillan had 
proved an able campaigner on behalf of de Gaulle and the 
Free French; on many occasions he had acted as an effective 
counterweight to the influence of Spears, especially so 
during the Lebanese crisis, when he was prepared to involve 
himself in all sorts of manoeuvres designed to assist the 
French as much as possible. He interceded with Churchill and 
did what he could to attenuate the Prime Minister's anger 
over the affair whilst making repeated entreaties to London 
for tolerance towards the Committee. 
Moreover, Macmillan had outspokenly criticised the 
belligerent policy of ultimata and threats advocated by 
Spears and Casey and firmly believed that his approach of 
dealing with the French by gentle persuasion was more 
effective whilst causing less damage to Anglo-French 
relations. Makins spoke for Macmillan when he reported in 
late November that in general, he did not believe that the 
recent crisis had left the French any permanent feelings of 
bitterness towards the British. Perspicaciously, Makins 
added that he could not, however, be sure "that the affair 
had not imprinted another permanent grievance upon that 
sensitive film, the mind of de Gaulle".7 
The boundless efforts of all these individuals were 
instrumental in rescuing the Anglo-French alliance from the 
trough into which it had been steered by the Lebanese 
crisis. Yet the alliance did not emerge unscathed. On the 
surface there was little visible damage: there was no 
rupture of relations, Duff Cooper's appointment was not 
delayed and early in 1944 Churchill and de Gaulle met at 
Marrakesh for what was to be a cordial encounter. Below the 
7 Makins to Strang, 26 November 1943, FO 800/432. 
659 
surface however, the ha 'd b rm was conSl era Ie: despite the 
encouraging signs that the Committee was now more 
representative, more democratic and capable in the final 
resort of standing up to de Gaulle, the Lebanese affair had 
reinforced Churchill's worst suspicions about the Free 
French leader and had had an equally detrimental effect on 
Roosevelt. The two Allied leaders were confirmed in their 
doubts that de Gaulle could not be trusted and that there 
could be no question of recognising the CFLN as the 
legitimate government of France. 
As a direct result of the crisis therefore, and the 
subsequent attitude of Churchill and Roosevelt, de Gaulle 
was deprived of the chance to participate in the momentous 
decisions connected wi th the liberation of France. 
Additionally, the effect of the crisis on the French 
position in the Levant was close to fatal; de Gaulle was 
forced to preside over the effective dismantling of the 
French mandate, whilst for the time being, the British were 
to enj oy an increased surge of prestige. Ironically, the 
crisis was to effect something of a change in official 
British policy. From the time of the invasion up until 1943, 
British policy, in view of the war and the French refusal to 
make any concessions, had of necessity, been weighted 
slightly towards the Levant States as the underdogs. Yet 
after 1943, there was a belief that it was the French who 
were now the underdogs and that it was they who were now in 
some danger for the Lebanese crisis had, to use Eden's words 
to Spears, "til ted the balance somewhat unduly against 
them" . 
Yet at this stage of the game, no amount of support 
could revive the French position in the Levant and nothing 
could alter the fact that the policies which both Britain 
and France were trying to implement there were 
anachronistic and therefore doomed to failure. Neither power 
seemed to have grasped that treaties along the lines of the 
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Anglo-Iraqui treaty of 1930 or the unratified treaties of 
1936 between France and the Levant States which they so 
assiduously tried to force on the States, were in the new 
conditions of the time, no longer acceptable. The British, 
in trying to preserve a French position of privilege and 
pre-eminence in the Levant, found that where a degree of 
flexibility and compromise in the French attitude was called 
for, none was forthcoming. The French too, continued to 
delude themselves about the strength of the Levantine 
attachment to their independence and about the place of 
France in the hearts of the Syrians and the Lebanese. Given 
such lack of realism from both Britain and France, it was 
hardly surprising that their relations in the Levant should 
impede the quest for an Anglo-French alliance for several 
more years to come. 
661 
BIBLIGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
I Unpublished (Britain) 
i) Public Records Office, Kew, London 
CAB 21 
CAB 65 
CAB 66 
FO 226 
FO 371 
FO 660 
FO 684 
FO 800 
FO 921 
FO 954 
PREM 3 
PREM 4 
WO 201 
WO 202 
Cabinet Office Registered Files 
War Cabinet Minutes, 1943 
War Cabinet Memoranda, 1943 
Foreign Office: Beirut Legation and Spears Mission 
Foreign Office: General Political Correspondence 
Foreign Office: Office of Minister Resident at 
Allied Headquarters in Algiers and Paris 
Foreign Office: Embassy and Consular Archives, 
Damascus 
Private Collections 
Foreign Office: Minister of State, Cairo 
Avon Papers 
Prime Minister's Office: Operational Papers 
Prime Minister's Office: Confidential Papers 
War Office: Military Headquarters Papers: Middle 
East Forces 
War Office: Military Headquarters Papers: Military 
Missions 
ii) Middle East Centre, St. Anthony's College, Oxford 
Sir Patrick Coghill: War Diary 1941-45, Notes on Wartime Jottings 
and unpublished autobiography "Before I Forget" 
Sir Miles Lampson, (later Lord Killearn): Killearn Diaries, 1943 
Major General Sir E. L. Spears: Private Papers, Boxes I, II, 
IIA, III, IX 
662 
II Unpublished (France) 
i) Ministere des Relations Exterieures, Quai d'Orsay, Paris 
Papiers Massigli, Vols 1468, 1479-1481, 1483-4 
Papiers 1940, Sous-serie Chauvel, Vols 19, 22, 137 
Reconstitution Fouques Duparc, Vols 1-2 
Serie Guerre 1939-45, Alger CFLN, Vols 999, 1000, 1004-1006, 
1009-1012, 1016, 1018, 1023, 1026, 1028, 1030, 1033-1035, 1158, 
1215, 1238, 1241, 1243-44, 1312 1314 1522 1551 1575 1578 1592. ' , , , , , 
ii) Ministere de la Defense, Service Historique de l'Armee de 
Terre, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris 
4 H 295-345: Delegation de la France Libre au Levant 
iii) Bibliotheque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, 
2, rue de Rouen, Nanterre 
Delegue Generale de la France Combattante au Levant, Inspection 
Generale de l'Etat de Syrie, Apergu General, Nos 2-17, Fevrier 
1942-Septembre 1943. 
III Published 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vols II and IV. 
IV Diaries/Memoirs etc 
Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs. The Reckoning, (London, 1965) 
Mary Borden, Journey Down a Blind Alley, (London, 1946) 
Lord Richard Casey, Personal Experience, 1939-1946, (London, 
1962) 
General Georges Catroux, Dans la Bataille, de Medi terranee: 
Egypte-Levant-Afrique du Nord, 1940-44, (Parls, 1949) 
Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, (Paris, 1963) 
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. The Hinge of Fate, 
Vol IV, (London, 1951) 
The Second World War. Closing the Ring, 
Vol V, (London, 1952) 
A. Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, (London, 1953) 
663 
Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre. L'Appel. 1940-1942, (Paris, 1954) 
Memoires de Guerre. L'Unite. 1942-1944, (Paris, 1956) 
Memoires de Guerre. Le Salute 1944 1946, (Paris, 1959) 
D. N. Dilks, (Ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938 
1945, (London, 1971) 
Trefor Evans, (Ed), The Killearn Diaries, 1939-1946, (London, 
1972) 
John Harvey, (Ed), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-1945, 
(London, 1978) 
Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945, (London, 1967) 
War Diaries. Politics and War in the 
Mediterranean, 1943-1945, (London, 1984) 
Richard Pearse, Three Years in the Levant, (London, 1949) 
Sir Maurice Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain, (London, 1950) 
Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears, Fulfilment of a Mission. 
The Spears Mission to Syria and Lebanon, 1941-1944, (London, 
1977) 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. Stirling, Safety Last, (London, 1953) 
Lord William Strang, Home and Abroad, (London, 1956) 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
I Books 
C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas. The Great 
War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 1914-1924, 
(Stanford, 1981) 
J. Baillon, (Ed), Les Affaires Etrangeres et Ie Corps 
Diplomatique Franyais, 1870-1980, Vol II, (Paris, 1984) 
Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War. Causes and Courses 
of the Second World War, (London, 1979) 
John Charmley, Duff Cooper. The Authorised Biography, (London, 
1986) 
Alfred Cobban, A History of Modern France. 
Republics, 1871-1962, Vol III, (London, 1977) 
France of the 
664 
Aidan Crawley, De Gaulle, (London, 1969) 
Henry H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in the Post War Near 
East. The Decline of French Influence, (Oxford, 1938) 
A. W. de Porte, De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, 1944-46, ( b 
Mass.,1968) - Cam ., 
Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds, France, 1943-1945, (Leicester, 
1988) 
Arthur Layton Funk, Charles de Gaulle. The Crucial Years 1943 
1944, (Norman, 1959) , 
A. B. Gaunson, The Anglo-French Clash in Lebanon and Syria, 1940-
1945, (London, 1987) 
Martin Gilbert, Road to Victory. Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945, 
(London, 1986) 
Ahmed A. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States. 
Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics, 1941-45, (London, 
1977) 
Anthony Hartley, Gaullism. The Rise and Fall of a Political 
Movement, (London, 1972) 
Alastair Horne, Macmillan, 1894-1956, Vol I, (London, 1988) 
A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, (London, 
1946) 
Frangois Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle, (London, 1981) 
Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate. The Politics of 
Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945, (London, 1987) 
George Kirk, The Middle East in the War, (London, 1952) 
The Middle East, 1945-1950, (London, 1954) 
Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle. Le rebelle. 1890-1944, Vol I, (Paris, 
1984) 
Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle, (London, 1982) 
George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca, 
1962) 
Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate, 
(London, 1958) 
Wm Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 194~-1~51. 
Arab Nationalism, the United States and postwar Imperlallsm, 
(Oxford, 1984) 
665 
Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, (London, 1987) 
D. ~ruc? Marshall, The French Colonial Myth and Constitution 
Mak1ng 1n the Fourth Republic, (Yale, 1973) 
Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914 1971, 
(London, 1981) , 
Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914 
1920, (London, 1969) , 
N. Nicolson, (Ed), Harold Nicolson. Diaries and Letters, 1939 
45, (London, 1967) 
Royal Institute of International Affairs British Interests in 
, ' the Med1terranean and Middle East. A Report by a Chatham House 
Study Group, (London, 1958) 
B. Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947. The 
Road to the Cold War, (London, 1980) 
H. M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East, 1936-1954, (London, 
1974) 
K. S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, (London, 1965) 
W. I . Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East. The 
Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon, 1900-1914, (Wisconsin, 
1976) 
David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon, (London, 1980) 
Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North 
Africa, 1914-1967, (London, 1968) 
Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second 
World War, Vol IV, (London, 1975) 
John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 
(Leicester, 1984) 
Robert Young, French Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. A Guide to 
Research and Research Materials, (London, 1981) 
Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Indep~ndence., west7rn 
Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's K1n dom 1n S r1a, 
(Beirut, 1960) 
II Articles 
John Charmley, Harold Macmillan and the Ma~ing of ,the French 
Commi ttee of Liberation, International Historlcal Revlew, Vol IV, 
November 1982. 
A. B. Gaunson, Churchill, De Gaulle and the Levant Affair, 1941, 
666 
The Historical Journal, 27, 3 (1984), pp 697-713. 
Sean Greenwood, Ernest Bevin, France and "Western Union": August 
1945-February 1946, European History Quarterly, Vol 14, (1984), 
pp 319-338. 
Fran90is Kersaudy, Le Levant. De Gaulle et la nation face aux 
problemes de defense, 1945-1946, Colloque organisee par 
l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Present et l'Institut Charles de 
Gaulle, 21-22 Octobre 1982, pp 249-261, (Paris, 1983) 
Abed AI-Hafiz Mansur, Great Britain and the Birth of Syrian and 
Lebanese Indepedence, International Studies, Vol 16, No 2, April-
June 1977. 
John Wilson Young, The Foreign Office and the Departure of 
General de Gaulle, June 1945-January 1946, The Historical 
Journal, 25, 1 (1982), pp 209-216. 
III Unpublished Theses 
Abed Al Hafiz Mansur, Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant and the 
Question of Syrio-Lebanese Independence, 1939-1943, (University 
of Oregon, 1964) 
Y. Olmert, British Policy Towards the Levant States, 1940-45, 
(University of London, 1984) 
Asher Susser, Western Power Rivalry and its Interaction with 
Local Politics in the Levant, 1941-1946, (University of Tel Aviv, 
1986) 
